

EDUCATION REFORM

OR,

THE NECESSITY OF

A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF EDUCATION

BY

THOMAS WYSE, ESQ. M.P.

"Less than thorough will not do it."

Lord STRAFFORD.

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PREFACE.

THE following work, as will appear from several passages in the text, was commenced and in part printed in the year 1832, and resumed at such intervals as other avocations, and the difficulty of obtaining adequate information on many details, in the present defective state of statistical knowledge, would permit. The author, nevertheless, sees no reason for making any considerable alterations. Unfortunately, with much decided progress in education in particular cases and localities, with all the knowledge and zeal existing in particular quarters (and a long catalogue of supporters, worthy of such a cause, might easily be found), neither the legislature nor the people have yet taken any decisive steps to give to the community at large the advantage of such progress; in other words, no measure, with the exception of Lord Stanley's "Instructions to the Duke of Leinster" for establishing the present Irish Board, has been attempted, for the organising, on a broad, efficient, and permanent scale, a National System of Education. The old anomalies, and many also of the old abuses, still continue as vigorous as ever. The minister waits for the country, and the country waits for the minister; each fearing to go first, both, it seems, have come to a sort of tacit agreement to

stand still. This is the more remarkable, as in the interval no other nation has followed the same ignoble course. Since 1833, the few countries who, like England, were unprovided with a National System of Education, have had the wisdom and the courage to adopt one. In England only, a National System is still wanting:—EDUCATION REFORM is still needed; as much so, nay more, from the greater extension of civil franchises, in the year 1836 than in the year 1833. The evils now existing are as great, the complaints as just, the remedy as obvious, as in any of the preceding years. As long, therefore, as this unhappily shall continue to be the case, no apology will surely be needed for the writing, or publishing, of such works as the present.



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ERRATA.

Page 40. line 5. for "which we," read "with which we."

57. l. 4. of note *, for "neither compelled," read "neither are compelled."

61. l. 27. for "cannot," read "can."

67. l. 8. of note, for "perdu," read "perdre."

71. l. 2. from bottom, for "roidir, l'ame" read "roider l'ame,"

78. l. 4. of note, for "Selfishness; unkindness," read "selfishness, unkindness."

83. l. 2. for "can," read "could."

123. l. 7. from bottom, for "being the signs" read "the signs being."

149. l. 4. of note, for "since," read "from."

150. l. 5. for "is entirely," read "are entirely."

153. note *, for "castigat," read "castigatque."

159. l. 33. after "physical," read "means."

174. l. 5. of note from bottom, for "a thousand of other," read "a thousand other."

177. l. 3. for "two classes, only," read "into two classes only."

185. l. 18. for "Saadi Boustan," read "Saadi's Boustan."

183. l. 10. of note, for "general," read "generally."

188. l. 7. of note, for "que s'y," read "qui s'y."

193. l. 36. for "morale," read "la morale."

194. l. 4. for "it has intended," read "it has been intended."

194. l. 26. for "view," read "point of view."

202. l. 6. for "descriptions," read "descriptions."

208. l. 31. for "perform the unpaid," read "perform unpaid the."

233. l. 3. from bottom, for "exesutioner," read "executor."

253. l. 11. from bottom, for "some trifle of discipline; the enforcing," read "the enforcing of some trifle of discipline."

254. l. 12. of note, for "Carlberg," read "Carlsberg."

261. l. 8. for "their," read "his."

294. l. 11. for "with whoever," read "with whomever."

297. l. 15. of note, for "as of the nature," read "as to the nature."

302. l. 14. for "intuism," read "criticism."

303. note †, for "Appendix A," read "Appendix D."

303. l. 6. of note †, for "economies," read "economics."

309. l. 9. for "lies," read "lie."

309. l. 15. from bottom, for "does," read "do."

310. l. 16. from bottom, for "vision," read "view."

322. l. 11. from bottom, for "requisite," read "applied."

340. l. 9. for "were," read "was."

357. l. 9. of note, for "deserters from," read "deserters on."

397. l. 13. of note, omit the comma after "forces."

395. last line but one, for "of its tenacity," read "of tenacity."

406. l. 10. from bottom, for "being," read "having been."

414. last line of note, insert a comma after "Parochial."

423. l. 20. for "line," read "like."

427. l. 3. for "it is," read "they are."

433. l. 16. for "Mortgagees," read "Mortgageors."

433. l. 19. for "work of itself together," read "work itself together."

EDUCATION REFORM.

INTRODUCTION.

THAT Education should be in harmony with the wants and prospects of the individual, is a truth which no one thinks seriously of contesting. When applied to nations, the case alters: it is either questioned or neglected. The reason is obvious. Men understand tolerably well their own immediate interests. It is a matter of somewhat more difficulty to judge of the remote interests of a nation.

Yet surely no subject is so truly worthy of the serious attention of every member of a free community. We are part and parcel of all its institutions. We can no more preclude ourselves from acting on, and being acted on by each, than we can extinguish the reciprocal influences of our own private families.

To propose, then, the application of a new system of education to any country, much more to think of the alteration of an old, — to attempt education reform even in its most limited sense, would unquestionably be a folly of the grossest description, unless it proceeded, in both instances, in direct reference to the condition of the country.

But this condition is the result of many complex circumstances. It is not composed of actual opinions or peculiarities only, but of tendencies to produce new — tendencies which, though still in germ, are destined to grow out in due season to opinions still more important, perhaps, than those which they were fated to succeed.

If ever there was a country in which such circumstances required to be taken into account, in suggesting so important a change, it is our own; if ever there was a period in which such consideration was more espacially necessary, it is the pre-

sent. Our opinions, our prospects, have recently undergone a remarkable revolution. We are not the people, I will not say, of the last fifty years, but scarcely of the last ten. All the physical, intellectual, and moral proportions of our society have altered. By a singular succession of great, but hitherto bloodless, revolutions, we have been at last landed in the midst of a totally new era—with new elements of society—new institutions—new modifications of old forces, or applications of new. If we look to the physical world—we have Steam, which, even in its hitherto limited employment, has already sensibly altered the minutest relations of the social body, and is destined yet, by gradual but inevitable changes, to induce a civilisation, essentially different, far more magnificent, if not happier in its results, than any which has preceded it. It has discovered to us not merely fetters for the material world, by which we could bind its rebel powers at our feet, but forces also, by which we can work, the obedient captive to all our behests. Distance has disappeared,—villages have dropt into towns,—commerce has found communications, even for her heaviest operations, to which, formerly, the individual could scarcely aspire,—kingdoms are gradually forming but one city,—and competition and co-operation finding every day new facilities, to join issue more vigorously with each other. Nor are these transformations, almost magical, confined to matter only; to this mere mechanical agent, mind is scarcely less indebted for its late rapid developments. It has been the fashion to call this a mechanical age; it may, as contrasted with its predecessors, claim that distinction, but not as opposed to intellectual. It may, with advantage, be distinguished from all others for superior regard to utility, for more avowed contempt for the vague and the speculative; it may be marked out as the age, in which the slowly accumulated treasures of our forefathers, of little value, like every other description of wealth, until put into active and judicious circulation, (“*nisi temperato splendeat usu*.”) have been for the first time unanimously brought forth, poured out profusely upon the country; treasures which are, at this moment, with the energy and certainty of all capital, setting society and its innumerable varieties in motion. But then to infer, that, be-

cause it is all this, it is nothing more, is surely an injustice. This very practice must have been preceded by theory; this material activity, must be accompanied by intellectual:— from the philosopher's cabinet spring forth the produce, and the manufacture, and the fleets, and the commerce,—nay, the very lowest ministrant to our coarsest physical wants. The glory of this age has been to have drawn down Heaven upon Earth—to have more closely cemented the connection between science and art,—between the discovery and its application,—between speculation and utility,—between thinking and animal man. It is not a mechanical age, in opposition to a mental;—nor a material, in opposition to a spiritual;—but it is the wise association of both, for the combined purposes pointed out by our double conformation and capacity.

But while it has been thus impelling forward, with such accelerated force, one portion of our social system, it has been dislocating others. The new power has not entered into operation, without much disturbance of the old. The jerk and revulsion is every where sensible. Hand labour is in abeyance; industry unaccompanied by capital, at a stand—the minor capitalist extinguished;—markets glutted by sudden and undemanded supply. Time, indeed, and the compensation of larger benefits, will finally reconcile the *community* to the change, but in the interval how much must the *individual* suffer; of how much must he be ignorant; and how liable to erroneous conclusions, and prompt to vicious and dangerous courses, whilst under the influence of both these causes,—want of knowledge, and conviction of wrong! The late rick-burnings of England were the most daring, but by no means the only, expression of this feeling. Under the surface of society, there is a far wider extent both of wretchedness and discontent than can be collected from these occasional outrages; deeper, too, it may be added, and quite as unmerited. If, for the present, we only feel their existence in these agrarian excesses, we ought not to conclude from thence, that to these excesses they are always to be confined. Habits of mere mechanical patience are no sufficient guarantees for our tranquillity. Self-control, to be permanent, must arise from full conviction of its utility.

The people must not only wait and submit, but they must feel the personal advantage of submission and long-suffering. But of how many ingredients is such feeling composed? — How few amongst the people possess them? With them, we retain some control over masses and events: without them, our prosperity, far more than our distress, is a contingency.

A second remarkable circumstance in our present condition, and acting materially upon our whole social system, but not less liable to be acted upon by the diffusion of knowledge, than the circumstances above noticed, is the diversity of opinion on the actual operation of the law of population. Without going into any discussion upon this subject, (every inch of which has been fought with as little advantage to the victor as to the vanquished, and which, like most such conflicts, when over, will yet be found to have been a conflict on words,) one conclusion may at least be drawn from the admissions of both parties, that whether over-population arises from too many consumers for the supply, or too small a supply for the consumers, one thing at least is certain, that knowledge and morality, and their concomitant habits, must act with equal advantage on both. If the populationists, on one side, maintain, that so far from beginning by repressing consumers, our only business should be to raise materials for them to consume — that these materials can be so raised — that all that is necessary for that purpose is a proper application of labour and capital, — in a word, that, to restore the country to its propriety and prosperity, nothing is requisite but a judicious and immediate developement of both: if such be the tenets of the populationists, they must also, in candour, admit that it is not sufficient that a community should possess labour or capital; they must also know how to direct both. On the other side, the anti-populationists, who see in the constant tendency of all communities to press against the means of subsistence, (no matter what accessions they may receive,) a sure cause, unless kept under due restraint and regulation, of constantly recurring distress, — the anti-populationists must equally look to the cultivation of the intellectual and moral habits of the people, for the only efficient guarantee

for the due exercise of such control. That such equilibrium between means and wants, in every well-ordered society, is essential, no one has attempted to deny; but whether we look for its preservation to this term or to the other of the question—whether to one or other of the two expedients just noticed—to the raising the means to a level with the demand, or to the reducing the demand to a level with the means; whichever of these two expedients we adopt, we terminate in the same consequence, the utter impracticability of effecting either, without the aid of a moral and enlightened population. If instruction, on one side, gives a new energy to intelligence, and brings into more vigorous operation the sinew of the peasant and the purse of the merchant; if it calls gardens out of wastes, and builds cities upon marshes; so also does it check, on the other, by habits of thinking, prudence, and good order, all sacrifice of future advantage to present indulgence, and thus keeps society, whatever may be its means, within the same unvarying limits of happiness, security, and virtue. It is not for me to pronounce which of these two roads to the same end is the most rapid or the most certain: I limit my assertion only to the necessity of providing for either, by due attention to the only process by which such provision can be secured. Both countries evince, in their present condition, upon this question, very diversified aspects. Labour in England is subject to great fluctuation; Capital, to disproportionate accumulation: but labour in Ireland is a drug, capital a timid visiter. Labour in England is scientific; capital, managed upon well-defined rules, the result of long and extensive experience: labour in Ireland is still rude, far from being brought to its perfection of skill, energy, or perseverance. It is a labour (like the cheap articles of other countries) often rendered dear by the slovenly manner in which it is got up; capital in Ireland is regulated by no steady commercial principle—adventured rather than advanced, risked with a lottery appetite for sudden profits, and seldom put out upon those slow, but certain, experiments from which only all truly wealthy nations have derived not merely their accumulations, but, what is far more valuable, the art of acquiring more. Even this, too, precarious, and doubtful as its

advantages may be, is often withdrawn. The Irish stock-market, is subject to panics and ague fits, peculiarly its own. A country reputed, and not unjustly so, to be in one prolonged fever of excitation and uncertainty,—whether the causes be just or not,—is not precisely the land for the tranquil and steady operations of commerce. It is not enough to tell a capitalist, “You may rely upon it there is no immediate danger of a disruption of the connection next summer; there is nothing more opposed to separation than repeal: the ~~the~~ war is already drawing to a conclusion.” To the question he asks, this is not the answer. He wishes simply to know, whether the mill, which you propose he should build upon your premises, is likely to be burnt down in the winter; whether the railroad, for which he is contracting, has a chance of being torn up; whether there is to be a run, when the crops are coming in, upon the bank for gold: in a word, whether he, and not the country, is to be ruined; whether he, and not Ireland, is to run the chance of a bankruptcy. Who, in Ireland, can fully answer these queries? and where is the capitalist, however adventurous, who will not pause until he receive a satisfactory reply. Thus the populationist is as much at fault as his antagonist. Taking his theory *au pied de la lettre*, he finds, under present circumstances, but scanty materials to work it out.* What, then, shall we say of his adversary? Is the anti-populationist more fortunate? With him, means are stationary: he looks only to the demand, to the census,—to the mouths who press to the feast. Does he meet, in Ireland, any symptom of a diminution either in numbers or appetite; any check upon their increase, or, generally speaking, any weighing of this day against to-morrow; any foreboding of difficulty, husbanding of advantage, any preparation for the future, in the great mass of the population, beyond what may be met with in the mere physical man? The exuberance of natural gaiety, or the recklessness of despair, fling the peasant, without a thought beyond the moment, upon all the pains and pleasures of existence. The vigour of a pressing population yields, indeed, at times, to the scythe of want and disease; but these are visitations only: the same causes soon produce similar effects; year after year, the same complaint is renewed—a great in-

crease of production, but a still greater increase of consumers to devour it. England does not exhibit these symptoms, except only in cases where 'injudicious' interference with demand and supply — (as in the instance of her Poor Laws — subject as they were, from the changes in their constitution, to every variety of abuse,) — has in like manner disturbed the natural progress of her industry. But their operation has every year become more sensible and extensive. They have essentially affected both the quality and quantity of her labour, unprofitably consumed her capital, and lowered the scale of her whole social and national prosperity. These evils might be transient, if, from their continued action, they had not penetrated much deeper. By an inevitable result, they have struck at the moral and intellectual character of the people, at the same time that they have restricted their profits, and retrenched their enjoyments. They have furnished youth with no stimulant, age with little consolation; raised supplies for the gibbet, or the workhouse; organised crime; offered premiums for profligacy; rendered prodigality an honour, and poverty perpetual.* But who is there that does not see that the remedy for this spreading leprosy is not to be found, in the mere repeal of the statutes which gave it birth? Its long continuance has grafted upon the national constitution a series of other diseases. These demand a far more general and searching cure. The rooted malady must be plucked out, not by surface treatment, but by attacking it in its central seat. The mind of the people requires reorganising, as much as their statute book requires reform. Under the surface of seeming virtue there is positive and vigorous vice, in the bone and marrow of the country. What iniquities have been opened to the public gaze by the late Factory Inquiry? Children, passed through the fire of every moral and physical corruption, are the daily sacrifice to the Moloch of our commercial greatness in every large city of the country. And if we go a little farther into those alleys and lanes of wretchedness, which contain, in our trading towns, so much

* See the Administration and Operation of the Poor Laws, published by Authority, 1833, pp. 80. 116. 15. 77. 189. 241. 396. 401. 188. 260. 87. et passim. See, also, the Factory Report.

of the poverty and profligacy of the land*, what a visible connection shall we not perceive between ignorance and depravity, — between depravity and want? What materials are these to build on! — what beings to assure the happiness or strength of any community! Yet of such materials, despite of our pulpits and our churches, our grants of two millions and our sabbath enactments, — of such beings is in great measure composed the large mass of our city populations. It is not by clothing the naked, nor by feeding the hungry, that the misery, and pain, and utter abasement of these degenerate human creatures are perfectly and permanently to be exorcised. We must get beyond their physical nature; we must penetrate, however painful may be the task, not merely through all the external filth and raggedness which fester around them, but far deeper through all their darkness and depravity, to their still human hearts; we must there seize the still reclaimable moral being, and restore it, purified and regenerate, if we can, to the upper day, and clear breathing, of a wholesome moral and intellectual atmosphere.

Scotland has not to struggle against the political and social disorder of Ireland, nor the “*plaie dévorante*” of English Poor Laws. She has, in an already advanced state of parochial education, securities against either calamity. But Scotland, which has so long ceased to be the Scotland of Fletcher of Saltoun, has some progress yet to make, before she can become the Scotland of Dr. Chalmers’s aspirations. She has

* How applicable the portrait which Dr. Chalmers draws of Glasgow, to the majority of our commercial towns! — “This is an age of many estimable doings in behalf of Christianity, and it looks a paradox to the general eye, that, with this feature of it standing out so conspicuously, there should also be an undoubted increase of crimes and commitments, all marking an augmented depravity amongst our population.” After admitting the existence of a certain portion of religious and intellectual instruction, he continues, “And yet there is not a second-rate town in our empire, which does not afford materials enough; but for all this stir and appearance on the one hand, I see a rapid increase in the quantum of moral deterioration, on the other. There is a firm and obstinate growth of a sedentary corruption, which will require to be more actively assailed.” . . . “There is room enough for apparent Christianity and real corruption to be gaining ground together, each in their respective territories.” . . . “In these circumstances, we know of no expedient by which this woful degeneracy can be arrested and recalled, but an actual search and entry upon the territory of wickedness.” —

Advantages of Local Sabbath Schools, pp. 20, 21.

still her peculiar disease, less chronic than that of England, less acute than that of Ireland. She has still the want of communication, a scattered and thin population, a disproportion and disjointedness in her civilisation; but with this, also, the counteracting forces of industry, order, and well-disciplined good sense. Her bright destiny is already commenced: she has already gone half way to a wise system of National Education.

But a third, and by far the most important, circumstance in our present condition — the actual *political* position and prospects of the country — still demands our attentive consideration. A mighty change has taken place; another, but more peaceable 1688. The Reform Bill is law; the people are now masters of their own destinies. Each order has its own fair apportionment of the public blessings, of the public duty. The reward is for all, but the labour is for all likewise. The direction of that labour requires, however, judgment, reflection, knowledge. The constituent decides who shall be the candidate, what shall be the legislature. If the people have no sense of what the qualifications of candidates should be; if they value the appeal to their passions more than to their reason, — the purpose of the hour more than the permanent objects of public interest; if they weigh in the balance professions against performances, opinions against character, and allow the former to prevail; there will, of course, be at all times a large supply of candidates well suited to such demand. But if the candidate gains, the constituent loses, by the quality of such merchandise: between both, the country at large will be the great and permanent sufferer. Nor are his duties limited to this single important choice. They will be immeasurably extended by Parliamentary Reform. Its natural, indeed inevitable, tendency is, to carry down its principle, into every detail. The right of self-government itself, in its most solemn form, is consecrated by the late charter. A new set of first principles has been recognised. Like those which succeeded to the Divine Right of Kings, and Passive Obedience, they will soon be followed in action, by a series of analogous measures. Nothing will bound the application of these axioms, but time and mode of

proceeding. They will alter, and re-organise all popular bodies, Grand Juries, Corporations, Vestries, &c. &c. In all these, and in all others similarly constituted, the people must, sooner or later, have their share, on the same ground, and by the same title, by which they now so fully participate in the functions and powers of Parliament. A true division of legislative and administrative labour, not less essential than a division of physical, will ensue. Every man, down to the mere "*prolétaire*," will be successively governor, and governed. In all these relations, the welfare of the community is immediately dependent upon the *manner* in which their respective duties are fulfilled. This, again, not less depends upon the *competency* of the individual; this competency, again, upon his previous *moral* and *intellectual discipline*. Honesty will not do, patriotism will not do, without having, in the understanding, an auxiliary, a proper instrument to work with. Without understanding, it is scarcely possible to conceive even the existence of these qualities; for it is doing too much honour to the random impulses, which pass under their name, to identify them with these high and steady virtues. A voter at a vestry, who has only "honest intentions" to work with, will soon be the victim of his own ignorance, and of the knavery of others. What is true of vestries, is true of every body similarly formed, up to the Great Council itself. Every man ought to be educated up to the level of the functions, to which his country and situation call him. One is preparation for another: and one man taught, soon becomes the teacher of twenty. From one centre, knowledge radiates in a thousand directions. The lower orders force their intelligence upon the middle, and the middle upon the upper. The man who discharges one duty well, will equally well, with proportionate care and opportunities, discharge another. They will not only be good vestrymen, but good jurymen, good corporators, good electors, and, if circumstances shall permit or require, good representatives also. The duties are analogous; they differ only in degree and extension. The middle orders will not less benefit by such improvement. Besides their own advance in the social scale, they will obtain a legitimate defence against the common encroachments of their superiors. Finally,

their superiors will be subjected precisely to those restraints, which have been found, in all cases, the most favourable to the maintenance, not only of true liberty, but of just power. They gain, in the general order (the result of reflection and content), the best guarantees for public tranquillity. Without such guarantees, their pre-eminence is not better than any other, founded upon momentary partiality, or worn-out prejudice. It must, while it lasts, be exposed to the chances of every convulsion; its excesses, though suffered, will not be the less averaged.

The concurrence of these several powers in the advancement of the country to future political amelioration, and the right employment of the new means with which they are intrusted for these ends, are what really gives its value to the late Reform. If these means are to be left in the hands of *ignorance*, and the guidance of the state confided to the mere instincts, the coarse passions, the blind impulses of an unenlightened community, — if there is not to be a proportionate fitting, by a far wiser and more extended training than what has hitherto prevailed, — far better would it have been that the perilous gift had, for some time longer, been withheld from the certain abuse of the multitude. True it is, that it was rather won than accepted, rather grasped than given; — true it is, that, by a swing of the whole people, it was forced from the hands of the aristocracy: but stronger proof than this cannot be given, of what energies and powers the people now are masters, and how fatal it may be, to leave them, any longer, the random direction of such means. We are not in times, when we can afford to trifle with such forces ranging at will, through society. It is an electricity which must be conducted, or turned aside. Great skill; the purest intentions, a very high improvement in our mental and moral capacity, are essential. Error in such cases is crime. It plays with the happiness of millions; it is felt for generations. In new states, where “verge and room enough” is left for the play of the machinery, society can bear with a little blunder, for the sake of experiment; the consequences of mistake are less injurious or perceptible: but in old states, where every wheel is most minutely adapted to its individual purposes, where every joint is screwed up to its extreme; where every

variation, every friction, is calculated ; there the slightest neglect is felt, the slightest derangement vibrates through the whole complicated machine, and produces a disorder so extensive and confused, that it requires the greatest expense of time and labour to redress, or even to detect it. Our present position, then, and future prospects, are good or bad, fortunate or fatal, in precise proportion to the manner in which the people shall use the means intrusted to their hands. But this, again, depends not on the people merely, but on those by whom the people are ruled. It is not a matter of abrupt enlightenment — not the sudden conversion wrought by a pamphlet or a speech ; it is the slow and imperceptible creation of many lessons, and of many hours. The man, indeed, cannot go back into the child, and the grown generation may *already* have passed beyond our reach : but the rising nation still is ours — we hold in our hands its destinies ; we may still cultivate, in the child, the future man. We are the accountable guardians of their virtues and their happiness ; the creators, under Heaven, of their characters : we are they who are to decide, even now, whether they shall be the future criminals, or the future benefactors, of our common country. But we have no right to erect gibbets, if we will not take the means of preserving from them ; we have no right to punish ignorance and vice, if vice and ignorance be the paths to which we and our institutions inevitably lead.

Such, however, is not the practice (reasoning is out of the question) of our modern Solons. They first produce the evil habit, and then rush to other evils to correct it. They render the people vicious, and then inveigh against their vices. When a second nature is firmly established, in step the law-maker and law-executor with their coarse instruments, and think to redress the malformation of years, in a single night. The charitable passenger who attempted to reset the hump of his neighbour, who had fallen into a ditch, mistaking it for a recent injury, at least desisted, on being informed of his mistake. Our law-givers are not so wise : in defiance of experience and common sense, they insist on curing inveterate disease by a *coup-de-main*. Nor is their justice greater than their wisdom : ignorant that the individual does not form his

own character, but that it is formed in great measure for him by circumstances, they rage against the individual, and leave circumstances in "*statu quo*." Hence the long roll of ineffectual pains and penalties, successful coercion Acts, Ordinances, spies, bayonets, &c. in this and other countries; legislation, not against causes, but results. Force at all times, force against all, is their only panacea: as if true skill in government did not consist, not in using force, but in rendering force unnecessary. It is the blunderer only who flies to the rod. This is as true of governments, as of schools. Wherever such remedy is applied or demanded, there we may be sure the state-physician is a quack. An intelligent and moral nation does not require these rude appliances, these "*voies de fait*." If the nation be neither moral nor intelligent, what or who are to blame? Set it down at once to unfavourable circumstances and those who have created and continue to create them; to bad governors, and bad educators.

Education, it is true, will not of itself be sufficient: the People, when educated, must be surrounded with such circumstances as may allow this education to work to good. Nothing can be more absurd and wicked than strengthening faculties which are not to be employed — exciting desires which are not to be gratified. Hence Austria and Prussia, if they do not intend giving constitutions to their subjects, are guilty of a cruel inconsistency in giving them education. It is out of the nature of things, that a People who read will not soon learn to think, and that a thinking People will not, sooner or later, learn to act. But Education, on the other hand, is not less necessary to give value to these circumstances. If Constitutions are to be granted, no better preparation for their wise use, than Education: it is to this interior world, to the enduring soul of man, that the legislator for millions and generations ought to look. If that be pure and sound, there is no fear of what may proceed from it. Mere Act-of-Parliament Reform, has never yet of itself regenerated a nation: to be good for any thing, reform must first begin in the nation's heart. Institutions without this inward life to animate them are mere phantoms. Nero was Tribune of the People; and the Venetian Council of Ten, republicans. To create this spirit—to make it what it ought

to be—to make it national, is the highest end of the legislator and the educator ; — to succeed in such an end, their truest glory. With such a spirit, so formed, all things are possible; let it but once move over the waters, and a world of order and beauty will soon rise out of the darkest confusion. Teach and habituate the People to make right use of the faculties which God has given them, and then trust them fearlessly to themselves. With such a guide within them, it little matters who may be over them. Self-government, of all governments, becomes then the easiest and the best. The just bounds of Centralisation, now so commonly confused, are at once determined. The People have their share of management with the Government, and the Government their share of burdens with the People. Centralisation, to which modern Governments fly on every difficulty, as the only remedy for follies and evils which it would be much better the People had been taught to remedy, without such intervention themselves, will be only used when it can really be useful; that is, when great unity and promptitude of action is required, — when the interests and energies of the People are scattered or in conflict, and demand concentration or control. Localisation will be applied wherever it is practicable, without sacrificing to private vanity or ambition the general good. We complain of the proneness of the People, to the discussion of matters in which personally they can have little interest, and of which generally they know less,

— — — “ Natio

Trepidè concursans, occupata in otio

Gratis anhelans, multum agendo nihil agens.”

But the way to check or to direct this passion, is not restraint; the People spurn it as they ought; — but the giving to an appetite—which is there for wise purposes, and cannot and ought not to be eradicated—its proper food. The People will not look abroad, at least not more than they ought to do, if they have interests to look to, and families and affections to cultivate, at home. The ignorance and neglect of this plain truth has been the cause of half the disturbances of the social machine in our own and other times. We complain of the facility with which the multitude fling themselves into the arms of the

first intriguer who flatters or excites them. But we wrong the People: *we*, not *they*, are to blame. By refusing them education, we disqualify them from managing for themselves; we render them childish by treating them as children: by blinding and degrading the People, we take from them the power and wish to choose well. What right then have we to vilify them if they choose ill? Bad government cannot exist for any time, in the face of good Education; neither can popular folly or disorder. Men who have knowledge and reflection, will soon have a steady and well-regulated will, and will not lightly surrender themselves to the random guidance of others. They will weigh and taste for themselves, and not require a weigh-master or taster to weigh and taste for them. Why did the American Revolution issue so differently from the French? Simply because it was conducted under the auspices of knowledge and virtue.* The men who wrought that mighty change, exhibited a good system alive in their own persons: but then to work it as it ought to be worked, above all things, and before all things, the system must be good.

But if Education be more than ever necessary, — if an education fitted to its wants and prospects, be the only education worthy of a nation; — it is surely a matter of the utmost moment to ascertain how far such education exists, or how far, if we possess it not, it may be attained. Now, it may safely be asserted, that no such education is to be found, on a large scale, in any part of the united kingdom. Qualifications and exceptions to this assertion may, here and there, be met with. No one classes Scotland and Ireland in the same category; or, in Scot-

* "Our liberty," says Dr. Channing, "did not come to us by accident, nor was it the gift of a few leaders, but its seeds were sown plentifully in the minds of the whole People. It was rooted in the conscience and reason of the nation. It was the growth of the deliberate and generous principles liberally diffused. The United States had no Liberator, no political Saviour. We never lost our self-respect. We felt that, under God, we were to be free, through our own courage, energy, and wisdom, under the animating and guiding influences of his great and good mind. By an instinct which is unerring, we call Washington, with grateful reverence, the Father of his country, but not its Saviour. The People who want a Saviour, who does not possess an earnest and pledge of freedom in its own heart, is not yet ready to be free." — *Dr. Channing: Character of Napoleon Bonaparte.*

land, town with town, or county with county. Even in the same district, there is a marked difference between the several processes of mental culture, practised in one school and in another. But this does not materially alter the main proposition. Notwithstanding all our vain-glorious assumptions, when put to the test, our education will be found, both in quality and extent, not only below the actual condition of these countries, but below the education of other countries in many respects our inferiors. Our education of 1835 is little better, in most particulars, than the education of the sixteenth century. Some efforts have been made to fill up deficiencies too deeply felt, or to satisfy demands too generally expressed, to be neglected by the most apathetic government. But these very changes have, by the manner in which they have been made, become evils rather than benefits. The institutions to which they have given rise, have little or no connection with those already existing: they have no point of support in those which have preceded; no subsidiary assistance in those which follow them. Destined solely for "the mere material objects of existence, they present no sort of efficient guarantee to the country, for the due cultivation of her moral interests. Thence the universal feeling of uneasiness amongst parents, when about to provide for the education of their families: an uneasiness every day taking a more marked character, and more and more justified by the increasing disproportion between the supply and the demand. They every where seek, but seek in vain, an education which may, in some degree, be suited to the future destinies of their children. The nation neither offers them such an education, nor assists them in their choice. Incapable of selecting for themselves, they are necessarily left to the mercy of every empiric, who can substitute for real merit a brilliant prospectus, and for efficient services, a few occasionally successful experiments. These evils are not confined to elementary education; they are common to the whole of our system. Readers we have, and writers, and accountants, and, mayhap, surveyors: but is this education? These keys of knowledge are thrown carelessly into idle or dangerous hands, or if into active and industrious ones, they are not always allowed to approach the doors for which these same keys were intended. The formation of mind, of character, of mental and moral

habits, is neglected, in some cases studiously discouraged, in how few really taught! * Hence we suffer in every form the accumulated ignorance or depravity of society. The several duties are ill performed, or unperformed; abuses are not detected, or, detected, are uncorrected, and, uncorrected, are encouraged. Barriers of every antiquated form,—formularies of the church, special conditions, imposed by the founder,—all obstacles which the perverse ingenuity of ignorance, or intolerance combined, could associate, are raised, and, what is far worse, maintained, between the great domain of true moral and intellectual enlightenment, and the growing mind of the country. Our Elementary schools are mere “*machines à lettres*,” our middle classes, in many instances, have not the advantage of much better “grinding,” and our upper are laboriously miseducated—swathed from their childhood up with so many and such well devised absurdities, that it is not singular they should present, in after life, so many incurable cases of mental rickets and distortions. Many of these vices are the slough of preceding generations. The mistake which inadvertence and ignorance might first have caused, has been cherished for its continuance—and, *because* it has continued, become venerable. It has been found useful in the sustenance of this or that bad ascendancy; as long as that ascendancy was strong, it was the ornament of its power—as soon as it began to totter, it was used as a buttress to prevent its fall. But even this will not always account for the indefatigable perseverance in error, which still disgraces almost all our Education-mongering. Self interest is sacrificed, with just as little compunction as public interest. Egotism itself is at fault. Half the abuses are in evident self-wrong.

That these reproaches are not unwarranted, general and

* These defects, and the necessity of strong remedies, have been equally felt in France. So early as the year 1760, the venerable La Chalotais (*Essai sur l'Education nationale, ou Plan d'Etudes pour la Jeunesse*) raised his voice for Education Reform. Though unsuccessful, he prepared the way for the extensive improvements, which have lately taken place under the wise administration of MM. Montalivet and Guizot. Fleury preceded him, in calling the public attention to Individual Education, in his *Traité du Choix et de la Méthode des Etudes*; a work very remarkable for the period in which it was written. The first edition was published in 1686.

loose as they may appear, the slightest glance over our several systems, in the succeeding pages, will abundantly show. Scotland, indeed, set out on comparatively a good plan — a plan, at least, in full harmony with her political and religious institutions, and the hale and sturdy offspring of both. She has indulged in few of those semi-barbarous antics, under the name of Public Instruction, those zigzag movements between truth and error, which have characterised her neighbours. In England, there are many *materials*, — few *buildings*; some of these materials are lying half unfinished on the ground — some wholly so — others in the block, still awaiting the chisel — others not yet raised from the mine. The parts are sometimes good — but there is no whole. In Ireland, — all that has been done by accident in England, in Ireland has been done by design. Her Charter schools, her Societies for the suppression of Vice, all these joint stock companies in appearance for the promotion of Education, but in reality conspiracies against it, were so completely the machinery of a party, that it is a matter of no surprise they should have left out Education, and retained only the government purpose of the hour. All Education soon got infected with political and sectarian spirit; it was attack on one side, defence on another, — a battle fought in every school, under every hedge, for the minds and feelings of the country. If the Protestant Church and State man raised up the Charter seminaries as the out-works of his Ascendency Citadel — the Catholic, not less, constructed in self-defence his bastions within the precincts of his Chapel schools; whilst a middle party, between both, considered the whole as a mere plea for the disposal of place and pension, — a less objectionable or less obvious way of bribing Protestant and Catholic into adherence to the government. How little even these ends have been answered, it will not be difficult to show. Education could not coexist with such a system, no more than such a system could coexist with Education. Shreds, indeed, of knowledge were picked up by chance in the way — but they have never been worth any thing; such knowledge adds arrogance to oppression, and discontent to slavery. It is neither happiness nor power. The mind of Ireland was inconsiderately sacrificed to selfish

and fleeting passions and purposes; instruction was made subservient to the worst uses of barbarism. With few exceptions not only has she now to do much, but, what is far more difficult, to undo much of what has been already done.

In a Reforming age, with the instruments of correction so numerous and well adapted in our own hands, to state an abuse ought to be to correct it. But the *disposition* is not sufficient. There must be due acquaintance with the *means* by which such correction may most easily, prudently, and certainly be effected. We must not "*simply repeal*," we must have some substitute—*precise* and *immediate*—to present in its place. Other nations have preceded us in the path, and now are marshalling us on in the way that we should go. We have their failures to warn us from error; their triumphs to beckon us to success. Less distracted by religious differences than ourselves, they have removed the most material obstacle. They have, in most instances, come at the real object—the *esoteric* principle of education; and applied boldly and wisely to their purpose, all means, high and vigorous, within their reach. In the old countries, indeed, they had many of the same barriers to throw down or overleap, which still discourage us; but they have looked, without any absurd fastidiousness, not only to theory, but, to example;—they have taken double counsel; from their own self-inquiry on the one hand, from the efforts of newer or renovated states, on the other; not hesitating to take the good, and cast by the bad, whenever, and wherever they found it.

The object of the present work has been to aid, on these principles, our own exertions. The first chapters are limited to the Theory of National Education. The real meaning of that important word, (so frequently misapplied, and its misapplication so full of fatal error,) has been attempted to be determined. The obligation, the expediency, the necessity, of rendering education universal, is discussed. Finally, the sources from which it should be maintained, and the principles and the process by which it should be administered, conclude this portion of the work.

But theory is a dangerous guide, without the chart and compass of experience. The *a priori* reasoning of the first

part of the work, is attempted to be proved by the practical reasoning of the second. A comparison of the systems gradually adopted in modern states, with each other — a due appreciation of their effects, confirmed by unquestionable and extensive experiment — and an examination of their applicability to the peculiarities of our own political and social condition, — terminate the second.

The conclusions to which such results must naturally conduct, lead us to the third division : or the application of the principles, collected both from theory and practice, to our own particular case. It is not sufficient to ascertain the excellence of a particular system : the facility with which it can be adapted to particular habits and positions, is an equally essential consideration. The author has not been insensible to this difficulty — he has attempted to conquer it; and in venturing to suggest, in the conclusion of the work, such a system as, judging from the evidence offered of its efficiency in other states, appeared most calculated to attain the great object of *Education Reform*, he has not been unmindful of the necessity of consulting existing habits, and usefully applying existing Institutions. That *some* Reform is necessary, no one will be hardy enough to deny ; that *the Reform suggested* is the only one, or the best, it would be the extreme of arrogance to assume.

Whatever shall be the opinion of people or government, one thing, at least, is certain, — that the sooner it is formed, and the sooner, being formed, it is acted upon, the better. The necessity of National Education once decided, not a moment should be lost, in a healthy state of the community, such as it is hoped will soon be the case, in taking measures for its effectual establishment. Education Reform is the natural sequel to Church Reform, as Church Reform has been to Parliamentary. The obstacles to its complete and universal extension on just principles will have been got over. The interests which so much tended to pervert it, and to continue its perversion, will have passed away. The road will lie wide open — smoothed of all difficulties, disencumbered of all monsters and enchantments — for the traveller ; all we shall want will be men, who will gird themselves up in stern earnest, for the journey. Every hour delayed, is an hour not of loss merely,

but of injury. Every hour delayed, casts us deeper into the "Slough of Despond," leads us further into the treacherous "forest" of the Poet. Every step, is a step farther from the right way. At this moment there are thousands, defrauded of half their faculties, lying half made up in the thick obstruction of ignorance. At this moment there are thousands mis-educating in every part of the Empire. They are already treasuring up for themselves and others, for this generation and for the generation to come, seeds of error — seeds of crime — big with the rank harvest of personal and national calamity. The Captain Swing of to-morrow, is formed in the idle and ragged urchin of to-day. The Captain Rock of to-day, was the untaught and dissolute boy of yesterday. Their taste vitiated by political dram-drinking — burning, from past indulgence, for more — looking to the gin shop, the club, and the newspaper, for all their creeds and all their codes, — if we cannot recall them, let us not supply them with new recruits. Let us somewhere, and at last, stand between the young generation about us, and this pestilence. They who have the power to prevent, and still permit, are guilty of the guilt — are accessories to the misery of millions of their fellow creatures. Government ought to fear no party in this matter; there should be none to bind, none to palter with — no ignorant self-loves to woo — no reluctant concessions to win — no blind opposition to tread under. Who, in a British Senate, in the nineteenth century, with France gazing on him, and Prussia, and America, will dare to avow himself the Apostle of darkness, a Hater of the light — an enslaver of the minds and hearts of his future countrymen? Ministers *can* effect this change — if they *will* — will, they must, if they be, indeed, what they profess themselves to be, the *People's Representatives* and the *People's Government*. Education Reform will be the *third great Reform*, the crowning capital of the column of National Regeneration. It will be the seal to the bond; the ward and keeper of all our happiness, of all our safety, of all our rights. Other measures may change, and yield, and be forgotten, as the national mind changes or subsides beneath them; but this is a measure which creates the national mind — which ensures, by its firm and broad substructions, the solidity and durability of every other

structure. We raise up breakwaters against all vicissitudes, which would plunge us back again into "the ancient night" from which we have yet but scarcely escaped, or precipitate us forward into extravagances which will risk the blessings we now enjoy. Until this shall be obtained, other reforms may be good, but they must also be *provisional*. The instruments we must use to work reforms, are not reformed themselves. Make the minds of men, you are masters of their actions — give them a right direction to a noble end, and you may safely trust all further progress, all ultimate improvement, to *themselves*.

Ministers have not been quite insensible to these calls. Something has been done in Ireland — something in England; but these somethings are satires rather upon the feebleness of their means, or the coldness of their intentions, than living eulogies of their knowledge and zeal for the true interests of Education. The adoption, for the first time, of a National Board of Education in Ireland — the grant of 20,000*l.*, for the first time, for the purposes of Education in England — and far more important than either, because striking at strong prejudices, the recognition by the Legislature of the necessity and expediency of *compelling* Education, in the clauses of the late Factory Act, — are all evidences of a change of tide, a reflux, even in Government opinions, — the last, generally, to be affected, — and decisive of the near advent of this first of human blessings. The time is now past, for vexing its bright course with the seductions of this party, or with the terrors of that — it is a solemn, sacred, national cause, embracing all duties and all interests, beginning with those which link us with the angels, and ending only where we blend with the beast. All Europe gazes in astonishment at our inferiority — at our apathy. We, whose loftiest pretension has been to lead on the civilisation of the age and species, to find ourselves in the rear of our inferiors, and to require teaching in that very art on which all civilisation must finally depend! — this should not be, — our national honour should be better vindicated from the stain. The Minister should not wait till Reform calls to him for his hesitating assent — he should take the "*initiatif*" boldly with his age and country, and create events instead of following

them. Nor let him think that, in such a work, he should want co-operators. There is not a man in these realms, who hath drunk at the fountains from which morality and intelligence flow, who would not gladly press forward at such a spirit-waking invitation. Not a day passes, but some token of its inward stirring is sent forth. What a year ago appeared impossible, to-day is sought for — to-morrow will be done. But the *how*, is as important as the *when*. Whilst yet unruffled by the rush of contending parties, the Minister can sit down, and take in not a faction, but a country, in his glance; whilst he can legislate, not for this isthmus of life on which he stands, but for the continent of human existence beyond it: let him, in the name of country and religion, of all that is dear to man, patiently but fervently, but above all immediately, set him down to the task. A nobler never yet was confided to human intellect; — to pour out blessings on any country, in any age, is worth the ambition of the proudest; but when that blessing is universal enlightenment — and when that country are these realms — and when all this is done in the full blaze of the nineteenth century, — nothing can be added in this life to the distinction; the full reward for the inestimable service can only be conferred in the next.

PART I.

THEORY—*Principles of National Education.*

—“Παντεχγου πυρος σελας.”

ÆSCHYLUS.

“Ce n'est pas une ame, ce n'est pas un corps, qu'on dresse — c'est un homme.”

MONTAIGNE.

GENERAL POSITIONS.

EDUCATION,—what is Education?—what are its ends?—what are its means?—Is it a blessing?—If so, of what description—under what restrictions or protections,—how is it to be established—how maintained?—These are all questions which have successively agitated, and still continue to agitate, numerous parties in this country. They are each of them momentous; each deserving of active and searching inquiry, of sound and early conclusion. Loose and partial views only perpetuate and multiply error; theory, unless collected from facts and accurately systematised, cannot be reduced to practice,—unless practicable, it is little better than ingenious trifling.

What is Education?—There is not, perhaps, in the range of art or science a more difficult question. A celebrated philosopher has observed, that it is an Art—for nature has not given us any instinct on this subject as an infallible guide. Man is the only animal who follows no certain path. What a variety of singular and contrasted customs amongst savage nations? How little do they appear to be enlightened by that feeling which, of all others, is the most universal,—maternal affection. Civilised man has reflected, and inquired, but he has not yet been enabled to reduce Education to strictly fixed principles. The attempt has been made in Germany, and, under the designation of *Pædagogik*, it has assumed the rank of a science. But a designation is not sufficient to produce unanimity. Every district has its system; every system has been blamed

and praised in turn. The very bases of each have been successively attacked. What diversity of opinion on the propriety of punishments and rewards—on authority and emulation—on severity of discipline, or the absence of discipline altogether! The very first positions, in some instances, are scarcely yet determined. We know not yet, decidedly, how far the mind, with its innumerable delicacies and intricacies, can be wielded, or disciplined by the body. We know not how far physical force and development correspond to moral; or what are those faculties, or what are the laws of their affinity, which mutually strengthen or paralyse each other. Condillac's and Bonnet's statues, though each lead to a totally different theory through the same fiction, are not the result of much experiment or observation. Their human being is what a human being might be, not what it is: nor is this extraordinary, when even the physical portion of our double nature, falling as it does immediately under the notice of our own senses, has been scarcely better explained. We have advanced a few steps; we know somewhat better what we are to avoid, but do we yet know what we are to do? Are we to subject children to the influence of physical habits, or, on the contrary, to use every effort to emancipate them from them? Are we to despise their cries, or is pain an intimation to which we ought implicitly to yield? How are they to be fed? What is the influence of early nourishment on the future being? What are the effects, from which we are decidedly bound to preserve them?—what those against which they should be hardened from their childhood up?—All these points, even to the maternal instinct, are still vague and uncertain. The mother trusts herself to chance and experiment, and, not having the attention or the means to transmit the result to the generations which follow, her successors inherit her ignorance only, and have again to pass over the same road of difficulty and doubt.

It is, unquestionably, a singular circumstance, that, of all problems, the problem of Education is that, to which by far the smallest share of persevering and rigorous analysis has yet been applied. The same empiricism, which once reigned supreme in the domains of chemistry, astronomy, and medicine, still retains possession, in many instances, of those of

education. Our age is distinguished for its indefatigable attention to the most minute phenomena of the material world; but the intellectual and moral are yet without their journalists. No journal is kept of the phenomena of infancy or childhood—no parent has yet registered, day after day, with the attention of an astronomer, who prepares his *Ephemerides*, the marvellous developements of his child.* Until this be done, there can be no solid base for reasoning; we must still deal with conjecture. Until experience be more severely and constantly consulted, the Art of Education may appear to advance; but we shall find that we only have changed place, and that Education itself has remained where it was.†

* Perhaps we ought to except the Journal given by Madame Guizot in the *Annales d'Education* and republished in her *Lettres sur l'Education domestique*, and the specimen which forms the *Appendix to Miss Edgeworth's Practical Education*, vol. iii. p. 189. under the name of *Notes, containing Conversations and Anecdotes of Children*. Short and irregular as it is, it is highly instructive and interesting. The Journal of the German Schwartz is considered much too imaginary and romantic.

† The history of Education, both as art and science, is highly illustrative of this diversity and fluctuation. Previous to the Reformation, there was teaching, but little education. That little was almost exclusively confined to the upper and professional classes. Charlemagne and Alfred made some efforts to establish, on a broad basis, elementary as well as superior education; but the results were trifling—not extending beyond their own lives, and soon yielding to the general barbarism. In the thirteenth century, the mendicant friars gave some attention, but on a confined principle, to popular education; and in 1379, the Hieronymites of Deventer more directly applied themselves to its reform, but with little further result, from too exclusive a regard to superior education, than merely preparing the way for the numerous improvements which were to follow. The Reformation and the Restoration of letters are the true commencements of enlightened and general education. (*Uebersicht, &c. or Sketch of Pedagogical Literature to the End of the eighteenth Century*, by Petri. (Leipsig, 1805.))

The period from that epoch to our time may be divided into two others;—1. from the Reformation to Rousseau; and, 2. from Rousseau to the present day. Each of these periods is marked by a very distinct character of practice and opinion.

Martin Luther, so early as 1524, urged the nobility and municipalities of Germany to erect popular schools. Philip Melancthon, in 1560, founded a school, and originated a system of organisation, which was for a considerable time in vigour. Their example was followed by most others of the Reformed sects in Europe, and rivalled by the exertions of the Jesuits in 1540, in their numerous establishments for boys, and by the Ursulines and the order of St. Elizabeth in theirs for girls. The Jansenists followed later. (*Histoire Générale de Portroyal*. Amsterdam, 1755—1757.) Nor were the principles of education less attended to than the materials. The narrow spirit of the middle ages, which still adhered to these institutions, was greatly corrected by Montaigne (*Essais*. Paris, 1818.),

But are there no facts, from the immense collection of various observations, to guide us to something more precise?

by Charron (*Le Livre de la Sagesse*. Paris, 1671.). Valentine Ickelsamer reprobated the practice of spelling in teaching children to read. Albrecht Dürer attempted to unite drawing and writing. Geoffroi Gory published, in 1559, his *Calligraphy* in French, Italian, and Latin; and Barbedor and Lébé, two of the French Society of Calligraphists, arranged models for pupils, which were engraved and very commonly used. A general improvement had commenced. Religious education alone made little progress. Exclusively polemic, it had yet nothing of that living spirit, that unction, which alone can touch the heart. But this defect was soon sought to be remedied both by Protestants and Catholics. Two distinguished individuals, differing in creed, but united in heart and objects, — François de Fénelon, the illustrious Archbishop of Cambrai, and Philip James Spener, — in the end of the seventeenth century, first took means to correct it. Though somewhat touched by a certain “pietism,” (but so pure that it could scarcely be censured,) they both had the merit of raising themselves above the prejudices of their age and country. Fenelon preached charity to an intolerant nation — Spener, practical Christianity to the supporters of a dry and dogmatic controversy. They both placed virtue above orthodoxy, and both recommended systems of education, which, though limited in details, have still, by their gentle and wise spirit, produced the happiest results. Fenelon may be considered the first who seriously attended to female education. (*Vie de Fenelon*, par le Cardinal de Beausset. *De l'Education des Filles*, par Fenelon.) Spener, was the great propagator of Catechetical instruction, (see his *Life*, by C. F. Wilke, at the head of a new edition of his work *Das Geistliche Priesterthum*, 1830, and his *Gedanken*, &c.) Spener was more fortunate than Fenelon in his influence on popular education. Fenelon was opposed by the Jesuits — Spener was supported by Ernest the Pious, Duke of Saxe Gotha. Several schools essentially practical were founded under his auspices. From one of these — the school of Gotha — proceeded Augustus Hermann Franke, the most illustrious writer on Education of his time. A disciple of Spener, and imbued with his spirit, he felt still more strongly than his master the ameliorations of which education was still susceptible. Without fortune, with few assistants, he shrunk not from the obstacles opposed to his projects, and successively established, by his efforts, new institutions, united at Halle under the humble designation of the *Orphan House*. This establishment, the model of so many afterwards founded in Germany, comprises — 1. the *Orphan House*, properly so called; 2. the *Pædagogium*, or School for the upper and middle classes; 3. the *Latin School*; 4. the *Schools of Industry*; 5. the *Normal Schools*. Its teachers spread through all Germany its spirit and methods; and to this day the Moravians preserve in their institutions (their founder, Count Zinzendorf, was his pupil,) the genius of this illustrious master. Several of his fellow labourers subsequently distinguished themselves by their exertions in advancing education, and Petri, in his “*Uebersicht*, &c.,” has given us interesting details of the principal. Amongst them may be noticed J. Lange, a distinguished grammarian, author of a treatise on the amelioration of schools; J. Rambach, author of the *Perfect Instructor*; J. J. Hecker, author of an *Anatomy for Youth*, and founder of the *Schools of Industry*; J. J. Fellbiger, a Catholic priest, founder of Normal schools in Austria, &c. &c. &c.

The mental and moral habits of different sects—of different professions (though many are adopted very late in life)—but

Franke may be considered as the first who contributed, in a marked manner, to the present spirit of Education. His principles and practice become, in this point of view, of deep interest. He considered—1. Religion as the basis of all education, and by religion he understood an entire faith in God and Christianity. He grounded this opinion on the belief that children were indiscriminately inclined to evil, and required purification. Intellectual without religious education, he considered an evil; but religion and piety were regarded as compatible with every situation in life. With this view, a strict surveillance was recommended to parents and teachers; exercises of piety, singing, prayer, religious instruction, insisted on. The injurious effects arising from too much severity in these particulars, have been ascribed to *Franke's* system; they are more justly attributable to the indiscreet zeal of his successors. So far from extreme austerity, he encouraged, as judicious relaxations, bodily exercise, mechanical labour, country walks, &c. &c. 2. Intellectual Education was conducted with strict reference to the future position of the pupil, but in all instances was most ample. Elementary Education, for instance, embraced not only reading, writing, and calculation, but outlines of natural history, physics, geography, civil history and legislation. The pupils in the higher departments of education, were taught in classes directed by intelligent masters. The masters were not attached to particular classes, but pursued the special subject prescribed by the general plan of studies. The pupils were actively occupied. "*Intuition*," or observation by the senses, frequent application of the interrogative and repeating system, and periodical examinations, were amongst the most prominent of his methods. (See, for a fuller account, *Beschreibung, &c.*, or *Description of the Orphan House of Halle, &c.* Halle, 1799.) *Franke* died in 1727, and many of his opinions and principles of teaching are now superseded; but it should never be forgotten, that he was the great precursor of the succeeding period.

The Reformation produced, in concurrence with the Restoration of Letters, its mental revolution; the philosophical spirit of the eighteenth century — (that spirit which overturned and re-instructed society) — in its effects upon Education, rivalled the Reformation. It affected to regenerate every thing, and at once; and though much evil and no less ridicule necessarily attached to such preposterous pretensions, it led, in the end, to many useful practical results. The majority of the Education writers of that period applied themselves, however, to individual and not to general education; but their principles were easily modified; they soon extended from the private circle to the public school, and were more or less recognisable in every institution, from Superior to Elementary. *John Locke*, who more properly belongs to the preceding period, had already given a new impulse to Education Reform in England (*Thoughts concerning Education, &c.*); but his more remarkable merit was to have suggested the *Emile* of *Jean Jacques Rousseau*. This celebrated work of a still more celebrated author, produced more evil and less good, than could have been expected. Rejected without regard for its numerous excellencies, on the one hand, (it was burnt by the Parliament of Paris, in 1762, and the author condemned to prison,) adopted without reference to its still more numerous errors on the other; if it corrected many

especially the broadly traced characters of nations, are marked by features too regularly recurring, too decided, to have

abuses, it went far to replace them by greater. Modern education, until very recently, was strongly infected by the vices to which this remarkable work gave rise. His theory may be characterised, as *all nature*, and *no religion*. The child in his system is left to be entirely guided by itself. Self love is the "instinct moteur;" good will and benevolence to all, the consequence. Hence, all that is required on the part of the teacher, is to study the character of the pupil, to anticipate his wants, to treat him with strict justice, to make him obey by habit, without any appearance of severity, or too punctiliously insisting on his several duties. This principle is carried through the whole of moral and intellectual education, as well as physical. The country is chosen all the age of twelve at least, as the scene best adapted to this developement. It is required that it should be in all cases spontaneous, aided, however, by artificial contrivances (Madame de Genlis has adopted the same injurious theory); these contrivances to be imitated from nature. Moral education is to be insinuated, rather than taught; the pupil is to be left to example and experience. The conduct of the teacher — reward and punishment arising *naturally* from the action itself — absence of all *arbitrary* measures, — these are the best lessons; and, by their means, a child may be educated in a manner conformable to nature, and without risking the infection of either obstinacy or lying — the results only of bad education. Intellectual Education, in like manner, is to be left to nature. It is not to commence until the child evinces a desire for instruction. No stimulant is to be used to excite this desire; but, once testified, the child is to be taught music, especially singing — writing — drawing after nature — geography, always beginning with that of his native place — geometry, by means of an exact copy of the figures, and a process which leads to a discovery of the problems, by the child itself. Serious studies are excluded altogether; they become, by means of intuition, a mere amusement. The great defect of this system is, the omission of all Religious instruction. He seems to have passed by the moral and religious elements of human nature altogether; he is opposed to all teaching on *authority*; and, consistently with this principle, defers all lessons on religion to the age of eighteen. This error has, till lately, betrayed itself strongly in modern Pædogy, and is the cause of much the greater part of its defects. — (*Emile, ou de l'Education. Anti-Emile de J. S. Formey. Histoire de la Vie et des Ouvrages de J. J. Rousseau, par Musset-Pathey. Paris, 1821.*)

The influence of Rousseau's theory was soon felt in Germany. Franke's reform had excited the popular attention — but it was still imperfect. The spirit of philosophism and innovation soon seized the opportunity, not so much of completing it, as of turning it in an opposite direction. Johan Bernard Basedow, an enthusiastic admirer of Rousseau's opinions, under the auspices of the Count Bernstorff, dedicated himself exclusively to the extension of popular education; and, in 1768, published his *Vorstellung*, or "Invitation to the Friends of Humanity," to co-operate with him in this great work. This was followed by his "*Elementary Book*," or, as it is entitled in the second edition, which afterwards became so celebrated, his "*Elementary Work*:" it comprises numerous engravings, intended to render more intelligible the objects of instruction, on the plan of the *Orbis pictus*

originated from mere casualty. So strongly is the reverse the case, that, if we could ascertain with sufficient accuracy the

of *Amos Comenius*, a teacher of the seventeenth century, many of whose principles Basedow borrowed. The Elementary Book was succeeded, in 1773, by the "*Book of Methods*," intended for the use of fathers and mothers. In these writings are developed the leading principles of his system. In direct opposition to Franke, he considers Physical and Intellectual Education of primary importance—Religious of secondary. He consequently lays great stress on gymnastic exercises, and whatever can contribute to the development of the bodily health or vigour of the pupil. Intellectual Education must precede moral or religious, because it is only through the understanding we can reach the heart. Hence all instruction should be *exclusively* rational—religious and moral, as well as intellectual: the exercises of memory tending to dull rather than to sharpen the natural intelligence, the only method to be adopted with effect, is observation by the senses, or intuition. This is sufficient to teach every thing. The details of education—the languages, &c. &c.—are of minor importance; the great point is, developement of body and mind. Basedow did not confine himself to mere precept; he travelled through various parts of Germany—raised considerable sums for purposes of education (amounting to 150,000 franks from his friends alone)—obtained from the Prince of Dessau, not only pecuniary means but a site at Dessau, for an extensive establishment, and there erected it in 1774, under the imposing title of the "*Philanthropic Institution*." His unquiet spirit, and the quarrel which occurred between him and his fellow labourer Wolke, induced him to leave it, for other experiments, in 1778. The school continued open till 1793, and gave birth to numerous other establishments, of which the principal were those of *Marschlin* and *Schnepfenthal*. (*Beyträge, &c.*, or *Documents relative to the Life of Basedow*, by *Ruthman*, 1791; and *Leben, &c.*, or *Life, Character, and Writings of Basedow*, by *Meyer*, 1792.—*Ueber Basedow's Vorschläge, &c.*, or *On the Proposals of Basedow for improving the Education of Youth*, 1769.) Basedow had numerous disciples, who formed the school, designated from their head establishment at Dessau, the *Philanthropists*. Amongst them may be noticed *Ch. H. Wolke*, already mentioned; *J. Iselin*, author of the "*Ueber Basedow's Vorschläge*;" *J. H. Campe*, author of several esteemed works for children, "*Library of Youth*," &c. &c.; *J. Ch. Fr. Saltzman*, head of the seminary of *Schnepfenthal*, and author of several works; *J. Ch. Fr. Gutsmuths*, distinguished by his *Gymnastik, &c.* 1804; *E. Ch. Trapp*, author of the best outline of the system of the *Philanthropists* (*Versuch, &c.* 1788); *F. E. de Rochow*, promoter of rural and founder of several Normal schools: and author of numerous works upon elementary and rural Education, printed in 1790; and finally, the celebrated *Abbé Louis Gaultier*, who died in 1818, and whose method, from the *Rapport* of *M. Dacier* to the *Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres*, appears to have been strictly conformable to the system of the *Philanthropists*. "*Sa méthode, aussi utile qu'ingénieuse, oblige de simplifier, d'analyser, de classer les idées. Elle fournit les moyens de former le jugement et un sens droit; elle habitude à reveiller et à soutenir son attention. L'intérêt, l'amour-propre bien ordonné, l'émulation, la gloire, et la honte, sont autant de mobiles qu'elle met en action.*" (*Rapport, &c. Exposé analytique des Méthodes de l'Abbé Gaultier*, par *M. L. P. Jussieu*. 1822.)

early as well as the late education of these different masses, we might, without difficulty, I am persuaded, from such data,

The system of the *Philanthropists* was strenuously opposed. Amongst the most distinguished of its adversaries was *Louis René de la Chalotais*, author of the *Essai sur l'Éducation Nationale*—it was condemned as insufficient, and flimsy, but it doubtless led to many important ameliorations in education, not only by the efforts which it excited, but the numerous pedagogical publications to which it gave birth. But notwithstanding these unquestionable merits, the *Philanthropists*, either individually or as a body, were far from answering the growing intelligence and wants of the age. The *Eclectic* school, if so it may be called,—men, who, without addicting themselves implicitly to any master or system, selected whatever they found good in each,—endeavoured, from their retreats, to supply this defect, and to apply their calm philosophy and deep knowledge to the further improvement of education. The writings of *J. G. Sulzer*, *J. P. Miller*, *J. G. Büsch*, *C. F. Weiss*, and especially of the celebrated philosopher, *Kant*, who published a “*Treatise on Education*” in 1803, preluded to that fuller development of education, of which *Henry Pestalozzi* was destined to be the chief instrument in our own days.

Few have a more unquestionable claim to the gratitude of mankind than this distinguished man. Had he been enabled to transfuse his own high-mindedness, his comprehensive philanthropy, his enlightened philosophy, into the minds of his disciples and successors—had he succeeded in rescuing himself from those petty and humiliating intrigues, which embittered especially his latter days—he would not have had to lament the curtailment or abandonment of so many of his projects, nor seen his model school successively transferred to Stanz, Burgdorf, München-Bucksee, and Yverdun. The conduct of *Schmidt*—his evil genius, as he well merited to be called—his literary and political contests, his domestic feuds, his pecuniary embarrassments, clouded the evening of life almost with insanity, and have detracted much from those true merits which belong to him as the great Father of modern Education.

The system of *Pestalozzi* differs materially from those of his predecessors. Though imbued in early life with the ideas of *Rousseau*, and adopting in part the opinions of the *Philanthropists*, he considered the radical defect of all previous systems to be, the ignorance of the majority of teachers of the first elements of the science, inverting in their instruction the principles of nature and experience. He looked to nature, for the only true system.—This system he believed he had discovered. His leading idea was, that the child should not rely, for his knowledge, on the knowledge or hearsay evidence of others, but on its own actual examination. This he termed “*Intuition*.”—Hence he discarded all instruction dependent on the Socratic, Catechetical, or Rational methods;—he used neither composition, nor questions; but merely presented the objects of study in an order rigorously progressive, and, for a time, sufficient to make a full impression on the understanding of the pupil. To facilitate these lessons, he classified and arranged,—every object was referred, according to its analogy, to one of three categories—*Words, Form, and Numbers*. These three elementary examples afforded full exercise for the eyes, the hands, the memory, the understanding, and the imagination,—and the process adopted in one instance, was successively

pronounce the national character which ought, *à priori*, to belong to each. But, unfortunately, these are the very defi-

applied to all others — to religion, morality, reading, writing, geography, mathematics, &c. (*Schriften, &c., or Works of H. Pestalozzi*, 1817. — *M. A. Jullien, Esprit de la Méthode d'Éducation de Pestalozzi*, 1812. — *Dr. Biber, Memoir of Pestalozzi, and his Plan of Education*, 1831.) The chief accusation against Pestalozzi's system is, that like that of the Philanthropists, though from totally different causes, it does not provide sufficiently for religious education, — but this charge is abundantly refuted by a reference to his works, particularly to the “*Wie Gertrud, ihre Kinder lehrt.*” — On the contrary, he made it “the key-stone of his whole plan;” not, indeed, as Niederer, one of his disciples did, “by overfeeding his pupils with the strong meat of his deep doctrinal views,” but “by nursing them up with milk, the appropriate food of babes,” — in other words, adapting his instruction to the age and capacity of his hearers. The manner in which the religious education of Yverdun was conducted, is an exemplification of his anxiety to reduce these views to practice. Whence such calumnies arose, it is easy to divine. A total misconception of the religious peculiarities of the German mind, and an intolerant and narrow preference of form to substance, was the source from which they sprang, and from which they still are propagated in this, and other countries. (*Biber*, pp. 73. 167. 447. 467.)

Pestalozzi had several disciples, amongst whom are classed rather too implicitly, the *Abbé Girard* and *M. de Fellenberg*. The *Abbé Girard* was one of the three Commissioners appointed by the Municipal Council of Fribourg to examine the merits of the establishment of Yverdun, and imbibed early the leading principles of Pestalozzi, but their methods are essentially distinct. He borrows as much, indeed, from the *Abbé Gaultier* and the Philanthropists, as from that great master. He adopted his logic, but applied it to Grammar instead of Mathematics, the utility of which appeared to have been exaggerated by Pestalozzi. Syntax was his instrument of all education; other studies, such as arithmetic, geography, &c. he considered as accessories. This he terms “*la grande pensée de son art* ;” “*la Pensée Mère.*” His system also not only admits, but encourages, the Socratic method — composition, &c. (excluded by Pestalozzi), and assumes, as its distinctive title, the designation of “*la méthode rationnelle.*” It is but justice to add, that the accuracy of the theory has been fully supported by the success of the practice. The Institution at Fribourg continued to furnish numerous instances of great development, as well as of acquisition, amongst its pupils, until its suppression, through the intrigues of the clergy of the canton, in 1823. For an outline of his system, see *F. M. L. Naville, De l'Éducation Publique*, 1833, pp. 135—172. 2me sect. art. iii. and more especially the works of the *Abbé Girard* himself, and of his pupils — *Neue Verhandlungen der Schweizerischen Gemeinnützigen Gesellschaft*, 1825; *La Grammaire des Campagnes*, 1821; *Explication du Plan de Fribourg*, &c. &c. For the destruction of the school of Fribourg, and the causes which led to it, see also *Naville, &c.* Note D. p. 413; *Lettre du Conseil Municipal de la Ville de Fribourg*, &c. 13 Mars, 1823, &c. &c. *M. de Fellenberg* has employed the Pestalozzian method, but with great improvements, in the education of youth. His grand principle is *applicability*; — create all the wants you can gratify, but none beyond that line — educate the people for what the people are destined to be. In-

ciencies of which we have to complain. We hear enough of this method and of that, but we are seldom informed of their

struction he considers secondary—as only a minor portion of education; accordingly, he allots to it not more than one hour in the four and twenty. It is thus ardently sought for; it is a pleasure, and not a pain. *Labour* is his great instrument—“*le grand moralisateur de l'homme*,”—his end, the *developing* and *ennobling* the character of the individual and society. He has been eminently successful, notwithstanding all the opposition made, and still making, to his efforts. Hofwyl is a noble and encouraging proof of what can be accomplished by steady adherence to such principles, even by a single man. (*Des Instituts de Hofwyl, par le Comte de Villevieille. Lettre de M. Pictet, &c. sur les Etablissements de M. de Fellenberg. Aperçu des Vues du Fondateur de Hofwyl. Revue Encyclopédique. Evidence of H. Brougham, Esq. Journal of Education, No. xii. p. 337.*) Other institutions, combining both Girard's and de Fellenberg's systems, have been recently established in Switzerland, amongst the most successful of which may be noticed that of the Castle of Lenzburg, in the Canton of Aargau. (*Notice sur la Maison d'Education dans le Château de Lenzbourg, 1831.*)

During these improvements on the Continent, England was not altogether idle. Pestalozzi had given the first impulse in Europe to Mutual Education. (*Wie Gertrud, &c.*) The honour, however, of its invention is claimed by Dr. Bell (*Instructions for conducting Schools, &c. 1817. pp. 16, 17.*) and by Joseph Lancaster. (*Letter to John Forster, Esq. &c. &c.*) It is well ascertained, however, that the mere form was employed in the East, from time immemorial. Pietro della Valle, who travelled there in the beginning of the seventeenth century, speaks of its existence,—some time anterior, certainly, to the experiment with John Friskin at the Madras school in 1797. It also appears to have been applied in France, by the Chevalier Paulet, in 1780, though not extensively. (*Plan d'Education pour les Enfants pauvres, par le Comte Alex. Laborde, 1816.*) Between Dr. Bell and Mr. Lancaster the dispute is easily settled. Dr. Bell has undoubtedly the prior claim. (*Principles of Elementary Teaching, by Prof. Pillans. 1819. Postscript, p. 126.*) But, after all, the object of the contest scarcely appears worth the vehemence which it has excited. It is a cheaper and more expeditious form; but, after all, a *form*. Neither Bell nor Lancaster appear to have ever truly penetrated to the *spirit*. Some inconveniences they removed—they drilled better, and drew tighter the machinery; but this is the mere surface of Education: Education *itself* they scarcely touched. But if England did not rise to the full elevation of the Pestalozzian system, (the parent, undoubtedly, of that high and ennobling tone which now pervades so generally continental Education, and of which so many traces are perceptible in their pedagogical productions, from Schwabe's *Lese und Lehr Buch*, up to Mad^r. N. de Saussure's *Education Progressive*;) she did not want writers who added materially to the practical and every-day departments of the art. Miss Edgeworth on one side, and Mrs. Hannah More on the other, without affecting to found a new school, still less to adopt implicitly the systems of others, by their good sense and earnestness corrected many old and pernicious absurdities, and made the first step towards reform, by arousing us to some sense of our defects. Our metaphysicians contributed, also, to these matter-of-fact improvements; but, from the material character of

results. We are told what has been done; but whether there was good reason for doing it, or due encouragement for

their philosophy, even in the hands of its purest and most eloquent teachers, such as Dugald Stewart, Alison, &c., Education was precluded all chance of advancing to that dignity and spiritual power which it has attained elsewhere. *Dr. Chalmers*, indeed, seems, of all our Education writers, the best qualified for this magnificent task; but he has hitherto dealt chiefly in generalities. A system of Education, into the details of which his lofty and glowing spirit could be infused, would, of all others, be the most fitted to redeem the country from its present gross attachment to the material and mechanical. America has outstripped us in the wise application of means. *Webster*, who stands at the head of her Educationists, has boldly insisted on the necessity of making Education universal; *Channing* has cast into it a portion of his pure and solemn morality; *Mrs. Child*, by several little treatises, of great practical value, has considerably ameliorated Maternal Education; and, by thus preparing the soil for the good seed, done as much as most of her fellow-labourers for the ultimate ends of all Education. But in America, as well as in England, there is no general system, no great eagerness for discovery. The merit is the employment of old means,—leaving to Germany and France the honour of inventing new ones.

In this latter country there has been no lack of this spirit of adventure. *M. Jacotot* has departed widely from all preceding systems. His Theory, termed, with much pretension, *l'Enseignement Universel*, is to produce the "intellectual emancipation" of the whole human race, by means of a method at once simple, invariable, practicable by all—rich or poor, infallible in its effects, &c. &c. The spirit of his doctrine is comprised in three maxims—"Tout est en tout"—"*Les intelligences sont égales*"—"On peut enseigner ce qu'on ignore;"—three startling positions, no doubt, but which *M. Jacotot-Newton*, *M. Jacotot-Socrate*, as his followers have styled him, has not applied to any more important result than the practical improvement of the memory and attention. The method deducible from these principles is comprised in a single precept, "*Apprenez par cœur une chose et y rapportez tout*;" and, to effect this, "*Répétez sans cesse*;"—a precept neither new nor yet absurd, and which has been practised time immemorial, with much advantage, but without any of the wonders which the spirit of partisanship has recently ascribed to it. *M. Jacotot* disdains to enter into any logical defence of his theory: he appeals simply to practice and results. On these, however, there is much division of opinion, even in France; and, of course, no small vehemence and partiality. Facts, however, better proved than those already produced, and somewhat more knowledge, philosophy, and modesty, on the part of its propagators, will be required, before there can be any chance of extending the system to this or to other countries. (*Enseignement Universel, par Jacotot. Emancipation Intellectuelle, par M. Le Comte de Lasteyrie. L'Enseignement Universel de M. Jacotot, en présence de l'Enseignement Universitaire, par M. La Roche. Traité Complet de la Méthode Jacotot, par M. Durietz, 3 tom. Rapport sur l'Enseignement Universel, ou Méthode Jacotot, par M. Lafite. 1830. La Jacototomachie, &c., par M. Champré. Réfutation de la Méthode Jacotot, par P. Iorain. 1830.*)

Such are the fluctuations of opinion and system in this important art; nor are

repeating it,—of this we are totally ignorant. The school or college process is, of course, vaunted; but its fruits, good or bad, soon disappear. We know nothing of the pupils it has so systematically educated; we lose sight of them the moment they are ushered into the wide and bustling world: there commences another education, far more complicated than that from which they had just emerged; an education, made up of all the infinite and tangled passions and influences of human life; influences of government—influences of party—influences of society,—all seizing the soft clay, and fashioning it into a thousand fantastic diversities. Yet, amidst all this, the original being pierces to the surface; so also does the original education. If the grown man evince a marked deficiency in his mental or moral constitution, we may boldly aver, except in cases of decidedly organic defect, that there was a secret vice in the management of his childhood. What is true of the individual, is as true of the masses; not only as true, but far more perceptible. Where a large portion of any community is defective in the qualities necessary to ensure the public happiness, its education is essentially bad; vice is at the bottom, however it may be disguised by externals: both the interests of the individual and the nation have been compromised.

There is thus a *bad* education and a *good* education; and, in order to ascertain the good, all that appears necessary is, simply, to examine the various processes presented to us by different countries, to compare them with their results, and to select such as are found to have produced the greatest amount of benefit. The complete execution of this project would, no doubt, be very difficult; but the attempt to execute it will still be of infinite utility. The time may be yet far distant, in which we shall be enabled, from well-ascertained experiment,

they yet by any means terminated. New demands, new lights, a different tone of metaphysics and morals, will every day infallibly modify, not only the applications of these principles, but the means which may be taken for the discovery of new. In either case, enough has been shown, in the preceding outline, to teach us caution and humility. Exertion is not enough—it must not be misapplied. Improvment cannot be attained by conjecture, but by observation. We must *think*; but we must have, also, *facts* to think upon.

judicious discussion, and just classification, to say decidedly what constitutes good Education; but, in the interval, the boundaries of doubt may every day be more and more restricted. Private Education must long continue an art—a collection rather of happy applications than fixed maxims. But even that art, after a time, will gradually establish its principles, in proportion as parents improve in observation, and new materials for generalising arise. Public Education, has already risen beyond that term. There, methods take a firmer hold: individual differences are absorbed in the mass; the play of the complex and vast machinery depends neither entirely on the scholar, nor on the master. Defined and constant rules, on established principles, are in operation; and, however we may yet require a much more extended experience, to bring its working to perfection, it still exhibits the rudiments of a science; it is the best field for observing and developing what really constitutes good Education.

What, then, is good Education? The best means we can devise for preparing the future man for the ends destined by the Creator. But what are these ends? Upon the solution of this question depend the means. We must know whither we are going, before we can decide what road we are to take. We must know in what Education proposes to terminate, before we decide what should be the nature of our Education.

Some have proposed, as ends, the Development and perfection of our faculties: but this is mistaking means for ends—it is stopping short on the road.

Others, again, have proposed, Utility. But this conceals an ulterior term,—what is utility? “The greatest happiness of the greatest number.” Happiness, then, is the end of education,—but what is happiness?

From the time of ancient philosophy to the present day—this has been the great object proposed to the hopes and passions, spiritual or physical, of our nature. Sometimes it has taken the lofty character of Stoicism; sometimes the more attractive form of Epicurism: but, throughout, it is one and the same divinity, under all these various manifestations, which has been worshipped. But were happiness, *alone*, the end—or

even the end, *par excellence*,—either of human life or of Education, we should, on an impartial examination, be compelled to confess, that it is an end which has scarcely ever been attained. Happiness, on this earth, exists only by comparison. It is not, nor can it be, an absolute, a fixed quality. It is a mere motion to some other happiness beyond it; and just in proportion to the distribution of this motion,—of these hopes and this activity,—through our earthly existence, is the measure, great or small, of our earthly enjoyment. Both these stimulants, indeed, can be vigorously sustained by a series of ends in long perspective, all sufficiently accessible, to justify our calmness and confidence, but all requiring a certain putting out of our internal and external forces, and all terminating in some object more than any other worthy of our exertions. It is precisely this perspective which gives so much charm to the labours of most professions, and which keeps in such healthy circulation the life-blood of society. But to mistake this for the *end* of being, would be fatal. Philosophy, it is true, teaches that there is a happiness which is independent of these worldly rewards, and often in contrast to them. Philosophy teaches that true happiness and true utility can only combine with virtue; that even nature avenges itself for the abuses of her gifts; that, on the most refined calculation of selfishness, there is wisdom in self-subjugation; and in economising pleasure, a certain, though late reward. But, after all, what is this but prudence? And what, even at its highest value, is prudence? Prudence, by itself, in the moral world, has no fixed value; it derives all its worth from the impress it receives. It may be found as often in the service of vice as of virtue, and just as great a check upon one as upon the other. In the language of Plato's Socrates, we may be temperate, through intemperance. It is, after all, a more purified species of egotism; it ends where it begins. Utilitarianism, indeed, has attempted to raise it from this earthly origin; and, by embracing mankind, to divest it of its purely personal characteristics. It thus partakes of a somewhat more elevated morality: but then it is a morality *recommended*, not *enforced*. There is no seconder, of the external law, in the human breast—no Utilitarian conscience. As long as such is the case,

self-sacrifice—the individual for the mass—may be preached, but it will not be practised. The interests of society may be said to be conformable to those of the individual: but *what* are those interests? who is to teach those interests? on whose teaching are we to rely? and, until we can rely, and are convinced, why should we believe? Teachers and opinions, indeed, we meet in abundance. We find a creed and a pulpit at every step. But who would build on such vague and shifting principles the great ends of human life? We must look for something certain—something here to-day, but not gone to-morrow. But is this to be found? Undoubtedly, God has not commanded impossibilities; nor sent us into creation—without a path, or purpose—a medley, only, of doubts and contingencies. There *is* an end, and there *are* means (though not those already mentioned), both clear, both decisive. That end is, the full *perfection* of our being in another world, through the faithful discharge of *duty* here—those means, the full developement of our double nature—for the ultimate accomplishment of that end.

Such I believe to be the great purpose of all human existence, the great object to which all human existence should unceasingly be devoted. Nor is it immaterial whether this principle be well established or not. On the contrary, it is of deep importance; it directly and powerfully affects the entire character and conduct of man. How different the motives suggested by the two principles—to what opposite results do they not inevitably lead? How different the disciple of an unchanging law,—a law of self-devotion,—a law which admits no uncertainty, and no compromise,—calm, absolute, perfect; and the disciple of one which estimates virtue as a choice between one kind of pleasure and another, and depends for the interpretation of its obligations on the veering political or metaphysical factions of the day. It is not the pleasures of virtue which the former seeks, but virtue itself; not the consolations of religion, but religion even without its consolations. A character so tempered, in such a school, may not play well with the counters of the world: he may fail in the little dexterities of life; he may be unfortunate; he may be unhappy: but he will have satisfied the *highest* end of existence; and,

if he does not attain perfection in his way, he will assuredly reach a very high degree of amelioration. The thirst of perfection, its want, the presentiment of something better than our best, will constantly urge him onward, and not onward merely, but upward; instead of taking his destiny at the hands of others, he will impress his destiny on them: he will draw his opinion and practice from himself, and not from men or their vicissitudes.

If this be the end of life, surely it should be the end of all preparation for life—of all Education. The idea of motion, of progress, of a constant tending towards perfection, ought never to depart from the mind of the teacher. It is not the acquisition, but the disposition to acquire, which is to be looked after. Where this impulse is not, all is wanting; there is no interior life—all dries up—all perishes. Not to go on, is to go backward; as soon as we cease to grow, we begin to decay. It is the want of this instinct towards the best, which is the cause of so many educations, carefully conducted in appearance, terminating in miserable results. The very degree of improvement attained, produces indifference to further attainment. They have reached their level; the rest of existence is stagnation and mediocrity.

"Perfection, through the performance of Duty,"—is, then, the great end of all Education. But, to attain this, appropriate means are requisite. These in their turn become other ends, to which other means are necessary. To develope, in the individual, all the perfection of which he is capable, is, says Kant, the great object of Education. But this, again, requires the development of all the faculties of the individual.

Faculty means power. Our faculties are our powers—the result of our organisation—the instruments of our nature. Our nature is triple,—physical, intellectual, and moral; so also are our powers, each acting on, and acted on by, the other. To develope and perfect these faculties or powers, becomes an immediate or secondary end of Education; and naturally divides it into *physical, intellectual, and moral*.

But how educate these faculties?—how carry on this physical, intellectual, and moral education, so as to obtain the

ends for which it is designed, and to obtain them most expeditiously and surely?

These faculties are to be developed—but in reference to our improvement and well-being, and to that of the society which we are surrounded.

This improvement, this well-being, both individual and social, is a large term, subject to infinite modifications. The well-being of one man is not in all things the well-being of another. Neither is the well-being of this state the same as that of the next; nor of this day the same as that of yesterday.* There is but *one* food, though several *forms* of food, says Hippocrates. There are points in which we all agree; but points, also, in which we all differ. Both resemblances and differences should be taken into consideration.

Education, divided into three great departments, in reference to the intrinsic nature of man, will thus require a new division or classification, in reference to the purposes of his social existence. Such as are destined for private and domestic duties, are educated at home—such as are destined for public, in communities and abroad. Education, in this point of view, is *private* or *public*; or, more specifically, *individual* or *national*.

As Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Education are reciprocally affected by each other, so also is Public Education affected by Private. It is, therefore, extremely important for the great ends of Public Education that Private Education should be highly improved and perfectly understood. Private Education embraces almost the entire department of Female Education; Female Education exercises a direct influence over the education of children; that of children, over every other—public and private—in after life.† It is in Private Education

* Filangieri, *Legislazione*, lib. i. c. 5.

† Female Education, especially as preparing and qualifying for maternal instruction, is, perhaps, after all, the most important. It decides all; for it is that first step, which leads to all others. That step taken, it is difficult to cross from it into any other road. Iselin and Pestalozzi have not too strongly insisted on its influence: — “Ich habe es für unstreitig,” says the former, “wenn man die Geschichte aller Männer genau wusste, edie sich durch Rechtschaffenheit, und Tugend ausgezeichnet haben dass man unter zehnen immer neuen finden würde welchen diesen Vortheil ihren Mütter schuldig waren.” Few, indeed,

we can best analyse the more minute processes of Education. It is true that Public Education is busied chiefly with the combination and management of masses; but all this combination will be useless, and this management impracticable, without a previous knowledge of details. These details must first be studied in the single sample; they may then be applied with advantage to numbers. But this application, it must also be remembered, is a new process, and requires equally a new study. Minds brought together, are totally different from minds when alone. New affinities, unknown to their possessors, suddenly declare themselves—new influences arise out of contact—a general fermentation goes on—totally different combinations ensue. To manage, then, such materials with effect, to give Education its full power, a competent knowledge both of Private and Public Education is indispensably requisite.

But what is this power, what are the real unexaggerated influences of Education? How far can it correct, how far remodel the original man? What share is to be ascribed, in the formation of character, to constitution, what to Education?—an intricate question; and, though debated, from the earliest period to our own days, by opposing metaphysicians, is still undecided. Yet the various changes through which one's own intellect and character successively pass—the colours which they invariably borrow from surrounding minds—the sort of “education source” which is constantly going on within us, under the imperceptible but ever-active tutorship of time and place,—these phenomena, familiar to all, would, without any additional evidence, lead us to ascribe the largest influence to Education. No two men, it is very true, are the same; and

have better than the Germans inculcated “wie sehr überhaupt die Vollkommenheit, und das Glück der Menschheit sich auf *Weibesstand* und *Weibertugend* gründet.” How weighty an office, then, lies in the hands of the mother! and how deeply responsible is she for the virtue, the happiness, the security, of her children! Until this portion of Education be efficiently reformed,—until mothers themselves be taught how to teach—until apathy be stirred to exertion, and ignorance begins to see, and indolence no longer delays,—Education will always be encumbered with great difficulties, and teachers be left at the mercy of every contingency.

there are aboriginal differences between one man and another, by which, notwithstanding all our efforts, all subsequent impressions must be materially modified; but it must also be remembered that there are also singular powers of sympathy, wonderful facilities of adaptation, in the human being, which go far to harmonise these differences—to supply the want of that instinct, which, amongst animals, is invariably found to be the same in the same species.* The manner in which these powers are developed and applied, chiefly determines the future character, both of the individual and society. A number of children, following, even separately, the same discipline, will, with all the peculiar shades derivable from their respective positions, bear to each other a strong family likeness. But, if these children be brought together, and, to similarity of precept, similarity also of practice and example be conjoined; these powers of sympathy, these tendencies to imitation, will be increased in an infinite proportion. Admitting even a far greater depth and permanence in national habits than is supposed, there is little doubt that a number of pupils, of totally different nations, thus educated together, would lose all national peculiarities, and be only known by their resemblance to some *common* model, which belonged strictly to none. In this point of view, the infant may be said to be of no country, but capable of belonging to any. He may with equal facility be moulded into a Chinese or a Laplander, a Turk or an Englishman; so completely are preceding ages to him a blank, and (physical differences apart) is the flexibility of his nature at the disposal of those hands which first receive him on his arrival. Education thus becomes,—a second creation. That creation, its order, its force, is again directed by a thousand circumstances,—some intentional, others accidental—in the Child, the Parent, and the Teacher. The great difficulty of Education is to counteract or to employ these circumstances. How it may *best* be effected, is still, in great degree, a secret; but a secret which may be discovered, like every other secret

* What teaches the chicken, almost as soon as hatched, to fly from the hawk—little more than a speck in the air—to the maternal wing? What instructs the castor? Condillac, and the whole of his school, make us creatures of mere experience. But is there no thought or action until experience begins?

of nature, by persevering observation of the phenomena, and a judicious classification of the laws by which these phenomena are governed. The present age has begun this task, but many desiderata remain to be supplied before we can legitimately hope for its completion. Either branch of Education—Private or Public—opens an ample field for such enquiry and discovery. The present work is necessarily limited to the second only of these branches—to *Public* or *National* Education.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

“ Ut humanitatem homini daret.” — PLINY.

WE live in an age and country in which the true principles of national glory and security are no longer questioned. We place them on the only basis capable of supporting them—on the national liberties and happiness; these, again, on the foundations of national intellect and virtue.

If the character and conduct of the individual be only the expression of his Education “*en dernier résultat*,” so also, but far more strongly, is the national conduct the expression or result of National Education.

It is surely, then, a matter not only of interest, but of safety—of duty—the paramount interest beyond all others to every nation, to every individual of every nation,—but above all to its rulers—to whose guardianship what the nation is, and what the nation may become, is confided,—to see that the Education of the nation shall, in all things, be such as most to favour the national intellect and virtue.

No portion of the Education of a country, on these principles, ought to be excluded; for there is no portion which does not exert some influence on the country. Private and public—individual and national—all are co-operating causes, of more or less weight, in the one common result.

But peculiar obstacles may preclude the state from any im-

mediate interference with Private Education. The sensitiveness of freedom, the fastidiousness of national habits, may shrink from such intrusion. Not so with Public. It is, or ought to be, the immediate object of its solicitude; it belongs to all; it is, in the fullest sense, National. The nation ought to interfere in its establishment and management.

But what are the considerations which such an interference implies? That the Education should be perfectly well adapted to the important purposes for which it is intended. An Education counteracting these purposes, or not in entire harmony with them, is an injurious or defective Education. No state is called on to protect, no state should permanently permit, the existence of such an Education. It would be a perpetual *contre-sens* on the largest scale. The admission of the utility of intellect, of the necessity of virtue, and perseverance in measures adapted only to discourage both, is at once an error in logic and morality.

The Goodness, then, of Education, is the first object to be looked to. The diffusion of a bad system, is the diffusion of an evil. Numbers, here, so far from being matters of congratulation, are matters of regret. When we are told there are 60, or 600, or 6000 schools, we are told nothing,—sometimes worse than nothing. We do not ask for buildings, we ask for Education.

But if the system be a *good* system,—if every day furnishes in the increased improvement of the moral and intellectual habits of the people—evidence positive and decisive of its goodness,—then, indeed, the question of extending such a blessing to all our population becomes an object of deep importance; and the adoption of every means, which can accelerate its extension, is a *duty*.

But there is a third consideration, essential to the efficiency of the other two: the Education may be the best; it may fully answer the high ends for which it is designed; it may have already produced a new race of men; it may have gone far to reform the morals and mind of the country. Again: these changes may be general; the spirit may have passed over every water, the light penetrated into every dwelling. Instruction may be found on every hill,—under every

green tree! What secures the permanency of this blessing? where are its roots laid? on what does it live? Enthusiasm is a wayward nurse, and may desert its offspring at the very hour when its sustaining arm may be the most necessary. The contributions of charity are fluctuating — often fleeting; national grants are the instruments of parties; modern largesses often voted for the object of the hour, — sometimes proposed with little consideration, at others rejected with less. Are these to be the only assurances which a nation should have for the duration of its Education; a blessing which ought to be bound up with the very existence of the nation itself? It is not sufficient that it be *good*, nor that it be *extended*; we must have pledges that it will *last*: in other words, there must be means, not for its establishment only, but for its continued support. To resume, — National Education should, in the first place, be *good*; in the second, *universal*; and in the third, should be provided with *means* for its *permanent support*. These three propositions will be amply developed in the three succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER I.

NATIONAL EDUCATION SHOULD BE GOOD.

“ Ce n'est donc ni le Latin, ni l'Histoire, ni la Géographie, &c. qu'il faut apprendre, aux enfans. La première chose, qu'on devroit avoir en vue, ce seroit encore un coup, de donner à leur esprit *l'exercice de toutes ses opérations.*”

CONDILLAC.

“ Le précepte fondamental qui regarde le but et la fin de l'instruction, est d'avoir beaucoup plus, et tout le principal soin d'exercer, cultiver, et faire valoir le naturel et propre bien, et moins amasser et acquérir de l'étranger; plus tendre à la *sagesse*, qu'à la science, et à l'art; plus à bien former le jugement, et par conséquent la *volonté et la conscience*, qu'à remplir la mémoire, et réchauffer l'imagination.”

CHARRON.

WHEN we aim at excellence in any department, we are not satisfied with assuring ourselves of the superiority of one process over another; we immediately seek the means by which it may be put into operation.

We apply these means, but we have still to wait until their efficacy be confirmed by experience.

The subject, then, of this section, naturally divides itself into three distinct enquiries:—1. What constitutes a good National Education? 2. By what means is it to be applied? 3. What are its effects upon the community?

1. *Characteristics of a good National Education.*—A good National Education is an absolute term. We can only judge comparatively or approximately; we can only say which is the best amongst those with which we are acquainted. By best, we mean what is best calculated for our purposes.

But what are these purposes? The fulfilment, in the first place, of the great end of all Education; and, secondly, of the proximate ends by which this end can be attained. This chief end is perfection through duty. The proximate ends are, the complete and harmonious development of all the faculties

of man, in or dermore perfectly to enable him to fulfil these duties.

But these duties and these faculties vary. Some of these duties are universal; others, special. Special are, again, determined by difference of individuals, societies, and nations. Again, these faculties are more largely bestowed and required in some cases than in others, according to the same distinctions, — individual, social, and national.

1. Some of these duties are universal. There is no individual who is not called on to fulfil the common moral code. Parents, children, brothers, sisters, husbands, wives, have duties, which are not determined by climate or government, which are the duties of the civilised and the savage — the unwritten law of the whole human race — co-extensive with human nature.

2. Others of these duties are special.

The duties of a free citizen and a slave, of an English nobleman and of a Russian, of this century and of the middle ages, are obviously distinct. Individual situation, government, time, are all elements in such considerations. They determine these special duties.

In like manner, the developement of the faculties is universal and special. 1st, There is no individual who will not derive better means for the fulfilment of all these duties from a sound state of health, an active and vigorous frame, — from an intelligent and occupied mind, — from well-regulated passions and perfect self-control. There is no state which will not be virtuous, and prosperous, composed of individuals so disciplined. But the application of these improved faculties must vary according to the laws of climate and institutions. Thus, then, in the first place, *some* degree of developement is required in every state as long as these faculties are common to human nature, for the well-being both of the individual and society: and, in the next, the *greater or less degree* of this developement depends upon the greater or less improvement, the greater or less degree of moral and intellectual wants, in the state itself.

The best system, then, of National Education, is that which enables each citizen most perfectly to fulfil the various duties which his several relations, public and private, in society impose

upon him, by giving to the physical, intellectual, and moral faculties the full perfection of which they are susceptible.

All this may appear superfluous—the announcement of self-evident propositions: so, indeed, it ought to be; but when we proceed from reasoning to realities, we find each of these positions contravened in practice. The majority, not of the ignorant only, but of the half-enlightened, of the teachers as well as of the taught, draw, if we are to judge from their conduct, their Education system from very different principles.

But what are the public and private duties of the citizen? That depends upon his interests.

Every man, by his conformation, has two classes of interests—moral, and material: the second, of course, subordinate to the first. These, again, are modified—1st, by his dispositions; and, 2dly, by his position.

The Dispositions of an individual are, more especially, the object of Individual Education. It is extremely difficult to adjust Public or National Education to all those niceties which constitute individual character or idiosyncrasy. At the same time, hopes may be legitimately entertained, that, in proportion to the discovery of new methods, and more judicious classifications, even this task will become comparatively easy. In the interval, due attention may doubtless be paid to those dispositions which are common to all, and which, in some manner, form the public character—the moral physiognomy of nations.

This peculiar public character, formed of the aggregate of private, again, acts, in a very striking manner, upon the character of the individual. But this action is still farther affected by the changes of the times. A period of total quiet, resulting from a long-continued acquiescence in old institutions, leaves a very different imprint upon the national mind, from that which is the necessary consequence of a general breaking-up of old principles and forms, and an earnest search after new. In the first instance, an Education of stimulants becomes necessary; it is essential to the healthy activity of the body politic: in the second, steadiness—love of order—mutual toleration—the sacrifice of private resentments and factious interests to general good, should be the great lessons of National Education.

But, the Position, both of the individual and of masses, admits of a much greater variety of modifications. It is affected by grade in the social system—by the form of government—by the actual state of civilisation. All these, again, are subject to various vicissitudes. All are to be attended to in Education. •

1. *Grade in the social system* determines both the nature and extent of instruction. There is a certain degree of developement and instruction, which ought to be common to the members of every civilised community, but beyond which it may not be for the interests of certain classes, or of the community at large, to proceed. There are others, also, which require not only a much larger share of this common instruction, but also a special instruction, adapted to their own special wants. Both these demands should be strictly attended to. A National Education should provide for the first case in the amplest manner, giving, to all, the instruction necessary, but not requiring application to any other, which might demand too much time, and tend to produce a developement as dangerous as it would be disproportionate. For the second, the nation cannot necessarily be expected to provide a separate education,—the study and practice of each particular art is beyond its province; but it may combine with the general instruction the elements of these special studies, and give, to such as more peculiarly require or merit it, a more positive encouragement and assistance.

2. *The form of government*, in the present age, is all-powerful in modelling character. But character reciprocally models government.* The education of the days of passive obedience, and of boroughmongering monopoly, is no longer fitted for the future legislators and constituents of England. We have obtained rights which we should respect and make respected; we have received a new code of political duties to fulfil. If we do not wish to produce neglect or discord, apathy or anarchy, too much or too little, our education should be in harmony with these new institutions. It should give the intelligence to appreciate, and the courage to main-

* “ Pour les conduire comme il te plait, il faut te conduire comme il leur plait.”—*J. J. Rousseau, Émile*, t. ii.

tain them. It should fit for the wise, but vigorous exercise of our new powers; for the gradual and discreet correction of still remaining abuse. What a variety of distinct, but not opposing qualities, are requisite for these important purposes! How much ought the absolute necessity of providing such qualities, modify the entire organisation of our public education!

3. The position of the individual is most of all affected by *the civilisation of the day*. It surrounds him on every side; it enters, in every way, into the whole of his moral and physical being. Its manifestations are visible in every possible relation, of man with man, of nation with nation. Industry, labour, the arts, the developement of all spiritual and material power, the exhibition of thought under all its varieties, of moral principle in all its applications, the government, the station, the very existence of communities itself, are all immediately affected by the state of civilisation. Education, which ought to be a preparatory discipline for all, must be in conformity with all: but more; it must also contain within itself the vivifying and active means of improving all. It must not only be in conformity with existing civilisation, but it must also tend to augment the good, and check the evils which existing civilisation is calculated to produce.

It thence follows, that, as all classes are actively engaged in the advancement of civilisation, but all variously, a system of National Education cannot be considered good, which is not organised in reference to the occupations of all these classes, and, as much as possible, adapted to the diversity of their occupations. Formerly, all education was for the higher orders only; the lower—the operative classes—were passed by. At a period when mechanical superiority depended only upon manual force or practical dexterity, this neglect might have been attended with comparatively little injury: but in the present age, when both form so small an item in the account,—when intelligence and information are the great elements,—when, by the contact of nation with nation, by general assimilation of habits and governments, the number of competitors in every market has been indefinitely increased, and

every department of trade or manufacture necessarily exposed to frequent vicissitudes; the continuance of such neglect is, at the same time, both injurious and unwise. It is a crime against the individual, upon whom it entails unavoidable misery; it is a crime against the country, which it places necessarily in a position of inferiority to those neighbouring states, where a wiser policy assists the intelligence and exertions of the inhabitants. It is not sufficient simply to permit the mental and moral culture of these classes; both should be actively protected, and encouraged. Elementary instruction, as has been already said, should be sufficiently broad to allow the first rudiments of all those branches of knowledge, which a more special education is intended afterwards to develop. The facility of communication with nations, hitherto unknown to each other, the new relations of thought and action, reciprocal commercial and political services, should be still further encouraged, by furnishing the rising generation with such knowledge as may every way tend to maintain, and multiply them. All barriers should be broken down which the prejudices of ignorance, and the erroneous calculations of commercial or political selfishness, have hitherto so generally and successfully maintained. How many countries have lingered behind their destiny — how many have lost all the advantages which nature and events have showered into their lap, from a want of due attention to this first national lesson! Nor is *knowledge* only sufficient. New wants have imposed additional necessity for *labour*. A good system of National Education should be especially fitted to produce both the taste and habits of useful occupation. All systems which counteract this tendency, or inadequately encourage it, are at variance with the demands of our age. To allow the pupil to pass whole years in learning little and learning ill, is inculcating, by practice, if not by precept, the habits of idleness; to allow him to pass it in studies which have no sort of reference to his position, is superadding, to idleness, inutility.

But civilisation has also its vices and abuses. The extraordinary activity which it gives to thought, is not always fertile in benefit: it impresses, at times, directions, on opinion and action, injurious to both the moral and intellectual man.

In certain points of view, it exhibits the seeds even of decay and deterioration. The very arts, which seem most to raise and embellish life, introduce, also, in their train habits of effeminacy and self-indulgence. They create new wants, which become, in turn, from servants, masters. They concentrate the entire being within self; they render self-sacrifice, an absurdity, — duty, a difficulty; they fix all enjoyments in the material world; they add to riches a fictitious value, measured by the lowest passions of our nature. The political economy, and much, also, of the moral philosophy of the day, harmonising too closely with this sensualism, — estimating as nothing, in the social scale, what cannot be reduced to some material utility, — substituting, too often, calculation for conscience, and measuring virtues by what they will fetch in the market, — has contributed not only to disenchant existence, but in many instances to lower it; to dry the heart; to deaden the understanding; and to wither the noble and the generous in every department of life. To this general influence, arising out of general circumstances, others of a more special nature may be added. While the diffusion of knowledge tends, on one side, to *enlarge*; on the other, the division and subdivision of labour, mental and physical, tends not less to *restrict*, the free exercise of our faculties. Even the highest professions are not exempt from this defect. Prejudices innumerable, contracted habits, little ideas, — a disproportion, bordering on distortion, in their mental organisation, disturbing all intellectual and often all moral beauty, — dispositions fatal to independence both of thought and action, are the frequent consequences of this vaunted improvement of modern times. In the prison of a single occupation, how few can breathe the free air, and gaze on the broad sky, of intellectual or moral speculation! how cramped their corporeal and mental vigour! how stunted and curtailed all the original movements and energies of their nature! True it is, that society out of this partial evil educes common good: this very subdivision is the creator of all the magnificent and gigantic marvels, in which our modern civilisation glories as her peculiar boast. But it may still be doubted whether, with all this, there is not, in the infection which individual misery, igno-

rance, and depravity arising out of these causes, must more or less communicate to the mass, a heavy balance of evil, which, in the mind of the moralist, is scarcely compensated by all the seeming power and wealth by which it is concealed.

Nor is this evil confined to professions—it is the characteristic, in a minor degree, of all modern civilisation—if the principle of the perfection, the principle also of the feebleness of our whole modern system. The very security and facility which it produces, the little demand upon individual powers, and the dead reliance upon combined ones, have gone far to extinguish that personal energy, that sense of soul, that will of iron, allied to the higher qualities of our nature, and the glory and the strength of ancient and barbarous times. Our crimes, for the most part, are weaknesses;—want of virtue more than vice: we omit rather than commit; we dwell in decencies; we allow evil; we would not take the trouble to injure our neighbour: *but* neither would we walk a single step to save him. This negative virtue, this passive vice, has, however, produced as much corruption, and far less heroism, than the fierce but generous passions,—the vice and virtue,—the half-god and half-demon spirit,—of barbarism. It has let down the whole scale of our social existence imperceptibly: in comparing with each other, we do not perceive the alteration,—so exactly are proportions preserved: it is only by looking to the points which we have passed, in our voyage onward to civilisation, that we at last become sensible of the humiliating change.

But these vices, inseparable, perhaps, altogether from civilisation,—the complement, indeed, in general, of its virtues,—may be *checked* and *neutralised*. Whatever be the position of the individual, he is exposed to the action of these influences. An education, therefore, which proposes to fit him perfectly for such position, must be as well calculated to preserve him from these evils, as to prepare him for the full enjoyment and advancement of the corresponding good.

The best system, then, of National Education, is that which best fulfils these several conditions. It should be an education which, keeping steadily in view the perfection and duties

of the individual, should fit him, by every possible development, for each. It should be an education which should make him not only a good son, a good brother, husband, father, and friend; but also a good citizen,—and a good citizen living in the nineteenth century, and under the shade of British institutions. It should be an education fitting him for the most skilful exercise of the particular trade, profession, or functions to which his position in society shall ultimately lead. It should be an education which, by exciting a love of labour, an honourable emulation, a well-directed industry, should prepare him for the wise and rapid advancement of human civilisation. But, above all, it should be an Education—a truly moral—a truly Christian education—not an education of sect or of party; not an education of surface or of letter; but an education, truly and thoroughly, of the *spirit*, and dealing with the spirits of men; which, by striking at the root of all our vices, that systematic egotism, which leaves the individual without energy, as the state without vigour,—that want of will which drags him at the wheel of every folly, of every seduction,—that habit, in all things, of the little, the calculating, the material*, should renew, elevate, and ennoble society in its very elements, and check at the root the vices, of that civilisation which, without such check, it is sometimes a matter of doubt whether we should curse or bless. It should, in fine, be an education which should make the rising generation not only guardians, of the rights and blessings which they are destined to enjoy, but reformers also of the corruptions which may still continue:—the masters, and not the slaves, of their social prosperity; which should light in their hearts that moral flame, that generosity, that truth, that “loyauté,” for which there is so little aliment in our present system, but upon which, after all, the real power, as well as happiness, of nations is built. Whether such an education, with our actual means, and against our actual pre-

* “Que doit-il résulter de cela ?” says Madame N. de Saussure, speaking of the vices of elementary education: “Exactement ce qu’on observe chez les hommes faits : une grande absence des motifs désintéressés, et une prépondérance toujours croissante des motifs sensuels ou égoïstes, que dès-lors ne sauraient manquer de se manifester tôt ou tard. Une volonté foible pour le bien, ardente et habile pour tout autre objet, devient ainsi une conséquence nécessaire.”

judices, be practicable, is another question. Our present methods give great surface, and little depth, to mind or character: greater depth, and less surface, would be the result to which our education should be directed. But in order to obtain this, as well as other benefits, we have first to combat many monsters; and of all, none more difficult to meet or vanquish, than our inordinate ignorance and vanity. “Socrate répétait souvent, ‘Tout ce que je sais c’est que je ne sais rien.’ On sait tout dans notre siècle, excepté ce que Socrate savait.”

2. *Means for carrying into effect a good national education.* “Carneades,” says Cicero, in his *Treatise De Divinatione* (l. i. c. 13.), “imagined, that, in the stone quarries at Chios, he had found, in a stone that was split, a representation of the head of a little Pan, or sylvan deity. I believe he had found a figure not unlike; but surely not such a one as, you would say, had been formed by an excellent sculptor, like Scopas.” And such is the difference between the education of nature and the education of art; between leaving mind to its own accidental fashioning, and shaping it into the expression and beauty of which it is susceptible, by the philosophic spirit, and skilful chiselling, of moral and intellectual discipline. Michael Angelo saw, in the mass of marble, the future statue*; but it required the hand of a Michael Angelo to evoke a Moses: in the hands of an inferior artist, the stone would have continued a shapeless block.

Methods, then, are the all in all of education: they are education itself. It is, of course, necessary to have an end; to understand where it lies; to see it distinctly: but, without the means to reach it,—the road through the spirit of man, the bridge across the difficulties of time and place,—we can only sit down upon our native earth, and yearn after the rocky summit in vain. Do these methods exist?—Are they applied? Are they applicable? Can they be found? Is a process, practical and steady, to be devised, by which, even partially, the ends can be attained?

It is here we are at once thrown upon the wide field of

into health. Omit it in favour of the intellectual and moral faculties, and you provide instruments, it is true, for mind, but instruments which, when wanted, cannot be used. Intellectual and Moral Education may rank before Physical, but they are not more essential: the physical powers are the hewers of wood and the drawers of water, for the spiritual. The base of the column is in the earth; but without it, neither could the shaft stand firm above it, nor the capital ascend to the sky.

The education which confines to the desk or chapel is a very partial education; it is only a chapter in the system. It is pernicious — it is a portion only of the blessing of education. If such be the result of separating physical and intellectual education—how much more so of dividing intellectual and moral! It is laboriously providing, for the community, dangers and crimes. It entrusts power, with the perfect certainty of its being abused. It brings into the very heart of our social existence the two hostile principles of Manicheism; it sets up the glory and beauty of civilisation, to be dashed to pieces by the “evil spirit,” to whom it gives authority over it. It disciplines the bad passions of our nature against the good, making men wicked by rule, — rendering vice system, — intrusting to the clever head the strong hand, and setting both loose by the impulse of the bad heart below. The omission of Physical Education renders the other two ineffective or precarious; but the neglect of Moral Education converts physical and intellectual into positive evils. The pestilence of a high-taught, but corrupt, mind, “blowing where it listeth,” scathes and sears the souls of men, — it is felt for miles and years almost interminable. By the press (the steam of the intellectual world) it touches distant ages and other hemispheres. It corrupts the species in mass. It is not only in the actual generation, but in the rickety offspring which follow late and long, that its deep-eating poison — its Mephistopheles breath — is strongly detected. Late ages wonder at the waste of great means, at the perversion of high opportunities, and noble powers, at the dereliction of solemn duties, which every where characterise these strong, but evil beings. Call them conquerors — call them philosophers — call them patriots — put

on what golden seeming you may, — when the mask falls off, as it always does, in due season, we see behind it the worst combination which can disgust or afflict humanity. Such men — deliverers and enlighteners (as their sycophants hail them) — such men are the true master-workers of the vices and calamities of their age and country. But who made them? They who taught them. Education left out its very essence. It gave them knowledge, but it left them immorality.*

But is Moral Education possible, without Intellectual? There are those who think they can, and ought to separate them.† But they judge erroneously, and thank God, attempt impossibilities. Half of our being cannot thus be torn from the other. They are intertwined: it is difficult to say, where one begins, and the other ends. The two great movers of our moral nature, are Sentiment and Reason. Sentiment is the aboriginal instinct of our being — that which, for a long period, preludes to, and supplies the place of, Reason, and, in its wonderful developements of sympathy and imitation, directs more rapidly and truly to the degree of intellectual and moral culture for which it was intended, than even reason itself. It is the living flame, by which we measure the proportion of

* What is true of individuals, is still truer of societies. A reading and writing community, may be a very vicious community — if morality (not merely its theory, but its practice,) be not made as much a portion of education as reading and writing. Knowledge is only a *branch* of education, but it has too often been taken for the *whole*. Hence the innumerable contests, on the advantages and disadvantages of *Education*. If the terms of the proposition had been clearly stated at the beginning, these differences could not have arisen. The advocates of Education appeal for proof of its advantages, to the effects resulting from the extension of reading and writing only. These effects are by no means as favourable, as it is assumed. The opponents of Education, taking advantage of this circumstance, maintain that Education *in general* is injurious. If both parties had determined, that by Education should be understood, *not* only knowledge, but morality, there could not have been a question between them, of the advantages of its diffusion. Both, therefore, to a certain degree, are right, and both are wrong. That the extension of true Education, of complete Education, is a blessing, cannot be doubted; but that the extension of Intellectual Education, without Moral, — the extension of the half Education, or the false Education now in use, is such — is a very different question.

† "Nature and mind! This is no language for Christians. On this account we burn Atheists, because such speeches are highly dangerous. Nature is *Sin* — Mind is *Devil*. Between them they give birth to *Doubt* their misformed, hermaphrodite offspring. Not so with us," &c. — *Goethe's Faust*.

life which is within us. With Sentiment, all morality, all religion should commence. Hence, no child is too young for the first feelings of either. The Author of all good, and of all love, is already made known to the infant, in the smiles and caresses of its parents. But something more than this is required; and Providence has been equally wise and beneficent in providing it. Reason is the regulator of this impulse — though not the impulse itself. Providence offers us its aid, precisely at a period, when it is demanded. Morality must confirm its impulses by its convictions. It must judge as well as feel. An act of sound judgment is often a virtue — if not a virtue, at least, the creator of many. Most of the passions settle into vices, principally from the weakness or torpor of the intellect. A conscience, indeed, is set up; but so completely under the guidance of its numerous assessors, — prejudices, illusions, fears, and other children of ignorance, — that its decisions cannot for an instant be relied on. The decree of one day is reversed the next: it is dragged to and fro by contending beliefs and opinions; it is the mere creature of chance and impulse. How has all this vacillation and incoherence been produced? By the insufficiency, or the vagueness, of the materials which go to make up its judgments. The senses have been uneducated — the perceptions uneducated; the attention has been uneducated; reason and judgment are therefore blind and random. The intellect, in a word, has lain dormant. Religion — Piety is not the child of the affections only, but of the affections and of the reason combined. Allow the affections only to sway, without the regulation of reason, and this very Piety will soon become a spoiled child! Where a false association sets in, — where error is once engrafted by wrong judgment, — every new step in the same line is a new error. The only remedy is to go back, and to re-examine our judgments, and to bind them up again in a better form. Let a child be taught (or permitted) to connect with certain classes, or certain persuasions, painful impressions — these classes and persuasions will often be the hobgoblins of his heart and head, for the remainder of his existence. He will confound them with the very nature of man; and will, at last, associate the Divinity himself, with his hates and apprehen-

sions. Extend this from one to many — from Individual to National Education — and you get at the root of all the unnatural intolerance, which not only divides nation from nation, but often societies, and even families from each other. In the case of the individual, these prejudices may pass off; there are generally various opportunities of correcting them. Approach, acquaintance, shows the absurdity of such opinions, and new habits and reciprocal services gradually dissipate them. But the case is very different with multitudes. The man, who, in a private capacity, merely dislikes, or quietly plumes himself, like the Pharisee of old, “that he is not as one of these Publicans” — once engaged with others, in bodies, becomes, from the excitement and confidence which numbers usually create, a persecutor, a pursuer, and, if he can, a tyrant. But is all this the true original man? Is this naked human nature? Is this inherent malevolence — deep inwrought evil? No: it is only *error* grown into *vice* — a slow but certain growth, — it is the perversion, the insufficiency, the want of Intellectual Education.* Intellectual Education teaches first to observe and enquire, and then to conclude. Just conclusions lead to just actions — just actions are virtue. A community, so

* “Virtue,” says Miss Hamilton (vol. ii. p. 379. ch. xii.), “consists in the right direction that is given not only to the affections of the heart, but to the powers of the mind. It is not of a negative, but of a positive nature. It implies the proper employment, not only of the *moral*, but of the *intellectual* powers. These the wisdom of the great Creator has ordained to a mutual dependence on each other, so that neither cannot be in any considerable degree improved while the other is neglected. Where the feelings of benevolence are unknown, the exertions of the understanding will be concentrated, by selfishness, within narrow limits; and where the impulses of the benevolent heart are not controlled and directed by judgment, they will be productive only of partial good, and may, eventually, lead to *extensive misery*.” Reid maintains, but not very effectively, a somewhat contrary opinion.

“Il n'est pas seulement ordonné de faire le bien; mais de faire *tout le bien possible*. Comment y réussira-t-il sans déployer *toutes ses ressources*. En effet, quelque espèce de bien qu'on veuille opérer, il faut des *lumières*. Il en faut pour combattre dans ce monde le principe toujours renaissant du malheur, l'*immoralité*, et il en faut pour soulager tous les genres de misères. Des hommes dans la même position, et animés du même zèle, contribuèrent au bonheur de leurs semblables dans la proportion exacte de leur capacité. Nous avons besoin d'une certaine étendue d'esprit pour influer, et pour que notre influence soit judicieuse.” — *Mad. Necker de Saussure, Educ. Progress.* i. p. 72.

formed, will not fall into those national prejudices, which not only strike with astonishment other times and nations, but, when the fit is over, surprise and humble themselves. The wise king asked for *understanding*, above all treasures. To him, it was morality, virtue, religion. He was right, — without it, morality is mere passion — virtue is an ‘accident, or a name, — religion gropes ‘blindly into fanaticism, or floats off from disappointment into incredulity.’ A faith which is merely the echo of an echo — which is thought, but not believed, which is custom, but not conviction — rests passively, but not firmly, in the mind of the professor. It is not thrown off, neither is it kept. ‘It remains there, if no storm threaten; but the first blast which disturbs, destroys. No one would willingly trust the character of a child to the decision of such chances; much less the character of a community. How much wiser to build upon the base which God has given; to build upon that which may sustain, and in the order in which the removal of no one stone may endanger the entire structure.* That base is Intellectual Education.

When I speak of Moral Education, I imply religion; and when I speak of religion, I speak of Christianity. It is morality, it is conscience, *par excellence*. Even in the most worldly sense, it could easily be shown, that no other morality so truly binds, no other education so effectually secures even the coarse and material interests of society. The economist himself, would find his gain in such a system. Even if it did not exist, he should invent it. It works his most sanguine speculations of good, into far surer and more rapid conclusions, than any system he could attempt to set up in its place. No system of philosophy has better consulted the mechanism of society, or jointed it together with a closer

* The Scripture preaches to babes and innocents, to the poor and despised, to the ignorant and unlearned. Does religion, then, or its practice, require knowledge? Are the learned more virtuous than the unlearned? But this is another of those errors which have originated from an inaccurate use of terms. Knowledge and learning are, in themselves, nothing. They may even be of injury; not so cultivation of the powers from which they spring: the innocent, and the poor, and the unlearned, may have exercised and improved these powers and ought to exercise and improve them, as well as the learned. This is what is required.

adaptation of all its parts, than Christianity. No legislator who is truly wise—no Christian—will for a moment think—for the interests of society and religion,—which, indeed, are one,—of separating Christianity from Moral Education. It would be quite as absurd, as to separate Moral Education from Intellectual.* But this is very different from sectarianism. National protection, accorded to the schools of particular churches—when the whole nation requires it—is a tacit rebuke and discouragement to all others. It is prohibition and monopoly, — not Christianity, but anti-Christianity.

These positions—the necessity of combining, and conducting concurrently this triple Education—are sufficiently established. But how carry them into effect? This leads us to the second point of our enquiry.

2. *Means, to render these branches as perfect as possible.* These means, their combination, regulation, &c. &c., depend upon circumstances. The first of these circumstances, is the nature itself of the Education, we have in view. One modification answers for Individual, another for National, Education. Our business is with National; we have, therefore, to examine, what means are best adapted, in a system of National Education, to render these branches most perfect; in other words, to conduct them with most effect and facility.

1. *Physical Education* is one of those departments of education, which most gains by being pursued in common. The sight and sound of motion communicates motion. It is difficult to be in the midst of joy and energy, without feeling a buoyancy, and sense of force, an earnest desire to develope it. This is the natural result of all youthful society. But these forces are not idly to be played away.* They are to be put out to the utmost profit; they are not only to contri-

* Montaigne, following Plato, strongly insists on the necessity of attending to Physical Education: — “C'est merveille combien Platon se montre soigneux, en ses loix, de la gayeté et passetemps de la jeunesse de sa cité; — il s'étend à mille préceptes pour ses gymnases, pour les sciences lettrées il s'y amuse fort peu.” — “Le corps encores souple, on le doit à cette cause plier à toutes façons et coutumes; et pourveu qu'on puisse tenir l'appétit et la volonté sous boucle qu'on rende hardiement un jeune homme commode à toutes nations et compaignies; son exercitation suive l'usage; qu'il puisse faire toutes choses, et n'ayme à faire que les bonnes.” — *Essais*, liv. i. ch. 25.

bute strength, but dexterity; not merely to be considered in their immediate effects, but in their remote; not only in their physical influences, but also in their moral.* Their object

* The first hints of Gymnastics, as an important branch of Public Education, we owe to the Germans, but perhaps the most accurate views of their objects and utility, are to be found in Pestalozzi. In his *Wie Gertrud*, &c. he traces the necessity of their introduction; the principles upon which they should rest; the manner in which they should be applied. He sees two objects in all Education: — 1. The acquisition of knowledge; and, 2. The development of our abilities. Our abilities may be either mental or practical. Under the latter designation all species of physical exercises are especially comprehended. The first law of Education being the preservation of harmony and equilibrium between all our powers, "the necessity of following this law is as evident, with regard to our practical abilities, as to the acquisition of knowledge: he seeks, therefore, in proceeding to the application of these principles, "to follow essentially the same progress as in the communication of knowledge, beginning from an Alphabet of Abilities (in analogy with his Alphabet of Forms,) that is to say, from the simplest practical exercises; which, being combined with each other, would serve to develop in a child a general fund of ability, to be applied to whatever purpose circumstances might render it necessary in after-life. Such an alphabet has not yet been found, and that for the obvious reason, that it has not been sought for." . . . "If once discovered, it would be of essential service to mankind. It ought to comprise the simplest performances of the bodily organs of action, such as *striking, carrying, throwing, pushing, pulling, twisting, swinging, &c.* Whatever manipulations may occur in any calling, may be reduced to one or more of the simple actions, and their combinations. The Alphabet of Abilities should, therefore, consist of a complete succession of them all, arranged in the order in which they follow each other practically, according to the structure of the human body, and the greater or less pliability of its different parts." . . . "As the ultimate object of the Alphabet of Forms, and of intuitive instruction generally, is to lead us, in the course of our mental development, to clearness of ideas, so is the Alphabet of Abilities intended to lay the groundwork of future virtues, in the progress of our moral education. Self-command over our physical powers and movements is, as it were, the *apprenticeship of virtue*, in the bondage of which we are to be kept until the development of higher powers assigns to our physical nature at once a subordinate position and more elevated aim."

These principles very soon developed themselves in Germany; and Professor Jahn, and his Berlin pupils, during the war of independence, gave them a sudden and important celebrity. To the enthusiasm and skill of these young men, who formed the vanguard of Blucher's army, much of that fervent spirit of national resistance to the domination of the French is undoubtedly to be ascribed. The favour with which these exercises were then regarded was universal; kings and people vied with each other in extolling their importance: the promises, however, proclaimed in a time of need, were recalled; and gymnastics, associated with popular opinions, and love of change, fell, with the governments at least of Germany, into disrepute. They have not, however, ceased to be cultivated (see Prus-

should be utility, either in reference to the communication of general vigour necessary to all, or to the fitting for special situations and ultimate objects. Hence, these exercises may be divided into two classes, *Gymnastic Exercises*, and Exercises of *Industry*. Gymnastics, again, may be classed under two heads: — 1. The robust exercises, or Gymnastics more especially so called, comprehending also riding, swimming, &c. and all exercises tending to produce habits of order, &c. &c. 2. The more graceful exercises — fencing, dancing, &c. or Callisthenics. These, of course, vary according to the nature of the school. They all propose, however, to dispel indo-

sian Circular of 1827), but under rigid surveillance on the part of the authorities, — justified, in some instances, by the political movements with which they have been connected in the universities. Gymnastics, in some degree expatriated from Germany, were well received in France, and there form an integral part of Education. The attempt made by Professor Völker, pupil of Jahn, to introduce them into this country, has not been crowned with equal success. Yet there is little doubt that their utility, will every day be more appreciated by a nation, so habituated to out-door and manly exercises as our own. The only difficulty is in their application. There is a medium to be observed between military drilling, and mere Callisthenics; between riotous sports, and lifeless attitudes; between disregard to all rule on one side, and too formal an attention to it, on the other. “An alphabet of abilities” suited to our uses, should immediately grow out of our own ordinary exercises, and amusements. It should put to profit what we already know, and teach what might be really of service hereafter. A grammar of practical exercises, following up this principle from the simplest elements, such as walking, running, leaping, &c., to more complex combinations, such as riding, archery, &c., would be far preferable, whether in writing, engravings, models, or practice, to those pragmatistical and comparatively useless instructions, which now go under the name of Gymnastics.

For more ample information, for the spirit and history of Gymnastic Instruction, and its importance as a branch of Education, see the authors mentioned in the *Kleine Handbibliothek*, 1815, and the *Litteraturzeitung*, or literary gazette for the use of teachers, published at Ilmenau since 1819, the *Gymnastik* of Gutsmuths printed at Schnepfenthal, 1804, Saltzman, &c. In French may be consulted the *Manuel d'Education Physique, Gymnastique et Moral*, par le Colonel Amoros, 1830. 2 vols.; the *Gymnastique de Jeunes Gens*. Paris. 1829; and the *Calisthénie, ou Gymnastique des Jeunes Filles*. Paris, 1829; *Gymnastique Médicale, &c. &c.* par Charles Londe, Paris, 1821, &c. &c. In Italian, Bernardi on *Swimming*, &c. In English, we are somewhat deficient in this branch of Education; but valuable hints may be selected from the *Journal of Education*, passim, &c. As a measure of strength, and for other gymnastic purposes, the Panorganon of Mr. Edgeworth, *Practical Education*, vol. ii. p. 303, may be employed, as well as for the illustration of mechanics.

lence and listlessness from the mind ; to brace with new energy the body ; to communicate that masculine and bold spirit, founded on a true measure of our own strength, which shrinks not back from any danger, when necessary, but seeks it not, or rather avoids it, when not required, which, in every emergency, preserves its coolness, which is not to be tired by any disappointment, or disgusted by any failure, but perseveres even to fatigue in every task which it has once taken up. All trials of skill, ostentatious efforts at "tours de force," ridiculous displays of vanity, are abuses, and should at once be discouraged. Throughout, there should be the impression of *rational study*; throughout, a just sense of the final object in view—a certain seriousness should preside over their gaiety; order and decency should be seen in all.* With these general Gymnastic exercises must, however, be conjoined, in greater or less proportion, according to the description of school,

* Such are the principles which regulate the Swiss schools. "Nous maintenons ici la plus exacte discipline ; nous exigeons que tout se fasse toujours avec calme et avec mesure ; et nous ne souffrons jamais un instant que ces exercices dégénèrent en jeux sans objet, ou en efforts dangereux. La nature de chaque effort à faire, et la difficulté croissante d'un exercice, sont toujours exactement calculées sur l'âge et la force des individus, et leur adresse progressive. Nous ne portons même l'indulgence jusqu'à permettre qu'un élève satisfasse le goût qu'il aurait pris pour un exercice particulier, exclusivement aux autres, car ce ne serait la qu'un développement *partiel*, contraire à notre grand principe de l'accord et de l'harmonie en toutes choses. Nous tenons en même temps compte au jeune âge de sa faiblesse, et nous ne refusons point à la force de l'adolescence la satisfaction d'user raisonnablement de tous ses privilèges." — *Notice sur la Maison d'Education dans le Château de Lenzbourg*, 1833. See also Freud, *Univ. Educ.* p. 43-50.

See the effects of regular exercise and gymnastics, on the health of pupils, exemplified in Pestalozzi's school at Yverdon. — *Birkb.* ch. v. *

The moral effect is still more remarkable : — "They have gymnastics together ; which, besides the inestimable advantages they afford to physical development, and the preservation of innocence, lead them to consider one another as common pupils, indebted, for the benefit of their education, to the same state." — *Report of the Council of Education of the Canton of Zurich*. This friendly feeling is also commonly the result of gymnastic exercises in Germany : so true it is what Montaigne observes : — "Les bonnes polices prennent soing d'assembler les citoyens et les rallier comme aux offices sérieux de la dévotion, aussi aux exercices et jeux ; la société et amitié s'en augmente, et puis on ne leur sauroit concéder de passe-temps plus réglez, que ceulx que se font en présence d'un chascun et à la veue mesme du magistrat." — *Essais de Montaigne*, liv. i. cap. 25.

the exercises of industry.* In country schools especially, field labour may with advantage be pursued, under intelligent masters. In no case, indeed, where it is at all practicable, should the scholars be without opportunities, at least, of gardening.† Mechanical arts, particularly in the higher grade of schools, may also with great advantage be encouraged. Carpenters' work, turning in wood and metal, &c. &c. furnish to all classes not only a useful and agreeable means of occupation, a wholesome exercise, but offer innumerable opportunities, of applying to practical utility, their knowledge in mathematics, drawing, chemistry, &c. They exercise the eye and hand; compel the mind to develop its resources; gradually form the taste for the useful and ornamental in art; accustom to patience, invention, and perseverance; and teach a skill and dexterity, of the highest benefit on a thousand other occasions, in managing every sort of instrument, and applying to the best use whatever material may be placed in their hands. No reward can stimulate more powerfully than the pleasure, which always results from the contemplation of the work of one's own hands. The gratification, also, of having it in one's power, to make an occasional present to a parent or a friend, besides the moral influence which it exerts,

M. Pictet thus describes the moral influence of these exercises of industry at Hofwyl:—"Les travaux manuels sont des moyens de perfectionnement moral pour l'individu, lorsqu'ils sont conduits avec cet esprit éclairé et bienveillant qui fait converger vers un but utile, et relève jusqu'aux moindres détails dont se remplit la journée. Ainsi on leur inspire le goût de l'ordre, et de l'exactitude, &c. Ainsi on forme et développe leur attention en les accoutumant à la porter avec force sur l'objet dont ils sont occupés. Ainsi on les habitue à employer leur activité toute entière, &c. C'est ainsi, enfin, qu'on les accoutume à ne rien laisser perdu de ce qui peut servir à la consommation ou à la reproduction, à ne pouvoir souffrir le moindre dérangement, le moindre défaut d'ordre auquel ils puissent remédier; ranger et maintenir chaque chose à sa place, devient pour eux une sorte de besoin: ils acquièrent ce goût d'exactitude, de propriété, de perfection, trop rare, mais pourtant bien nécessaire parmi les ouvriers de campagne."

† "L'histoire naturelle et les élémens de la botanique font diversion à leurs études plus sérieuses; la menuiserie et le jardinage servent à leur délassement; une gymnastique variée, sous les exercices du corps y compris, le maniement des armes à feu et de l'arc sont aussi employés comme moyens de développer la force et l'adresse: former coup d'œil et l'attention sont deux points auxquels on met une grande importance dans tous les jeux." — *Lettre de M. Pictet à ses Collaborateurs de la Bibliothèque Britannique, sur les Etablissemens de M. de Fellenberg.*

produces the best effects as an encouragement to industry. No school should be wholly unprovided with these means; but the quantity or quality must necessarily be determined, as well as the greater or less degree of attention to any particular branch, by the rank and object of the school.* In the higher schools gymnastics, in the lower the exercises of industry; in the town mechanical, in the country agricultural, labour should predominate. In some schools they should form the secondary, in others the main, object of Education. Indeed manual labour ought to be the basis of all popular Education. The labourer, both boy and girl, should not only be prepared by good methods for his vocation, but taught to feel early (by being allowed to profit by the fruits of his labour) the connection between labour and enjoyment. But this on a general scale, it is much to be feared, is not yet to be accomplished in these countries. At Hofwyl ten hours per day are given to labour; but our schools are, for the most part, day schools, and parents are very avaricious of the labour of their children. (*Digest of Par. Rep. on the Educ. of the Poor.* 1818.) We must, for the present, therefore, content our-

* These exercises should occupy a considerable time in all schools without exception; but, in schools for special branches of industry, they should, of course, continue much longer, and be carried to a higher degree of perfection. Examples of the beneficial results of the application of the labour system in both ordinary and special schools are becoming numerous. The "Manual Labour Schools of America" are instances of the first; and also the higher classes of M. De Fellenberg's establishment at Hofwyl, &c. Of the second, the lower classes in the same institution, the Ecole de Roville, the admirable School of Arts and Trades at Menars, lately established, are excellent specimens. In these countries, some occasional, though not very successful, attempts have been made. The Templemoyle and Fallowlee Schools, on the Hofwyl plan, opened in 1827, in the north of Ireland, and the Bannow School, which was more strictly agricultural, in the south, have met with unforeseen difficulties. An exertion was made later (1828), by the *Society for the Improvement of Ireland*, to extend these seminaries over the whole country, by an appeal to the Grand Juries of each county, but without effect. Industry Schools have been opened, on limited plans, in various parts of England, near Brighton, Southam, &c.; — one, lately, in Durlightened Mr. Cropper, of Liverpool, I am informed, is also engaged in the making dispositions for an establishment, on a large and liberal scale, on the Swiss system, near that city. Of each of these establishments, their principles and operation, a more detailed account will be given under their respective heads, in the practical division of the work.

selves with the exemplification of the advantages of such a system, in schools established for special branches of industry. Country walks with their teacher, at appointed seasons, may also be applied to the most beneficial purposes.* The teacher cannot be too much with his pupils, but especially with their minds. He should extract Education from every thing. To the young, especially, every thing around is a book.† This ambulatory instruction was justly preferred by the ancients, to every other. It concentrates attention without labour; it exercises the mind with the body; it communicates knowledge through the medium of amusement. Geography, natural history, mathematics, especially lend themselves to this out-of-door illustration.‡ The imagination also may be similarly cultivated.§ But religion more particu-

The French as well as the German systems strongly inculcate this mode of instruction. "16. La promenade, étant très-favorable à la santé, l'instituteur profitera de tems en tems de jours de congé, pour y conduire ses élèves. Il y trouvera une excellente occasion de leur faire faire des exercices de gymnastique. 17. Quelle que soit l'utilité de la gymnastique, elle ne remplira néanmoins pas tout le tems des promenades et des récréations. A la promenade le maître fera remarquer à ses élèves les beautés de la nature, et de la végétation; il rendra pratique l'enseignement qu'il donne dans l'école. Pendant les heures de récréation, il leur montrera parfois quelque objet curieux; il fera en leur présence des expériences de physique ou de chimie; il leur apprendra à lever des plans, et ainsi de suite." — *Manuel de l'Instituteur Primaire*, ch. 2.

† This is most usefully applied in French instruction. "L'instituteur fera connaître aux élèves dans l'intérêt de leur santé, la structure du corps humain; il leur fera sentir les avantages d'un mouvement modéré; il leur indiquera les moyens de se préserver de l'échauffement et du refroidissement; il les rendra attentifs aux moyens de se préserver les dangers dont ils sont menacés dans les différentes saisons de l'année et pendant la durée de maladies contagieuses; il leur fera connaître les plantes vénéneuses de leur pays; les conséquences fâcheuses des remèdes empiriques ou magiques; les inconvéniens de certains métiers; les suites de l'intempérance, de la mal-propreté, de l'imprévoyance; les malheurs qui peuvent résulter de la lutte, des jeux d'enfance, des bains de rivière," &c. — *Manuel de l'Instituteur Primaire*, ch. 2. art. 8.

‡ See the use which Pestalozzi made of these walks, in teaching the elements of geography, — one of the most practically useful of his "intuitive" methods (*Biber*, ch. vi.), though strangely at variance with the theory in his work, *Wie Gertrud*, &c. De Felleberg also applies them with great effect to the teaching of elementary geometry, botany, mineralogy, &c. See also Frend, *Univ. Educ.* pp. 29-43.

§ See the three descriptions of evening, by three different children, during their evening walk, in Miss Edgeworth's *Practical Education*, vol. iii. p. 21.

larly derives from such exercises, the most important assistance. It is sufficient for a child to see the works of God, to love God; to love God, is the best way to adore him. Children require not *proofs*, but *emotions*. Sentiment, even for a long period after the appearance of reason, is still their real guide — it is only when urged to it, that they appeal to reason. No emotion can be stronger than that which has its spring in religion, and is at the same time helped on by the keen sense of physical enjoyment. It binds up the most solemn and sacred influences for ever after, with pleasure. Happiness after all, is the best of all atmospheres for youthful education. Whatever checks, chills, or humbles, is directly adverse and injurious to their young and buoyant natures. It is a season of love, and hope, and exultation — and to load it so soon with the pains and fears of earth, is a gratuitous cruelty — an error as well as crime.

Such a system of Physical Education, combined, of course, with minute attention to cleanliness and diet *, not less important in National than Individual Education, and which, with air and warmth, have been but too much neglected †, should be common, with such variations as circumstances may require, to every school in the country. The poor should not be deprived of its advantages: the rich should be induced to use them. Country schools, of every degree, from the simple parochial school up to the academy, offer great facilities. They all should have their piece of ground, rooms for different trades, &c. &c. &c. In towns, this may be attended

* Contrast the beneficial effects, resulting from clean linen, order, and good air, on the health, morality, and happiness of the pupils, in the instance of Pestalozzi's establishment at Yverdon, with the diseases produced by the contrary causes, at his first settlement at the Ursuline Convent at Stantz. *Biber*, ch. iii. iv. See also the régime pursued in the Normal Primary School at Brühl, *Rapport par le Directeur de l'Etablissement*, M. le Curé Schweitzer (3. Etat sanitaire des Elèves). Cousin, *Rapport*, pp. 330, 331. Frend, *Universal Education*, pp. 2, 3. 1832. *Traité d'Hygiène appliqué à l'Education de la Jeunesse*, par le Docteur Simeon. Paris, 1827. 8vo.

† Consult, for the site, arrangement, and ventilation of Schools, the Plans in Cousin's *Rapport*, 1832. p. 70. Plate 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, at the conclusion of the work; also *Code de Namur*, t. ii. p. 578. 1827. Loudon, *Encyclopædia of Architecture*, p. 727. Wilderspin on *Infant Education*, 12mo. 1832. Wilson on the *System of Infant Schools*. 8vo. 1826. 3d edit. &c. &c.

with more difficulty; but schools in such situations, being affected by the peculiar disadvantages of their situation, ought to meet, in more than ordinary attention to these particulars, some antidote to the evil. Whenever they can be placed in suburbs or open spaces, — wherever most air, most sky, most of the bright and green of nature, can be had — there, in mercy, not to the bodies only of the children, but to their minds, ought such institutions, at any expense, to be planted. Where this is not possible, compensation should be made for the want, by larger playrooms, and more airy workshops attached to the building. None of these circumstances are trivial.* Our school associations cast their sunshine or gloom over many a long year of after-existence; and in a season where so much of our spiritual nature depends upon mere material circumstances, as much life and joyousness should be thrown into them, as is possible. It is a part of education to make these simple accessories pleasures, and not pains: the first rudiments of feeling and knowledge, above all others, should be cleared from whatever can tend to obscure or distort them.

In the higher schools, there will be still larger opportunities of multiplying and varying these occupations. Not only should these gymnastic and industrial exercises be maintained, but Callisthenics also introduced, under various forms. These are the gymnastics of the higher orders, and form, at every period of life, a counterbalance to the feebleness inherited or induced by our social organisation, whether arising from the too sedentary habits of the studious, or the more injurious effeminacy of the self-indulgent.†

On the sound basis of *Physical Education* should be built *Intellectual Education*: “mens sana in corpore sano:” as on *Intellectual Education*, according to some educationists,

* De Fellenberg lays the greatest stress on these particulars, and with reason. Who would not improve in the midst of the scenery of Yverdon and Hofwyl? Are we to be surprised, that a different race of minds and bodies should issue from the valleys of Switzerland, and the lanes of Birmingham and Manchester?

† See the fine chivalrous education which Montaigne prescribes for his young noble. “Ce n'est pas assez de leur roidir, l'ame il luy fault aussi roidir les muscles, &c., &c. l. i. c. 25. On our modern cautious plan. “On les rendroit volontiers perclus, pour les empêcher de s'estropier.”

should be built moral*. Intellectual Education is still more modified by numbers than physical. Public instruction, both in the mode of conveying knowledge, and in the knowledge itself, materially differs from private. Neither, however, can be conducted without competent knowledge of your materials and instruments. The materials are the human faculties; the instruments, methods. To think of working on the human mind, without knowing what the human mind is, seems an absurdity so glaring that it could never have been maintained, even in practice, if the real object of educating had been education itself. The science of mind, at least such portions as bear on practice, is essential: without it, we may blunder into right; but even in our successes we shall be empirics, we shall never be sure that we are not in the wrong. Methods, as has already been remarked, are innumerable, both theoretic and practical, in every branch of Education, but in this particularly so, — some parting from the same principles, but diverging in their application; others starting from different points at the outset. From these we may select and combine as we deem judicious, remembering only, that method of some kind or other is absolutely requisite — without it there may teaching, and even knowledge, but no education. Between a mind taught at random, and a mind educated, there is the same difference as between a lumber room and a store, a book manufactory and a library.†

* “Such, for instance, was the theory of Basedow. But there is something in morality besides the teaching of dogma, or dryly appealing to the understanding. All that is requisite, but it is not the *first* thing requisite. The rule ought to come after the practice. “Il ne dira pas tant sa leçon, comme il la fera; il la répètera en ses actions,” says Montaigne. Pestalozzi extends the same principle to all education. “I have before observed, that the error of letting *definitions* precede the *intuitions* on which they ought to be founded, has the inevitable of making mere idle wordmongers; and the neglect of the practical abilities of life, produces in this respect exactly the same effect as the mistake of inculcating the *doctrines* of virtue and faith, before the practical feeling of both has been produced in the mind.”—*Leonard and Gertrude*.

† “Des ânes chargez des livres,” as Montaigne calls them: “on leur donne à coups de fouet en garde leur pochette pleine de science; laquelle, pour bien faire, il ne fault pas seulement loger chez soy, il la fault espouser.”—*Essais*, l. i. ch. 25. See also Seneca, *Ad Lucillum* ep. ii. Bolingbroke, *Letters on Study of History*, letter iv. Hobbes said, that if he had read as much as the erudite, he should have been as ignorant as they.

At the same time to persist rigidly in *one* method, desperately essaying on the young and tender spirit all its experiments, without reference to their applicability, is to consult our own curiosity or ambition, and not the interests of our pupils. We have no right to sacrifice them for public good — they are neither patients nor subjects. Even when constructed on apparently the very justest *principles*, all mechanism in education, too rigorously and invariably pursued leads to stiffness, to that “*spécialité*” which, for the wide and efficient purposes of life, is particularly to be avoided. It makes us not walkers, but dancers — not dancers, but dancing-masters.* Method, in education, ought to be, as far as possible, *eclectic* — a selection not only of the best, but the best for those actually under our care.† It ought also to be general; not only no omission of any one of the faculties — but no partiality to one more than to another. This, already impressed in reference to the great classifications, is not less important in reference to the minor ones. A man *all reason*, as well as a man *all imagination*, like a man wholly physical or wholly intellectual, is only half a man — and that half, disproportionately large. Yet this mistake is frequent — so frequent that the contrary instances may be considered the exceptions. It inundates society with your “*a + b*” men, who make up morality out of

Such, too, though in a more confined sense, is the advice of Quintilian, “*Nam plerumque nudæ illæ artes, nimia subtilitatis affectatione frangunt atque concidunt, quidquid est in oratione generosius, et omnem succum ingenii bibunt, et ossa detegunt,*” &c. — *Inst. Orat.* proemio.

† This made the principal distinction between the systems of Pestalozzi and de Fellenberg. De Fellenberg educates for the world: every child is placed, in his establishment, exactly in the rank which he is to occupy hereafter in life — his occupation, his instruction, every thing is calculated to prepare him for his *social* position. Pestalozzi's object, on the contrary, following too closely Rousseau, was to foster the growth of the intellectual and moral man. To the claims of the world he turned a deaf ear: he asked not for what *society*, but for what *God* had destined the child. “The position of each pupil in his establishment was accordingly founded, not upon the artificial institutions of society, but upon a spirit of freedom and brotherly love.” — *Biber*, ch. v. But were these two systems kept in practice, perfectly distinct, they would both be bad. A good education should *develope* like Pestalozzi's, and *fit* like de Fellenberg's. Their union is essential. We cannot fulfil the will of God, without fulfilling our duties in society, nor our duties in society without developing the moral and intellectual qualities by means of which such duties are to be fulfilled.

arithmetic — who measure impulse by rule and compass — who count the lines in Shakspeare, and look to the joinings in the Apollo ; — or else sends out, to shock the harmony of our mercantile metaphysics and morality, some fireship of fancy, upon which we gaze with terror or astonishment. Proportion — symmetry — are the first great rules of all education. No single chord of our complicated being should be left untouched or unstrung. They are placed in us in order to be sounded ; sounded separately they produce monotony — sounded without a knowledge of their combinations, discord. The very wants which we experience are permitted by a wise Providence, to rouse and stimulate us to action. There would be no gradation — no activity — no constant tending to perfection, without them. They are calculated with the nicest wisdom not only to rouse, but to expand. A child who could walk at once, would be behind-hand in almost every thing else. Yet compare him to a man who is learning to speak, or learning to see. What child, even amongst the most backward, who does not advance with tenfold the rapidity of Cheselden's patient, or Gaspar Hauser ? This feeling of *unity of keeping* in the intellectual and moral man, as well as in the physical, was the *beau idéal* of ancient education. The "*totus teres atque rotundus*," the "*ad unguem factus homo*;" was their perfection. Plato, Cicero, Quintilian, under one form or another, exhibit this model, — inimitable, perhaps, but not unapproachable, — as the visible and tangible of their philosophy. But already, in their day, the "division of labour" system had crept into Education. There was a master for virtue and a master for knowledge, a teacher of arguments and a teacher of persuasion. In like manner, we not only have different drillers for different portions of the same man, but what is a great deal worse, we often omit in our drilling, many of these portions altogether. We make up minds as we make up goods, not according to their really intrinsic qualities, but according to what they are likely at the moment to bring in the market, "the style of thing" actually in demand. But fashion no more in this, than in any other of its caprices, is to be relied on ; the fashion passes, even while preparing for it, and "the single power" man, like "the single speech" man, cannot work in the new

machinery, and is necessarily thrown by when most needed, as altogether worthless — of no practical use.

Intellectual Education should spread out to its fullest strength and size, the *whole* intellectual man. We must begin, then, with the beginning, if we intend to go on unto the end. We live before we think; our senses are the first objects of Education. Whatever theory we adopt, — from the sensualism of Locke to the spiritualism of Kant, or the absolutism of Cousin, — the senses, in all cases, must *practically* be considered as the great instruments of knowledge. We may therefore say, with perfect truth, that the day after birth, Education opens; the nurse is a teacher: the mother is a teacher — every circumstance with which the child is surrounded, is more or less a teacher. In this first mysterious period of life, the child, plunged at once into the tumult of existence, is in a state of vertigo, of reverie, differing probably but little from what it was in the mother's womb. As yet, it sits solitary in the midst of nature; little better than that simple modification with which Condillac begins his statue. But new relations soon establish themselves; and a week or two scarcely pass by, when, by discovery on discovery, it rapidly acquires, one after the other, the use of all its senses. Then every act is an impression, every impression good or bad. We attribute the birth of many of our passions to after-life: we might as well maintain that the tree grew from the surface of the soil, because we could not see its roots. Every motion of the body or mind is portion of a habit: from bundles of these actions is habit formed; and from bundles of habits the future man. The organisation of one child may be less perfect, than that of another; but this is no reason why we should not try, to make each as perfect as possible. Our vanity may be disappointed; our love should never despond. “Igitur nato filio pater spem de illo primum *quam optimam* capiat,” says one, who well knew what paternity and its obligations were*, “ita *diligentior a principiis* fiet.”† The great instruments of knowledge and

* See the admirable proemium to the 6th book of the *Oratorical Institute*: of Quintilian. The lamentation over the death of his only child is not surpassed in deep pathos, by any passage in the whole range of ancient prose.

† M. Rebuffi Quintilianus Inst. Orat. lib. i. c. 1.

virtue, should, as early as possible, be prepared for use. If not, when wanted they will be found rusty or blunt. The education of the senses neglected, all after-education partakes of a drowsiness, a haziness, an insufficiency, which it is impossible to cure. Educated well, they give to all knowledge and virtue a positiveness, a firmness, a vivid freshness, such as makes the difference between waking and a dream.* But this portion of education is in great degree individual, and does not properly come within the limits of the present work. It

Of the influence of this education of the Senses on intellectual progress, it is almost needless to speak. Clearness of idea — accuracy of language — justice of reasoning — knowledge — invention — application — all the utilities, in fine, of intellectual culture, are obviously derived from this single source. The effect even on organisation, on the senses themselves, is remarkable. The hunter tribes of the Indians have the muscles of the ear much more developed, than Europeans. The same peculiarity may also be traced in the eye. Compare sailors and shepherds with students. Here even organisation seems the result of early and constant exercise — of education. The ancient statues are deficient in these characteristics. Already the hunter and pastoral characteristics of the early races had disappeared. The *ομματα μμνκωτα* of the Egyptians, on the contrary, are given with great truth in all their painting and sculpture. The glare of a strong sun, drifts of sand, white rocks, and constant exposure to the effects of the Libyan and Arabian deserts, had produced this defect. On the same principle might not the *myopism*, or short-sightedness, at present so prevalent amongst the inhabitants of these countries, be in great part ascribed to the candlelight reading, late hours, microscopic trades (such as watchmaking and seal cutting), and the early and immoderate use of small print and ill-adapted glasses. I once heard a distinguished lecturer attribute to a want of this early education, a more serious defect, — the difficulty he constantly experienced in distinguishing the nicer shades of colour from each other. Göthe states, as an instance of the delicacy and discrimination to which this sense may be brought, that the mosaic artists of Rome employ 15,000 varieties, and 50 shades of each colour, 750,000 in all. This sounds marvellous; but it is less, perhaps, than what every painter of ordinary skill is habituated to, in the course of his profession. The Gobelin manufacturers go still farther; they must not only apply these shades, but under great disadvantages. They work their tapestry on the wrong side, and carry on as it were a running calculation of the effect. So, also, the painters on china. Their colours when just put on, differ materially from their after-appearance when burnt in. It is a sort of constant algebraic operation: they take colours as they would expressions, work them apparently in the dark, but always with an acute observance of their several relations; and, the work finished, convert them by a single operation to their *real* value. The ear is still more in need of education than the eye. A jeweller sees a thousand differences between two diamonds to the uneducated eye perfectly alike: but then they are before him; he can repeat and correct his observations. Not so a musi-

belongs to that important period, which is exclusively the domain of the mother, — a period which by ignorance is considered a blank, and by apathy as much as possible made one; but which, if properly developed, will be found full of the most important principles and results. The common eye sees in the child, perhaps, little more than a machine, the mother, a plaything; but philosophy, a sublime mystery. It is in this period, indeed, that some of the most wonderful of our mental phenomena take place. The transition from instinct to reason, — or, what is nearly the same thing, from sentiment in its unassisted operations, to sentiment in conjunction with reason now occurs: it is now that language appears first in the rude and sketchlike efforts of gesture, and insulated words,

cian — a note heard is lost, yet must he appreciate its truth or falsehood in the very moment of its passing, and in the midst of all the apparent chaos of an orchestra. Few ears, indeed, out of many millions, are thus trained; and many differ very little from the Turk, who mistook the tuning for the overture; yet between two extremes there surely is a medium, easily attainable by the majority; and to that medium at least every ear should be taught to tend. The Touch is partially within the power of education. Blind men have been known to acquire by practice and concentration of attention on this single sense, a skill in distinguishing persons and things quite inconceivable to the seeing. Michael Angelo said that the “compass should be carried in the eye;” they reverse it, and may almost be said to carry their sight in their hands. The deaf and dumb, on the other side, make up for their deficiencies, by a proportionate accuracy and acuteness of sight, acquired in a similar manner, by constant exercise. Buffon supposes touch to be the great civiliser; our superiority in this particular he regards, as the grand distinction between man and beast. He imagines that were it possible our fingers could be multiplied, *pari passu* our intellectual and moral improvement would increase. Condillac has abundantly refuted this conjecture, but still the grounds upon which it rests are unimpeached. Touch exercises a remarkable influence on all our judgments; but it does not, therefore, follow, by adding to its instruments, that we should add to its powers or effects. The smell and taste, cognate senses, are modifications of touch, though in some particulars the smell partakes of some of the powers of sight and hearing. (*Condillac, Traité des Sensations.*) The perfection to which both may be brought, in men and animals, is well known. In proportion to their sensitiveness, however, imagination assumes controul. The ladies of southern climates are strongly affected by the scent of flowers; but it is well known that artificial roses and jasmines have often produced the same effect as real ones. One of the objects of this Education is, to guard against such errors: — the senses should be rendered active, and keen; but, above all, just and accurate.

The moral influence is not quite so obvious as the physical. Yet that much of our moral habits, even the most complicated, depend upon attention, has not

and then in sentences ; it is now that generalisation gradually grows from assimilation and number, and is soon followed by abstraction, — that quality which separates the child from the infant, even still more than from the animal

escaped the metaphysician. Take, for instance, *Truth*, and *Benevolence* ; in both, attention is a very principal ingredient. Want of attention, produces want of thought ; want of thought, inaccuracy ; inaccuracy, indifference ; indifference, selfishness ; unkindness, and so on, from a little inattention in the beginning, the seeds of all vices may be effectually sown. This has been developed, with their usual perspicuity, both by Miss Hamilton and Miss Edgeworth. But whence is this want of attention ? It arises from two causes : — one, original organic defect, which may, in some, though rare cases, defy all discipline ; the other, want of skill, or want of steadiness in applying these organs. The correction of this is within the power of Education.

* Too much or too little credit is given to children, in the developement of their faculties. Language is formed rapidly ; precision of language very slowly.

1. A child seizes the *prominent* word — sometimes only the prominent *part* of a word — in a sentence. For a long time this, or its reduplication, as “ *Pa-pa*,” “ *Ma-ma*,” is his only vocabulary. This is mere imitation of sounds.
2. Material objects next are shown in *conjunction* with sounds : the child associates them ; they become representatives, signs, of the objects ; they are signs sometimes of the objects themselves, sometimes of their qualities. Hence *adjectives* frequently precede *substantives* in his little grammar ; they are his primary and secondary qualities at the same time ; — a circumstance observable also in the early language of nations, as well as of individuals. The Chinese call the sun “ *The Splendid* ;” the *Zeus* of the Greeks, and the *Deus* of the Latins, was the “ *Living*.”
3. But a child either desires or dislikes these objects : hence determinations of the will ; hence *Yes* or *No*, first expressed in action : then in words, by perceiving them used by others, simultaneously with the action ; he hears his mother say, “ Let us go into the garden,” and he sees her going at the same time. Here are all the elements — knowledge, feeling, will — nouns, adjectives, verbs — the entire man. But it is a long time before these are classed accurately : they are words, not sentences. “ Let us go into the garden,” is “ garden — go,” or “ garden — yes.” Many even of these are not recognisable to the child, taken out of the sentence in which they were first heard ; indeed, it may be doubted whether either child or man has any very accurate idea of words, much less of sentences, until he sees them written. For many months, he uses no other words but monosyllables. Prepositions follow, he employs them in some sort as verbs. It is very late before the child uses pronouns and adverbs. He speaks of himself for a long time as of a third person. It is not *I*, but *Baby*, or *Henry*, or *Edward*. This also is common to early and rude nations. Traces may be found of it in the oratory of the Indian and African tribes ; and even in the earlier pages of the Holy Scriptures. Even when the pronoun is at last adopted, this habit is for a long time retained. A French female writer observes, of a child of her acquaintance, “ *qu'on tutoyait* :” that he always used the pronoun “ *tu*,” in speaking of himself. To him the pronoun was a proper name. The only parts of speech with regard to

the man. It is this period, in fine, above all others, which, like the Fates of ancient fable, holds the threads of human existence in its power, and tangles them, at its pleasure, with good or evil: but, unlike the Fates, is seldom under the guidance either of forethought, or intuition. If it be true that the man is educated in the child; the man and child are educated in the infant. Every after-development is *only* a development. It is *education transformed*; the same quantity under a new name

which a child makes no mistake, are *interjections*. Whether they be portion of our aboriginal or animal language, as Horne Tooke supposes; part of our organisation itself, and arising at once out of our organic instincts; or whether, from their being accompanied by some marked expression, they appear always the same; a child never takes "Oh!" for "Ah!" — nor the "Oh!" of surprise for that of invocation or prayer. In all this, the child by no means advances by himself. He meets instruction and assistance in every thing around him. Hence the great difference between the progress of one child and of another, according as he lives with one, or more companions — with children nearly of his own age, or with grown-up persons. Action is the great teacher of the infant; and for a long time also, almost his only instrument. So it is with rude nations, and the inferior classes amongst the civilised. A Lazzarone of Naples gives you the object, or substantive, in words; the rest, adjective, verb, pronoun, &c. of his sentence are often thrown into gesticulation. Words are too little understood, or too slow, for his emotions: he lives as vividly as a child whose pulse is 120, and whose being vivacity and change. As long as this language is quite distinct from the language of words, it is easy and intelligible: when it once begins to blend with it, both become difficult; they confound each other. It is at this period of transition that the mother should be especially attentive. Children are all imitation. A child brought up with a bear (like the man found in the woods of Lithuania) (Condillac, *Origine des Connoissances Humaines*) will only comprehend the sounds made by a bear. Accent, expression, ideas themselves, are now in her hands; but she should also remember, they will not continue so for many months more.

* Condillac, after Locke (*Origine des Connoissances Humaines*, s. v. ch. 1.), thought that children at once abstracted, and then proceeded to generalisation. This may be metaphysics; but is it nature? A., two years and a half old, said, "A. got some *meat*," and when it was observed that it was *chicken*, "No," he replied, "A. got some *meat*." Condillac would have taken this as a proof of abstraction: it was quite the reverse. "Man," with them, is the beggar in the street; "tree," the shrub in the parlour window. The apparent generalisation of a child is sensation, not judgment. It is just what he feels, when he calls a picture of a dog, *a dog*. He imagines he sees the identical figure, not one of a class. By degrees, of course, he finds resemblances and then differences; and seeing many together, resembling each other, at last forms classes; after which generalisation becomes easy. But there is a vast interval between this, and the abstraction of the metaphysicians. Compare Reid, *Intellectual Powers of Man*, ch. 5., with Bonnet, *Essai Analytique sur les Facultés de l'Ame*, sect. 201. 205. 214.

and expression, but at bottom, “en dernière analyse,” the same. Yet, of all periods of education, this is the least considered as a period fitted *for* education, — as if the child could, by any process, be kept in a sort of suspended existence — between knowledge, and no knowledge, all this time. The child is educating, or miseducating: it is moving, thinking, living. We can choose, indeed, whether it shall be educated well, or educated ill; but we can no more put knowledge, or education of some kind or other, in abeyance, than we can life. But these truths are not believed, or not known, — certainly very rarely felt. It is the chief obstacle to all elementary education. Hence, the first year is usually one constant struggle to remodel, rather than to advance the pupil. The foundation, upon which an intelligent teacher tries to build, in the very moment of building, gives way. Happy, even if it occurs at such a period, that he can build anew; but the defect is often not discerned, until discovery be too late. He cannot put his pupils in relation with himself: he does not know by what means he can best correct them. The means are not in his hands; the season has passed by. Until the *mother* be taught (we cannot urge it too often, or too earnestly), the *infant* cannot be taught; and until the infant be taught, the child will not be *teachable*.*

Who can educate a child, but a mother? In perpetual change, it requires all the flexibility of the female character to follow and catch the infinite varieties through which it passes. Any other eye becomes giddy in attempting it. What but the female imagination — its vivacity — its disinterestedness — passing into another being, and still preserving all the peculiarities of its own — can fully comprehend them. The child is fresh and frank — hates constraint and hypocrisy — lives on sympathy — is all love. Who can think with it, and almost in it — who can understand it, through the heart, that best of interpreters — who can satisfy the first want of its young nature — like a mother? But mothers are not always inspired, even by nature. They require reflection as well as instinct; method as well as affection. How many children are taught caprice by kindness — weakness by indecision! Rousseau leaves all to nature: but parents cannot thus abdicate their trust: they must not be left to nature as well as their children. Where firmness is not, there will be no protection — where love is not, protection will not consult the happiness of the child. What yields, cannot support; a child requires both love and support. If the mother appears like another child — if she partakes all vacillations of her offspring, how should it respect her — what reason should it have to believe her its mother? But firmness should not degenerate into severity; nor anxiety into ill-temper. A child is much more prone

The senses being educated, next follows the education of the young intellect. It is just in its bud, and is not to be

to imitation than to fear. He lives in you, feels in you : what he finds in you, he reproduces in himself. Hence nothing is indifferent. Looks and words fall on these young natures, with the same force as actions do on that of others. They creep into their imaginations : they settle there, and form, for years after, part of their recollections, and, very generally too, of their characters. This is a fact of infinite importance ; it is the key of all early education. Feed your child with sounds and sights of sincerity and fondness ; breathe about him an atmosphere of serenity — “ *ce calme mêlé de joie* ” — his natural element ; love him well, and love him wisely, and you may dispose of him in all things even as you will. But who can do this like a mother ? and what mother so well as she who feels and studies it for herself ? Such mothers, it is hoped, may yet be numerous, though neither fashionables, nor managers, nor blue-stockings ; but mothers in the high and holy sense of the name — deeply penetrated with their sacred calling, and pursuing it “ in singleness and in simplicity — with energy and with intelligence — with assiduity, but without fidget — with dignity, but without parade.” It is this *domestic*, this *fireside Education* — this Education of *truth and love* — which has given the greater portion of its value to Scotch Education ; which transmits the talent and virtue of the mother to the son, and receives in return from the son the tribute of his earliest and most durable affection. Not to the father — not to the wife — not to the child, — but to the *aged mother*, the emigrant sends back the first-fruit of his distant exertions. So true it is what Pestalozzi says, — “ There are no better teachers than the house, and the father’s and mother’s love, and the daily labour at home, and all the wants and necessities of life.” It is this *domestic Education*, which, of all others, is most wanting in all classes under our present system. Without it, *public Education* may be good in an *intellectual* point of view (though even that is difficult) ; in a *moral* it must be defective, if not worse. The tendency of modern institutions — fond of masses, and co-operation, and broad effects, and sudden display — is to weaken and limit these home-bred influences. Proportionally greater ought to be our anxiety to extend and strengthen them. To point out in detail how this may best be accomplished, how mothers may best be taught to discharge these duties, and give this portion of Education its fullest value, would far exceed the object and the limits of this work, and its omission may be easily supplied by a reference to the writings of Pestalozzi, especially his “ *Gertrude*,” and “ *Mother’s Manual*,” of Miss Edgeworth, Miss Hamilton, Madame Guizot, Madame de Saussure, Mrs. Child, &c. &c. At the same time it may be suggested, that to give efficiency even to their advice, general Education should lend its assistance. 1. The art of Maternal Instruction, should be made an integral portion of general Female Education, whether amongst the higher or the lower classes, as it is now in Germany, France, &c. &c. 2. Its extension should be promoted by Public Professorships, and Lectures on Education, in our principal towns. Dr. Bryce, of Belfast, has given in his Lectures an illustration of the interesting and useful manner in which they may be conducted. 3. Normal seminaries for Female Teachers, on the amplest plan, similar to those in France, &c. &c. should be established.

forced open, but allowed to blow. This task, seemingly so easy in theory, and not difficult in practice, where the education is private or individual, is singularly so, where numbers necessarily confound all distinctions, and teachers are obliged to teach up to a certain average level, and to teach through to a certain given time. This is shaping mind “*à coups de hache*.” Hence schools, on our present system, are despatched by gangs, and sent out with their ration, — with so much word-knowledge a head. It is true, indeed, that these defects have been in some degree remedied by the application of improved processes. By the system of Mutual Instruction, the taught are enabled to teach, and the master, in his scholars, may be multiplied indefinitely around. He may turn them on each other, and reflect a thousand lights, not within the reach of individual education. Whatever be the mode, however, the material upon which we have to work is the same. Intellectual education is divided by the two great faculties, Sentiment and Reason, into two classes — Æsthetic and Rational. The Will is in the domain of morals, but depending for its functions and influences on both. The education of both should be conducted simultaneously, no matter what may be the first order of their march. To rational education may principally be applied the “intuitive” method. In æsthetic it is also requisite, — but æsthetics demand something more. This method is nothing more than the Education of the Attention. It is to all other Education, what the education of the senses is to it. Proportionally to its accuracy, its quickness, its compass, is the perfection of all its after-modifications — judgment, memory, imagination. Attention collects the materials — these faculties are the architects. The child at first simply perceives — the faculty is passive — it soon becomes active, and directs itself to certain objects in preference to others. It is then attention, and the duties of directing it properly commence. To do this immediately and effectively, was the great end of Pestalozzi’s method. He saw, that as our ideas of sensible objects were

“There is nothing in the understanding, which was not first in the senses,” say the Aristotelians. “Man can only act according to the measure of his knowledge.” “He knows nothing that he has not observed,” says Bacon.

the substratum of all others, where these were confused none others can be clear. It was necessary, therefore, before every thing else, that of these objects the child should acquire the most accurate ideas. The process adopted was a rigorous application of the maxim of Condillac, but as old as the human mind, — “*du connu à l'inconnu*.” The pupil was directed to enquire,—1. How many objects, and of how many sorts, he had before him? 2. What was their appearance, their shape, or their outline? 3. What were their names? In what manner he ought to represent each, by a sound or word? Under these three heads, — “Number,” “Form,” and “Language,”—he comprised all elementary instruction: the process of decomposition and composition was denominated “Intuition,” and the ideas thus acquired, “Notions.” With these Notions—these stones, well hewn, well fitted, well polished for the purpose, the building begins, comparisons are made: then judgments—first in reference to sensible, then to abstract, objects: their attributes are distinguished, their analogies, — they are classified, — they are named, — they are applied. To one judgment succeeds a series of judgments—or reasoning,—and new opportunities and subjects are presented for its exercise every hour. Children delight in thus discovering and using the powers of their own mind — they like to feel the phenomena, though they care little about

* Pestalozzi sometimes departed rather unaccountably from this great principle of his system. See the account given by Tobler, noticed in Pestalozzi's letters, of one of these deviations: —“There were some parts of his experiment, it is true, which seemed to me rather unnatural: of this description was, for instance, the repetition of difficult and complicated sentences, which could not, at first, but make a very confused impression upon his pupils.” Pestalozzi's answer to this objection, though acquiesced in by Tobler, seems very unsatisfactory. “Nature herself,” says he, “presents all sorts of perceptions to our senses in confusion and obscurity, and brings them to clearness afterwards.” True, but nature also presents great facilities for their accurate analysis. Nature presents *realities*, not *shadows*, and strong inducements besides, to the enquiry. Words, on the contrary, are not things, but signs; — always varying,—subject to constant misapplication. How reconcile this with the declaration, that he had simplified the teaching of language, chiefly by excluding from it every combination of words which pre-supposes a knowledge of languages? But these inconsistencies only more evidently show the practical mode, by which Pestalozzi arrived at his theory: Jacotot, on the contrary, takes up the error as a discovery, and begins Language with Telemachus, and Mathematics with Conic Sections.

explaining them — they like the sense of power, and the realising of anticipation. This principle may be seized, but should not be abused. The child should be allowed and induced to walk, but not forced to grope his way. Pestalozzi left perhaps too much to his pupils; and, relying with more than faith, upon the revelation of nature, permitted hazard often to take the place of instructor. . But “l'état de nature n'a jamais existé;” and Pestalozzi not unfrequently mistook for Nature, the counterfeit of Art. With the Reasoning Powers, Memory and Imagination begin to unfold.* This is natural. But the order of the cultivation is another question. Some begin with the exclusive cultivation of the Memory,—some with that of the Reasoning Powers,—some with that of the Imagination. But nature does not thus separate them. A child reasons and remembers,—remembers and reasons. Imagination, in its strongest form, is Memory and Reasoning both. They are all thus in action contemporaneously. We do not, indeed, discover the developement of the Reasoning Powers and Imagination quite so easily as that of the Memory. The operations of the latter are very perceptible — the operations of the two former are, I am afraid, not quite so obvious to our apprehension. Yet the Reasoning of children as far as it goes — (their notions being more accurate than ours)—is generally truer than ours. Nor is their Imagination less active — their young life is one dream: they have scarcely a past or a future—they are all present,—and in that they live most rapidly and most intensely. But if we must begin with Memory, we must still call in Reason to our assistance. A memory merely *organic*—that mysterious coherence of sound with sound, rather than of things with things—is a memory subject to a thousand contingencies. The memory of most practical efficiency—retentive as well as recollective — is *intellectual* memory — the memory of analysis—the memory of method. If the reason be not cultivated with the memory, we may retain the object presented, but in no shape fit for prompt application †: if, on the other

For ample developements, see “Wie Gertrud, &c.

“C'est témoignage de crudité et indigestion, que de regorger la viande comme on l'a avalée. Les abeilles pillotent deçà delà des fleurs, mais elles en

side, it accompanies, — should all idea of the object be momentarily lost, reason will rediscover it again. Hence “learning by heart,” which forms so large a portion of early education, requires great delicacy in the management. It may be made an instrument of evil, instead of good. Whatever is learnt, however, should be learnt *well*. Half-learning is not only confused, but it confuses. It overlays with its rubbishy accumulations the clear and solid, — the real knowledge which has been acquired before. Children themselves dislike this want of positiveness and certainty; it renders them listless. When they have half-ideas, or half-recollections, they wander about in the twilight — they lounge. The first general elements in every branch is the part which requires to be studied with most care: and not only with care, but, as much as possible, too, in the order in which nature, under happy circumstances, points out. They form the skeleton, which may subsequently be clothed with muscles and flesh; — whatever is afterwards taken, finds its way into nourishment and strength. It does not hang as an accessory about us, it is identified with our being itself. “Apprenez bien une chose et y rapportez tout,” says Jacotot, — an excellent maxim, when not carried to an extreme.* Such an

font après le miel, qui est tout leur; ce n'est plus thym ni mariolaine.” — Montaigne, *Essais*, l. i. c. 28. This is the Memory of Method. See also Bolingbroke, *Letters on History*.

* Jacotot seems indifferent about the subject matter to be learned: he proposes to *learn by heart* before you *comprehend*. This is raising difficulties, for the pleasure of conquering them. Taking any subject, such as the first chapter in *Telemachus*, is taking a heap of ideas, which, by a succession of explanations, the child *at last* may comprehend; and in the course of acquiring which, it may attain considerable knowledge: but most of these ideas depend upon a variety of preliminary and unconnected elements, all of which must be understood, at least in some degree, before the child can pretend to understand the idea which is the expression of their result. How loose and disjointed such heterogeneous acquisitions must be, is obvious. How much simpler to begin with *these elements* first, and come to their *combination* in *Telemachus* and such other books after? So much for the improvement of the reasoning faculty, — by actually reversing the process which nature herself has pointed out! Jacotot, however, is not singular in this error. Pestalozzi's mistake we have just seen. Condillac, whose great doctrine was, “commencez par le commencement,” made his pupil, of eight years old, read Racine through, ten times. Such a sacrifice is too great to the improvement of the memory. But is the memory *really* improved by the

exercise of Memory is an exercise of Reasoning, and classification. Verbal Memory, on the contrary, is an exercise almost exclusively physical, — but there is no reason why it may not be combined with the Memory of Method. Both should be exercised with judgment, always in obvious reference to the object in view. In some cases, Verbal Memory may be sufficient, but these cases are very rare. Even the most trifling piece of poetry, the most inconsiderable fact, gains materially by good arrangement. Should this be omitted, and the verbal memory fail, the intellect will have nothing to fall back upon. But method differs from method, and the effects upon the memory of false or clumsy method, are exceedingly important.* This is partly the business of Reasoning, partly of the third faculty to be cultivated — Imagination.

The imagination of a child, especially at the age of three to four, is one of the most marked of its faculties. He has already acquired a certain number of ideas, but he has not classified them; he has no general laws, either in reference to himself, or to the external world.† All his consequences

process? To learn by heart before you understand, is imposing an *additional difficulty* to the learning by heart, besides injuring the cultivation of the understanding. Why not let the learning by heart follow? Of the absurd method of cramming dictionaries, it is unnecessary to speak; a more ingenious device could not have been thought of, to blunt both faculties, at a great expense of time, labour, and happiness, than thus stringing together lines of words with erroneous significations, and which cannot but be erroneous, — the context being wanting. Jacotot hardly defends his plans *à priori*; he merely points to the fact of their success. But might not other methods be still more successful, and is this success fact? Are these *Boys* yet *Men*?

* The best aid to Methodical Memory is frequent analysis, in a well-arranged common-place book; to Verbal — a *Mémoria Technica*, on judicious principles. That of Mrs. J. Slater is the best, being clear from all absurd associations — but it may be improved. Why not take ten letters only, counting from a, on the principle of the Greek numerals? They may thus at any time be recalled. After all, the “*Repetez sans cesse*,” of Jacotot, is the only real assurance for perfection in either one, or the other.

† A child opens every instant its toy box, to see if the contents be gone. It obscurely *personifies* every thing: — its car and horses, its doll, even its whip, or hoop, all are animated; it sees the clouds like *giants*, and the heavens coming down upon the earth. Experience is feeble, or deficient; — consequently, there is no limit — no rule.

are merely coincidences; he sees certain phenomena together with others; he expects to see them again.* He has no idea of the limits of possibility. All things appear possible to him. Motion seems sufficient cause for every phenomenon. To him it is life. In all this, his imagination differs materially from ours. There is less art, less invention—more nature, and far more vivacity. In many instances it is strictly contemplation—that sort of imagination which madness and dreams produce—a sort of twilight life, like this, though fainter, but totally beyond his power either to combine, or controul.†. Hence, you may tell a child the same story again and again; you cannot fatigue him. He is acting it, whilst others are hearing it. Hence, also, the least addition, as well as omission displeases him. It is the alteration of a picture—it is not *his* picture. It is a departure from visible and tangible fact—it is making the chair he sits on, a chair and not a chair, at the same time. This it is, this strong power of *realisation*, which makes his whole existence a continued drama. He assumes every character with equal facility—every character assumed by his companions he adopts, with not less. About the age of five, these illusions begin to disappear—they are recognised as such; but their echoes still are felt through his entire being. They then in some sort begin to assume the characteristics of our imagination. They are no longer taken for realities; but as typical, as hieroglyphical, as revivers of a train of former ideas. He begins to obtain a power of separating and of combining them. A new faculty enters into partnership—invention. The elder children *compose* for the

Children have a clear idea of duration, but they measure it differently from us. A., who usually slept in the middle of the day, counted his day from getting up to going to bed, or two days for our one. See Condillac's Hypothesis, *Traité des Sensations*, which is in accord.

† In dreams, the *Will* is inert; but, in the illusions of children, very active, if not in creating the illusion, in managing its details. The one point granted, all the rest follows as of course. The two or three lines, or bits of wood, stuck upon each other, which are taken for the gardener or coachman, perform their parts in perfect keeping:—the child does not look to the copy, but to what it represents; it is a sort of hieroglyphic throughout. In this he exerts decided power, but not in first raising the illusion; that often is involuntary:—so far it resembles madness, and not sleep.

younger. They form for them their play — distribute its parts — suggest its dialogue — sometimes from themselves, sometimes from circumstances in the last story. The pleasure, as well as the faculty sensibly alters. It is now greatly affected by the immixture of reason — it is the sense of power, the pleasure of creating. The manner in which any disturbance of these day dreams is taken, is strikingly characteristic of these two stages of the faculty. The younger child will, for some time, resist your laughter; he will not consent to believe it an illusion, until confirmed by the sanction of his elder companions. To them he always, in the first instance, appeals — the slightest hesitation in their look is sufficient, “il prend son parti,” anticipates a more formal decision — ranges himself on your side, and, now a partisan of reason, joins in your laugh. The elder follows a different course; he hardly requires your smile; he says in look, if not in words, “It is all play — but *we* must amuse these children;” and goes on, not so much the actor as the poet in the scene. The period of transition from one of these stages to the other is singularly curious. The child in such cases is often carried away by his own fancies; he raises the vision which he cannot lay. He is a poet, an actor, the combination of both — a miniature of what is often exhibited in the infancy of nations, and of the arts. Once, however, beyond this epoch, he travels rapidly to a new state, that of our imagination, — a rapidity greatly accelerated by the society of children who are in the first stage still. The contrasts between them become every day more striking; and universally, wherever an elder person mingles in the scene, with something of shame he separates from the children, and does reason with *papa* and *mamma*.

But these are phenomena more immediately within the province of Individual Education; we have to consider them only in their connection with National. At the age at which children usually come to a public school, they are in the second of these periods, but still partially under the influence of the first. Associations formed, almost without their knowledge, and frequently in their despite, are not so easily dismissed. They are much more frequent, and exert a longer

influence, in children of *lively* imagination, that is — in children over which this first species of imagination continues longest its sway. It ought to be the object of the teacher gradually to neutralise its power (for it materially interferes with intellectual progress, by the distraction and levity it tends to produce), either by the encouragement of the second, which participates so largely of reason, — or by exercises limited to reason alone. The first of these expedients is often not only the more easy, but the more advisable; for it is scarcely by a directly opposing force, that any mental energy in children is ever to be met. In such cases the two qualities often maintain, by a sort of tacit compromise, separate and sometimes alternate dominion. The evil of one imagination is best cured by the good of the other.* A thousand opportunities exist, for its useful exercise in schools. Judicious arrangement of their plays — attentive observation of natural phenomena — judicious selection from good writers, but always in analogy with the actual state of the mind.† Imagination of this second kind, if it cannot be altogether originated, can be so greatly developed, as almost to place it solely within the limits of Education. The “*nascitur Poeta*” is a discouraging maxim, and yet it is far more referable to the passions, than to the faculties. The same may be said, with quite as much truth, of the Orator. The Education of the imagination, however, in a general view, is not intended to make exclusively either. It is intended to assist in the formation of the other faculties — to make us happy men. Without reason, we have no memory worth having; without imagination, our reason will always be a copyist: but society requires discoveries and inventions, as well as argu-

“*Eadem animi facultas*,” says Dr. Smith of Dublin, in his *Dissertatio Medica* on the Power of Imagination on Disease, 1833, “*quæ vulnera infixit et postea iisdem vulneribus medicata est, Achillis hastæ quæ Telephus vulneratus, et firmitas eidem parti reddita est exinde, apte comparari potest* —

“*Unâ eademque manus volnus opemque ferat.*” p. 47.

† For the injurious effects resulting from boys reading, and learning by heart, fragments of poetry or prose, beyond the actual developement of their understanding and imagination, see the account of Gluelphi's School, in the “*Leonard and Gertrude*” of Pestalozzi, and Professor Pillans, *Principles of Elementary Teaching*, 1829. p. 62.

ments. At the same time, its utility depends immediately on its regulation. With an imagination which, instead of our being its master, has become ours, we are constantly exposed to folly or unhappiness. Like fire, it is an admirable servant, but a tyrannical master. “*εχω, ουκ εχομαι*,” should be the terms of our contract; it should not *possess us*; but *we* should *possess it*. But within these limits, a greater intellectual gift can hardly be bestowed on the weary pilgrim of this earth. Heaven knows, “*the Ideal*,” with all its gracious fantasies of joy and sorrow, flies from us but too soon; “too soon we lose, one after the other, the morning companions of our journey; good fortune passes light-footed away. Thirst of knowledge, indeed, remains unsatisfied; but the sunny gleam of Truth is lost in the darkness of Doubt. Love with all her gentle gifts follows in the train of the brief spring; and high ambition, and all the large hopes and fond aspirations, which we once formed for our country and our kind, die gradually in the dreary heart.” We touch at last the cold reality; we see

——— “Des Ruhmes heil’ge Kränze
Auf der gemeinen Stirn enweilt,” &c.

——— “The holy crown of Fame,
Profaned by vulgar brows,” &c. • —

and sink down the vale of life after our “weary chase and wasted hour,” with little more than a pale glimmering of hope to light us the remainder of our way.

All that can still nourish the heart in the midst of this barrenness; which can keep up the fresh fountains of youth in our withering existence; which can bring even a portion of its life into our life; and not permit the world, worldly as it is, to be wholly desecrated to our sense,—whatever can do this, is a great and good gift to any human being; and at no time, and in few countries, greater or better than in our own. It is not persiflage with all its levity, nor philosophism with all its errors, which has so materialised us; but the love and worship of gold, a common-place mercantile ambition, vulgar means, and paltry ends. The elevated, the true, the pure,

the constant, have ceased from our public morality — they are words of reproach — deeds of folly — the knight-errantry of a bygone age — the romance of a patriotism which can exist no more. We have got, indeed, in return, political tact, and financial common sense; the mediocrity, and dexterity, and utter selfishness, and all the little vices of little men: patriotism that traffics; “pride that licks the dust;” firmness indomitable on paper; governments just, through force or fear; and nations that rant of liberty to the music of their chains. Let us then cling to whatever God has planted in us of spiritual — to whatever may still linger with us of the frankness and freshness of our first nature — of the devotedness and the true-heartedness of youth. These are the regenerators which we want, imaginations or realities — wisdom or folly, — they at least raise us, and keep us above the sordid and the vile; they give us another conscience besides expediency, and a nobler glory than successful chicane. An Education which tends, however remotely, to produce or to prolong these effects, is a good Education, but especially a good National Education. It is what these nations call for — what is alone worthy of these nations. We have had enough of the material, and the gross, — enough of earth; it is time that a higher and purer spirit, somewhat more allied to soul, somewhat less to sense, should be allowed to breathe upon us, as in the olden time; and if it cannot purge us from this dross, to preserve at least from such contagion, that young and yet untainted generation which is destined so soon to take our place.

The Imagination, should be diligently and lovingly conducted, not for its own sake only, but for the sake of all the other powers which walk with it. It has an immediate, and, when so taught, a most kindly influence upon the second portion of Intellectual Education, or the Æsthetic, — the Education of Sentiment — of the Feelings. This portion is generally left in our Public Schools, even in its connection with Religion, a chill and dreary blank. Yet how beautiful, how glorious might it be made! how kindling with life! how truly, how intensely, life itself! The greatest effort of our Education, is to produce a race of “reasonable men” —

men who may pass through life without committing themselves, but may have the reasonable pleasure of laughing in their corners at those who do — men whose virtue will be always found, as much within reasonable bounds, as their vices; useful members of society; respectable family men; good men; voluntary contributors to injurious charities; destined to enjoy spotless reputations upon their tombs. But, thank Heaven, who made us better than we can make ourselves, we are not *all* reason! Men may be brought, it is true, to this state of sorry perfection; but it is not a state of nature. We are something better than cubes and squares. We have within us a much ampler and more diversified nature. We are men — and men in a far more poetical, in a far more philosophical sense, than was ever dreamt of by the mere reasoner. We bear within us an expansive and elevating principle, — the sense of moral beauty. This is the intellectual “*vis motrix*” of all our lives. The “reasonable man” has stopped it; and he asserts he is still living: but who believes him? There is a death-like feeling about all he does, — “dead before his death,” as the Arabian proverb says of the ignorant — his body, “is a sepulchre, as yet unsepulchred.” Not so the man in whom this noble principle is awake and active. His actions are not efforts; they live: his whole being is in harmony: he does his duty, but he does not make us observe that he does it; we comprehend him, we feel him before we approve him: he does not ask our praise, but he secures our spirit. His very faults partake of his virtues, “*si non errâset, fecerat ille minus.*” His very superiority does not offend us; we sympathise with him as with a brother. Whence is all this difference? One is a phantasm of humanity; the other, humanity itself — one has in him, in full developement, the sense of moral beauty, generosity, enthusiasm, self-sacrifice, without which there is no moral beauty — nothing noble — nothing great upon this earth. The other is a man of merit; and a man of merit is a respectable man, and that is all. But is it all? Has nothing taken the place of these feelings? A man who has nothing to love on this social earth, must, at last, perforce, love himself; the reasonable man ends, of necessity, an egotist, and dies, leaving no blank, for he filled no space

in the eyes or thought, of friend or foe. Between these two beings, in public or private life, we do not hesitate which to choose. It is the choice between the "mannikin" and the "man." But each is the creature of Education; each can be formed. In the season in which they can be formed, we should recollect this. We should believe in the resources of our nature far more fervently; we have hearts as well as heads; we should call into action, far more energetically than we do, this better portion of man. Education is only knowledge, without the love of moral beauty — without the sense of higher perfection, to which we are constantly to tend, it is sluggish self-conceit. It is "soi vertueux, soi parfait," as Fénelon says, self always — *Le moi* — a miserable divinity, under the appearance of virtue, before whom we bow down. Education fails in its most essential quality, if it does not lead us far beyond this. It may give us palisades, to prevent us from falling over precipices; but what we want is force to impel us on the road. "*Il faut ou courir, ou du moins marcher, pour tomber.*" It may give us decorous mediocrity, means to conceal, under proprieties, defects; but sobriety is not thought. "*L'âne,*" says Montaigne, "*est le plus sérieux des animaux,*" — neither is absence of vice, virtue; nor exemption from mistake, truth. If we are to look to propriety, let it be to the lofty propriety, the *μεγαλοπρεπες*, of ancient excellence. Let it be dashed with something of the *génie-passions*, as a French writer calls them, with something like heart, with something we may feel to be soul. Without this, there will be no fermentation, either in the man or in society, — no true progression, no certain success. Nations, like individuals, will sit down and fall asleep.

Such is the utility of æsthetics — of their beauty need I speak? What is more wonderful, amongst all the marvels of this glorious world, than a human soul in the fulness of its developement? — what more beautiful than all its depths spread out, star-illumined, like those of the midnight heavens above us, with pure affections and bright thoughts? How doubly beautiful and how doubly admirable is all this in the perfect purity of youth, before the mist of this lower world hath yet come upon it! What a task, full of sacred and in-

spiriting consolations, for a true teacher ! What an Education, that, which proposes to give to this wonderful being, the entire enjoyment and mastery of these wonders — the perfect possession of itself ! Where this purpose is attained — where æsthetics have really worked their task — the routine of Education changes. Every thing takes another hue. Nothing remains idle or indifferent. “ Instead of building up a dead mind and a dead heart, it draws forth life to the mind and life to the heart, from the fountain of life within. It teaches numbers, instead of ciphers — living sounds, instead of dead characters — deeds of faith and love, instead of abstruse creeds — substances, instead of shadows — realities, instead of signs.” Of morality it is the natural ally. It makes religion an affection ; the passions, virtues — it places love at the feet of belief — it weds enthusiasm to duty. The Arts are its especial province — they are embodied sentiment — the earthly personification of the ideal — the visible triumph of the sense of beauty, which is the soul within man’s soul. He sees in them relative perfection — gleamings of a higher, a more absolute one — he sees in them man in his power and beauty — but in man, God. Even his reason gains a loftier cast. Natural history spreads before him an ever-fresh creation — he drinks in religion, as well as knowledge, from every sight and sound. Geometry is no longer a chaos of conundrums, but a beautiful interweaving of order within order, truth growing upwards out of truth, full of holy influences on the heart, as well as on the head. But these are things not in the philosophy of our schools. All our Education is negative rather than positive ; so also are its effects. We sometimes may succeed in checking vice, but we can seldom create virtue — we make bankers, or attorneys, and not heroes — machines for business or intrigue, *ad nauseam*, but few great men.

Such is the Intellectual Education which a nation should aim at, which has a great name to sustain, but feels also there is a much greater yet unacquired, within its reach. Movement, in the *spiritual* and moral, though certainly not in the mechanical or material, sense, is what we most stand in need of ; an Education which gives this is a good National

Education — that which gives less, is scarcely an Education at all.

But these are the *principles* of Intellectual Education; we have still to look to their *applications*. They are infinite. Even a concise review would far exceed the limits of this work. We must content ourselves with merely touching on the principal, as we pass.

There are two considerations involved in these applications: 1. The *knowledge* communicated; 2. the *mode* of communicating it: or, 1. Studies, and 2. Instruction. Studies depend upon the wants of the individual. See what is likely to be of use, and prepare for that. “Much of the time that is spent in teaching boys to walk upon stilts,” says Miss Edgeworth, “might be more advantageously employed in teaching them to walk well without them.”* Studies may thus be divided into such as are necessary to all, and such as are necessary only to some; or into, 1. Essential, 2. Accessory.

Essential studies are, Reading, Writing, Mother Tongue, Mathematics, Useful Knowledge, &c. &c.†

Accessory studies are, Natural History, Geography, History, Physics, Astronomy, &c.

Reading. — It is still a matter of much discussion at what period reading should be taught. The partisans of memory would begin at once; the partisans of reason would wait. This depends upon their manner of considering the subject. The former think of words, the latter of things. Reading is the study of both.

The argument of the first sets out with an error, — a belief that the only faculty yet sufficiently developed is memory. If the memory be not employed, what is to be employed? — the child must remain idle — so much time and “schooling” will be lost.

Religion, of course, is not only an integral portion of this Elementary Instruction, but of all instruction; — without it we may teach, but our teaching will only show how we may, more efficiently, pervert. For the present, Intellectual Education only, is under consideration. To Moral and Religious Education, we proceed later.

† Practical Education, t. ii. p. 209.

Hence Memory loses a great assistant in Reason. It learns *ill* what it has to learn—and learns a *bad method* besides.

The argument of the second replies to this. Do not think of reading, until the perception and attention be in perfect training. It is quite immaterial, provided the child learns to read within the prescribed period, whether the teaching be spread over the whole of that period, or only over a part. The question is, Has he learned to read, and within the period prescribed? But though immaterial as to time and reading, it is not so with reference to every thing else. It is most material that what he learns, he should learn well. This is more likely, if prepared by previous exercise of his faculties, than if not. But how can a child be so prepared? What can he learn, if he has not first learned reading? Every thing—at least the principles of every thing, of every branch of human knowledge.* He can practise perception and attention on every object around him. He can exercise these faculties on colours, forms, &c. He can require accounts of every thing he sees and hears. He can be practised in observation. He can be required to combine these facts so collected—to compare them—to draw conclusions from them. He can be taught by these daily exercises to judge and reason, with promptitude and accuracy. These exercises may be made amusements, pleasures,—matters of course. It is of little moment on what they are exemplified; a thousand incidents suggest themselves in this little world of his, almost every day. The great point is, to prepare the faculties; the more rapidly and perfectly, the better. At the same time, it is not to be inferred that knowledge is not acquired: much and good—though

* “ Quidam literis instituendos, qui minores septem annis essent, non putaverunt, quod illa primum ætas et intellectum disciplinarum capere, et laborem pati, possit. . . . *Melius* autem, qui nullum tempus vacare cura volunt, ut Chrysippus. Nam is, quamvis nutricibus triennium dederit, tamen ab illis quoque jam informandam quam optimis institutis mentem infantium judicat!” And again: — “ Quid melius alioqui facient, ex quo huiusmodi poterunt? Faciant enim aliquid, necesse est. Aut cur hoc, quantulumcumque est, usque ad septem annos, luerum fastidiamus? . . . Quantum in infantia presuntum est temporis, adolescentiæ acquiritur.” — M. Fabii Quintiliani *Inst. Orat.* l. i. c. 1. See also Miss Edgeworth's excellent chapter on Servants, *Practical Education*, vol. i. ch. iv.

of trivial objects—is really acquired,—true knowledge, clear, serviceable, always at hand. But it is not the matter which is now of moment, but the method. The matter can easily be changed; not so the method: a bad method once contracted renders all after-efforts nugatory. When the child is sufficiently practised on these common objects, he may, always using the same process, advance to new. He has been taught, for instance, to notice the different objects in his country walk—he already distinguishes rivers, hills, valleys,—a step farther leads him to the elements of geography. It is only the combination of what he already knows,—but it soon becomes the basis for other combinations, which gradually grow out of it, and so prepare the way for more. To a child—but especially to children in mass—all this is a gratification and stimulant at the same time,—it gives the pleasure and glory of a discovery. So also with every thing else—the observation of the simplest article,—a stool, a table,—disposes for the first rudiments of mechanics. Geometry, in like manner, may be preluded to,—a few planes and solids of wood, thrown on the table to be classed, form already an elementary lesson.* There is no *reading* in all this,—and yet what a preparation for all kinds of reading! How soon would a boy so prepared overtake a three-syllable boy without such a preparation, though he had been at the task-work, duly set, an entire year.

But in this, also, there is an erroneous assumption. Reading is considered a mere exercise of the memory. If it had been recollected, how easily it may be made an exercise of all the other faculties, this question could not have been stirred.

These lessons may begin, almost the very moment a child can speak. The classing of the bits of riband or paper, which his mother cuts out, may, as they fall on the floor, be his first. The “Mothers’ Manual” will next conduct him to pictures, and from thence “the Lessons on Objects,” “on Numbers,” “on Shells,” recently published, will lead him, gradually, to a perfect familiarity, with these most useful of all exercises. Another practice, well conducted, may be of eminent advantage; requiring the child, every evening, to give an account of his day. It prepares for the habit of journalising,—one of the best means, at every period of life, for assuring habits of observation, inquiry, order, economy of time, &c. See, for the application of these principles in the Elementary French schools, *Manuel de l’Instituteur Primaire*, ch. iii. art. 10—19.

The period allotted to elementary instruction is, besides, too limited to allow this parcelling out of studies, at great intervals. It is absolutely requisite, independent of the assistance they afford each other, on the principle of mere economy of time and money, that as many branches as possible should be united together. The child should begin reading, and, indeed, writing, at once; but then the method should not be *mechanical*, but *rational*.

Mr. Edgeworth has observed, that "learning to read is the most difficult of human attainments."* But what attainment would not be difficult, with the methods now in use?

What, in fact, is more preposterous than our proceeding? Instead of beginning by the beginning (the only mode of attaining knowledge), we begin by the middle, or the end — with the difficult instead of the simple — with our own inventions instead of the dictates of nature and truth. Instead of keeping to analogy even where unnecessary, we depart from it wherever we can. Scarcely one of our processes but is, in some way or other, a violation of its rules.*

Various methods have been devised for the remedy of these errors. The best is that which adheres to the wise suggestions of nature, with the greatest simplicity and steadiness; which keeps closest to analogy; which proceeds most gradually and surely from the "known" to the "unknown;" in a word, which best remembers that it addresses itself to children, and not to men.

But what is the process which seems most in accord with these principles? — what is the order which nature and analogy seem to prescribe?

When we come to apply these principles in practice, the contradiction is glaring. The child is required to believe that *bee* — *ar* — *eye* — *gee* — *aitch* — *tee*, the names of the letters, or sounds when in the alphabet, the moment they come together in a syllable, are to be sounded "*bright*," and is, perhaps, severely punished for being so *stupid*, as not to understand so very *plain* a thing. Besides the absurdity of the process, what ideas must it give of our justice and intelligence, and what an admirable preparation for the reception of our lessons in future? The child protests against it, common sense protests against it — but parents have learnt by it, and as parents can read very well, they see no good reason, why their children should not learn by it also. Time and torment are matters of no consideration.

In reading, there are three processes : — 1. Formation of sounds, or *pronunciation*. 2. Connecting these sounds with a letter or letters, or *alphabetic teaching*, and *spelling*. 3. Combining these letters into words and sentences, or *reading*.

Great diversity of opinion exists amongst Educationists, which of these three processes should be taken first. Some begin with pronunciation, and then proceed to the other two, as Pestalozzi; others with the alphabet and spelling, our ordinary method; others, again, with reading, as Mr. Wood.

But proper arrangement is not the principal difficulty. The pronunciation of the letters, when single, bears little resemblance to their pronunciation, when combined; the pronunciation at one time, is not the same as at another, either of letters, syllables, or words; the spelling is often a most incorrect decomposition of the word, analysing neither its meaning, nor its formation; the reading is committed, in general, to chance, without the least reference to the new character which every word necessarily assumes, the moment it is combined with others. All this requires correction.

It seems quite preposterous to use signs for sounds, before we first possess the sounds for which the signs are to be used. It is unnatural; it is injurious. A child who is set down to an alphabet and spelling, before he is habituated to, at least, the simple sounds which arise from either, will necessarily be embarrassed by both; and not only will not proceed faster, but will proceed much more incorrectly and painfully, than a child who is familiarised first with the sounds, before he advances to the letters. Pestalozzi, therefore, seems to have judged accurately, in commencing with pronunciation.*

* “ It is not to be left to chance, at what time, and to what extent, the child shall become acquainted with each sound. An early and complete knowledge of them all, is of great importance. This knowledge he should have before he is able to pronounce them; in like manner he should be able to pronounce them generally, with ease, before he be introduced to the knowledge of written or printed characters, and taught to read.”—*Mothers' Manual*.

“Pronunciation” and accent cannot be taught too early, too assiduously, too perseveringly. Without going to the full length of the assertion, that no man ever *pronounced* confusedly, whose *ideas* were not also confused, it cannot be denied that the influence of a clear, sharp-struck, rhythmical pronunciation has scarcely more influence on the hearer, than on the speaker. In all periods it has been the characteristic of intellectual nations, and almost in proportion to their intellectual superiority. The Athenians “atticised” as well in *accent* as in *idiom*; nor were they less vain of one, than of the other.*

* The story of the Attic market-woman and the Roman orator, is well known; but the Romans themselves were not less fastidiously attentive to early pronunciation, a solicitude accounted for by the rhythmical precision of the language, and the superior importance to the citizen of oratorical and rhetorical studies. (*Du Bos, Réflexions Critiques sur la Poésie, &c. Condillac, Orig. des Connaissances, 2d part.*) Quintilian gives special directions to choose nurses with pure accent: — “Ante omnia ne sit *vitiosus* sermo nutricibus,” &c. &c., and when this cannot be had, to select pedagogues; “qui si quæ erunt ab his, præsentē alumno, dicta vitiosa, corrigat protinus, nec insidere illi sinat.” (*Instit. Orat. l. i. c. i.*) To such as are not penetrated with the “Orator,” “De Oratore,” &c. &c., of Cicero, this may appear hypercritical, but succeeding writers have insisted on it, with scarcely less anxiety. Compare Montaigne (liv. i. ch. 25.), and Pestalozzi (*Mothers’ Manual*). Pestalozzi, indeed, requires that “the child who learns his spelling-book ought to repeat them to the infant in his cradle before it is able to pronounce even one of them, so that they may be deeply impressed upon his mind by frequent repetition,” — a precaution, perhaps, in the extreme. In Italy it was a part of education formerly, to spend a certain time at Rome, in order to acquire the *bocca Romana*, though public opinion of late, with Alfieri, gives the preference to the more masculine accent, the “*accento vibrato*” of Tuscany. Hence it is not unusual for persons of literary pretensions, to pass a few of the summer months at Pistoia, for the purpose of catching the true atticism of pronunciation as well as dialect, which distinguishes its peasantry. Tours, in a similar manner, now divides with Paris, the palm of perfect accent. One, or other, must be visited. We have no capital of the kind, and, to judge from our indifference to the subject, probably think we do not require it. Yet there is scarcely a defect more common or more glaring, in our education. There are few, even of our higher classes, who do not carry with them through life, in the midst of all their attainments, the alloy in one shape or other of provincialism. Yet a good accent should not be English, Scotch, or Irish, but British. The fact is, the nurse and servant still pierce through all; and as to the pedagogue, instead of being qualified to correct, he often requires correction.

As to the application of all this to reading, better instructions for the whole process cannot be found than in Quintilian. He is just, practical, and precise. Dr. Whately, also, in his *Rhetoric*, gives excellent instructions. The great es-

It is a more difficult question, to settle the priority or precedency between spelling and reading. It is clear, however, that both must be preceded by an accurate knowledge of the alphabet.

“Alphabetic teaching,” as it is generally practised, is the disgrace of elementary education. It is a complication of useless and difficult absurdities.

These may be reduced to — 1. the naming of the letters; 2. their classification; 3. the determination of their powers.

The *names* of the letters are, with the exception of the vowels, at variance with their sounds. In languages where vowels are not used, and consonants, therefore, very indeterminate, it would, perhaps, be a matter of difficulty to designate them by any name strictly expressive of their sound: the same difficulty ought not to exist with us. In teaching them to the child, we should give them a name, as nearly as possible coinciding with this sound; their ordinary names may be learned afterwards.

The *classification* of the letters seems the work of mere

sential is, after all, *understanding perfectly what you read*. But this is the last thing thought of. Our teachers require the reading first, and promise the meaning afterwards.

It is hard to say which is the best method of teaching reading, to numbers. So far the teaching of the individual; but there are additional difficulties. Pestalozzi adopted the simultaneous: but apparently as much from necessity as choice. (*Wie Gertrud*, &c.) It may be both practicable and judicious in the mere elements (*Ziber*, pp. 164—168.). In the more advanced stages it can scarcely be employed (Pestalozzi himself was obliged to recur to the mutual method), and even if it could, it is not at all clear that it should. Where a crowd of boys are thus “crowing their lesson together,” the diligent can profit little — the idle escape. All sorts of vicious accents and pronunciations are swept away in the mass. Time-keeping and hand-clapping, are not sufficient to teach even the mechanism of pronunciation. It requires inflexion and modulation, as well as rhythm. The mutual method is scarcely much better, unless, indeed, the monitor be a good reader himself, and thus a good teacher of reading. Pronunciation is so much a matter of imitation, that, if the model be not good, it is impossible the copy can. What then is to be done? I see no remedy for the defect but better monitors, or individual teaching. But of this later, in treating of Instruction.

chance. No possible reason, theoretic or practical, worth attending to, can be given for the order in which they now stand. It is common, or nearly so, to most languages; but the consonant languages ought surely not to have been the model for ours. They are arranged, neither in accord with their sound or appearance. So far are they from assisting, they unnecessarily embarrass the pupil.

The alphabet should be classified, as well as named, anew. The classification might proceed on the principle of the resemblance to each other, either of the letters or of the sounds. For reading, I should prefer the latter; for writing, the former. The latter is much more difficult. The vowels give their sound to the consonants; and thus five classes might be determined, under which all the consonants might be ranged. But this would be of very limited service; it would not be, properly speaking, a classification of the alphabet. The name of the isolated consonant would remain undetermined. There is nothing, however, which prevents both from being tried. When we once depart from the classification in use, and adopt a new one, it is immaterial whether there be one, two, or three classifications.

The *powers* of the letters, in English at least, are very capricious; but they may be reduced to some sort of system, by either classifying them under the more marked sounds of the vowels, to which they are, by the preceding arrangement, annexed, or else (a more complicated process) by determining certain original sounds, under which they may be respectively arranged.

As "alphabetic teaching" precedes "spelling," so "spelling," it would appear, ought to precede "reading." But two very different meanings may be attached to this. Our present system teaches spelling by long columns of monosyllables, dissyllables, trisyllables, arranged according to similarity of *sound*, but without *meaning* or connection. The one here intended selects such as resemble in sound, but still bear a signification, and practises the pupil, progressively, on these, and on these *only*.

The first rebuker of our present methods was Valentine Ickelsamer, already noticed; but his labours seem to have made little impression on his age, for we

When the pupil has made sufficient progress in these preliminary studies, he should proceed to "Reading." The

find the suggested reform mentioned in the Portroyal Grammar, as still new. (*Grammaire Gén. et Raisonnée de Portroyal, par Arnauld et Lancelot. Ed. Paris, 1803.*) The eighth chapter is thus headed:—"D'une nouvelle manière pour apprendre à lire facilement, en toutes sortes de langues." It addresses itself principally to the anomaly in the names and sounds, of the letters. "Il est certain que ce n'est pas une grande peine à ceux qui commencent, que de connoître simplement les lettres; mais que la plus grande est de les assembler. Or, ce qui, rend maintenant cela plus difficile, est que chaque lettre ayant son nom, on la prononce seule autrement qu'en l'assemblant avec d'autres." After giving instances, it proposes as corrective, "que ceux qui montrent à lire, n'apprennent d'abord aux enfans à connoître leurs lettres, que par le nom de leur prononciation; et qu'ainsi pour apprendre à lire en latin, par exemple, on ne donnât que le même nom d'é à l'é simple, l'æ et l'æ, et de même à l'i et à l'y, &c. &c.; qu'on ne leur nommât aussi les consonnes que par leur son naturel, en y ajoutant seulement l'e muet, qui est nécessaire pour les prononcer: par exemple, qu'on donnât pour nom à b, ce qu'on prononce dans la dernière syllabe de tombe, et ainsi des autres qui n'ont qu'un seul son. Que pour celles qui en ont plusieurs, comme c, g, t, s, on les appellât par le son le plus naturel et plus ordinaire, qui est au c le son de que, et au g le son de gue, &c. &c. Et ensuite on leur apprendroit à prononcer à part, et sans épeler, les syllabes ce, ci, ge, gi, &c. Voilà les plus générales observations de cette nouvelle méthode d'apprendre à lire, qui seroit certainement très utile aux enfans." (pp. 266—268.) Pestalozzi and Mr. Edgeworth, somewhat later, made almost contemporaneously, similar efforts to remedy the same abuse. Pestalozzi's plan rests on the principle "that the basis of every syllable is the vowel to which consonants are conjoined before or after." The vowel, therefore, in learning to spell, is laid down first; and, according to the succession of syllables in the book, consonants are to be added at the beginning and at the end; as, for instance, a, ap, pap, lap. Each syllable, spelt in this manner, is to be pronounced by the teacher and repeated by the children, until it is indelibly impressed upon their minds: then the teacher asks for each letter separately, and independently of the order in which they stand; and lastly, he covers them, and makes them spell from recollection. When familiarised with one character of letter, a second tablet, with the accompaniments of larger characters, is given; and finally, when sufficient progress is made in all these, the *Spelling Book* is put into the child's hand. (*The Mothers' Manual.*) All this is directed exclusively to the spelling; it does not strike at the root of the evil—vicious alphabetic teaching—the difference between the names and the sounds of the letters. Why also make the vowels the base of all reading? The Orientals consider them, as only modifiers of the consonants. The spelling book is still more defective: it retains all the old absurdity of heaping together words of analogous sound, but in most instances of no meaning. This is the more remarkable, as it was in direct contradiction to his principle of early "intuition." Mr. Edgeworth directs himself to the correction, principally, of the confusion in spelling, and for that purpose applies himself, not so much to the naming or clas-

chief points to be kept in view in reading, are — 1. Gradual progression ; and, 2. Utility. Unless a child understands what

sification of the letters, as to the determining of their powers. This he does by a simple classification, taking the vowels as the basis. The several sounds of each vowel are determined, and each sound designated by a point, an expedient suggested by the points in Hebrew ; as, *a*, for instance, in *fate*, *à* in *fat*, *â* in *fall*. In their combination with other letters he also uses 'lines, either as marks of fusion or obliteration. To facilitate this, a table is given, which in a few lines comprises the whole system. (*Practical Education*, vol. i. p. 66.) Sheridan and Walker (to whom, however, Edgeworth does not owe the invention) employed figures instead of points, and otherwise considerably developed the principle. The remainder of his system bears a strong resemblance to Pestalozzi's. "As soon as our pupil is acquainted with the sounds of *a*, and with their distinguishing marks, each of these sounds should be formed into syllables with each of the consonants ; but," he adds, "we should never name the consonants by their usual names ; if it be required to point them out by sounds, let them resemble the real sounds or powers of the consonants ; but in fact it will never be necessary to name the consonants separately till their powers in combination with the different vowels be distinctly acquired. It will then be time enough to teach the common names of the letters." (p. 67.) He then proceeds to teach the different sounds of *a*, combined in succession with each of the consonants, &c. — "a short and easy work," (p. 69.) ; and the sounds of each of the vowels with each of the consonants, first exemplified in the alphabet, then in easy lessons, and finally in general reading. (p. 69.) The results produced by this method were highly favourable. He had the experience of seven children ; and he adds, "We think that nine tenths of the labour and disgust of learning to read may be saved by this method ; and that, instead of groans and tears, the usual harbingers of learning, cheerfulness and smiles may initiate willing pupils in the most difficult of human attainments."

Later writers have not materially departed from these views. Duclos, in his commentary on the Portroyal Grammar, has, in a different way attempted to accomplish the object of Mr. Edgeworth. Instead of classifying the powers of letters by means of new signs, he proposes introducing new letters altogether from the Greek and Spanish alphabet, and applying them with those already in use, in order to bring the spelling of words much nearer to their sound. But this is creating a greater evil, to remedy a lesser one. It strikes at once at all etymology and analogy, and is in every sense unphilosophic. From the sentence given as a specimen by his annotator, it appears to have been nearly as infelicitous an attempt, as that of Trissino to press the Greek alphabet into the service of the Italian, or of Volney to use the Roman for the Arabic. (*Grammaire Gén. et Comment. de M. Duclos*, Paris, 1803, pp. 400—406.) Dr. Biber has extended both Pestalozzi's and Edgeworth's systems, on a very ingenious though somewhat complex plan. He is more scientific than either, but less practical. (*Memoir of Pestalozzi*, &c. pp. 230—237., particularly the Analytic Table, and pp. 237—240.) He takes the original sounds, and not the vowels, for his basis, and then applies the vowels, in proportion as they express these sounds. These sounds are designated by old English letters, instead of points, and are divided

he reads, it is quite obvious that his understanding cannot benefit; but it is not quite so clear that his memory must suffer

into two classes, *fundamental* and *modified*. The fundamental should at once be taught, the modified much later. Both (on the Pestalozzian principle) should be quite familiar before alphabetic teaching or spelling be commenced. (p. 234.) Mrs. Williams adopts the principle of the Portroyal Grammar, and many of the applications of Pestalozzi.

Mr. Wood has applied, with great success and considerable improvements, a portion of the systems of Edgeworth and Pestalozzi; but he differs from both, in going at once to reading, and in not exercising the pupil upon any word, which has not a meaning. The pupil is first made acquainted with the form, name, and power of the letters; when master of these, he combines them in the easiest words, — monosyllables of two letters, — then three, four, and so on; but always in distinct words, and not parts of words, or arbitrary combinations, as in our actual systems. He then proceeds to definitions of meaning, &c. &c. which belong more specifically, to the study of the mother tongue, and bears a strong resemblance, as far as it goes, to the “*Méthode Rationnelle*” of P. Girard. (*Wood's Account of the High School of Edinburgh; Professor Pillans' Principles of Elementary Teaching*, particularly *Appendix*, Note A.) Professor Pillans has suggested very valuable improvements in alphabetic teaching, in his Christmas Lectures of 1827–8, on Didactics. He directs his attention particularly to the classification of the letters; and proposes “to arrange the alphabetic characters in brotherhoods, according to the organs of voice used in pronouncing them, and to teach the child the knowledge of his letters at first, and, for a long time, in this way only.” (*Principles of Elementary Teaching, Appendix A.*, Note, p. 93.) The French *Manuel d'Instituteur Primaire*, published by the authority of the French Board of Education, lays particular stress upon this classification of the alphabet. It proposes three different methods:—1. The pupil begins by the letters; but, instead of classing them alphabetically, classes them according to their form, in three categories;—letters beginning with a *small straight line*, letters beginning with a *long straight line*, — letters beginning with a *curved line*. The capital letters are arranged in a similar manner, under the head of *straight lines*, *curved*, and *mixed*. He then proceeds to syllables of two letters, to double syllables, &c. and so on, until he can read. This differs in classification only from our method. It requires the naming of the letters first, preserving the present names, and then proceeds to spelling. There are thus two sets of sounds for the same sign. 2. The pupil begins with the vowels (on the Pestalozzian plan), and then adds the consonants, — naming both, however, by their ordinary names: its after applications are conducted much in the same manner as the preceding, and come under the same censure. 3. The pupil learns the vowels, and combines them with the consonants, but without naming them, or spelling. This last process seems to be preferred. (*Manuel*, &c. &c. part ii. ch. ii. 1831.)

In resorting to these several systems, it is impossible not to recognise the great superiority of the new methods over the old. The old lay claim to stricter analysis, greater accuracy, more familiar acquaintance with the composition of words, all excellent preliminary studies for orthography, grammar, &c. &c. But

also*, that even the mechanical part of reading, cannot be carried on as it ought. If he does not understand, he must read at random, with inattention; he must read ill. If idle, he will never understand; and contract, besides, the ruinous habit of listlessness and inaccuracy in future; if diligent, he will try to understand, and generally fail. Whilst attempting to discover a meaning, he should be listening to pronunciation, &c., or engaged in pronouncing himself. 'In attempting to do both, he will do neither well. But then, in justice to the child, the book should be comprehensible, and the master competent.† Both text and explanation should be adapted to his

it by no means follows, that the new methods are deficient in any one of these advantages; on the contrary, the classification of sounds is far juster, simpler, and better graduated; — that of letters not less so, — and the connection between both, whether in their fundamental or their combined forms, without comparison more obvious as well as more philosophic, than any which could possibly be attained under the old systems: not only the voice analyses with facility, but also the eye. It is the road of nature, and analogy, and, therefore, of analysis in its purest and clearest form. Of the facility of their application, it is needless to speak. Partially as these new methods have been tried, their value has been fully justified by experience.

* "Sçavoir par cœur n'est pas sçavoir," says Montaigne; "c'est tenir ce qu'on a donné en garde à sa mémoire. C'est qu'on sait droitement, on en dispose sans regarder au patron, sans tourner les yeux vers le livre." . . . "Qu'il ne lui demande pas seulement compte des mots de sa leçon, mais du sens, et de la substance." (*Essais*, liv. i. ch. 25.) But of what consequence, exclaim our practical men; if he does not understand now, he will later; it is so much laid up, so much acquired: — "O la belle ressource que celle qu'on leur prépare en donnant à leur esprit les habitudes vicieuses, en la chargeant de liaisons fausses, de mots sans idées, d'idées sans clarté." (Naville, *Educ. Pub.* p. 98.) But we shall return to this later.

† Admitted generally — seldom acted on. We have made some steps since Miss Edgeworth's chapter on Books (*Practical Education*, vol. ii. ch. xii.), but so few and feeble, as scarcely to deserve notice. For recent instances of this crying folly, see Professor Pillans. (*Principles of Elementary Teaching*, pp. 61—65.) To give Pope, Dryden, and the most difficult parts of our most difficult poets, — Milton, Young, — to young peasants, who should be learning the geography of their native village, or a sufficiency of arithmetic and practical economics for their conduct in after-life, is surely preposterous. Such are the studies in the higher classes, but the elementary are still worse treated. All the old absurdities are retained. — Yet this is Scotland, and such her boasted Parochial Education. In Ireland, "Chesterfield's Letters," a highly instructive book to a Kerry mountaineer, has superseded "Freny the Robber," and other moralists, — doubtless a great step in Education Reform. The Kildare Race Society has done something,

years and intelligence ; in other words, should be accurately graduated ; not only nothing left unexplained, but nothing introduced, which was difficult of explanation. Nor will this be sufficient ; the lesson should not only be clear, but of service. The pupil should learn words as well as sounds, and things as well as words. But I am anticipating : the moment a pupil begins to read, he should immediately begin the study of his "Mother tongue." In treating of the manner in which that important branch should be taught, an opportunity will offer of more fully showing, how all the above principles should be applied.

Writing.—The principles of reading are rendered more practical by writing ; and it combines, besides, the application of the principles of drawing, at least in a slight degree, and the first hints of geometry. It is a new lesson in *forms*.

The *generation* of the letters should be the leading prin-

and the Irish Education Board is doing something,—but both must do a great deal more, before they can hope to overtake Germany, France, or even America. Compare the "Kildare Place Society's Book List," with the enumeration and description of the "German Elementary School Books," in Cousin (*Rapport*, pp. 2. 64.) the "Choix des Livres à l'usage des l'Instituteurs et des Elèves" (*Manuel des Inst. Prim.* part. 5.) ; and the list in the Kentucky Report, 1831, p. 29. But we shall revert at length to this important subject, in treating the Education of each country, in the practical division of the work.

* The Pestalozzian principle requires, that the pupil should begin with drawing,—and should begin drawing with the *measurement* of lines. This is grounded on the positions, that writing itself is only a species of *linear* drawing (an idea carried much too far), and that, by beginning with what exercises an ability for *all* forms, instead of confining it to a *few* peculiar forms on a contracted scale, the hand will attain much greater freedom, and "all that time be saved which children generally spend in contracting, in correcting bad habits,—contracted by a long practice of bad writing, and substituting a good hand for the misshapen and incorrect characters to which, for years, they have been accustomed." (*Mother's Manual*.) For the manner in which drawing was facilitated, by the "Alphabet of Forms," and other exercises concerning lines, angles, curves, &c. ; and in what manner Pestalozzi first chanced on that expedient, see *Wie Gertrud*, &c. ch. v. ; for an explanation of the alphabet, the self-biography of *Buss*, given by Pestalozzi in the work just quoted ; and for the diagram itself of the alphabet, which was not published in his works, Biber, p. 205. It is simply "a series of elementary geometrical figures, by the composition of which, any given form might be produced, in a similar manner as the words in language, by the composition of the letters of that series of sounds commonly called the alphabet."

ciple, the first point attended to; the recomposition, or *formation*, follows easily.*

It is only by gradual, but not necessarily slow, steps that the pupil should proceed to these different stages. In writing, as in every other branch of Education, he should not be permitted to advance to a new lesson, or a new order of ideas, until he be completely master of the old.

Writing, as well as reading, should be applied to purposes of intellectual and moral instruction.

Attention should be paid to the *physical* management of this department, the position of the pupil, the substances used, &c. &c. They materially influence not only writing, but composition, the mind as well as the hand; and, what is more important than either, at this age, the health.†

We begin, it is true, by *lines*, and begin well, but we soon depart from these elementary principles. We take the alphabet as we find it, instead of selecting the simplest forms first, or reconstructing an alphabet for ourselves. The straight lines, the curved, the mixed,—should be written, as well as learned, successively. Their combinations,—how one gives rise to the other,—the elements of each,—will thus become obvious. How much this assists in the *formation*, as well as in the *comprehension* of letters, will be intelligible to all, who feel how much mechanical skill always suffers, by being detached from intellectual. “C'est l'entendement qui veoid et qui oyt; toutes aultres choses sont aveugles, sourdes, et sans ame.”—Montaigne, *Ibid.*

† The mechanical teaching and practice of writing is necessarily, in the first instance, *copy*; and, so far, Pestalozzi's three principles are perfectly just. Subsequently, the application of Biber's suggestion, of dotting the outline of the letters, and allowing the child to fill it up from memory, may be of use. (p. 242.) Pestalozzi begins with the slate,—though on rather speculative grounds; the facility of correction is obvious, but whether a child's modesty is much benefited by effacing what it executes, is another question. It is of moment to have some standard of comparison. The handling of the pen, too, does not seem much advanced by previous use of the slate pencil: it contracts, and hardens. Economy, indeed, is a more urgent motive; but even this objection, in large schools, may be obviated by the adoption of Messrs. Smith and D'Olier's recent delible ink and copy-book invention. Quintilian recommends (and we have partially adopted the hint) large ivory letters, both for learning to *read* and to *write*, for the latter deeply engraved: —“Cum vero jam ductus sequi cœperit, non inutile erit, eas tabellæ quam optime insculpsi, ut per illos velut sulcos ducatur stilus.” (*Inst. Orat.* lib. i. c. 1.) Its advantages, however, were more obvious to the ancients, with whose wax tablets it was more in analogy, than they can be to us. A piece of black chalk, and a large white painted board, would be more useful. Whatever be the material, the exercise is of primary importance,—not merely in a *mechanical*, but in a *mental* point of

Mother tongue. — Knowledge is not to be acquired by accident, at least to any great amount, or with any great rapidity. We may ultimately, indeed, without the assistance of masters, or methods, reach our destination by a circuitous route of our own; but this, as Reid says, is like going round by Paris to reach London. Almost every thing in Education requires to be taught: the inspirations of natural genius* are not to be listened to. But when we say *taught*, it is meant not only that the teacher should teach, but, what is far more difficult, should enable the pupil to *teach himself*.

This maxim, true in all cases, is especially true in teaching the “mother tongue.” We may speak prose all our life, like the Bourgeois Gentilhomme, without our knowing it; but it is a different thing to speak it well.

But we learn a language not merely for the purpose of speaking it well, but also as an instrument of mental culture.

Both these objects should be pursued simultaneously. It will be necessary, however, for the sake of clearness, to consider them successively; and first in reference to the acquisition of the language.

All languages are analytic methods; and in proportion to the greater or less degree of analysis visible throughout, is the more or less perfection of the language. This, particularly striking in the operations of reasoning, is also very perceptible in those of imagination.

A language, like every other branch of knowledge, is best learned by studying it, in the way in which it was formed. To know any thing, we must know how it is composed; to know how it is composed, we must *decompose* it.

These two considerations point out at once to us the course,

view; a good and quick hand is essential. “Tardior stilus cogitationem moratur; rudis et confusus intellectu caret; unde sequitur alter dictandi, quæ ex his transferenda sunt labor.” (Inst. Orat. loc. cit.)

* It spoils his taste — “gli guasta il genio poveretto!” — an ordinary excuse of idle children, or of still idler parents: — “μία τέχνη πρὸς αὐτὰ, τὸ πεφυκέναι χεῖρω τε τὰ φυσικά ἔργα ὡς οἴονται, καὶ τῷ παντὶ δειλότερα καθίσταται, ταῖς τεχνολογίαις κατασκελετωμένα.” (Longinus, *De Sublim.* sect. ii.) But if mental exercise injures the mind, why should not bodily exercise weaken the body?

which should be adopted in teaching languages. The method being analytic, we should pursue this analysis; but in order to pursue it with effect, we should resolve the language into its simplest elements.

Language is considered merely as a medium for the communication of idea; but it is also an instrument for the fixing of idea, as useful to the reasoner in the wide world of thought, as his lines to the astronomer, in determining the relative positions of the heavenly bodies. (*Schiller, Menschliches Wissen.*) In numbers we cannot advance many steps without names, and names not arbitrary, but formed in strict analogy to the manner, in which the numbers themselves were formed. (*Condillac, Origine des Connaissances, Langue des Calculs, &c.*) As in numbers, so also in every other species of language. Where the analogy is lost by the introduction of other words, or other phrases, from other languages (especially not cognate), confusion instantly ensues. It is this, which gives such immense advantages to the languages of calculation, as instruments of thought, over every other; the elements, the generation, the combination of signs are there easily traceable. Hence the perfect clearness in their most prolonged reasonings; a clearness, which, without a language equally analytic, can never be hoped for, in metaphysics. The true value of terms can never be got at, except by decomposition, and where, as in all highly civilised languages, there has been a great variety of additions, or new applications, or where they form portions of words, or are traceable to roots, to be found only in other languages, this process becomes a matter of extreme difficulty. To study a language properly, we must of necessity study many languages, and not the languages only, but their several histories, and, consequently, the histories of the men, by whom they were framed. Our modern languages, like our modern kingdoms, are aggregates of various heterogeneous fragments. They were brought together by external circumstances, and are in no sort of analogy, in many instances, with each other. The clue is frequently snapt asunder, and we are left in a labyrinth of doubt. The ancient languages were comparatively exempt from this defect, and the higher we go in antiquity, the more decided this exemption will appear. Homer's vocabulary may be found in a few roots, scarcely a word of it which does not bear the visible imprint of its origin. The Arabic, is still more perfect. Its most complex combinations, may be reduced to a few elements. The triliteral root of every verb, is easily detected as we peel off, one by one, the various modifications of gender, pronoun, and adverb, which affect it; the substantives grow out of the verbs, and the adjectives out of both. This original simplicity, conjoined with the general exclusion of all words from foreign, or at least uncongenial languages, produces a completeness, a distinctness, a harmony, which we seek for in vain, in the hybrid languages of modern Europe. For reasoning purposes such a language must be almost an algebra, but it is not less favourable to the rapidity and richness of the imagination. Imagination depends upon association, and association depends for its extent and vividness on the extent and perfection of analogy. Where it is well preserved, words explain themselves, and with an energy and picturesqueness, which is not attainable in disjointed languages, swept up from successive contributions. Under the most modern dress, the word still preserves the graphic truth, and the

When a child has attained a tolerable facility in the mechanical part of reading, the master should take some familiar sentence, and by a series of questions lead him to decompose it himself. He would thus discover the chief elements, and be able to recompose it into similar sentences.

At first the words selected should be names only of *sensible* objects, and of objects within his experience or reach. If the child has been previously exercised, as he ought to be, in the intuitive method, by "lessons on objects," their meaning will be obvious, or very easily discoverable.

He may then be habituated to arrange the words under different heads, with their significations annexed; and thus commence not only *learning*, but *constructing* his vocabulary.

It is obvious that no word can enter this list, with whose meaning he is not thoroughly acquainted; nor is he confined to one. In a public school there will be many different significations given, according to the intelligence, previous experience, or peculiar position of the pupils, and their families. He may select from these, and thus exercise his *discrimination* as well as *memory*.

From names of sensible objects, he may now proceed to names of spiritual ones. This transition should be gradual. He should first be shown, how the names of material things already acquired, are applied by an extension of signification to intellectual objects, care being taken to select such as to exhibit this application in a strong point of view, without the necessity of recurring to Latin etymologies. From thence the passage to words simply intellectual, and

vigorous nature of its first meaning. But there is another advantage; the effect is not limited to one word, each word acts as a conductor to a whole line of others. The imagination falling on one point, shoots out, with the velocity and brilliancy of electricity, to thousands of others. It multiplies indefinitely the power of the poet. Such a language is an instrument with which, in compass and power, as well as accuracy, no language on our modern construction, can very easily compete.

At the same time, this ought to be but a stronger motive to remedy, as far as in us lies, the operation of these causes. We ought to take advantage the more earnestly, of the advantages in our hand. If we cannot teach English etymologically, with the same ease as Latin or Greek, we ought nevertheless so to teach it. No other mode deserves the name of analytic; by no other mode can it be said to be *taught*.

from objects to operations, is easy. All these are additions to his vocabulary; and he has been practised not only in orthœpy, and orthography, but also in etymology.

Such is the first stage,—the accurate acquisition of *words*: he should now proceed to *sentences*. These sentences might at first consist of only one member; then, of two. They should be analysed on the same principle as words. At first they should, as nearly as possible, be composed of the words with which he is already familiar; then of those in analogy with them; finally, of words of every description. As he has decomposed, he can recompose them; and as he has constructed one sentence on a specified model, so can he reconstruct many on the same. He proceeds from the composition of his vocabulary, to the composition of sentences.

From sentences of two members he may advance to sentences of four; and from thence to sentences of any number which may be required. This leads him immediately to paragraphs. It is only a combination of many sentences; an extension of the same process—decomposition and recomposition throughout.

When familiar with this second stage,—the analysis and composition of sentences, and the analysis and composition of paragraphs; he proceeds to the third, from one paragraph to many, or to a whole *discourse*. When this can be accomplished with accuracy and ease, he may be said to have attained a competent knowledge of his language; but he has yet learned no grammar.*

Grammar and Syntax are a collection of laws or rules.

* If we wish to know how such a theory succeeds in practice, we must listen to Montaigne:—"Sans art, sans livre, sans grammaire ou precepte, sans fouet, et sans larmes, j'avois appris du latin tout aussi pur que mon maistre d'eschole le sçavoit. Et Nicolas Grouchi, qui a escript 'de comitiis Romanorum,' Guillaume Guerente, qui a commenté Aristote, George Bucanan, ce grand poète escossois, Marc Antoine Muret, que la France et l'Italie recognoist pour le meilleur orateur du temps, mes précepteurs domestiques, m'ont dict souvent que j'avois ce langage en mon enfance si prest, et si à main, qu'ils craignoient à m'accoster." The whole of his secret, was *practice*. Even where grammar was ultimately applied, it was on a new plan,—“par forme d'esbat, et d'exercice: nous pelotions nos déclinaisons, à la manière de ceulx, qui par certains jeux de tablier apprennent l'arithmétique et la géométrie.”—*Essais*, liv. i. ch. 25.

Rules are gathered from practice; they are the result of induction, to which we come by long observation and comparison of facts. It is, in fine, the science, the philosophy of language. In following the process of nature, neither individuals nor nations ever arrive at the science *first*. A language is spoken, and poetry written, many years before either a grammar or prosody is even thought of. Men did not wait till Aristotle had constructed his Logic, to reason: they were eloquent before either he or Cicero had prescribed their code of eloquence. All these are only abbreviated methods, grammars, to come at the same end—to enable us to do always more surely, what is sometimes done but not so surely, without their aid. To learn Grammar and Syntax, then, in the end, instead of the beginning, is following precisely the course of nature; it is learning the language analytically; learning it, in fine, in the very way in which the language itself has been formed. Language is a science and an art: a science in the sense just mentioned; in its application to composition and speaking,—in its becoming practical, an art. We begin with the art first, but without the science also, we can seldom apply the art *well*. Yet, as matters now stand, with all our affectation of grammar-learning, we practise the art ill, reach the science late, and sometimes never reach it at all.

The arrangement proposed is not only the most natural and judicious, but it may well be supposed the easiest. A child hardly requires either grammar or syntax earlier. When he does require it, it is ready for him: he finds it almost of himself. The fact is, in the course already given, he has been imperceptibly forming his *own* Grammar and Syntax all along. When he comes to them in the end, he merely rediscovers; he merely finds a somewhat shorter, and more formal method of going through the same process, to which he had been already accustomed.*

* But, to be truly such, the grammar should be deduced from these previous exercises; it should be analytic. I know of no grammar sufficiently so in our language; our corrections are limited to arrangements. But we must get beyond the age of Lindley Murray and his school, (why is he praised by Mr. Edgeworth, vol. ii. p. 185.?) before we can reach true grammar. This, perhaps, cannot be

will spread to the lowest cottage, a more obvious connection of the different orders will ensue. Above all, increased facilities will be obtained, for the cultivation of the intellectual and moral powers. This is the second object to be considered in teaching the mother tongue.

In applying the study of language to the développement of the intellect and the conscience, we proceed on precisely the same principles, as in learning the language itself. We reduce the phrase to its simplest elements — we then advance to the more complex. We begin by assuring ourselves of the clearness and accuracy of our ideas: we then proceed to combine them.

It is a matter of infinite importance to acquire this distinctness at an early period. The *idea* should be kept *clear* and *precise*. The *word* should be kept *steady to the idea*. These are the two great rules.

The first is acquired by analysis, by examining the object in its several parts, and then recomposing it anew. Long before a child begins to read, he should have been thus exercised, on a variety of objects, from the simple to the complex, from the common to the rare. He should from thence be led, by a series of observations, to discover an uniform method for such observations; he should be taught to classify their results under convenient heads; he should be shown, by practice and experience, the utility of such methods and classifications, both in facilitating the acquisition of knowledge, and the communication of knowledge to others. With these habits he is prepared, for the formation and application of his vocabulary.

He now begins to deal with words, and the second rule becomes necessary. No word should be admitted of which the signification was not first accurately analysed, and strictly defined. No quarter should be given to half meanings, and presumed meanings; far better for the pupil to own, that he had no meaning at all. But neither should a signification be given by the master, not *fully felt* by the pupil *himself*, and in perfect accord with the *actual* state of his mental progress. It is not necessary that it should be complete, but it is quite necessary that it should be *just*; above all, it is

essentially necessary, that it should be understood. In this, as in every thing else, we should encourage his curiosity — his sacred thirst of knowledge; but it should rather be by showing him the road to the waters, than by bringing the waters to him. He should taste the sweets of labour, and the joys of discovery; for we should always remember that it is not so much knowledge he has to acquire, as the means to acquire and usefully to apply knowledge. Not only should he give the signification of every word, but also the reason for preferring one signification to another; the mode by which he arrived at that result; in fine, every other circumstance connected, during the process, with the operations of his own mind. Nor should the teacher be satisfied with simple assent. He should probe, and get to the bottom of his knowledge, before he allowed him to go on. This practice of “accounting” to the teacher will soon produce, in addition to the other exercises, the most valuable intellectual habits, — exact inquiry, strict examination, methodical memory, and not only a knowledge of the operations, but a power also in the regulation, of his mind.

Moral lessons naturally arise out of the words selected for his vocabulary. There is scarcely one which may not form the text for a highly useful moral discussion, adapted, like the intellectual exercise, to the mind and progress of the pupil, and the circumstances in which he is *actually* placed. I say discussion, and not lecture; for the pupil should always feel that he is active and not passive — that he bears, and is entitled to bear, his part.

In the second stage, a larger field is opened. The formation of *sentences* naturally leads to the formation of *propositions*. These are formal exercises of the reasoning power — the first rudiments of logic. These propositions should be, at first, simple, self-evident, and absolute; exercises of little difficulty, but of great use in showing the process itself, of reasoning. They should gradually become complicated, doubtful, and conditional. The subject matter should not be indifferent, but should have a direct reference to some useful practical information, domestic or public economics, or some important moral truth. At first, the pupil may simply analyse

and discuss these propositions ; but by degrees he should be required to construct similar propositions himself ; and not only to construct them, but to render an account of the principle and grounds of their construction, in the same manner as he did of the signification and connection of words.

The third stage,—grammar, syntax, and the composition of essays and discourses,—affords every opportunity for the combination and extension of all these exercises. Minute analytical descriptions, —long trains of argument, —disquisitions connected with private and public duties, the combination of their several conditions, may naturally follow. The pupil is now fully qualified for the exercise of his intellectual and moral faculties, on all these subjects. But in this, as in every preceding step, self-examination should always be insisted on, —the accounting process should never be dispensed with. It is not enough that the pupil should succeed in explaining a difficulty, or surmounting an obstacle ; he should have made himself master of the means by which similar victories may be achieved in future.

This course, as well as that of language, should be accompanied throughout, by such a series of class reading, as may not only be graduated, but in perfect harmony with the spirit of the system. A class book for each branch, and for each stage, would be essential. They might be made, if written in the proper tone, and with due acquaintance with the objects in view, the vehicle of the most interesting and important information.

But can this course be reduced to practice ? Is it likely to produce all the good which is here anticipated ? The answer to these questions is simple. It was by means of a course, in many particulars, such as this, that the Père Girard succeeded in totally reforming the town of Fribourg, one of the most backward in all Switzerland. It had long been a desideratum in Education to discover some particular study, of sufficient extent and power to exercise all the faculties, and, at the same time, sufficiently elementary, to become applicable to every class, and to every period of society. This was first attempted to be supplied by the study of the ancient languages ; but even the German Educationists, the most zealous and successful in this attempt, have lately admitted that, from the impossibility of applying it to the very class which stands most in need of such an instrument, it is altogether insufficient for general purposes, and have not only given the preference to the study of the mother tongue, but, even where Latin was necessary, have deferred its study as long as

Mathematics. Under this general designation are comprised Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry. It is a matter, however, of controversy, with which of the three branches the pupil should begin. Arithmetic is considered the most elementary; the reason is obvious. We confound Geometry with Euclid; and Euclid, time out of mind, has been the exclusive property of our higher schools.

But if we reflect, we shall find no real grounds for this arrangement: our ideas of number and form are contemporaneous. It would be a difficult matter to say which of the two were first acquired; or at what period, indeed, either of the two began.

possible, in order to allow more time and attention to the teaching of German. Pestalozzi was one of the first who saw this want, and for the purpose of remedying it, proposed to combine intellectual and moral instruction with the teaching of language. "By way of a bequest to his pupils, to be published after his death," he intended "to give a series of fragments, under the head of the most important *verbs*, in which he would sum up the experience of his life, in reference to the actions, states, and relations, which they express."—(*Mother's Manual*.) This plan, of which he left little more than the idea, in a few fragments under the heads of *Breathing, Tilling, &c.*, was in a great degree filled up after his death by his disciple Kruesi, in a small work, entitled "Paternal Instructions, in Moral Comments, a Bequest from Father Pestalozzi to his Pupils." De Fellenberg has also practically applied many of these hints, and, generally speaking, opportunities are taken in the Swiss Schools, to connect with the teaching of language both moral and intellectual instruction. But these aphorisms and occasional applications, though excellent, fall far short of a well-digested connected plan for general intellectual and moral developement, in which the teaching of language should be the great auxiliary. Such project, and its execution, were both reserved for the Père Girard. In his quality of Prefect of Schools, for twenty years, he laboured unremittingly in the establishment and improvement of this system, and with a success of which no other testimony need be given than the state of the population of Fribourg itself, the work exclusively of his own hands, and such at this moment that a most competent witness (Naville) has declared, "qu'aucune ville peut-être dans le monde n'en pourrait offrir une semblable." Both system and establishment have been recently suppressed, — no unusual recompence for similar benefits: a faction similar to that which attacked Pestalozzi, and which is now attacking de Fellenberg, raised its voice against the Père Girard, and, to the disgrace of Switzerland, I might almost add of human nature, prevailed. The first elements of the plan, its practical working, the causes which immediately led to its suppression, &c. &c. will be more amply noticed later under the head of Switzerland.

There is, therefore, no good reason why Arithmetic should go before Geometry; but there are many reasons why they should go together. In their elementary processes they cannot easily be separated; and even if they could, the separation would produce more evil than good.

These two branches may, therefore, with perfect facility and advantage be combined, but then both must be studied and taught in such a manner, as to be perfectly within the comprehension of children.

We make the same mistake in their instance that we do in reading and in the study of the mother tongue. We attempt the grammar before that, on which the grammar is founded. We go to the *reasoning* before we are sufficiently familiarised with the *facts*.

Now mathematics form a language, and should be studied as we study other languages.

In studying the mother tongue, we propose, instead of the present methods, beginning with the simplest elements, and from thence proceeding by easy and well-graduated steps to their combination, learning the rule after we had become familiarised with the practice, and thus imperceptibly creating our own grammar, and advancing to the philosophy of the language in the end.

But this study is necessarily preceded or accompanied by reading and writing. In like manner, mathematics must be accompanied by the study of their methods. We must learn their alphabets, we must learn how to read them, we must learn how to write them, as we proceed along.

The first lesson of Arithmetic, and indeed of Geometry, may be given to a child, the moment it can speak. The moment it can say "another and another," it has begun.

Some suppose we form our ideas of number in an arithmetical, others in a geometrical progression, some by repeated additions, others by multiplications.* This is immaterial. Without entering into the metaphysics of numbers, it may simply be observed, that as soon as a child can distinguish,

See Pestalozzi, *Mother's Manual. Letters to Gesner. Numerical Table.* Biber, *Memoirs*, p. 284. *Christian Monitor and Family Friend*, pp. 40, 41.

it can understand what "chair, and chair, and chair" is, and all that is required, is to seize this knowledge and to apply it.

We begin by saying, not "one and one," but "one chair and one chair," or "one finger and one finger," to which collection we give the *new* designation, when joined, of "two chairs," or "two fingers;" when we add another chair, we give another new term, "*three*," chairs, and so on. It is of little consequence how far the child gets at first, but it is material that he should get on well; to ensure this, care must be taken that the *name* be joined to the *number*, otherwise the child will mistake the number itself for a *new name*, and find great difficulty afterwards in following the progression.*

From these casual exercises of numeration, the child now proceeds to the regular series; the fingers are the most natural instrument, he counts on them, and is stopped at *ten*.

At this he should be kept some time. When perfectly familiarised, both with the names of the numbers and their progression, he may be allowed to proceed, but not before. Apples, balls, squares, cubes, may then be substituted—always something visible and tangible. Additions and subtractions may next follow, but they also should be performed always in reference to real objects, and with something like a positive result in view.

The squares or cubes may now be placed in lines, one

I have seen children, from want of attention to this, frequently leap from two to five: one, two, five, were new names for the fingers, not for numbers. Names of numbers should be short, clear, and connected. M. de Condamine, quoted by Condillac, has given a striking proof of the obstacles which long names, unconnected with each other, interpose. Most nations count decimally, determined probably by the number of the fingers; and, accordingly, in most languages, the names of all numbers after ten are combinations only of these first. Each name is distinct and primitive, until we pass that number. Yet there is no reason, why these primitive names should not have stopped at five. One hand is as much the repetition of another, as one ten of another. Our numeration appears to indicate a duodecimal origin. Yet Zehn (the German for our ten), is only the plural (Zehen) of Zehe (toe); and "Eilf" (from which our eleven) seems as much to have originated from Ein (one), and "Zwölf" (our twelve) from Zwei (two), as the Latin "undecim" from unus, and "duodecim" from duo. We have adopted, it is true, the duodecimal in the late reform of our "Système Métrique," in preference to the decimal, chosen by the French. But this was principally with a view to practical convenience. It gives, from its binary formation, greater facilities in measurement, but less in calculation.

above another, so as to form a column. But the child ere this, has probably acquired the idea of two tens, three tens, four tens. These cubes may be then joined together, so that ten of them may form but one cube; this new cube so formed will be thus a ten in fact, and in name. Nine others of the same size may be made, and ranged above each other, so as to form a second column. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth columns may be formed in the same manner.*

The child thus, from their *size* alone, can now easily distinguish the units from the tens, and the tens from the hundreds; he will soon be enabled, by keeping them always in their respective columns, to distinguish them, by their *place*.

The cubes should now be arranged in an Abacus †, and the same operations of addition and subtraction be worked out, as before.

Writing may next be called in. The abacus should be copied by the teacher before the pupil. For the cubes, lines may be substituted, corresponding to them in size. The place also should be marked, the columns being separated, as in the abacus, by strong-drawn lines.

But these lines are liable to confusion, therefore inconvenient: — this soon begins to appear; as soon as felt, the child should be led to find out the remedy himself.

In counting, at the outset, the difficulty of following “one finger and one finger,” &c. beyond a few numbers soon became perceptible. Names were substituted to distinguish each collection, and to enable us to go on to new. In like manner written marks, to distinguish these same names, on paper, will now appear equally requisite. The child

Pestalozzi's Numerical Table, now fallen into disuse, exhibits something of the kind. It is applied to one column only. It sensibly shows *ten* to be the aggregate of *ten ones*, by crossing ten vertical lines with two horizontal; a mode of counting frequent among the lower classes.

† The Abacus, or ball frame, is now common in the outfit of our elementary schools. I prefer cubes to balls; the facility and exactness with which they may be divided and combined shows the formation of numbers much more distinctly. They are in more direct analogy with the signs which succeed to them; and, from their immediate applicability to the teaching of geometry and drawing, may be made to form a new link between both those studies, and that of arithmetic.

should be taught to *invent* them. He will almost naturally fall into the Roman numeration.* He should be allowed for a time to use it, until its clumsiness appears to call for a new improvement. The lines also dividing the columns will appear awkward: they may be dismissed, and dots designating them substituted in their place. The use now of 0 will of itself, become apparent. It should never be called “nought,” it is only a means of keeping the figures in their proper column. Here also the child should be first shown the difficulty, and then urged to suggest the means, by which it may be overcome.†

* The oldest forms of the Roman numerals are single lines differing very little from the numeral table of Pestalozzi. On old monuments they are found, I, II, III, IIII, IIIII. Beyond this the inconvenience became sensible: an abridged expression for IIIII became necessary. V was adopted; suggested, probably, by the extension of the thumb and little finger, indicating that all between was comprised. From V they proceeded by the same addition of single lines (the expression of IX for VIIII was a recent invention), until they arrived at ten. Here the same inconvenience recurred. But the remedy was now easy; the principle had been discovered, they had only to apply it. Ten are five and five, or two fives, two hands; they had only to add V to V, which thus became, we will suppose, X, or X, and they had at once an expression for ten. But hitherto they had counted in units only, they adopted the same process in tens. XXXXX required the same abridged expression that IIIII had done. The old expedient was again put in requisition. But the vertical position had already been employed; they adopted, we will presume, the horizontal. As V expressed five, L or L was made to express fifty. Their further progress was easy; they had only to pursue analogy. As V and V had by their combination in X given an abridged expression for ten, so, also, L and L combined into C or C, or finally C, would become the abridged expression for a hundred; as V, by being changed from a vertical to a horizontal position, was raised from five to fifty, so also C by being turned the other way, or 3 and subsequently D and D, would become the expression for five hundred. In like manner, as L and L had formed C or one hundred, so also M the old form, and subsequently M, would be the obvious expression for one thousand. It may be said, indeed, that C and M are only the initial letters of “centum” and “mille,” and no one forgets the crescent worn by the Patricians of Romulus; but may not the signs have suggested the names, as well as the names the signs? Why, on the same principle is not D and not X, the expression of “Decem?” Much of this is of course conjecture; but if it lead to more minute inquiry, it will not be without its use. The Greeks adopted the letters of their alphabet for their numerals, but being the signs in no analogy with the ideas, the generation of numbers, in their system of numeration, is lost sight of.

† See La Croix, *Essais sur l'Enseignement*, sect. ii, p. 230., Paris, 1828. He is a strenuous advocate for this *material* teaching. “Il conviendrait que les conséquences des premières notions fussent d'abord représentées physiquement, avant d'être déduites du raisonnement.”

All the operations of arithmetic will now proceed rapidly. For a considerable period, however, the pupil will continue to perform all his multiplications by repeated additions, and his divisions by repeated subtractions. So much the better: he will gradually, of himself, abridge these methods, and fall at last into the invention of a multiplication table, &c. &c.

The Rule of Three is his next trial. But there is no reason why it should not be quite as easy as any other rule which has preceded it. All that is requisite is, to begin by very elementary and very positive questions. «A cake is to be divided into parts proportionate to the age of two children. John, who is six years old, is to have so much; what is Richard, who is twelve, to have? A familiarity with examples like these, will make him well acquainted with the principle, and once the principle is firmly fixed, its application will be easy.

He has been hitherto solely engaged with integers; but the transition from thence to fractions, may be made very apparent. An apple is to be divided among six; three of the children give their portions, to the other three: each thus will have two-sixths, or one-third of the apple. Cubes may take the place of the apple, all of the same length, but divided into halves, fourths, eighths, fifths, sixths, sevenths, &c. On these cubes being compared together, and brought into contact, the child will see that what is two-fourths of one cube, is four-eighths of another; and so on. «Frequent exercise in these comparisons, will soon give him great facility. He will soon find little difficulty in answering such questions as, what is meant by the third of a foot? how many ninths of a foot make one-third? &c. &c. At the end of each cube, or foot, may now be marked the number of parts into which it is divided; and as this designates, or denominates the number, it may be called the *denominator*. But of any of these several divisions two, three, four may be taken, or enumerated; it will be necessary also to designate this; the number which specifies it may be called the *numerator*. The transferring these terms to paper, may now be adopted. It is required that the numerator should be separated from the denominator: as the column, or vertical line, was used to separate a class of integers, a horizontal line may, in the present in-

stance, be employed for a similar purpose; the numerator will thus be naturally written above the line, and the denominator under.

The addition, subtraction, &c. &c. of fractions, may now follow. The difficulties connected with the application of these processes to fractions, do not so much arise out of the operations themselves, as the not having steadily kept in view the preceding principles, and from too hastily applying terms which, in their new position, must convey an erroneous signification.* This error, very glaring in Algebra, is also obvious in Arithmetic, and stronger proof cannot be given of the necessity of not allowing any term to be used the meaning of which is not strictly defined, and the notions it comprises, already familiar to the pupil. Division leads to the reduction of fractions, first with integer, and then fractional numerators and denominators; from thence to decimals, &c. &c. Decimals to a pupil, familiarised to the palpable illustrations already used, present no difficulty. Even the notation, by means of the divisible cubes and columns, may be made exceedingly obvious. If a cube, by being advanced a column, becomes ten times greater, by retrograding a column, it becomes ten times less. The 0 which was used for the purpose of expressing this augmentation, may now be made to express the diminution; it is only necessary to place it on the other side of the figure. Decimals are essentially fractions; but, with the exception of circulating Decimals, much more easy. The only rule which produces any embarrassment, is division.

This slight outline, does not embrace any of the numerous

* See the remarks of La Croix, *Essais*, &c. p. 235. "Il y a ici," says he, in speaking of the multiplication and division of fractions, "un passage très remarquable d'une acception donnée aux mots *multiplier* et *diviser* d'après le cas le plus simple de l'idée qu'ils expriment, à une acception générale, dans laquelle on enveloppe des cas nouveaux, qui ne se lient aux premiers, que par de simples analogies."—Once these new significations are clear—there is no more difficulty in fractions, than in integral numbers. To us facility in these operations is essential. They are the great materials of our commercial arithmetic. The French, in consequence of the almost general diffusion of their "*Système Métrique*," have nearly got rid of them. The *Manuel de l'Instituteur* (2 partie, c. v. note) states, that it will be soon unnecessary to teach them in their elementary schools.

rules contained in our School Arithmetics. The fact is, with a little attention, they may be all reduced to these very simple elements. The multifarious names, and formulæ put forward with such pretension in these books, are only another of the numerous mystifications of our school learning. The habit of attending more to these formulæ, than to principles, has produced precisely the same results, as in the study of language. Taken out of the particular rule, the pupil is at sea. Great difficulty is experienced in the subsequent study of Algebra from this neglect; and commercial calculators, from the same cause, as well as the cumbrous processes they have adopted, seem scarcely more at home. The method now insisted on, is precisely the reverse. It begins at the very beginning; advances gradually; never adopts a rule which is not deduced from practice, or a term before its adoption is felt to be requisite; and thus arrives at the reasoning or philosophy almost before it is aware. It is true that every visible and tangible aid is made use of it; but by these means it was, that the language itself was formed. There is high authority amongst philosophers for the practice; but when human nature points it out, no authority is required. That it interferes in any degree with mental arithmetic is erroneous; nothing helps on these apparently exclusive mental operations so much, as external aids. But they have been called in not so much to facilitate questions, as to develop principles; and whatever can tend to that end, ought not lightly to be thrown by.

Algebra.—It is a question, at what period of a mathematical course, Algebra should intervene. Its position, will appear very easy to be determined, if we consider its object. It cannot precede Arithmetic, being a more general means to

* See Pestalozzi, *Mother's Manual*—with Biber's *Illustrations*. Miss Edgeworth, *Practical Education*, vol. ii. c. xv. *Tableaux de Calcul intuitif* — *Tableau de Passage du Calcul intuitif au Calcul Numéral*. *Arithmétique Élémentaire et raisonnée*, par J. B. Payan. Dr. Mayo's *Lessons on Numbrs*. Prof. De Morgan, *Elements of Arithmetic* (excellent). Conſillac, *Langue de Calcul*. La Croix, *Arithmétique*. Chappuis, *Elémens de Calcul à l'Usage des Ecoles de la campagne*, du Canton de Fribourg, *Guide des Ecoles Primaires*, c. v. *Journal of Education*, Nos. ix. and x.

obtain the same results; it ought not to succeed Geometry, offering, as it does, very important aid to the higher developments of the science. The period at which it may be pursued with the most advantage, will then be when its utility shall first become obvious, that is, after having mastered the elements, and before proceeding to the higher branches, either of Arithmetic, or Geometry. It is a new and richer idiom, if it may so be expressed, of the language of numbers; and little more is requisite than a familiarity with the prominent terms, to enable the pupil to translate from one to the other. The signs should be introduced, even in the study of Arithmetic. There is no reason why a child who has, as we have seen, “invented” so many abbreviated processes, such as names and signs for numbers, arrangements for facilitating numeration, addition, &c., fractions, &c. should find any difficulty in discovering such abridged expressions; as, = instead of “makes,” + for “added to.” The doctrine of negative quantities, and the meaning of such expressions as $\frac{m}{o}$ and $\frac{o}{o}$, present difficulties; but they only arise from the manner of explaining, or rather conducting to them*; a study of fractions and decimals in the spirit just recommended, will naturally prepare for the true understanding of these mysteries. Extraction of roots, progressions, and logarithms, should be exclusively reserved for Algebra. There is no need of embarrassing Arithmetic, with what can be performed with so much greater ease, and to greater extent in Algebra. Throughout, indeed, the same principles should be as rigidly

There is no science, perhaps, in which a strict adherence to the method of invention is more essential than in Algebra. It is this which gives the chief charm and merit to the Algebra of Clairaut. His readers assist, as it were, at the first formation of the science—they do not require to ask what is the meaning of these mysterious signs, by which they arrive at such unexpected results—every thing is clear, necessary—produced by what immediately precedes. In the higher branches of the science, it is true, he pushed this too far, and perhaps it was the cause why the latter part of his work, was not so well received as the first; but, for a young student, it is still, as far as *method* goes, one of the very best. Its deficiencies are, want of practical deductions, examples, &c. These can easily be remedied. Those who immediately succeeded, departed altogether from his plan. The consequence has been that, though the discoveries of Euler, Lagrange, &c. have added materially to the treasures of the science, a commensurate improvement has not been apparent in schools.

adhered to in one, as in the other: great simplicity; just gradation; and no proceeding to new processes, before perfect facility be attained in the old. For this reason formulæ should not be adopted too prematurely; their *necessity* should be first strongly felt. In the same manner that repeated additions and subtractions were for a long time adhered to, and that the pupil did not adopt the more abbreviated form of multiplication or division, until he had become fully sensible of their superior convenience; so also the pupil should continue to use aa , or $aaaa$, until their clumsiness in prolonged operations naturally suggest the abridged formulæ of a^2 , or a^4 . The employment also, of analogous illustration, and of visible and tangible aids, should not be despised. One of the difficulties, for instance, to a beginner, is the general nature of algebraic expression. This may be illustrated by an analogous case in language, where pronouns are substituted for proper names and long phrases.* But there will be less necessity for such means in Algebra, the pupil having already conquered the real difficulties of calculation, in the elementary portions of Arithmetic and Geometry.

Geometry.—If Arithmetic has been degraded into mere mechanism, under the name of “cyphering” and “accòmpts,” Geometry has not less suffered in another way, by being made a matter of pure abstract reasoning. The fastidiousness with which all attempts at *materialising* it, have been regarded, is not less unphilosophical than unwise. It is not by abstractions, either children or nations begin; it is not, in fine, the beginning of knowledge: even if it were, it is not the means to attract youth. Many are thus disgusted, and with good reason, at the outset, much in the same way, and from similar causes, that they are with Logic: but this disgust lasts, and effectually prevents a zealous or successful prosecution of the study, during the remainder of life.

We must here, as in all the preceding studies, take the road which Nature herself points out to us—the road of

* La Croix also recommends for this, frequent translations into Arithmetic. Want of such precaution leads to habits of confusion, particularly in the value of coefficients and exponents. It has been one of the chief causes of the obstacles which oppose the progress of the young student. *Essais, &c.* p. 272.

“Intuition.” Now, how is Intuition to be here applied? By pursuing the science in the manner in which it was formed. How was it formed? Like every other: first, by an observation of *facts*; then by a collection of deductions from these observations; finally, by the arrangement of these deductions into rules and principles. No science yet came fully armed, Minerva-like, from the human intellect. Euclid and Aristotle were inventors, it is true, but inventors in one light only; they brought together, arranged well, and thus to what was art before, gave the character of science. Precisely in this manner should the child proceed; he should set out by observation of *facts* — by discovering. It will be time later to come to their *arrangement* — to reasoning.

A child has been in the habit of using cubes for Arithmetic; let him use them, also, for the elements of Geometry. I would begin with solids, the reverse of the usual plan. It saves all the difficulty of absurd definitions, and bad explanations on points, lines, surfaces, which are nothing but abstractions; — explanations, too, be it remarked, which, from being generally unintelligible, and always unsatisfactory, give no assistance in Geometry, and leave a very injurious impression on the understanding besides.*

A cube presents many of the principal elements of Geometry; it at once exhibits points, strait lines, parallel lines, angles, parallelograms, rectangles, &c. &c. These cubes are

Condillac (*Traité des Sensations — Traité des Systèmes*) has placed this in an obvious point of view. See, for farther developments of the same, — La Croix, *Essais*, p. 276., and *Elémens de Géométrie*. Bertrand de Genève, (*Développement nouveau de la Partie Élémentaire des Mathématiques*, — Genève, 1778,) has examined it more profoundly. After all, his idea of superposition does not afford a clearer idea than La Croix's candid admission, p. 277. See how the difficulty of the “point,” is attempted to be obviated by intersection. — *Journal of Education*, No. xii. p. 220. The same difficulties exist with regard to parallels, angles, proportions, &c. There is scarcely any one of the definitions usually given, which is not, in some particular or other, liable to objection. Happily, great strictness is not necessary for children. They are yet concerned only with facts, their ideas are derived immediately from sensation. The best course which can be followed is to appeal to it (as Rousseau has so well done — *Emile*, l. 2.) at once, and to remember with Saurin, “Avec les plus grandes lumières et les meilleures intentions, ils pourraient tout gâter en donnant trop, non à la raison, mais aux raisonnemens.” — *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences de Paris*, 1723, p. 249.

divisible into various parts. The Pupil has already been familiarised with such divisions in numeration, &c. he now proceeds to a comparison of their several parts, and of the relation of these parts to each other. He takes, at first, those that are equal, then those that are unequal; he adds, multiplies, subtracts, divides — he forms prisms, pyramids, trapezoids, &c. &c. From thence he advances to globes, which furnish him with elementary notions of the circle, of curves generally, &c. &c.

Being tolerably familiar with solids, he may now substitute planés. The transition may be made very easy. Let the cube, for instance, be cut into thin divisions, and placed on paper; he will there see as many plane rectangles as he has divisions; so with all the others. Globes may be treated in the same manner: he will thus see how surfaces really are generated, and be enabled to abstract them with facility in every solid.

He has thus acquired the alphabet and reading of Geometry. He now proceeds to write it.

The simplest operation, and, therefore, the first, is merely to place these planes on a piece of paper, and pass the pencil round them. When this has been frequently done, the plane may be put at a little distance, and the child required to copy it. This he will find easy; and moreover will at once see what the representation is meant for. There will be no more difficulty in passing from planes in reality, to planes on paper, than from solids to planes.

The compass may now be put into his hand, and the rule, and the child led to discover their uses by experience. He will soon perceive that thick black lines, deep-dug points for centres, &c. &c. are no perfections.

The preliminary notions and facility in expressing them are acquired. It is now time for the child to proceed to their combination and to their properties, in the same way as in the mother tongue he proceeded from words to sentences.

But he must apply this knowledge to practice: he must not only read, but compose: he must not only observe, but measure.

Innumerable facilities present themselves. Measurement

of blocks of wood, tables, sheds, fields, rivers, &c. &c.* should successively be practised. All these measurements should be gradually tabulated. The principle of proportion will have already taught him that of reduction. He will soon find no difficulty in tracing out his room, field, or garden to a scale. The elements not only of Geometry are learned, but he has learned with them, as the name indeed implies, the elements of land surveying, of drawing, of architecture also.

His progress thenceforward will be rapid. The pupil will insensibly acquire both accuracy and facility of operation. It will now be time to introduce him to the study of the reasoning of Geometry. He is now arrived at the grammar of the science.

The powerful results on the reasoning faculty produced by the study of mathematics have been long noticed.† But this must depend upon the manner in which the study is pursued. In our present system, if not altogether a matter of verbal memory, it is a matter of routine. A very great reform is necessary in the teaching, before it can claim to be called a reasoning method. New books, with other arrangements, more simple, better connected, and, above all, better adapted to the already acquired ideas of the pupil, will be requisite. When this is accomplished, the child will find, under proper guidance, and with sufficient time, the last problem as easy as the first. The same reform is as necessary in this grammar, as in that of the mother tongue. Complicated formulæ, confused metaphysics, forgetfulness of the elements from which, and the way by which, the principle was derived,

See the manner in which this exercise is carried on at Hofwyl and Hazelwood. It has been found peculiarly well calculated to produce a very valuable quality, — precision of eye. De Fellenberg begins on the Pestalozzi principle, to draw lines, then to measure them; first inches, then feet, &c. He next proceeds to angles, then to rectangles, then to surfaces of various forms, first drawing, then testing them by measurement.

† "Every Frenchman," says Walpole, "ought to be taught logic and mathematics, that his mind may acquire some solidity." No nation has tried them more generally, but not often with this result. In another of his notes, on the same subject he observes, "The profound study of mathematics seems to injure the more general and useful mode of reasoning — that by Induction. Mathematical truths being, so to speak, palpable, the moral feelings become less sensitive to impalpable truths." But then it must be most exclusive.

disfigure both; the results produced by each have been analogous. It is thus, that methods are really Education.*

These are acquirements indispensable to every man; they are synonymous with the simplest elements of Education. But the first principles of many other studies may, under favourable circumstances, be added; these are comprehended in the German elementary schools, under the name of "Gemeinnützige Kenntnisse," or "Knowledge of general utility."

Useful Knowledge.—It comprises the elements of drawing, geography, history; general notions, in the most popular form on the nature and operations of mind; preliminary principles of logic; outlines of natural law; the particular law of the country; sketches of national biography; elementary principles of medicine, adapted to the people; principles of domestic education; of household, agricultural, commercial industry, &c. &c. The extreme advantage of these portions of public instruction in elementary schools is obvious. If the pupil is permitted by circumstances to proceed farther, they lay a firm and large foundation; if not, they form a good stock of education, by themselves. To those, therefore, whose means and time are limited, such as the lower classes, they are inestimable. The greater part of our national follies and frenzies arise from the want of good moral education in the first instance, and in the next from the sheer ignorance of large bodies of the people, of the principles, upon which their own interests, and those of society, repose. Even the half

* Pestalozzi, *Wie Gertrud. La Croix, Essais*, p. 274, *Elémens de Géométrie*. Clairaut, *Elémens*, &c. Abbé Gaultier, *Notions de Géométrie pratique, nécessaires à l'exercice de la plupart des arts et métiers*. See the epilog of Renouard on this work, "*Education Secondaire*," p. 80. 1824. Suzanne, *Géométrie Agricole*. On the Rational branch, consult especially *Journal of Education*, No. vii. p. 237., an article which contains almost every instruction which a pupil can desire. For general rules, Pascal's eight maxims, given in his *Pensées*, tom. ii. p. 47., should be always kept in view. The Mathematical Treatises published by the Society for the Diffusion of Knowledge, are scarcely elementary enough for the persons for whom they were intended: at all events, it is well known that it is not amongst students of the lower orders that they have the greatest sale.

The translation, or abridgement of Clairaut, published by the Irish Board of Education, is much more adapted to the present state of mathematical knowledge amongst the people. In the higher elementary schools a medium between this little work and the Society's treatises, would be the most eligible class-book for general purposes.

knowledge on these points which some have acquired, is, perhaps, worse than no knowledge at all. The people must be instructed, in order to check the people. False knowledge must be put down by true — twilight by broad day. Until something of this kind be first done, the rest of our Education will be a pernicious waste of time and means. It will give us pedant and superficial talkers on freedom and morality, instead of making us either moral or free.

A certain portion then, of these elements, may, according to circumstances *, with little expenditure of time or labour, be combined with popular instruction in every school, however elementary, in the country. In their farther developements they constitute those accessory studies necessary in the higher branches of elementary Education.

Drawing.—I begin with Drawing, because, if it is to be learned, it cannot be learned too soon; and because I feel the immense assistance it gives the pupil, in the prosecution of the several studies, which are to succeed. It is, besides, an almost necessary concomitant to Geometry; the applications of the science can scarcely be practised without it.

Drawing embraces two departments — the rational, if I may so call it, and the æsthetic. The first is chiefly imitation; the other is the moral, or philosophy of this imitation.†

Whatever may be thought of the applicability of the last to general, much less to elementary schools, the first is obviously useful, not only in the prosecution of actual studies, but in fitting pupils more perfectly, for numerous situations

But nothing beyond what is fit for the real use of the pupils, — more, is Education run mad, not less to be deprecated than the opposite extreme of the no-meaning system. See Prof. Pillan's *Elementary Teaching*, pp. 18, 19.

† It ceases to be imitation in the higher branches. It takes the elements obtained by imitation, recombines them in accord with acknowledged analogies, and works by association, if not exclusively, at least principally. It is this which constitutes the Ideal. The older a nation is in civilisation, the more numerous its associations. Hence amongst such, the greater power, and the greater prevalence of the ideal. From not keeping these notions distinct, serious errors have prevailed, not merely in ideology, but in art. Yet we find painters, though every step ought to have warned them, fall into the mistake as well as metaphysicians. De Piles has maintained the same heresy as Bacon.

hereafter. A common peasant will often have occasion to recollect a particular construction, either of house, instrument, the appearance of a plant, &c.* The artisan, the mechanic, absolutely requires it. A stroke of a pencil is often worth, in accuracy, to say nothing of the economy of time and labour, a thousand written words.

Drawing, as a mechanical art, grows out of measurement; but measurement, affected by position, by appearance of light and shade, and, finally, by both associated with colour. This divides it into three branches: — 1. Outline and Perspective; 2. Light and Shade; 3. Colour.

The study of Drawing should proceed in precisely the same way as Geometry, &c.—by the way of “invention.” In no department of Education is the application of this method more easy or obvious. A child begins almost exactly in the manner of the earliest inventors. There is less difference than we imagine between these rude scrawlings of a child after dinner, and the clumsy attempts of Eumerus †, or the truly infantine perspectives on Egyptian temples. ‡ He begins, therefore, by facts; from thence draws his rules; and then makes of these rules the extended application. The facts are, at first, simple measurement of form, and then the transferring of these measurements to paper. The child will here find his study of Geometry of essential use; in fact, for a time

At Hofwyl, drawing is applied to these purposes with great utility. From whom do most of our mechanical improvements originate? Naturally from men most acquainted with practice, — from workmen, — not from scientific men, theorists, &c. How many more might originate, if they had better instruments to work with, — if they possessed an adequate knowledge of geometry, mechanics, drawing, &c. &c.

† See Pliny, l. vii. and xxxvi. He ascribes to him the merit of having first distinguished the sexes, in sculpture and painting. Before him, statues were as shapeless as the Egyptian mummy, the origin, indeed, of the terminal Hermes. But the name, as well as that of Euchir, appears suspicious. They were probably designations invented afterwards, to mark the discovery rather than the individual. Eumerus — εὐ μέρω — εὐ μέρος, &c. Euchir — εὐ χειρ, &c.

‡ Especially in the propyla of the tomb of Osymandyas, the outer walls of Karnak, and the interior of Ipsambol. In the first, the subject of a war is treated in the same manner in which children generally treat their histories, — more as plan than perspective or elevation: several subjects not only distant in place, but time, occupy the same plane, &c. &c. &c.

the two studies will be nearly identical. But as in Geometry he began at once with *bodies themselves*, and not with their *transcripts*, so also should he do in drawing. The imitation of an imitation in this stage, is preposterous. They afterwards may be consulted, to see wherein his imitation errs. We read classical writers, and imitate their idiom, to improve our style. We may, with equal profit, consult and copy the good copy of a good master. The cubes may again be applied. A few scattered on a table are copied, their lines accurately traced; these subsequently combined, and made, at last, to assume regular forms. From these elements, the child advances to their more complex combinations, in tables, boxes, &c. or any articles of furniture in the room; thence to objects out of doors; and so on.* In all these instances, rough guesses should never be permitted, except with a view of practising the eye, and verifying them afterwards by actual measurement. When an error is committed in this, or in any other branch of study, the child should be led to its discovery, by being required to state on *what* principle, he had committed it. This, persevered in, will gradually and surely lead him to its correction. As soon as he obtains tolerable facility, he should be constantly exercised; but always with an obvious purpose, and directly from real objects. From dead he may proceed to

* At Fribourg, the course of drawing formed three distinct series. The 1st, was called the *Mathematico-mechanical*, and was analogous to that noticed above. It consisted of lessons of right lines, curves, planes; then copies of the cube, prism, cone, sphere, &c.; finally, of instruments of general use, machines, and the orders of architecture. 2. The *Vegetable*. It comprised the most simple and interesting plants, either indigenous or exotic, beginning with the parts most easy to copy, and gradually advancing to the more complicated. 3. The *Zoological*. It presented the animals in a series analogous to the preceding. At the bottom of the scale was the caterpillar; at the head, man. These three were subsequently combined; the caterpillar or butterfly with the flower; man, with architecture, &c. Accompanied with a text, they were material assistants in the study of geography, natural history, &c. &c. They pursued these three courses both after models or copies, and after nature. There was a collection of not less than 1,300 of the former. The first series was that published by M. de Lasteyrie. By these means, they scarcely required the assistance of the master. His whole duty was limited merely to examination, and to the preventing young pupils from advancing to a new model, before they had fully mastered the old.

living nature; always imitating, as in former instances, from nature itself. As he proceeds, the successful result of a process will at once suggest a rule; and, the rule being noticed, he will thus have a sure guide to direct him in his future operations. This habit of generalising and accounting, in Drawing as in other studies, so far from checking freedom of hand or boldness of conception, will, on the contrary, materially augment both, by converting a more mechanical art into an intellectual one, and substituting for chance-work, true knowledge. In the two remaining branches, a similar course must be adopted. Light and shade, once the eye has been attentively directed to them, will be seen as decidedly written on every object, as outline itself. The child should begin where these effects are broad, marked, and few; cubes again, and a strong lamp light, will at once present all these conditions. He may then proceed to more complex figures, as before; but even on the same figure the light and shade may vary: it is determined, not merely by the body that receives, but by the body that gives. This introduces him to reflexes, &c.; an endless series, but easily classified and highly interesting, both in their principle and effects. The study of colours may be conducted in a similar manner; their simple elements, their combination; how they are affected by the outline, by the light and shade, &c. If the eye and attention have been well educated (p. 76.), the progress will be rapid. The harmony between each,—between colour, and light, and shade, and outline, will become as sensible after a little practice, as the harmony of music to a well taught ear. As already observed, though extreme cases may be organic, all the intermediate ones are decidedly within the range, and, in many instances, are the direct creations, of education.

The drawer has now acquired the “language” of his art, but the “grammar” remains behind. It will be time, therefore, to arrange in order the rules he has been gradually forming, and to examine more minutely the principles upon which they rest. This will embrace successively the “science” of perspective, of skiagraphy, of optics, of anatomy, &c. &c., and a little insight into the principles which regulate the “music” of colours, &c.

The elements of *Architecture* may be made a very pleasing and useful accompaniment to drawing. Though its higher developements are necessarily æsthetic, its elementary portions are connected with the elements of measuring and drawing. In teaching it, the same process is to be followed — the road of invention: in no instance is it more obviously the road of instruction. The pupil begins, as usual, with facts; he sets out building in paper, pasteboard, wood, for himself: — the first rude essays of mankind are then brought under his notice, and he is gradually led on, as in drawing, &c., to discover (the particular circumstances of the case being given) the successive improvements, from the first rudiments in the tent, cavern, or cottage, to the final developement of the art in the architecture of Greece and Rome. The whole of the course is to be carried on, as in preceding instances, by realities, — that is, not by dry measurements on paper, with complicated rules, but by exemplifications in models or real buildings. It should not be a course of terms, but of things; — the spirit of the art, and not its mechanism; — the development, in fine, of the human faculties, and not the patching together a few scraps of pedantry. A hand and eye accustomed to geometry and drawing, will easily transfer all this to paper; — it will be an extension only of its applications. The models furnish an endless variety of subjects for the earlier portion of the study, and the more so, as they have already been put to requisition in learning drawing: — outline, light and shade, colour, being all as easily illustrated by their means, as architecture. From thence the transition to real buildings is easy. The eye and taste at once know what to look for, where to begin their analysis, how to recollect it when made, how to profit by the recollection in the application. Nor should the imitation be confined to drawing. The dexterity acquired in manual exercises, — for physical Education, it is presumed, is going on all this time, — may be put to good account. Models may be constructed, — first after models, then after measurements of real buildings: finally, the inventive faculty may be set to work, and certain data being given, models may be formed accordingly. All this may be most advantageously applied to the illustration of History,

Literature, &c. &c., and may be made a reward, rather for success or exertion in these or other departments, than a positive study of itself. The science, or grammar, will come later, as in Drawing, and with the same advantage; the facts may then be forgotten, and even the rule;—but the application, the science, and the taste, will remain behind.

Natural History.—The same process. Zoology is the most attractive to a child; but there is this objection to it,—it cannot be exemplified, except in a very limited way, upon *real* objects. Yet, on the whole, it is better to begin with it, than with Botany, or Mineralogy. It should, in all its departments, however, be as much as possible studied from nature itself, and not from copies: where this is impracticable, the copies should be, as nearly as possible, taken from nature, and in strict resemblance. Stuffed specimens are obviously preferable to engravings, and coloured to uncoloured. The child should begin, too, with the animals within his actual observation, instead of at once setting out, as is usually the case, with lions, elephants, &c. A dog, a sheep, an ass, seen and compared every day, will be a better lesson for his faculties, and a better preparation for future enquiries and discoveries, than all the monsters of the African deserts. We do not make sufficient allowance for the vagueness of these descriptions;—to the mind of a child they present much the same sort of idea that is presented to us, by the description of Scylla or Charybdis, a Chimæra, &c. We should not forget the nature of a child's imagination—how little limited by experience—how eager for the excitement of the marvellous,—how incapable of distinguishing between the extraordinary, and the extravagant. The examination of the object being diligently gone through, the classification should follow; but this classification should be the pupil's own. It should immediately rise out of the examination, and be in direct relation to it. It will of course at first be very simple and clumsy, but inconveniences will soon appear, and the teacher may gradually, as in all the other branches, conduct the pupil himself to the discovery of the remedy. His classification will thus gradually improve and extend; and, finally, reach the actual level of the science. This, again, is the road of in-

vention, and the march of the science itself, and of its great improvers. A thousand expedients for arranging these classifications may be devised; — such as tables, drawers, especially in conchology and mineralogy, herbals, &c.* By degrees, a little cabinet may be formed, and a “catalogue raisonnée” made out by each of the pupils, each according to the degree of his respective knowledge. This practice should be unremittingly kept up, and at stated periods the tables and catalogues should be examined by the teacher. It will be a test of their progress, and an inducement to future search, examination, and classification. The “habits” of the animals should next engage their attention. Nor should the “uses” to which each may be applied in agriculture, manufacture, commerce, &c. be forgotten. A column for each should be left in their catalogues. — As few books in all this as possible, — the book should be considered as the assistant only. The child should originate, and create the study himself.† The

Most judiciously applied at Hofwyl. — See *Journal of Education*, No. xii. These drawers will at once suggest the use of tables, which may be made on their models, substituting for the drawers and their divisions, columns for the various peculiarities, form, colour, region, &c. of the specimen; but sufficiently large to enter new peculiarities every day. Various colours, different forms of letters, may also be applied with advantage, at the discretion of the teacher, or, what would be still better, at the suggestion of the pupil. — See Biber's *Analysis* on the Pestalozzian model of the different families of the section *Pentamera*, order *Coleoptera*, an excellent outline of what may be effected in this way. — *Memoirs*, pp. 373—380. He does quite right in preferring English to Latin names; an example which, it is to be regretted, Dr. Mayo did not follow, in his *Lessons on Shells*. Conchology, in some respects, is not the best subject for the very young naturalist; but the manner in which he has treated it is an excellent model for works of the kind.

† Nothing can more strikingly evince the advantage of disseminating generally a taste for natural history, than the immense accession which has been made to our knowledge in its several branches, within these late years. In the vegetable kingdom, for instance, Linnæus was acquainted with only 8,000 species. Persoon, in his *Synopsis*, 1806, gives more than double—17,000. But look to the increase within the last twenty years. Decandolle, in 1827, already counted 40,000 species, and the number has considerably increased since. In zoology the augmentation is not less remarkable. Linnæus counted of mammiferous animals, 350 species. Buffon, 300. Lesson, in 1830, 1,000, and the probable number known at present is beyond 1,500. — Birds: Linnæus counted 1,300. Cuvier, 5,000. We are now acquainted with upwards of 7,000. — Reptiles: Linnæus knew of only 300 species. Lacépède, of 500. We are now acquainted with 1,500. — Fish: Lacépède, in

difference produced by facts found out, and by facts which fall upon the mind from books, is amazing. "Qu'il sache au moins qu'il sçait," says Montaigne; — a difficult task, when he follows implicitly the faith, and thinks the opinions of other men. In this study of Natural History, there is not only room for the practice of reasoning, as in Geometry, &c., but large opportunities for the collection of facts, upon which the reasoning should rest; — in other words, the Inductive, as well as the Syllôgistic process, is vigorously exercised. Nor is it confined to reasoning. It may be made, as we shall see later, a most powerful auxiliary to the advancement of æsthetics.

Geography.—Though the higher departments of this important branch of knowledge should necessarily be preceded by some progress in the preceding studies, especially geometry, drawing, and natural history, its elements may be taught, as we have already observed, even before reading, or at least before the study of the mother tongue. Its rudiments are already learned in the daily walk. A child sees all the definitions, which load our geographical catechisms and grammars, far better in the open page of nature, than in books. Here, again, I would pursue the same process — so often already spoken of — the road of invention. I would begin, as men began; — I would lead the child by the same steps by which they were led, to the discovery and arrangement — from observation to rule, and from one rule to the other — until they had embodied the science at last. Man did not set out with a definition of our universe, and a description of the imaginary divisions of our globe: he began with his valley; — his first geography was, strictly speaking, topography. His world did not extend beyond the next hill or sea; — he was, what the child now is, — and the child should be taught, by the same succession, not of theories, but of facts. Bring him up to the neighbouring hill, — point him the valley below, — the river or lake beyond — its islands,

1802, reckoned 1,300. We now count 8,000. Who will say how many species remain yet to be discovered? And should not this field be widely opened to every talent — to every ambition?

its headlands, its little bays, and close the landscape by the range of mountains in the horizon. You thus give the lessons of many days; — peninsulas, straits, gulfs, promontories, isthmuses, — all tedious technicalities to a child, — are learned in a few hours. Reduce this to a miniature, — a pond, or sheet of water, will exemplify the whole. In like manner, the house, the neighbouring buildings, village, town, may be exhibited first in reality, then in models. From models, the transition to paper is a matter of no difficulty; it is a practice of his lesson in geometry and drawing. If he has advanced sufficiently far in either, he can even reduce it to a scale. The child now fully understands the nature of proportion, and of maps. This acquired, he may proceed from the map of the district, to that of the county, — of the kingdom — of Europe, — and so on. But the earth is not a plane, but a sphere.* It will be now time to transfer these maps to a sphere, and the larger it is the better.† One of the first difficulties which will now occur to him will be, by what means the position of these several places was ascertained? It is easy to measure the distance of one house from another; but how measure the distance of islands from islands, — of continents from continents, &c. &c. This is the moment to initiate him into the mysteries of latitude and longitude. They should first be exemplified not on the terrestrial, but on the celestial globe. The common instance of the sailor may be given: he has no other guide at night but the stars; it is necessary, then, to find some expedient by which he may be enabled to ascertain their place. Hence the imaginary lines, &c. by which he divides the heavens. The constellations and lines are now transferred to a celestial globe: it should be of glass: the terrestrial should be enclosed within it. The projecting of these lines, equally imaginary, from the celestial to the terrestrial, will give him adequate ideas of

* See how the first idea of the spherical form of the earth may be communicated. *Emile*, liv. iii.

† Miss Edgeworth, vol. ii. c. xiv., suggests the use of a large paper globe inflated. They are now made of silk. It is preferable to solid material, because by being laid flat on a table it can be used as a map, and thus be made to show very sensibly, how geographers passed from globes to maps, the nature of Mercator's projection, &c. &c.

their object and nature; this well understood, they may be subsequently considered real. He will already have seen, in geometry, that by the intersection of any two lines, he is furnished with the means to determine any position. Thus, with the longitudes and latitudes, he may be enabled to fix the situation of any place on the earth. Having fully mastered these preliminary elements of *Mathematical Geography*, he may proceed to the second branch of the study, or,

2. *Constructive Geography*. He has been accustomed to point out, on the globe, the longitude and latitude of each place, on hearing its name; *vice versâ*, he should now be practised in determining the position of any place, by being given its longitude and latitude. He may thus be led to trace out a map, where nothing but these lines are given him, of the whole of the coast of England; at first, only in gross, the longitude and latitude only of the more marked headlands being laid down; and then minutely, by filling up the intervening spaces as opportunities shall permit. It was by these progressive steps, indeed, that our maps became gradually so perfect. The coasts being determined, the principal ranges of mountains, the great rivers, valleys, &c. may be successively fixed. Each day some new addition may be made, according to the "discoveries" of the pupil. This leads, of course, to the more enlarged study of *Physiæal Geography*.

3. *Physical Geography*. When sufficient proficiency is attained in all the foregoing branches, the pupil may proceed to an examination of the animal, vegetable, and mineral productions of each great division. Climate, whether determined by latitude or longitude, or by the height above the sea, will here introduce new classifications. It should be considered in conjunction with the habits, &c. of living nature, and the peculiar distinctions of dead; they will mutually verify each other. Such comparisons should be frequently made (they are excellent lessons of induction); and here books of sufficiently simple and well authenticated travels may be employed with peculiar interest and utility. For the same purpose tables should also be kept, and maps formed from them, illustrative, at one view, of each particular subject.

4. The pupil may now advance to what I should term *Historical Geography*, or, more specifically, the progress of historical discovery. Geographical knowledge was acquired progressively, in proportion as human-kind spread over the surface of the earth. The first lessons of Scripture will already have exhibited to him the whole human race, limited to a single family in the plains of Asia. Taking the East, then, as the point from which he is to start, he may from thence pursue the gradual discoveries of mankind, through their several extensions, like concentric circles, through the Hebrew age—the age of Herodotus—of Alexander—of Strabo—the Roman Empire—the Crusades—of Vasco de Gama, Columbus, Cooke, &c. down to our present time. This, which may accompany history, and form a course of ancient as well as modern Geography, will distinctly explain the nature of national and social boundaries, political aggregations, &c.

5. In concurrence, therefore, with this last branch may be studied *Political* and *Statistical Geography*. It should not be confined to a mere distribution of countries into their actual civil divisions, but should embrace all the most material circumstances connected with their physical and moral condition. Here tables and maps may, with the greatest advantage, be again called into use.* Their formation not only requires

* Pestalozzi placed the names of towns before a child, *alphabetically*, and then left him to classify them anew, according to a more useful arrangement. From this unscientific method, directly in contradiction to the rest of his system, he departed afterwards. His method at Yverdun, as already observed, was strictly intuitive, and he is generally understood to have suggested the first hints of Constructive Geography. These suggestions have been followed, but not to any great extent, in this country. (Biber's *Memoirs*, &c. p. 365., and the first part of Pullen's *Geography*, — the second is very defective.) On the Continent, however, the system has made great progress. The Swedish professor Agren has developed its advantages, theoretically and practically, with such success, at the Military Academy at Carlberg, that his book, "*Lehrbuch der Physischen Geographie*," has been strenuously recommended, as the best elementary work on the subject, to the Prussian Board of Education, and it is likely it will be adopted, not only in the schools of that monarchy, but throughout all the German states. *Journal of Educ.*, No. xii.

The superiority of this system is obvious. 1. It is the method of analysis, — of intuition. 2. It is a constant stimulant to enquiry, and an aid to classifi-

precision in classification, but reciprocally assists it. The human mind requires signs, not merely to retain, but to dis-

cation, — in this perfectly analogous to the methods suggested for natural history, &c., maps being only a kind of tables. 3. It imprints better than any other method. It is the method of methodical, and not of verbal memory. Formerly, teachers would hardly allow maps in aid of books : now, books should hardly be allowed in aid of maps. The map should be the book ; it is that chiefly which the pupil should read. All other branches of knowledge should, as far as possible, be mapped in the same way. There is little verbal examination at Carlberg. Written questions are given, and answered from the map ; — according to the progress of the pupil's map, is the accuracy of his answer. Some of these answers are astonishing—beyond the powers of many professors, in precision, facility, and extent.

Maps should be made on the same scale, for each of the above great divisions : — for instance, one for mathematical geography, a second for constructive, a third for physical, &c., and so on. These branches, as the pupil advanced, might be further subdivided. A map, for instance, of the oreography, another of the potamography of a country, &c. might be successively finished ; — when each of these was fully executed, they might be combined on a large scale. Finally, a comparative Table or map might be constructed of the whole. This would be more easy to accomplish than it is imagined. Let the mathematical and general physical construction be first gone through, — the coasts, chains of mountains, great rivers, &c. &c. accurately laid down, and expressed in ordinary letters, marking the length of rivers, height of principal mountains, in figures ; next the geological and mineralogical features, by means of particular colours ; then the vegetable, solely in green ; the exotic productions marked in Roman, the indigenous in ordinary letters, or with a representation of the prevalent species of trees, &c. : finally, the zoological, by means of miniature figures of the predominant species in each district. Nor would Political Geography present greater difficulties. The political distribution might be traced by the signs at present in use, for civil and other divisions, towns, bishoprics, represented boroughs, and roads, adding, rail-roads, canals, great manufactories, &c. The general statistical data should be given at the head of the map, under the title ; around the name of each district, parish, town, &c., in a small square, its respective statistics ; on the left of this square, the population, comprising the absolute and relative population ; the classification of the population — into agricultural, manufacturing, &c. ; the general and specific mortality of the district, births, marriages, deaths, — of the male sex, the female, &c. &c. ; on the right, the moral and intellectual condition of the people, church revenues, education, crime, pauperism, &c. ; above, general revenue, comprehending taxation, expenditure, &c. ; below, agriculture, trade, &c. This might be effected in a small compass, expressing each subject merely by its initials, or any other conventional sign.

Such a map would, however, express only the actual condition of a country. Successive periods require successive illustrations. There is, for instance, the England of the Romans, of the Saxons, of the Normans : then, the civil, judicial,

entangle ideas; but in this as in the former case, all must come from the pupil: he must constantly *invent*. If his at-

ecclesiastical, &c. conditions of each. For each of these, distinct maps, on the same scale as, in the former instance, might be constructed, similar to Arrowsmith's *Comparative Atlas*; and then a general combined map, in which the alterations might be designated by shadings, colours, difference of letter, &c., using the Roman for one, the Italic for another, and so on. Here also history might be introduced with effect, not merely marking in a similar manner the possessions of the same empires, or the sites of remarkable battles, &c. (See Le Sage's *Atlas*), but annexing to each town the period of its foundation; if ancient by Roman, if modern by modern letters; to each bishopric the same; and, in order to distinguish them, placing the figures designating the foundation of the town within the small square which expresses it, and of the bishopric either within, or accompanying the mitre. There would thus, by means of these two maps, be at once presented to the eye, and permanently imprinted on the memory, a clear, comprehensive, and useful body of geographical knowledge, in all its branches and bearings.

Maps on the same principle, are not less useful in statistics. Tables give the state of a country at any single period, with tolerable clearness, but when we have to travel beyond that, all is confused. We want *comparative* tables. This has to a certain degree been effected by W. Playfair's maps, (which, though not sufficiently minute, deserve the eulogy of La Croix,) and by other more recent publications, such as Layton Cooke's *Statistical Charts*, &c. &c., which have greatly remedied his defects. The principle is very simple, suggested probably by that of latitude and longitude: a series of vertical lines, designating the years, and of horizontal, designating the facts, give any particular data required by their intersection. It has been applied only to agricultural, commercial, and general financial purposes, but it might easily be extended to moral and intellectual—to crime, education, mortality, &c. Another expedient has been used to mark the proportion of any one statistical fact, at any one particular period; in other words, to designate the *intensity* of any moral or intellectual phenomenon. The "*Carte figurative de l'instruction populaire de la France*," by Dupin, and the "*Statistique comparée de l'état de l'instruction, et du nombre des crimes dans les arrondissemens, &c. de la France*," by Balbi and Guerry, are well known. The proportions between the figures are made sensible to the eye, by a similar proportion being preserved between the shades of the colour; and thus a single glance gives what a very attentive consideration of simple figures often fails to do. The principle is very obvious, very striking, and universally applicable to population, revenue, military and naval force, &c.

Maps, however, should not altogether supersede other tables. But, in statistics especially, great care should be taken in their formation. The student, before he attempts it, should be made perfectly well acquainted with the *principles*, on which they should be constructed. Not only the *authority* for a fact should be well sifted, but the *period* also when given: from a want of attention to this last particular, especially, the most incongruous materials from data collected at very distant periods, are day after day put forward as the *status quo* of a country, and not merely made the basis of geographical discussion, but, what is far worse, of legislative and government proceedings. Perhaps a better guide cannot be found for the correction of these defects than Balbi. See his "*Balance Po-*

tempts be at first awkward, practice will rapidly improve them. If one pupil be inferior to the other, he will gradually profit by the experience of his neighbour. It will give interest and spirit—it will make the acquisition his own. Any attempt is better than loose wholesale borrowing from the minds of others. — “A few books well studied,” says Francis Osborn, “and well digested, nourish the understanding more than hundreds but gargled in the mouth.”

litique du Globe en 1828;” his “*Empire Russe comparé aux principaux Etats du Monde*,” his “*Atlas Ethnographique du Globe*,” &c. All these, however, are likely to be eclipsed by his great work, “*Tableau Physique, Moral, et Politique des cinq Parties du Globe*,” if we are to judge from the outline given in his *Abrégé de Géographie*, Int. p. xlv. note.

* Some place geography already in the rank of a science. This is somewhat premature. A science should rest on a body of facts far more complete, harmonious, and unquestionable than what go to make up our actual geographical knowledge. There is, 1. great confusion:—fundamental definitions are disputed; there is no general method; the classification is constantly shifting; the boundaries of the different branches are confounded. The Germans class geography under statistics; the French, statistics under geography, &c. 2. Great inaccuracy in all these branches:—in physical geography, mountains placed, through mistake of terms (“monte” being used by the Spaniards for “forest”) where there are plains; hills called mountains; rivers given double their course; sometimes omitted altogether, as the Kiang, the longest in Asia after the Jenissei, passed over, &c.; distances taken at random (see *Klaproth's Strictures on Arrowsmith's Map of Asia*, 1822, &c. &c.) In the political and statistical branches, the errors are still more glaring. One writer gives the town of Boston a larger export and import than the whole of the rest of the United States: another measures crime by figures, without reference to law and police, and even states these figures erroneously. He finds 1 accused in 1,601 in Baden, and 1 in 169 in Wirtemberg, and ergo, &c.; yet there is no essential difference between the morality of the two states. A third, in his tables, by confounding German and geographical miles, spreads China over half the earth, &c. These and similar errors extend their influence to other branches, and throw a sort of uncertainty over the whole. Yet this uncertainty may assuredly be every day more and more restricted, first, by the institution of societies, geographical and statistical (they must take care not to fall into the mistakes of that of Paris, in the case of M. Douville); and, secondly, by the establishment of really comprehensive geographical courses in our public schools, and the general diffusion of geographical knowledge amongst all classes of the community; I say all, for the very poorest amongst us may be placed, by circumstances, in a situation to make the most important discoveries. The *Revue Encyclopédique*, (*Analyse du Traité Élémentaire de Géographie*, par *Malte-Brun*,) vol. xlvii., complains that for the last thirty years none but translations of English and German elementary geographies have been used in the French schools. If they borrowed from us, they must indeed have been in want. A

History. — In general, our common School Educators think as lightly of the difficulties of History as they do of Grammar, or even of Religion. Accordingly, we have catechisms of the histories of all countries, and epochs, knowledge thinned down and diluted—for the “tenderest capacities.” A child of eight or nine years old is thrown into the tangled parties of the Peloponnesian war, or the more unintelligible jargon of the Walpole and Pitt administrations. It is a jumble of idle words, through which, after wandering for months, and perhaps for years, he comes out, with the recollection only of a painful dream. It would be happy, indeed, if it were always so; but if he never draws in knowledge, he often draws in error, and almost always prejudice. Most of our abridgments, bad in an intellectual sense—as abridgments for young persons always are—in a moral sense, are abominable. They are catechisms of mutual distrust and dislike. If the catechism teaches dogma, they teach sect. Even ancient history is not beyond their reach. Whig and Tory have got into Athens and Sparta; Catholic and Protestant have long taken possession of Rome; Deist and Christian were lately to be seen in fierce encounter in Egypt, India, &c. History is a practical treatise of Metaphysics of the very highest order, and can never, I am persuaded, be studied with any true profit on a large scale, or even without considerable risk, until a substantial course of metaphysical and ethical studies shall

good elementary geography (graduated, of course, as La Croix has graduated his mathematics) is still a desideratum.

For the qualifications necessary for geographical reform, see the *Mémoire*, par le Baron de Férussac, 1819. Balbi considers, for the present, any thing like a uniform plan impracticable (*Abrégé de Géographie*, 1833, *Int.* p. ix.), but suggests, or rather his editor, an excellent mode to supply, as far as practicable, defects, and to keep up to the actual state of knowledge, viz. the publication of an *Annuaire Géographique*. Even M. Balbi himself may derive advantage from such a publication. In the work just quoted (accurate as it is, to an unusual degree, in most respects), we find, p. 456., the following: — “Carrick, petite ville, florissante par son commerce, et remarquable par le chemin en fer qui de Waterford doit aller jusqu’à Limerick; on vient de finir la partie située entre cette ville et Waterford.” Carrick, if you believe the inhabitants, is starving; and the railroad is not yet begun.

have first been completed. Instead of using it as an example for teaching philosophy, I would rather use philosophy to teach it. It would, therefore, be a great good to remodel the mode of studying it, or—if that be impracticable—to defer the study altogether, until the pupil be sufficiently grounded in all the great principles of moral and social duty. As a complement, in this way, to an ethical course, it might be made an effective auxiliary. Nor would I, therefore, substitute Chronology, no more than I would the latitude and longitude of places, for Geography. History is essentially a collection of facts, and not of dates—and in proportion as these facts are few, they ought to be fully developed.

But History is too intimately connected with other studies, and too essential to their comprehension, to be wholly dispensed with, even in Elementary Education. It *must* be studied, in order to study them. If it has the disadvantage of borrowing colour from the medium through which it passes, we must only make the greater efforts to purify that medium from all taint. If preliminary studies be required, it is another stronger motive to raise the scale of Education generally to a higher standard. It is, besides, an extensive study,—and, when properly pursued, spreads over many years. But Elementary Education is limited to a very few; we are thus compelled to select the most obviously and immediately useful portions, if we do not wish, comparatively speaking, to sacrifice all. Here, then, another question arises, and of scarcely less difficulty in the solution than either of the preceding. Which are the most useful? The usual course is to go right through what is called an universal History, in a perfectly impartial manner—not condensing, but omitting every thing but the mere outline—the skeleton facts. We thus know as much about Æneas as Alfred, and more, perhaps, of the Amphictyonic Council than of our own senate. But here are two mistakes: we take up that which is of little use; and what is really so, we treat in the most unserviceable and superficial manner possible. Ancient History is a portion of higher classical Education, and involves, for its true comprehension, the previous condition of a thorough identification with ancient opinions and manners. This is scarcely

within the grasp even of the more advanced, much less of elementary students. On the other side, these abstracts, far less graphic than the driest annals of the chroniclers, are wretched substitutes for national history. We care not for the herds of sovereigns who succeeded each other in the olden times, whether they be “fainéants,” or soldiers, or worse than either; but we value the slightest act of our Alfred, for the influence of his very thoughts is still perceptible in our institutions. National history is unquestionably the most useful portion of history to every individual: it is what a nation should first study; it is essentially the office of National Education to inculcate it; but then it should be *history*, and not a *table of contents*. Abstracts here will not do. At the same time, it is not intended to exclude every other. This would render even national history unintelligible. It should be seen in the general procession of events; but while all others might be permitted to pass shadow-like before us, this should stay. The same analogy as in Geography should be observed. Our own country should be the centre—all others should form fainter and fainter circles around. A slight outline, beginning with Scriptural and Eastern History, and proceeding onward to Grecian and Roman, might form the preface to the study, but then it should be treated like a preface. This would fix its place. It might, at first, be studied biographically. Biographies have just the same effect in history, as in real life. Children, especially, care little for masses. Besides, it is not men, but man—the spirit of history, which it breathes into the inward heart, and from thence into the actions—and not the knowledge, the bookishness of history, we are anxious to teach. Later, indeed, we might proceed historically and regularly through the whole, but the more remarkable periods should alone detain us.* These should be studied again and again; and here the moral lesson, and the just

* Thus the period of 504 years between the first visit of the Romans to the invasion of the Anglo-Saxons, or of 617 years from that epoch to the Norman conquest, may be shut into a few pages, while as many volumes will be requisite, fully and beneficially to develop the History of the 129 years since the Reformation to the Revolution, and the 146 years from that period to the present. The importance of an epoch is relative. (See Bolingbroke's *Letters on History*, 1752, p. 162.)

political principle, and the patriotic duty, might be profusely and appropriately poured out. But this will require a nice hand. There are many important events still so dubious in their character, that their aspect and impression on the pupil is entirely dependent on the teacher. It is the "*dignus vindice nodus*" of our education; and it is not the hand of an Alexander which can untie it. It requires patience, and not force—not effort only, but time and discretion. It will be a long period, I much fear, before such events as the Reformation, the Gunpowder Plot, the wars of William, will be treated *rationaly*. Yet we ought not to despair. Charles I. has lost much of his martyrship, even in our catechisms; and we are now abundantly just to "the crook-backed tyrant" Richard III.

History, under these restrictions, may, not only as an exercise of morality, but as an exercise of reasoning, prove highly profitable. In the first sense, a man who might feel himself little roused by the *maxim*, will be kindled by the *action*. Sidney and Hampden will make patriots, though the wisest maxim that ever fell from their lips should fail. In the second, it opens a totally new field, and, perhaps, the most practically useful of all, for the exercise of our reasoning powers. Mathematics were exclusively syllogistic—the first term of the proposition was always taken for granted. Its great use was the breaking in the mind to the severity of deduction, and giving, by constant exercise, an almost intuitive sense of truth. The physical sciences introduced us to another species of logic, the inductive; it was there requisite to prove the first term, and this could only be done approxi-

* Even where downright sect and party are avoided, we still have some fulsome nationality, like Archdeacon Wrangham's misplaced enthusiasm for Nelson and Trafalgar, in his notes on Plutarch; or idle gossip,—an insurrection, a murder, a procession, a court intrigue, &c.;—any thing, in fine, but history,—any thing but the record of the intellectual and moral progress of the country. The French deal in the same, and worse commodities. With them, what is so absurdly and criminally termed "*glory*," is the great staple. Their common school-books still rave of the campaign in Egypt, and the great nation,—a singular mode of forming peaceful and industrious citizens; holding up to their early imaginations the glories, the merit of war! Unfortunately there are yet few books which, like Mrs. Hack's *Stories*, have put in their proper light these anti-social and anti-christian insanities.

matively, and by the active observation and collection of facts. But in History, a third species of reasoning becomes necessary. We have often few or no facts to reason on, or facts so coloured by motives that an ulterior reasoning becomes necessary — a comparison of other facts, proving more or less the existence of this or that motive; in fine, a constant weighing, *pro* and *con.*, of probabilities. • Of such materials is human action composed; and as men, whatever may be their condition, have more to do with the actions of men than with any other object, the study which best prepares for such a task must, on the whole, be the most serviceable. Yet, there is no reason to depart from the process adopted in the preceding instances. Historic narrative is a series of statements purporting to be founded on facts, but resting, like many similar statements in the physical sciences, on authority. We cannot, however, as in those sciences, put the accuracy of this authority to the test *ourselves* — we must try its value by a counter or corroboratory authority; and the credibility of these authorities themselves is, perhaps, again to be tried by witnesses, called up, as in our courts, to prove character. These facts and these authorities being first analysed, and both proving satisfactory, we are then entitled to bring in our verdict — hearing, of course, the charge of the historian, who is the judge *, but not before. The result, indeed, may not always prove satisfactory. But this is of minor consequence — the practice is good, no matter what may be the result; and if it does not always teach what is called History, it does what is still better — it teaches us to judge of History, and not only of History, but of men. †

* The fewer of these charges the better. An historian always obtruding his reflections is the worst possible for a pupil. If he always uses the eyes of another, he will never see with his own. Facts, facts, are what he wants: a plain text, and as many original documents — as much evidence as possible.

† Maps and Tables are as useful in history, as in geography. In this department we are tolerably supplied. We have Priestley's *Charts*, Le Sage's *Atlas*, (Lavoisne's edit.), Sass's *Stream of Time*, Biber's *Synchronistic Tables*, *Memoirs*, &c., pp. 393—417., &c., all more or less suggested by the President Henault's *Abrégé*. But maps, &c. must not only be *used*, but *constructed*. Let the pupil begin, for instance, with England: first, he forms a general outline, — the great headlands only of history: by degrees the intervals are filled up with new personages, new events, new details. He thus completes a map or table of

Legislation. — Connected with, and an almost necessary deduction from, the study of History, is the study of Legislation. It is a strange anomaly in modern society, that it should be governed by laws, of which the majority of its members are totally ignorant. This, in a despotism, is natural and consistent *; in a barbarous community, perhaps inevitable. In one, the law being the will of the sovereign, controlled only by traditional habits, cannot be defined; in the other, ignorance is content with such knowledge, as secures the mere material interests of the day. But in a free and enlightened community, it is absurd and immoral — obligation is correlative to knowledge of the obligation. † If the people are called on

“General English history.” He then proceeds to a second, or a map of “Legislation:” to a third, or a map of “Moral and Intellectual progress;” and so on, all on the same scale. These correspond to the general, physical, and political maps in geography, and may be made quite as minute. For instance, that of Legislation may be divided into Ecclesiastical and Civil — and Civil, again, into Civil properly so called, and Criminal, &c. &c., each arranged in parallel columns. In like manner, that of Moral and Intellectual progress may have one column for Religion (subdivided, if necessary, into smaller ones for the chief sects); another for Morals, (also subdivided into science and practice); a third for Intellectual Culture, under the several heads of science, art, &c., manufacture, &c. &c. The principles of the statistical maps, already noticed, may also be applied with advantage to the development and progress of any of these particulars. Their combination afterwards is easy. † It only requires reduction, juxtaposition, arrangement in parallel columns, &c. Other countries may be mapped or tabulated successively, in the same manner. Courses analogous to each of these maps may accompany or precede, and the pupil be required to construct his map (chronology forming his longitude and latitude), as he advances. A general course, and the combined map, should terminate the whole. These extended courses are especially destined for the upper schools. The elementary schools should confine themselves to biographies and outlines.

* Yet what was the opinion of the despot, Catherine II.? In her “Instruction” on the formation of a new code, she thus speaks: — “Avec les lois pénales entendues toujours à la lettre, chacun peut calculer et connaître les inconvénients d’une mauvaise action, ce qui est utile pour l’en détourner, et les hommes jouissent de la sûreté de leurs personnes, et de leurs biens, ce qui est juste, puisque c’est la fin sans laquelle la société se détruirait.” (Art. 156. ch. vii.) “Les lois doivent être écrites en langue vulgaire, et le code qui les renferme toutes, doit devenir un livre familier.” (Art. 175. ch. vii.) — *Journal des Savans*. Oct. 1817. p. 607.

† “Crimes will become *less frequent*,” says Beccaria, “in proportion as the sacred text of the laws is read and understood by a *greater number* of men.”

to obey, they ought to know what they are to obey. To preclude them from knowing, and to punish them for not knowing, exceeds even the injustice of a Rhadamanthus. *

† The utility of such a course in the higher classes of Education, has been long recognised, though most imperfectly acted on. There is no course, but there are books: they, however, are few — exceedingly elementary — unconnected — inapplicable — no preparation for the respective duties, general or special, of the pupils. In most instances even this is discretionary, as if every man had not an interest, second only to that which he ought to feel in religious and moral instruction, in making himself acquainted with the laws and constitution of his country. After the law of God, it is the most marked interpreter of morality. Lawyers arrange a course for themselves, or, without a course, pick up their knowledge as they can — the professional stimulus is guarantee that they will acquire it. But the citizen is otherwise situated; he is not *paid* for knowing either his rights, or his duties — the motive is too weak, and too general; he has no interest in volunteering time or labour in the attainment of knowledge, which his teachers themselves tell him, very distinctly, is unnecessary.† Hence, not only is there little special information fitting for special situations, such as diplomatic, colonial, and other official employments, but there is not even that, which one would think absolutely necessary for the efficient and conscientious discharge of the common duties of the citizen. With the exception of a few confused maxims, liable from their very confusion to be distorted to any purpose, the majority rush from college to the several important functions which society immediately entrusts to them, either as jurors, electors, or legislators, with an ignorance and consequent incompetency which would not be tolerated in a candidate for the lowest domestic situation. The results are conspicuous: Jurors unacquainted with the simplest laws of evidence, deciding, as they must often do under our sanguinary penal code, on the lives of their innocent fellow-creatures; Electors, without any clear idea

* "Castigat auditque dolos," &c. °

† Locke's *Treatise on Government* formed a part of the Dublin University course, but the student was seldom examined in it; therefore it was never read. In other words, it was required and prohibited at the same time.

of the relative duties and rights of the represented and representative, consequently asking almost always, either too much or too little; Legislators, enacting first, and "explaining," if they can, their enactments afterwards — these are some of the many permitted nuisances which necessarily flow from this prolific source. Will any man say he is unaffected by this? Can any man rescue himself, a single hour, or in a single position, from this all-embracing influence? As the legislature is, so is the citizen; and as the legislators are, so is the legislature.

The corrective for this radical vice in our National Education, as far as the upper classes and higher schools are concerned, is obvious and easy. Instead of books, let there be courses; and instead of choice, let there be obligation. If an obligation of the kind cannot be enforced, then neither can education; — if there is time for some, but not for all, keep what is useful, and throw by what is not. A man can afford to be ignorant of the mysteries of the Digamma, or the obscurities of the choral metres in Æschylus; but were he even content to remain ignorant of the first duties of a citizen to his country, his fellow-citizens, for their own interests, and his country, for its own honour and safety, should not suffer it. If religious and moral teaching be an essential, so also is this; for laws are the machinery by which religion and morality work. I care little for the force, unless I have also the means of properly applying it.

In its application to the lower classes and elementary schools, the case appears to suffer greater difficulties. I am asked, Would you make our schoolboys politicians? I would not make them partisans. But, I ask in turn, why teach the catechism, why read the Bible? The first principles of our government and laws ought no more to make our youth sectarians in politics, than the study of the first principles of Christianity sectarians in religion. If we are partisans or sectarians in either, we are often so by imitation or accident. We are born Protestants, Catholics, and Presbyterians; and we are born Radicals, Whigs, and Tories. The evil threaded exists already, prior to, and independent of, all direct instruction. Besides, our government contemplates and makes every man a *practical*

politician ; and it is but common sense, that what an individual is obliged to practise as a man, he ought to learn as a youth. Every man in these countries, and in these times, has to act the politician ; and the question is, whether he shall act it *well* or *ill*. As things now are, there is a great deal of brute ignorance, or half knowledge, or confused and pernicious knowledge—a great deal worse than no knowledge at all. And how should it be otherwise? What are the sources from which it is obtained? From the newspapers ;—and what newspapers !—And these you make the educators of youth, —you allow them to take your place, —and then you talk in sober earnest of not making partisans ! Why not then in consistency suppress your scripture lessons and your catechism, and surrender your pupils at once to tracts and controversy ? —they will thus cease to be sectarians.

The fact is, it is not instruction, but the mismanagement of instruction, which is the evil. Out of the kindest lesson in the New Testament, the spirit of religious discord may be evoked ; out of the simplest principles of our constitution we may unwarily raise the arch-devil of faction. But both can be prevented, the one as easily as the other : and, if they can, why not effect it ? — why not try, at least, to effect it, in both ?

Another objection, less obvious, but more futile, has been made : — it will encourage a love of litigation. The reverse. This passion arises from ignorance ; — the illiterate love law, as they do the lottery. A lawyer is seldom seen, as plaintiff at least, in any court. Besides, what has law-gambling to do with a knowledge of crimes to be avoided, and duties to be fulfilled ? We do not speak of the abuse, but of the use ; — we wish to make citizens, and not attorneys.

I see, therefore, no difficulty in comprising within the circle even of Elementary Education, what the French call, with great precision, “*des Notions Législatifs.*” A general outline of the principles and constitution of our government ; — the nature of our institutions ; — the duties which they require ; — the manner of fulfilling them ; — together with a sketch of the chief features of our civil, but especially of our criminal, code — and, more particularly, its applications to the particular position of the lower classes in town and country, — the whole illustrated

by popular historic references — would be highly desirable, and might easily be comprised in a few pages. A “complement,” or subsidiary work, taking this as the basis, but developing these elementary indications to a much greater extent, and with more minute and richer illustration, not only from our own but from foreign History and Legislation, of which we are lamentably ignorant, would be equally useful in the middle and upper schools. Such works, however, like so many others, are yet to be executed. The task would be well worthy of the pen of our most distinguished writers, and, with all its seeming facility, would certainly require it. It is not cant, nor self-adulation, which we want. The *real* value of our institutions should be soberly pointed out, and impartially compared and discussed. The “envy of surrounding nations” is a good toast at a corporation feast; but it should be banished from Education; — our admiration should be manly and true; — our love to our fatherland should rest on something firmer than stage illusion.*

* “Il serait difficile de concevoir une nation libre,” says the *Manuel de l’Instituteur Primaire*, a work published, as already mentioned, with the approbation of the French Board of Education, “dont les membres ne connussent pas le régime sous le quel ils vivent. Le peuple a donc besoin, il a même droit de connaître la législation de son pays, et c’est dans l’école qu’il doit en être instruit.” Ch. viii. art. 31. Accordingly, their schools are well provided with elementary works on this important branch. There are the *Histoire-Analyse des Constitutions et des Gouvernemens en France, &c., pour servir à l’Instruction élémentaire de la Jeunesse*, par L. R. Danaufriquette; *Notions élémentaires sur la Justice, les Droits, et les Lois*, par M. Dupin; *Formulaire de tous les Actes, &c., que l’on peut passer sous seing privé*. The regulations of these schools, moreover, require that the nature of these legal forms should be explained, and pupils familiarised with their meaning, not only by their being read to them, but also by their being occasionally made subjects for the writing-lesson, &c. &c. *Guide des Ecoles Primaires; Annuaire de l’Instruction Primaire, &c.* In America, the same principle is recognised and acted on. The Superintendent of Common Schools in the state of New York, in his Report of 1827, places the position broadly: — “In addition to becoming acquainted with the history of his own town, county, state, and nation, the scholar should be made acquainted with the laws relating to the ‘duties and privileges of towns,’ the manner in which the business of the county is transacted, and the organisation and powers of the government. As soon as a young man enters upon active life, he is called upon to discharge the various duties of a citizen, and the necessary instruction to qualify him for an intelligent discharge of duties so important

Political Economy is almost implied in the foregoing. Can we advance a step in any of the walks of life, without feeling its influence? Is it not another term for the laws, which regulate our whole social existence? Is not the regulation of every portion dependent, in the first instance, on a due acquaintance with these laws? And all this being true, is it possible we can permit—I will not say approve—its exclusion, even from Elementary Education.

In the middle and upper schools, the justice of this reasoning is not even contested; but, as in the instance we have been just discussing, the principle is not visible in the practice. Professorships have been founded—courses are given,—a great preliminary step certainly, but still a preliminary. It should be made an *integral* part of Education. Though a representative be altogether ignorant of the controversy, of axioms or no axioms, in Geometry, he may yet be capable of giving an excellent vote on a district or provincial railway; but if ignorant of the great principles which determine wages, rent, currency, &c., he may, with the best

to himself and his country, should form a part of his education." See also the *Kentucky Report* of 1830. To facilitate these purposes, there are analogous works. Pasden Davis's *Principles of the Government of the United States* is used generally in New York. They have also Professor Yates' *Citizen's Guide*, comprising the constitutions of the United States, and of the state of New-York, &c. &c., illustrated with questions and explanations, a concise treatise upon the powers and duties of the principal state, county, and town officers, &c. &c. It includes besides, a summary of the various laws relating to towns and counties, and is recommended by the Superintendent to the Common Schools, as containing "information which every citizen ought to understand, and which will be highly useful to every young man when he becomes of age, and is to enter upon the discharge of his duties as freeman." Even in Germany, where a greater degree of jealousy may be supposed to exist, it is thought a study too important to be neglected. It usually forms a portion of all their school collections, and one of the best chapters in Wilmsen's *Deutsche Kinderfreund* (the general class-book of Saxe-Weimar) is an abridgment of Tittmann's *Allgemeiner Unterricht über die Rechte und Verbindlichkeiten der Unterthanen*, or General Lessons on the Rights and Duties of Subjects. We, alone, have nothing of the kind. De Lolme and Paley, both exceptionable in some respects, are not adapted to our elementary schools, scarcely to our middle; and all attempts at cutting them down into elementary works have neither done justice to the writers, nor to the pupils for whom they are intended. Besides, they are limited to constitutional knowledge; but a book, to be adapted to popular schools, should extend to the laws, and should be far more practical than theoretic.

intentions, reduce the majority of his constituents to ruin. But so it is—"quam parvâ sapientiâ respublica gubernatur"—a banker cannot afford (hoping to keep his bank or place) to be ignorant of the most intricate machinery of banking; but legislators—heaven-inspired—"improvise" their legislation, and dash at once into the glories of law-making and law-changing, with as little preparatory wisdom or knowledge as they would into a fox-chase. The next session comes, and with it, the tender reproaches of this or that trade, half-ruined—a deputation of merchants to the minister, with "I told you so," in their lengthened faces—then the minister's candid admissions in the house—atonement motions—committees—and as a final result, a "purple patch" or two of improvement, and some thirty or forty new blunders, to render lighter—by means of comparison—the old. All this is great sport to the boys, but death to the frogs. As if nothing at all had happened, the old performers take again to the same vigorous, doing-business amusement, with unsubdued appetite,—no matter, so they are in motion; for as every new season must, have its new pantomime, so every new session must have its new display of laws—"leggi che ingiuste, ogni lustro cangiar vede, ma in peggior:" and which if wrong, it is declared the blunder was inevitable; if right, as much self-complacency is displayed, as if it were not a miracle. But is there any thing extraordinary in all this? Nothing more, certainly, than in any other game of blind-man's-buff; the blind man, as a matter of course, tumbles over every thing in his way. The knowledge is not there—the men cannot see. They are highly educated, no doubt, but merely ignorant of the precise points which a legislator ought to know.

But what have the lower classes to do with these functions, and this education? We might as well be asked, what have they to do with rents, with labour, with prices? What have they to do with almost every interest of their social life? This department is theirs, if any be theirs;—if they are to have any education at all, this ought to be their education. Why do they pass—often in a single night—from people to populace, and from populace to mob,—

but from some supposed infringement of their rights and interests — some panic, in which their ignorance has a far larger share, than their malignity? Why do they run after gold? or cut off this or that intercourse with their neighbour, at the *dictum* of this or that Sir Oracle — such oracles upon such subjects! — but from the notorious confidence which uneducated men usually place in every audacious quack who takes the trouble to dupe them, — a confidence quite natural, from their want of knowledge and consequent total incapacity to judge, whether his nostrums will kill or cure. To extinguish charlatanism, you must show the people where it lies, and what it is; — to detect falsehood, they must early be accustomed to truth. Half the evils of our poor law system would probably have been neutralised, by the diffusion of sound economical knowledge, at an earlier period of society; — by such knowledge, chiefly, are their consequences to be healed now. Nor let it be supposed, that such information is beyond their reach. That objection Miss Martineau has already refuted, in the best way in which it could be accomplished. A few simple lessons, with such practical illustrations from their actual condition as she has furnished, is the most impressive of all popular instruction, the most calculated for the capacity and social reform of the poor. Such books, and such teaching, should form an essential branch of elementary education. The taste once given, food can be easily found for its gratification. Village libraries should be plentifully stocked with such productions. They will make their way, where moral and religious works fail.*

At the same time, I am far from thinking they can supply the place of either, nor am I insensible that Political Economy may be carried too far. When it assumes a superiority over moral and religious feeling and action, and thinks to carry into operation by physical, what they can effect much more nobly by spiritual, its influence becomes pernicious, and it produces that tendency to the material and sensual, which, in

* The first effort, I believe, of the kind, has been made by the Irish Board of Education. To the Archbishop of Dublin, (to whose acquirements, especially in this branch of science, and zeal for education, the country is already so much indebted,) both the conception and execution of this work are attributed.

the education of a nation, cannot, as I have already said, be too strongly counteracted, or condemned.

Physical Sciences. — Of the essential importance of these studies to the upper and middle classes, it is quite unnecessary to speak. Whether, in their application to mechanics, or astronomy — to the simplest, or to the most complex processes of chemistry, &c., it is now admitted they ought to form a considerable portion of every useful and accomplished education. The predominance, indeed, of classic studies, has, practically at least, excluded them from our academic education, and not allowed them, till lately, their fair portion of time or attention in our Universities; but, necessarily forming the great bases of all special education, they are studied with proportionate assiduity and success by our middle classes, to whom such knowledge, for professional objects, is a matter of absolute necessity. It would be highly desirable that in *all* our middle schools, without exception, their elements at least should form an important part of the general course, leaving their farther developement either to the University, or to the special school, but furnishing such quantity of preliminary information as would allow the pupil to proceed, on his admission to either, with far more security and rapidity, than, in nine cases out of ten, he does at present. The objections to this are such as are made to all other similar additions. Latin and Greek, it is urged, require the full allotment of time, which is actually expended upon their acquisition. Were this true, the only alternative which could be proposed would be, the sacrifice of one or other of these languages. But a sober examination into the case will prove, that, by a better arrangement of the period for commencing the classic languages, and by a better process in teaching them, not only time might easily be spared for these studies, without interfering with that of the languages, but that, in fact, the languages themselves would gain, instead of losing, and the pupil be enabled to attain a competent knowledge of Physics, and learn Greek and Latin much more efficiently besides.

In the elementary schools, how far they can be admitted, consistently with the time and means to which pupils are at present limited, may appear more doubtful. Yet there is no

reason, why a few simple applications of the geometry and arithmetic, already learned, to mechanics, &c., or the first obvious phenomena of chemistry and astronomy, might not, with perfect ease, and with very little demand either upon time or labour, be explained to the pupils, in conjunction with their other lessons. An elementary work, limited, like that on Legislation, or Political Economy, to "Notions," and comprising popular solutions of the most ordinary processes of nature — of the causes and effects of fire, water, earth and air; of light and colours; heat and cold; fogs, winds, ice, snow, rain, &c.; of day and night; the seasons; thunder storms, electricity; steam, &c., — might, with perfect propriety, be placed in the hands of the simplest peasant. In the town schools, further developements might be given, in reference to their respective trades, (what in France is called Technology,) — in the country, in reference to the purposes of husbandry, &c. This, besides being a preparation for the middle schools, as they are in turn for the special, would be of immediate utility to such as were prevented from proceeding farther, and would excite a taste for such enquiries; a material advantage, whenever we should find it useful and practicable to establish parish libraries.

¶ "Some persons," observes Raumer, "I have heard say, Natural Science should not be taught at school." They are right, if by our term "natural science," we meant to express, as they do, that which is adapted to the comprehension of a man — that which is mathematically exact. But by 'Natural Science,' as taught at school, we mean only that foundation of *sensuous* impressions, on which all future scientific knowledge must be raised." And this distinction, common indeed to almost all elementary education, will at once point out the description of methods, and class books adapted to each degree. The lower elementary schools must necessarily confine themselves, to the simplest "notions." We have no works in English, specifically adapted to this purpose. The French schools are tolerably supplied. Brard's *Minéralogie Populaire*, is in use — he has published, also, under the assumed name of *Maître Pierre ou le Savant de Village*, two small tracts, *Entretiens sur la Physique*, and *Entretiens sur l'Industrie*, both sufficiently intelligible, and unexpensive (50 c.) to be within the means and capacity of the poorest. Dupin's *Petit Producteur Français*, equally cheap, is adapted to a more advanced order of society — it is rich in the most useful details under the simplest form. In German, Schweitzer's *Schulfreund*, Part iii., contains the first and simplest elements of natural history, botany, mineralogy, cosmology, and physics. It presupposes, however, that the children should have passed two years at school, and reached the age of nine or ten. It is thus better

Domestic Economy.—Good Husbandry and good Housewifery are the two practical arts, of most use to our rural population. They enter immediately into the three great classifications of Education. No family, however limited, can be conducted without order, cleanliness, activity, good physical habits of all kinds; none without a spirit of good feeling, reciprocal kindness, peace, honesty, strict and persevering attention to moral duty; finally, none without a competent knowledge of the best methods, the shortest and surest means to the wisest ends, how to put out to the fullest advantage their well-earned gains, how to spend with frugality and profit, how to economise with comfort and generosity. The difference between two families equally industrious and equally moral, will be just the difference which exists between their respective knowledge. One starves with what to the other is competency, and sometimes superfluity. There is no happiness, and little morality, where there is not first a due provision for necessary physical wants. Education should, therefore, propose, as a primary object, the communicating, on each of these heads, concise, but clear and practical instructions. It should form, particularly among the lower classes, the most considerable portion of female Education. If the vices of the husband often reduce a family

calculated for the higher class of elementary schools, than for the lower. To this higher class may also be applied, with ease, Raumer's method, which is excellent. We have already noticed it, in speaking of Natural History. In the middle schools, a more amplified system, but on the same principles, may be admitted. Dr. Arnott's *Elements of Physics* may be here advantageously introduced, as they are in America, with the precautions, however, suggested in the *Journal of Education*, No. iv. p. 287. The perspicuity, variety, and simplicity of this work, eminently fit it for this stage of Education. In special schools, and in the universities, a higher degree of developement will become necessary, and technical or mathematical proofs and illustrations, which are excluded from Dr. Arnott's plan, will there necessarily form a considerable portion of the study. Dr. Arnott begins scientific education with Physics, and ends with Mathematics. Perhaps it would be more natural to begin with the elements of each, and progressively to pursue them to their fullest developement. See also the judicious suggestions of the *Journal of Education* (No. v. p. 70.) on the propriety of introducing Sir John Herschel's admirable *Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*, as an elementary class-book, into our schools. Mrs. Marcet's *Conversations*, &c. might also be added.

to beggary, these vices are frequently the result either of the indolence or the ignorance of the wife. Domestic Economics, well practised, will be the best preventive of want, vice, and discontent—the best barrier against the hospital, the poor-house, the gin-shop, and the secret club. But to be practised, they must be known—to be known, they must be taught. The same mode of teaching may be adopted in their instance, as in others. Short intelligible treatises, “Notions” not theoretic, but proved by practice to be practical, enforced by frequent reference to actual occurrences, and to their own habits and opinions, and illustrated by amusing, but at the same time instructive, tales, would be the sort of “Manual” calculated to do the most good. This, and the treatises just mentioned, might thus form a small popular library, which in process of time, it is to be hoped, would not only be found in every parish school, but in every cottage of every parish in the land.*

Ancient and Modern Languages.—The learned languages are still considered by many, emphatically—Education. To teach them, and to teach little else, was a portion of the wisdom of our ancestors; but though wisdom in them, it does not follow it is such in us. With them it was knowledge, not for ornament, but use. It was the instrument of *action*, as well as of *thought*. Law, Diplomacy, Medicine, Religion, all was Latin: a man who was no “*Lâtin*er,” was a mere “*vil-lein*” in education; he was deemed unfit in civil life for any situation destined for the “*ingenuous*” and free. But to insist on it at present, but above all, as the only thing necessary, and to the sacrifice of many other things really so, is a folly of which our ancestors could not have been guilty; they

* We have several excellent little works, answering in most particulars to these conditions, such as the “*Working Man’s Companion*,” “*Cobbett’s Cottage Economy*,” “*The Farmer’s Series*,” published by the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge; “*Martin Doyle’s Tracts*,” (the *Maitre Pierre* of the county of Wexford,) and various others. But all these, however good, are cottage books, and not school books. What we want is, to see such useful instruction not left to chance, or to the choice of the individual, but forming an obligatory and integral part of universal Education. This can only be effected by some elementary class-book, in the same tone, and treating of the same subjects; but, in style and form, more adapted to the capacity of the youthful pupils.

did not require Hebrew to prescribe for a patient, nor was it in Greek trochaics they negotiated loans, or ratified treaties of peace. Our social existence has been multiplied and spread out, by recent discovery, and extensive and rapid communication, to an extraordinary degree. We require means and instruments corresponding with this diversity and extent, and we are still to be limited to one little manageable, and, as we are taught to manage it, of little use. Of what advantage to a merchant, to the head of a manufactory, to a military man, or to any of the numerous classes dependent on our public offices, the most complete knowledge of the ancient languages? It is a luxury, but luxuries are but poor substitutes for necessities. Men cannot live on cakes, neither will erudition conduct through life. If they will read the ancient authors, let them read them in translations. It is not the best, but the best is attainable at too dear a rate. We live *too fast* in the present age to spend so much time on words. Things press upon us at every step — and an education dealing with things, a *real* or reality Education, as the Germans term it, is the Education best fitted for the practical, the reality-men — for the active classes of the community.

It thence follows, that the system of Latin and Greek teaching may sin in two particulars — in being applied to pupils who have no possible use for such instruction, and, secondly, in consigning a “*triste et stérile enfance*,” as it really is, under such absurd discipline, for years together to this one study. The learned languages should be taught to such only as require them; and taught so as not to exclude other more important matters; and, finally, they should be veritably and decidedly taught; that is, the pupil should receive for his time and labour something more than the mongrel, water-gruel, dictionary-knowledge with which, after an apprenticeship worse than Jacob’s, he is now generally sent forth.

The learned languages are luxuries; but luxuries in which the less laborious classes may most agreeably and usefully indulge, and which, for the sake of the whole nation, ought to be cherished and maintained. I once heard an English

traveller declare, he could see nothing in Rome but “stones upon stones;” and there are many who see in Homer and Virgil nothing but words upon words:—I have seen others bring one or two of these stones home, and imagine they could comprehend and admire the Colosseum. But there is a medium between these extremes. There is something more than words in Homer: but the knowledge of these words is not sufficient, to teach us how Homer is to be comprehended and admired.

These languages are no longer so much of practical, as of speculative utility. But they are still of utility. It is as the key to other studies—as producing a powerful effect upon all—that they are chiefly valuable. They lead, by an easy and sure route, to the cognizance of other languages, of every-day use. But even were this consideration excluded, their general influence of itself would be inestimable. It would be a real derogation and injury even to our national literature, to abandon the high and severe study of those great classical models, from which so much of the intellectual riches of every nation in Europe is derived. By their very contrast they chastise the riot of our modern fancies; they give a staid and sober grandeur—a sculptural beauty—a sacred quietude to thought; they teach us in literature the value of the natural and the true; they make us understand the wealth of enough—they imbue us with the gracefulness of simplicity, and steep us in times when our nature was yet in the fresh beauty and glory of its prime. They are the living history of ancient mind, and there, and in her arts (each the commentator of the other), we read most visibly the essential spirit of her divinity. To suppress or to discourage such studies, would be to shut out the second portion of education, *Æsthetics*. It would be starving feeling, to surfeit judgment. It would be carrying the “*cui bono*” principle not coarsely only, but erroneously, into effect. They are something more than a matter of gerunds and aorists—of anapæsts or iambics: they are speakers of the souls of great and glorious men. Not, indeed, that sound criticism and accurate grammar have not their value. I complain of them, not for being too much, but for not being enough. But is this the manner in which they are taught? Admitting

that the study is an appropriate occupation for the upper and professional classes,—how is it pursued? What other studies are pursued with it? Do we learn Latin and Greek? Do we learn any thing else?

Every thing on our present plan is studied, but the author. Our young pedants can tell, how many various readings, how many well-authenticated blunders there are for each passage, but know little of the passage itself:—nothing of its history, poetry, philosophy,—every thing about the dress—nothing about the man. This is very akin to the absurdity of the critic, who wished his classic all notes*; or of the philosopher in Montaigne, who, when called on to judge a cause, set about first inquiring, “*S’il y a vie, s’il y a mouvement, si l’homme est autre chose qu’un bœuf; que c’est agir et souffrir; quelles bêtes ce sont que loix et justice†*,” and in the midst of these questions forgot the cause. Even these technicalities, such as they are, are not always mastered. We spend years even on the threshold; turning the key backwards and forwards in the lock, but never sufficiently skilful to open the door. Who can read Thucydides, on leaving college, as he would a French newspaper? Yet he is less idiomatic than the “Rapport” of a minister of war. Victor Hugo, or Châteaubriand, present little difficulty. Theocritus still requires the Lexicon. Even German, stubborn as it is, yields to the “labor improbus” of a few years; but Greek is to the last impregnable. This is not in the languages, but in the teaching. Montaigne has shown us, with what facility Latin may be learned; and I could parallel his example by a case as striking in Greek. We begin too soon, and we begin the wrong way. Rousseau says, that one of the great arts of Education is to know “how to lose time.”‡ We ought to learn, in his sense, to lose a little more time, to delay a little longer before we begin teaching Latin and Greek. Parents, especially ignorant ones, measure the acquiring of knowledge as they would the going of their

* The Abbé de Longuerue, who preferred the “*Antiquitates Homericae*” and the “*Homeri Gnomologia*,” to Homer himself.

† Essais, l. i. c. 24.

‡ Emile, l. ii.

steam-coach. If the child were to travel with the same certainty and rapidity, there would be some sense in starting the machine early; but the case is precisely the reverse. The tortoise in this race, as in so many others, not unfrequently passes the hare. The future parson is scarcely seven or eight years old, when he is "put into his Latin grammar,"—and such grammars!—there probably to stay during the remainder of his education—perhaps of his life. It may be consoling to a parent's vanity, to put his boy into Latin and breeches at the same time; but one evidence of his virile dignity ought in all reason to suffice. Twelve, or even later, is quite time, if he intends to learn the language as well as the grammar.* He will then have made some real progress in the study of the mother tongue (the tongue which he must use, whether he be young or old, high or low, Latiner or no Latiner), and understand what language and what learning mean. His time and labour will be abridged and usefully employed—in a short period he will do much, and he will do it well.† But for this, he must pursue a process leading by the direct and shortest road to the object in view. We talk of translation and composition—good means when well conducted; but that is the point—how conduct them well? Some writers think a child cannot learn a second language, much less a dead language‡; others, that composition

The students of Solcure are distinguished by their superior knowledge of Latin, at the German Universities. They begin at the age of eleven.

† It is highly injurious to pass to the study of another language, before we fully possess our own. It is by means of words we think—the more familiar the words of our own language are, the more easily we think. But they will not become familiar, unless used exclusively. The use of two languages, whilst thought is still forming, injures the intellectual development.

‡ Of the first was Rousseau, *Emile*, l. ii., followed by Jahn, *Recherches sur la Nationalité*, &c. traduit par Lortet, &c. He places the question on just grounds. Language is not the art of words, but of words used as the signs of ideas. These differ in different nations; hence different idioms: a child cannot comprehend these differences, therefore cannot feel the value of these idioms. He may meet, in six or seven dictionaries, six or seven of these signs or words for the same idea; but his idea will be always one. This is learning a number of synonymes, but not learning a language. All this is true, when we talk of learning a language in its full philosophical extent. But when we speak of a child's learning it, we speak only of the limited vocabulary and limited reading of a child. Children are immediately concerned with sensible objects, and any mis-

of all kinds is absurd, until he has attained the age of sixteen or seventeen.* There is some truth, and some error, in both these opinions: they ought to make us cautious, at least, how we proceed. Montaigne's method, as far as it went, was perfect: it taught the technicalities—it made a fluent speaker of tolerable Latin, but not a thinker with Roman thought.†

take is rectified by the senses themselves. So far, not only do they learn without difficulty, but with ease. There is no confusion, especially if the same person always addresses the pupil in the same language. But all this is very different from the regular study of a language, consequently very different from the study of the dead languages. A mere child cannot possibly learn these languages; all he can do is to prepare to learn them—he may make dispositions for the period in which he can.

* La Croix, *Essais sur l'Enseignement*, p. 73—76. But, like Rousseau, his opinions are applicable chiefly to the more advanced stages of composition. He admits the propriety of an early study of the rules, leaving, with Helvetius, the developement of the passions, the energy of individual sensibility, to do the rest. But how study these rules? Rules should be the result of reading and composition, not the preliminary to either. Both may be combined. The conclusions drawn from the exercise of to-day, may become the guide or maxim for the exercise of to-morrow. It is the result of one composition, and the preliminary to another. But for children, how accurately and how gently must all this be graduated! Where this is wanting, they will never write, or write nothing but words.

† In learning languages, as Montaigne did, from speaking, instead of books, we seldom get beyond a very scanty catalogue either of words or phrases. This is natural. Except in particular cases, our conversation deals with ordinary subjects, with objects of sense, not abstractions—with events and persons recurring every hour. The number of our signs are therefore few—these few farther diminished by the little nicety observed in their application; the same phrase being made to serve for ideas or combinations, to a great degree distinct. This was the case with Montaigne's Latin, even from his own showing, notwithstanding the admiration of Muretus. Similar phenomena are observable among the lower classes, and amongst the uneducated of all classes. Hence the tendency to slang, cant, fashionable euphuism, &c. &c.—all results, not of negligence only, but often of sheer want of language, disguised under the cloak of affectation. The language of literary men, on the contrary, where personal shyness does not interfere, is generally rich, varied, and characteristic—not outlined after any particular society, but sculptured after the man himself. Sometimes this gets into too strong relief; but it may easily be rubbed down to better keeping, by the contact with the world, and good circles, &c. &c. In general, men who speak many languages are quick, but superficial—habitually translators and copyists, though very lively ones, they have little time for originality, or the working out their own thoughts. The inhabitants of countries who generally speak two languages are exemplifications. This polyglot education, however, is not yet fairly understood. We wait, as in so many other cases, for well-authenticated observations. Our remarks here, indeed, are

No language can be thoroughly learned which is not learned etymologically ; and etymology will always be difficult, unless learned historically. On this principle, it is not enough to translate : we must translate in a certain order—that order must be the order of time. Languages take the pressure and character of the age in which they are respectively formed. The writers of every civilised nation present, in their phraseology alone, a complete history of the national mind. In some nations, this is more conspicuous than in others ; for it depends not merely upon civilisation, but upon the extent over which it is spread ; and the more or less rapid fluctuation of national manners. In the Greek, and in most modern languages, this is striking—less so in Latin, though there is some contrast, certainly, between the style of Cæsar and that of Ammianus Marcellinus. The earlier we go in the history of languages, the nearer we come to the original *sensuous* meaning of words, and the more closely we perceive the true source from which they spring. They are signs of material existence—their application to abstractions is scarcely yet sensible. Every subsequent age, and almost every writer, modifies this meaning ; new associations, gradually more intellectual, cling to it as it proceeds along, till, finally, we arrive at a period when, all the more obvious meanings being exhausted, and the desire of novelty still continuing strong, the language becomes a complication of subtle and obscure phrases, *recherché* allusions, and forced significations, such as we detect in every page, for instance, of the productions of the Lower Empire. To study a language, with constant reference to these particulars, would not only be a very useful, but also a very interesting, and what, perhaps, will be still more attractive, a far easier study, than it is at present. At

limited rather to the speaking of languages, than to their number. Whatever use learning to speak them may be in the living languages, it is absurd when applied to the dead. Where is our judge for idiom, accent, and pronunciation ? The Greek, indeed, may form an exception ; but then we must adopt the Romaic pronunciation, and believe (which is not very difficult) that the Greeks know something more about it than our universities. The Latin is not quite so fortunate ; Italian will not supply its place. Yet we still use it in professional examination, and think we can gossip in it, because we act Terence once a year !

present, we usually begin, where we should end.* Nor is this our only mistake. What we do study, we not only study out of its place, but in the worst form imaginable. We disjoint — we confuse — we take a fragment here, another there; — we examine the scattered members of the author, but not the author himself. What more ingenious contrivance could be discovered, to invert and disturb any thing like rational order in reading, than our Collections, and Anthologies, and Selectæ, and Delectus, &c.† A boy leaps from Herodotus to Theocritus, and from Theocritus to Xenophon; and not merely from one author to another, but from one chapter in one, to a few dozen verses in the other. What idea can he possibly form by such a method — I will not say of the origin, the development, the perfection of the language — but of its very meaning. Every author of eminence has his own peculiar idiom: it is as much a part of him as his thought; but it is only to be explained by the author himself — it is only to be got at by the context, and the context can only be understood by continuous reading. The boy collects words, it is true, but they form a mere heterogeneous, unconnected heap in his memory; they carry with them few of the associations which arise out of their application and position. He meets them under such different significations, in such different writers, and with such rapidity of transition, that they at last cease to have for him any precise signification at all. Had he been confined to one writer, and required to read him through, he would have at least learned one. Had he read him in his proper place, each of these words would have had all that additional value and interest which can only be conferred by place. But it is urged, that, it being impossible to read the author through, the next best course is to select at least the beauties, and to impress them on the youthful mind. If this be the object, there could not be a worse way of impress-

I do not know whether it would be advisable, if practicable, to preserve the same order between the several languages as between the different epochs and writers of each language. In that case, Hebrew ought to be the first, then Greek, Latin, German, &c. &c.

† Compare the "*Musa Græca*" of Harrow, with the "*Delectus*" of Westminster, and the "*Scriptores Græci et Romani*" of Eton, &c. &c. They might justify even stronger observations than those in the text.

ing them. Relief is produced by surrounding depression;—the lights of a picture owe their value to the shadows. The beauties of a writer cannot be felt detached from himself; they require the *juxtaposition* of other passages; and, as mere matters of phrase or painting, they lose their colour, when thus taken out of their frame. As to other beauties, to which these ought to be quite subordinate, such as invention—disposition of the subject—combination—contrast of character, &c.,—these are sacrificed without remorse. They are excellencies spread over too large a surface to be caught by this kind of reading; they cannot be shut up, quintessentially, in a page. Nor is translation, merely such, more felicitously managed. The lesson is “done”—the happy phrase!—into English; the grammar learned by rote, right a-head—the syntax and prosody quoted at the end of every sentence, no doubt, with accurate verbal exactness; and all according to the inexorable school statute “in that case made and provided.”* But all this, and much more, is performed with the same glibness by the Euclid men: and yet it is precisely those very boys who know the most about the number and language of the propositions, who know the least about their reasoning; that is, who know the least about the propositions themselves. I cannot conceive a more senseless martyrdom (except, indeed, the infliction of the catechism on a child of five years old,) than all this “doing,” and “construing,” and “parsing.” It is as melancholy as the painful agility of a monkey at a village fair. Besides the objection to the learning a grammar by heart, before the pupil has had time or understanding to form one for himself, I do not see how it is possible, by a mere mechanical process, to apply that spirit of analysis, without which even simple translation is neither accurate nor sure.† Boys, indeed, may be taught to repeat

* We do not take sufficient advantage of analogy, in studying these Grammars. The conjugation, especially in Greek, as it is usually taught, is a chaos of inextricable confusion. See some excellent remarks of Naville on this subject. *De l'Educ. Pub.* p. 265.

† The “Hamiltonian” or interlineary method, copied from Locke, as Locke copied it from others, purports to be analytical. So, to a certain degree, it is. It separates sentences into words, and words into their parts, and gives the precise local meaning, which a dictionary cannot give. But there is a great deal

any thing, and any thing they repeat may be taken for reason, —so may parrots,—and half impose even upon a Locke. But, with all this, let it appear what it may, it is not translation—it is routine, and nothing but routine—mere rope-dancing—a mechanical “tour de force.” Take the boy out of his book and page, and you will see how he will stagger, how he will wander about.* It is not Latin he has been learning, but three or four chapters in Cornelius Nepos.

To correct this defect, composition is suggested. We are told it is not sufficient to translate Latin into English; we must reverse it, and translate English into Latin. If composition were limited to this,—merely used as subsidiary to translation,—it would be unquestionably of utility. Nothing winnows our knowledge better, nothing teaches the value of words so accurately, as the necessity of employing them. But precautions are to be taken even here. Composition in a dead language must be a matter not merely of authority, but of *dead* authority. In the modern we have *living* tribunals to appeal to. Not so in the ancient. Who shall be our precedent?—to whom shall we appeal?—from whom shall we select? If from all, only picture to ourselves the confusion which will ensue. Imagine, for instance, a translation of Bossuet in the style of Taylor’s and Bacon’s prose, with occasional dashes from Sterne, the whole brought up with a strange mixture of Dr. Johnson and Lord Byron. Would you call all this harlequinade, English?—would you call it even a translation? We must keep closely to one period, and to one author. We may translate Bossuet, if we so fancy it, *à la* Bacon or *à la* Johnson, or into our own good vernacular, but not into the language of half a dozen periods and writers—into a lash of languages at once. In Greek or Latin we are cut off altogether from the vernacular: we must take up our language *solely* from books. We may choose Cæsar or Cicero, and “cæsarise” or “ciceronianise” as long as we please; but to our choice we must keep; to one or to the other, and, not to both. It will not do to stitch them together, unless we intend to parody or caricature. But what will be the use of

more in analysis than this:—What is the primary, the secondary signification of the words,—what circumstances determine these significations? &c. &c. &c.

this? It will, at all events, teach us the meaning and value of Cæsar's or Cicero's idioms: it will do that, — and that is something; — but it will do no more.

To think of carrying Latin or Greek composition farther, at least, in these countries, is preposterous.* The very nature of the exercise prescribed above (I know of no other), must merely make us *imitators*; an enviable result, after four or five years' labour! And then, imitators of what description? "I would have the imitator be," says the Earl of Bedford, "as the son of the father, not the ape of a man; and as he can never run well, who shall resolve to set his foot in the footsteps of one that went before; so neither shall any man *write well*, who *precisely and superstitiously ties himself to another's words*." Yet, what else are we to do? If we do not tie ourselves, and precisely and superstitiously too, to our author's words, we cease to be our author — we cease to be Ciceronian, Virgilian — we cease to be classical. And what do we become — ourselves? No; neither ourselves nor our author, but a wretched, piebald jumble, between both. Are we even sure, that we are Latin? We are grammatical, it is true; but are we idiomatic? And for that idiom (without which the Frenchman speaks French in English, and the Englishman English in Italian), back to our deserted authorities, to our servile adherence, to our *superstitious imitation*, we must come again. As to an exercise of thought, in such intellectual buckram, it is a farce. Men, for wagers, and after long practice, may walk pretty quickly *in* irons; but let them walk their best, they will walk better *without* them. It is truly a practical bull, by way of assisting our mental flights, thus to hang another man's thoughts dangling at our heels. Plagiarism, barefaced plagiarism, there is no use in concealing it, is the great virtue of your classical composer: the more clearly he proves that all these phrases are not his, that he has nothing more to say to his composition than what

* The Italian, and even the French, may be allowed some privileges. They are in some manner "to the fashion born." Latin, if not their mother tongue, is at least its parent. But for us, in despite of our *Musæ Anglicanæ*, *Etonenses*, *Prize Poems*, &c., our pretensions are ridiculous. Of this, however, later.

the string has to the pearls of a necklace, or Glycera to her garland of flowers, the more he deserves your applause. As many words, and as few ideas, as possible—such is the grand recipe. All this may be the glory of schoolmasters, and the surprise and delight of parents; a pupil so caparisoned may, no doubt, in time become the *μεγα θανμα* of exhibitions — (he is kept and trained for that alone); but, in the midst of his jackdaw triumph, has not the smallest boy who has discovered a fact in geography or physics, of his own unaided power, a far higher intellectual rank? — has he not a right to turn round and say, “This is mine?” but, to his self-complacent rival, in the language addressed to the French lady who boasted of her court costume, — “How much of all this, sir, may I ask, is yourself?”

So far the mere technical acquisition of *language*: but this is a minor portion of classical education; this is not the acquisition of the *writers* — not that for which the language chiefly is of use. Philology is one branch; but it is only one: there are many; — Geography, Archæology, History — the whole mind, and the whole character of ancient mind, still remain. Each of these, in nine cases out of ten, are not merely mismanaged, but omitted. ‘A Lemprière’s or Dymock’s Dictionary will bring us but a short way into the walks of Greek or Roman antiquities. Words will not do; these are things to be seen and touched — “intuitively” studied. Even where this is impracticable, is any effort made to supply its place? — are modern travellers ever called in to aid? * — are models

Even the mere interpretation of language requires the assistance of the traveller. What a different image the *οινοπα* and *μυλτοπαρρος*, of Homer, presents to one who has seen the “wine-faced” Ægean, and the “vermillion-cheeked” ships of the Euxine, with his own eyes! Who comprehends the wandering *αμφοσινη δια νυκτα*, so well as he who has felt the perfumes rising from the flowers crushed by his horse’s tread, in a nightly excursion, in the month of August, across the Troad? Who, that has looked on the Dardanelles, will dispute the propriety of the epithet *πλατυς*, the broad *river-breadth* of the Hellespont? Who that has tasted the modern Greek *κρασι*, the half-turpentine beverage they call wine — but will perceive the origin of that symbol, the fir cone, which, equally with the vine, was the ornament of the thyrsus? These, and a thousand of other instances, might be quoted, to show the advantage of living and seeing commentators! We cannot all see with our own eyes, it is true; but why dispense with the eyes of others? Our classical school teaching calls imperatively for a Burder.

or engravings ever used? Are not all the old errors piously preserved? Do not half our college youths grow up in precisely the same learned ignorance, even on the very points on which they perform pedant, as their masters? Ancient Geography and ancient History, within these few years back, have been literally revolutionised. Who now looks to the blunders of Eustace, or to the negligence of Goldsmith, for his topography or history of Rome? Yet to speak of Platner, Bunsen, &c., or Niebuhr, or Heeren, or Müller*, in the precincts of a classical academy, would, with few exceptions, be exceedingly unintelligible and insulting. By the time only that the pupil leaves school, imagining himself perfectly well stocked with a good and useful provision, and thinking to enjoy his "*veni, vidi, vici*," wherever he condescends to reveal himself, he discerns that, all this time, he has been labouring to pick up, what every one else has been seeking to throw away. Mythology is studied (if it be studied) precisely in the same way. If we look into the class dictionary, we shall find it to be a catalogue of names, or a compilation of indecencies. Yet, studied as it *ought* to be, it is a highly moral and interesting study — full of exquisite and profound philosophy — full of truth and beauty — full of all sweet and noble harmonies. We study it, like vulgar heathens, without even the charm of their material associations. But in this there is nothing singular; it is in perfect consistency with the rest of our course. Do we not voluntarily throw by one half of ancient mind, the very best interpreter we could possibly have for the other, by throwing by the whole range of ancient art? Who thinks of translating a poem into a bas relief, or of seeking in a statue the first outline of a poem? It is in their juxtaposition that they become comprehensible — that they reciprocally give and receive form and life. The Laocoon of the sculptor

* Niebuhr, the first who boldly carried the torch into the dark resting-places of Roman history, and changed into philosophy its romance. Heeren, author of "*The Manual*," &c.; "*The Researches*," &c.; "*History of Ancient Greece*," &c., a German, — therefore conscientious, laborious, and daring, not unworthy of the country of Niebuhr, Müller, author of "*The Dorians*," &c. Platner and Bunsen, in conjunction with Gerhard and Röstel, and assisted and encouraged by the immortal Niebuhr, have published a volume of the most accurate and elaborate description, yet written, of Rome.

gives body to the Laocoon of the poet; the Pygmalion touch of the poet kindles into flesh the marble Venus of the sculptor. We never dream of such "note and comment." Our schools understand by halves, and never feel at all. But such is all our education. Æsthetics, of which all this is but one of the applications, are unceremoniously and universally excluded. It is a heresy, in teaching Greek and Latin, to teach any thing but Greek and Latin. Verily we receive our exceeding great reward: our mathematical prodigies work their sums with as much technical precision, and as little mind, as Mr. Babbage's calculating machine; and our Greek and Latin scholars draw out their verses with the same manual skill and velocity, but with as little claim to their formation, as the conjuror does from his mouth his interminable yards of riband. It is, however, to be hoped, that, in process of time, even this branch may be still farther perfected. We may yet hear, "for the use of schools," of a new Patent Epigram or Ode Writer, an Euterpeon, a Polyhymnion, a Rhapsodion, &c. &c., with hexameter, iambic, trochaic stops, on the model of Mr. Babbage's invention, or perhaps on that formerly of such eminent service to the epic poets of Laputa. Whatever opposition it might at first experience from the "hand-loom" men of prosody, like all other useful improvements in machinery, there is little doubt that its merits would ultimately prevail even among the present furnishers of examination exercises. It would save much labour, more time, to all parties, and turn out a material, very probably, quite as good, for equality and fineness of texture, as any to which we have yet been accustomed from the trade.

But if there are to be no more nonsense-verses — *heu nefas!* — no ancient allegories in modern brocade — no traditional common-places — no cut-and-dry beauties — no *Gradus ad Parnassum* enthusiasm, — what are men to do? How are schoolmasters to be employed, pupils to be kept out of mischief, or Greek and Latin to be tattooed into the understanding of the country? As to schoolmasters, let them look to Goldsmith, and see how Greek professors prospered in his time, without knowing Greek; and to the university of Oxford, and see how chancellors may be elected, despite of

their very equivocal Latin. But as to pupils, for them there is a higher consolation: the whole world is not divided, as they are taught to suppose, into two classes, only the verse makers and the no-verse makers. There are many who think, and who think well, — and who speak as well as they think, who are yet, *proh pudor!* absolutely ignorant of the distinctions between the Pindaric and Æschylean ballet dancing. Let them aim, first at being of that despised class of thinkers; and then, if they have superfluous time to throw gracefully away, let Greek and Latin verses follow, if they will. But such time is not easily to be found in modern education; — we have something more to do than to dig holes, on the Castlereagh suggestion, for the purpose of filling them up again. We have many and useful objects to occupy us, if for such occupation we could only find the time. We have modern literature — we have the modern languages — French, Italian, Spanish, but especially German, so rich in itself, and the key to so many others. All these are well worth a little of the time and labour we throw away. But these can be learned afterwards — true; and so also can Greek and Latin verse making. I do not say that Greek and Latin verse making will be learned; but that must be set down, not to their difficulty, but to their inutility. For one who congratulates himself on the acquisition of this amateur talent, there are hundreds who mourn with unavailing regret over the loss it entailed of the most precious hours of life, — the heavy price they paid for an accomplishment which they threw by as utterly profitless, the moment they left school. But are we quite sure the modern languages are so easily and certainly to be acquired? If not, — and both cannot be managed together, — let Latin and Greek verse making take its chance; but let the modern languages, by all means, be secured.

The process in learning these languages, is one and the same. What was good in learning the mother tongue, is good in learning the classical languages, is good in learning the languages to which they gave rise. The language, first, and then the grammar, — the language strictly and accurately analysed, therefore etymologically, — therefore as much as possible in

the order which its history and progress point out. With this must be conjoined, in the higher developements, the æsthetical aid of a course of literature, of the arts, &c. &c. I see the language of Montaigne and Amyot in the palaces of Francis I.; — I understand the romance of the Cid in the cathedral of Cordova, and the halls of the Alhambra. This done, we feel the language, as well as know it. We may speak it afterwards, if we like, or can: but that is not the affair of a study—it is the acquirement of a good accent, and the mastery of a very limited vocabulary.*

Psychology, or Science of Mind. — When Germany groaned under a foreign yoke, it was in the schools of Kant, that was first prepared her resistance. It was the word of her “Ideologues” which first drew the sword of her deliverance. From this sacred source, remote as it may appear from objects of sense, even physical discovery has drawn its origin. Bacon, Descartes, Leibnitz, Newton, were all profound metaphysicians. Lavoisier never could have rescued chemistry from the chaos in which he found it, were it not that he had derived from his metaphysical studies, that elevation of view—that precision of idea—that fertility of invention—which give such value to his magnificent labours. Even mathematics themselves depend upon its aid. If Condillac and Paschal owe to mathematical science so much of the accuracy and closeness of their reasoning, not less succeeding mathematicians, La Croix, Monge, &c. &c. are indebted to the writings of Condillac, for that limpid clearness and simplicity, which is one of the most favourable characteristics of French mathematics. If its influence, then, has, even in the material world, been so very visible,—in its own peculiar province, the spiritual, it must be unbounded. In its application to morality, it is the very basis of legislation and theology: without a preliminary knowledge of its leading principles, high as either of these sciences may appear to rank, they must be devoid of that spiritual and inward power, which gives them not only their dignity and grandeur, but their true

* For many useful suggestions on the manner of teaching modern languages, particularly French and Italian, very contrary, it may well be supposed, to the processes now commonly in use, see “*Journal of Education*,” Nos. iii. and v.

practical grasp upon the souls and actions of men. Lower the tone of mental science in any country, and proportionally with it must moral science descend. Where moral science falls into disrepute, there religion wanes off into ceremony and outward ritual, and morality, left to its own guidance, insensibly degenerates into the vulgar, and takes the tinge of the material, with which it is perpetually combined. We require something to win us back from such sordid interests—something to keep in fealty and obedience, the physical man. Moral science has little direct relation with mere physical wants: she deals with a loftier world; she uses thought, not as an instrument of enjoyment, but as a creator or a purifier—as a deliverer—as the means to obtain that independence from the debasing and gross of our nature, without which the hope even of material perfection, is in vain. She turns us in upon ourselves; and from this self study, this solemn exploring of the inward man, we come back to the material world, with far juster measures, even of these earthly relations, than we could possibly have had before. Morality gains new and nobler motives—religion a higher and purer morality. Indifference to such inquiries is characteristic, and productive of a selfish civilization. If such an age throws out occasional blossoms of moral excellence, or that to these blossoms succeed fruit, it is attributable not so much to its own moral vigour, as to the sap of another generation working in it still. Such, perhaps, has been too much the case with our own country. The want of moral and mental science is conspicuous, even in our virtues. We require to handle every thing—to materialize every thing; we seem to know of no such thing as mere mind. This passion for the corporeal and active, this dislike to the mental and contemplative, has got into the spiritual itself. We must not only have an end, but it must be at arm's length. We cannot conceive the beauty of an unseeing and untouching faith,—a hope, which stretches through generations, is to us folly. Our imagination—our religion—breathe of the positive. Our institutions are all “redolent” of this banking spirit. Our Midas touch turns every thing into ingots and finance; and when our piety seeks for a paradise, it is in a Jerusalem paved with precious stones,

that our money-loving generation delights to luxuriate. But out of this Mammon thralldom, there is surely a redemption. There are means of imbuing society with a more perfect spirit — with a pride more intrinsical, issuing more from the man himself, less from the accessories around him. These means are to be sought in mind, and the study of mind; and if ever they ought to be sought, it is in this day, “when the earth reels to and fro, like a drunkard,” — when society is yet in stern and universal strife; when law, and rule, and judgment, however irrevocable, however unchangeable they may seem, are only transitions — links between the old and new; when all men feel, however humble, old systems gradually dissolving around them, and each is called, however reluctant, to bear his part in the construction of the new. The interests of mankind have become large, and lofty, and awful: they are not to be studied in the battle field, nor in the money mart — least of all in the antechambers of princes; other counsellors, other parties of far more ample influence, are to be consulted. New and mightier masses, little dreamt of in former struggles or adjustments, not merely with their physical energies, but with their minds, and the weapons of mind, have crowded into the conflict. Physical energy was of old the only lever of the multitude; but they knew not how to use it; they either grasped it too long, or too short — expended too much motion, or too much power: but mind is now amongst them, economising and systematising their forces, — to good, if well directed; but if to ill, enhancing the evil and the peril a thousandfold. Truly it is a war of opinion; but of opinion, which is not satisfied with thoughts and words; — its very whispers are more fearful, than, in other days, the commands of conquerors. In an hour they “thunderstrike” the strongest from their seats — they “punish the host of the high ones that are on high, and the kings of the earth, upon the earth.” To allow such a power to be abroad, and not to seek its tutorship and guidance — not to spend, with a lavish earnestness, all our means upon that object to which all others are as nothing — is, indeed, a folly which not even the most prosperous governments should be allowed to commit. Unless we seek to purify, to ennoble, to illuminate society, — unless

we give a discipline to its strength, and a wisdom to its daring, — we intrust our institutions to builders, who may pull down, but will never be able to build up any thing, but a worse description of Babel in their place. This renovation is in our hands. It is, so to-day — but who can assure us, that it will be so to-morrow?

But the advantage of a general culture of metaphysical science, is not confined to this general elevation of the tone of society; it has, besides, its local and peculiar utility, in its application to every purpose and province of education. The entire circle of its processes immediately depend upon the due management of our mental powers. Now the greater or less degree of skill with which we manage them, must depend upon our knowledge of their nature and capabilities. In the earlier departments this is taken on trust; the pupil relies on the knowledge of his master — he leaves the reins in his hand. But when they are placed in his, as ultimately they must — and as they ought to be much earlier, than under our present system they usually are — the case alters. He is intrusted with a government, which he knows not how to conduct; he is ignorant of his subjects or their resources; he is in a state of tutelage; he is dependent on a regency still. He knows the world around him, but he knows not his own world — the world within. The most useful education, in general, is that which a man pursues after leaving college, for the simple reason, that it is usually the most in harmony with his real and not presumed occupations; but without being qualified to be a teacher, he cannot easily teach himself. He takes the longest circuits to the most obvious ends; he expends much labour and time for objects which are worth neither. He is ignorant of the facilities which methods furnish; he sits down to a “*cœna dubia*” — tastes of all — would swallow all — yet how many things there are he ought to reject — he ought to have the courage, not to know. In fact, after years, he finds he has been doing much, which he ought not to have done — and neglecting more, which he ought to do. His whole intellectual existence is wavering and capricious; every method is grasped at — none pursued. All this, or much at least of this, might surely have been avoided, by a very limited knowledge of his

instruments — by a timely acquaintance with the machinery, by which they may be best and easiest worked. “The conduct of the understanding” is the art, of which the knowledge of the understanding is the science. Psychology, then, is as essential to the student, as the theory of Hydrostatics and Mechanics to the civil engineer. It is making a man master of his own mind, and not sending him blindfold to look for its management to the minds of others. It is a preliminary lesson to self-knowledge, as self-knowledge is to self-control. Both are essential; it is their union which constitutes intellectual and moral excellence. Without them, we must always continue pupils, and never become men.

These are motives, surely, more than sufficient to determine the introduction, and sedulous cultivation, of this important science, in every branch where it is at all practicable, in modern Education. For the elementary schools a very slight tincture will be sufficient; but in the middle, its first elements should unquestionably be developed; in the upper, it should, under all its forms, engage a large portion of the time and attention of the pupil.* Logic necessarily intervenes, though not under that precise name, in every branch, even the most elementary; but it should also constitute a formal study, in the more advanced, under all its varieties of mechanism, both as Science and Art.† It will thus form an

D'Alembert (*Elémens de Philosophie*, art. vi., and its *Supplement*) gives in a few words, whatever is necessary to know on the *natural mechanism* of reasoning. A concise but luminous exposition of the different forms which its *artificial mechanism* in syllogisms may assume, will be found in Euler. (*Letters to a German Princess*, Letters cii. and ciii.)

† There has been much nice discussion on its claims to these respective characters; but the fact is, with every other portion of human knowledge, it is *Art* first, and *Science* afterwards. A few successful practices are retained; others are added; they form a body; it thus becomes an art. So in architecture, sculpture, &c.; so in medicine, law; so also in logic and rhetoric. A more civilised and refined age enters into the inquiry of the causes and laws of each process; discovers, defines, fixes them; this is the science: and from thence draws a more systematic code, under simpler and more expeditious formulæ; and thus improves, in turn, the art. The art then is learnt; and is often learnt, and in almost all cases practised, with little reference to the science. It is an algebra which works out mechanically its results, but seldom refers to the latent principle upon which its formulæ are grounded. It is the too partial consideration of links in this progress, which has led to the exaggeration or depreciation of the

introduction, or an accompaniment rather, to an extensive course of Psychology—both principle and application—both system and history—from Plato down to Cousin. From this the transition to all the higher developements of Divinity, Law, and Legislation, will be obvious. It will be a practical application, on a noble scale, of the theoretical knowledge just acquired. In Literature, too, especially in the higher departments, such as the Rhetorical and Critical (too long mere verbal arts), it should be applied, under every diversity of illustration. Indeed, it should throughout accompany, at least

object and nature of the scholastic logic. The schools, for instance, occupied not so much in *testing* data, as in *drawing deductions* from them, were naturally driven into an exclusive admiration of the mere *formal* portion of the subject, and considered what worked quickest and best their own purposes, as *all-sufficient* in itself. It was with them solely and truly the *Art of Reasoning*. The moderns, more occupied about the *data*, which they soon found to be false, could not apply to their elucidation this art of reasoning, hitherto so vaunted. A totally different operation of mind was requisite; examination, classification, and, to assure both, experiment. This was the *Inductive Art*, which has been considered a *new* species of logic: but there is a general understood *sylogism* throughout. The process, indeed, by which we come at the middle term, is principally observation; but once these primary data are admitted, the old logic again resumes its place, however changed may be its *arrangement* or *formulæ*: the difficulty of thus applying it in limine, and the great success of the Inductive, in the fixing of *data*, and the ascertaining of truth dependent on facts, threw the old logic into disrepute. Hence the *censure* of Locke, Condillac, and all their disciples, all more or less disciples of Bacon, and exclusive partisans of the Inductive philosophy. But even Condillac, who is the loudest, is not aware that his own favourite “*identité*” is nothing but a series of enthymems or *asorites*. The first “*Dire*,” with which he heads a proposition, must be taken for granted, or proved by induction; but this also was requisite in the regular syllogistic *sorites*. The difficulty in both is precisely the same, the finding out of proper middle terms, or in his language, “*la liaison des idées*.” His analysis has nothing to do with this portion of the reasoning. In fine, the fault is not to be found with the process, (for after the first step, both are the same,) but with the mode of their *enunciation*; that is, with the substitution of formulæ for the more irregular original of nature. It is true, men reason, without squaring their reasoning after syllogistic formulæ; but so also they calculate without algebraic formulæ, and speak and write without grammatical. These are all abridgements, helps; but there is no necessity to display them. The algebra, the grammar, the logic knowledge should be *felt*, not *seen*—“*ars est celare artem*,” but to say that it is useless, is to say, “Go round by Paris to London,” when you can go there straight; or, “walk to Manchester,” when by the steam-coach you may reach it in one tenth of the time.

in an elementary form, the æsthetical branches of Education ; for it would be a gross inconsistency to teach effects, without also, in every instance possible, conducting the pupil, by just degrees, to their causes. In all this, the studies are congenial, and blend insensibly with each other ; if they are separated, it is merely for the purpose of pointing out more distinctly the laws, by which their several operations are guided.

How this may best be effected, by what course, and, what is more puzzling perhaps, by what system, a reference to the purposes in view, and the degree of the pupil's progress and situation, will easily determine. In the elementary classes, a few general principles, the least controverted, and the most abundant in clear practical results, will be sufficient* ; in the middle and upper, an absence of all system, or rather, an impartial exposure of all, would be advisable.† In the Universities, such a course is amply provided for ; but we have no

Both French and Germans introduce Psychological studies very early, and very generally into education. They formed a branch even in the central schools of the Republic, under the name of "*Méthode des Sciences ou Logique*." La Croix *Essais sur l'Enseignement*, p. 6. In the actual elementary course they are in great degree connected with the department of morals. *Manuel de l'Inst. Prim.* c. vi. The manner they are applied in Germany is very clearly given in the *Lesen und Lehrbuch* of Schwabe. The first part, divided into two chapters, treats these questions ; — "What am I? What can I? What are my duties? It comprehends, at the same time, an easy course of Psychology, Logic, and even an analysis of the reasoning powers, adapted to popular schools. The first chapter treats of the knowledge of man in the exercise of his senses ; the various meanings of the word man ; of the animal soul ("de l'ame animale"), or the instinct observable in beasts as well as men ; of mind, or the rational soul of man. The author follows, in his developments of our faculties, the idea of the Bible ; distinguishes man into body, soul, and mind ; and seeks to render sensible to children, by clear and appropriate illustrations, the abstract ideas which it is most necessary for them to know. This book is used in the Primary School at Weimar, and, generally, throughout the state. Bardi's *Elementary Readings*, recommended by Prof. Pictet of Geneva, and Prof. Pillans, to a certain degree psychological, are used in Italy, Switzerland, &c. &c.

† See Condillac, *Traité des Systèmes*. The edition of his *Logique*, published in 1802, is accompanied with a series of illustrations of ancient and modern theories extracted from this, and his other works. It forms a good model for an Elementary Class-book, as far as it goes. A modern work would require numerous additions from the French, Scotch, and German schools. The English could contribute little, strictly their own. Mills, Bentham, and a few other names, against Roger-Collard, Degerando, Cousin, and the whole host of the Northern Psychologists.

books fitted for the middle classes, much less for the elementary. For the last, appropriate models may be easily discovered—for the former, we must create. Whatever may be the execution of such a work, the great end ought to be to spiritualise and to elevate, at the same time that we instruct. There is a general aversion to these studies, from the shifting nature of their principles, and the obscurity and mysticism in which Transcendentalism seems to have involved them. That veil should be lifted (for few boys will have the courage to lift it of themselves), and the more generally recognised features taken as the elements of all our after instructions. To set out with a paradox, or a novelty, however fascinating, or eloquently sustained, is, to youth at least, perilous. With all the ambiguity, in the theory, it still leads to results which may be made very positive in practice—and whatever may be at first the obscurity, we should remember the maxim of D'Alembert, — “*Allez en avant, et la foi vous viendra*” — and console ourselves with the hope of Saadi Boustán: “My dear friend! fear not the darkness—it conceals, perhaps, the springs of the waters of life.”

Music. — The exclusive manner, in which this art is cultivated in these countries, has greatly curtailed its influence on education. Except in strictly professional cases, it is neither made an object of elementary, nor of advanced and elaborate study. What music there is amongst society generally, belongs almost exclusively to the mechanical. It is, in its highest degree of attainment, but the clever expression of the thoughts of others: a dexterous manual achievement, in which mind

Between Locke and Kant we stand in this position; — The doctrines of the former, pushed to their extreme by Hume and others of the sceptical school, and by Helvetius, Condorcet, and Cabanis, and the materialists in France, have, by their tendencies, despiritualised philosophy, and acted in an injurious manner on the purity and elevation of public and private morals. The hostile theories of Kant, on the other side, of which the Scotch school, especially Reid, is occasionally a close approximation, restore, in their result, this degraded dignity of our nature, and re-assert with power, the spiritual and eternal of man. But there are many links in the chain not quite so satisfactory as the last. There is a general air of arrangement for an end—a disposition of the reasoning for the consequence—of the system, for what it is to produce. The German schools have often mistaken for essential modifications, very slight differences; as, in mathematics we sometimes combine, through mistake, one equation with another

does not even affect to have a share. It is reading, not writing—and reading with a mere sense of the meaning of words, without the slightest critical or philosophical perception of the propriety or beauty of the language. The evil effect of this, on the art generally, is very obvious. Men will not ask for more than they want—for more than they can understand. If the ear be the only judge consulted, the appeal will be made *singly* to the ear;—the art will merit the reproaches of its detractors—it will become sensual—a flutter of phraseology without meaning—not even words, but sounds.

Music, even the most elementary, not only does not form an essential of Education in this country, but the idea of introducing it is not even dreamt of. It is urged, that it would be fruitless to attempt it, because the people are essentially anti-musical; but may not they be anti-musical, because it has not been attempted? The people roar and scream, because they have heard nothing but roaring and screaming—no music,—from their childhood. Is harmony not to be taught?—is it not to be extended?—is not a taste to be generated, at least in the period of two generations? Taste is the habit of good things — “je ne suis pas la rose, mais j’ai vécu avec elle”—it is to be caught. But the inoculation must somewhere, or other begin. It is this apathy about

differing from it in appearance, but in reality the same. In calculation, the result, being expressed in determinate signs, falls under the senses, and the mistake is at once detected. Not so in metaphysical inquiry. There, the want of precision in language leads to interminable error. The mental eye fixes intensely upon the same thought: this very intensity confounds it. “Les extrémités de notre perquisition tombent toutes en éblouissement,” says Montaigne. New words are created, or old ones combined anew, and taken for newly discovered realities. Then follow upon these, a series of hypothetical abstractions; till some more daring innovator, taking up the theory where the last reformer left off, and pushing it still farther, arrives at some absurdity which annihilates the entire fabric. These objections, applicable even sometimes to their physics, would be serious if *system* only were under consideration; but in our searches for that truth which is likely to continue, some time longer, “*un grand peut-être*,” we glean in the way many noble fruits; and derive moral and mental health from the very exercise which such inquiries require from us. It was not drugs concealed in the hammer of the Greek physician which cured the king of Persia: the efforts he made in using the hammer was the medicine.

beginning that is censurable, not the difficulty of propagating when it has once appeared. No effort is made in any of our schools — and then we complain that there is no music amongst scholars. It would be just as reasonable to exclude grammar, and then complain that we had no grammarians.

The salutary effect of musical studies, on the young mind, has been an axiom in education since the days of Lyncurgus. It is true the Greeks had no harmony, and thus lost one of the most effective applications of the art to youth and numbers*; but even their limited means worked moral and intellectual changes, within the compass of few other instruments of education. These eulogies may be considered as the exaggerations of Greek vanity or susceptibility; but the unanimous testimony, in our own days, of all who have tried or examined experiments of the same description, on a sufficiently extensive as well as judicious scale, is enough to justify, in great part, the enthusiasm of antiquity.†

The Elements of Music should, therefore, form an integral part of *all* public Education. The higher branches might be reserved for Special. The whole art resolves itself into three divisions.—1. “Rhythmic,” or what relates to measure.

The very form of their lyre indicates that.

† “Le chant élève l’ame, et touche le cœur : il est une partie integrante du culte, et un divertissement pour le peuple. *Il sera donc un moyen puissant d’éducation dans toutes les Ecoles primaires.*” Such are the Instructions in the *Manuel de l’Inst. Prim.*, c. vii. art. 1., addressed to the teachers throughout France. “Mais il faut remarquer, surtout l’enseignement musical,” says Cousin, speaking of the Normal school at Weimar; “c’est là, que se révèle le génie musical et religieux de l’Allemagne.” *Rapport*, p. 55. Every pupil in the day-school sings; every master plays on that most difficult and magnificent of all instruments, the Organ. In fact, travel where you may, the results of this education every where meet you; — in the mountain, in the plain — in the chapel, in the cathedral — you every where hear the music of the human voice; and wherever you hear it, it is impossible not to bow down before it — not to feel yourself profoundly and solemnly moved. Well may Haydn have asserted, that the finest things he had ever heard in music, did not approach the effect produced by the uniting of the voices of the London charity children at their anniversary meeting in St. Paul’s Cathedral. The unison of a chorus, especially in the act of religious worship, makes the strongest appeal to the feelings to be found in the resources of the art: but why is such music rare? Why are these voices not heard in every church and chapel in the land? We are silent, or worse — discordant.

2. "Melodic," or what relates to tone. 3. "Dynamic," or what relates to expression. The two first are essential to the most elementary education. They are the common language, the prose of the art. The third, especially in its full developement, is the Poetry and the Rhetoric.

Such is the *Reading* of musical language — the first portion of the study — but the student should not remain here; he should soon proceed, as in learning the mother tongue, to the second, or to *Composition*.

In the two elementary branches, the pupil should begin, as in every thing else, by the very simplest elements. 1. Sounds must be familiar, before the Gamut (the musical Alphabet) is thought of. 2. The Gamut should be learned by sounds, and without spelling. 3. A few simple combinations being mastered, phrases may be formed — and with phrases, sentences — and with sentences, paragraphs. 4. Paragraphs being familiar, the pupil may proceed to a whole composition. In all these different stages, the two branches should be first taken successively, and then combined. It is only when the pupil reads and speaks the language, and plays from book with accuracy and fluency, that he should be led to its grammar, or the principles upon which it rests. The whole of this course is, step by step, another application of the method adopted in all preceding studies. It is no other than the method of invention — at once the study and the history of the art.*

* See Biber, *Memoirs*, &c. p. 380. He extracts largely from Pfeiffer and Nægeli, Pestalozzi's pupils, whose methods are most prevalent in Germany. The *Manuel de l'Inst. Prim.*, considering singing as an essential, and not an accessory branch of popular Education, gives the following instructions: — "Quant à la méthode à suivre, pour enseigner le chant, elle sera d'une extrême simplicité pour les écoles primaires. Elle se réduit à faire chanter successivement les gammes, et des airs faciles que s'y rapportent, jusqu'à ce que l'enfant sache discerner et produire les différens tons. Puis on passe à des morceaux de musique plus compliqués, exécutés à l'unisson. Les exercices de chant, avec le texte, et à deux voix, n'auront lieu que quand les élèves auront saisi la mécanique des tons. On leur expliquera le texte, afin qu'ils prennent intérêt et chantent avec expression." c. vii. art. 7. In the middle schools a higher degree of instruction is requisite. As much of the early progress of the pupil depends upon habit, mechanical assistance has been called in. In France, for this purpose, they use in public and private instruction, the Meloplast and the Chronometric Table.

The third branch cannot be taught, until the pupil has attained a certain progress in the other two — and a certain *age*. Not only must the mechanical principle be fully developed, but also the rational and æsthetic. The sensibility of children, though strong, is limited; it has few associations, and those positive. Their reading is unaccentuated and vague — if otherwise, it is *imitation*, and not *invention*; the spirit of the *teacher* is in it, not their *own*. Their imagination, too, gives as little assistance as their sensibility; as they recede from childhood until the period just alluded to, it becomes every day more and more faint, more and more passive. But this period once attained, too much pains cannot be taken for its amplest developement. The mechanism of the art should then altogether cede to its philosophy — to its poetry. Expression should be considered as it really is, the great essential. Every means should be taken for its culture. It is now that composition should be frequent — reading extensive. It is only by composition, that the true value of style

The Meloplast, the invention of M. Gallin, is a table of lines and spaces without written notes. The teacher, by means of one or two rods with a small ball at the end (the first rudiments of the *Idea* are in Nægeli's), marks the notes to the pupils, and teaches them to sol-fa, without any written music. This, in the hands of a good master, possesses great advantages, and is far superior to the ordinary solfage. It allows him to present in any order the difficulties of intonation; — he may conduct the pupil alternately by the most ordinary or unexpected arrangements, as he thinks proper, through the whole scale, instead of confining him, as in the ordinary method, to a single one, which, once learned, demands no further attention. The Chronometric Table introduced by M. Wilhelm (so well known by the success with which he has applied the monitorial instruction system to the study of music), is of the same assistance to the pupil in learning measure, as the meloplast in learning intonation. It presents notes of all the ordinary values, combined, in every possible variety. Another German invention, the Metronome (less expensive than that invented in this country, being without springs or wheels), is also used for the purpose of marking the time. We have got the Chiroplast (Logier's) for the fingering, &c. &c. The two tables just mentioned are used successively, and form the two first degrees of instruction. The third commences with the first regular lessons of intonation. The fourth combines both intonation and measure, but the meloplast only is used. After a considerable degree of practice in both, the pupil proceeds to written music, which he finds, after such exercises, comparatively easy. Wherever these methods have been applied in popular schools, for which they are especially adapted, it has always been with the most remarkable success.

— method — character — is imprinted ; it is only by a *judicious* selection of authors (an object almost universally neglected), that the purity of idiom, the delicacies, the felicities, the finer spirit of the art, can be understood.

This third branch is sacrificed, in our common musical education with very few exceptions, to a greater degree of dexterity in the other two ; in other words, to mere mechanical *execution*. The third section of Nægeli's Manual is wholly confined to this division, and he treats it in a manner worthy of its importance. In a series of lessons, he touches on all the points, on which *expression* and *character* depend, and gives successively as exemplifications, "rhythmic sentences," or a succession of notes in order of time, and "melodic sentences," or a succession of notes in order of tone, and then their combination, conducted according to the rules for expression, &c. &c. just laid down. The fourth section reduces these rules to practice, and introduces the pupil to the art of *Composition*. It is obvious, however, that these instructions, like the rules of Syntax, Prosody, or Rhetoric, are not supposed to be sufficient to create the spirit or the feeling on which all expression must ultimately depend ; but merely to regulate it. Musicians must create for themselves. Variations, "floriture," &c. &c. are only more developed colourings, more expanded forms of this expression ; they belong solely to the individual (that is their real charm), and cannot be taught. Rossini, indeed, has written out at full length all his embellishments, and left nothing for imagination ; but he was the first who did so ; his predecessors wrote the air simply, and left the ornament to the intelligence and poetic feeling of the performer. Whatever correctness, this revolution may have produced (very similar to that wrought by Goldoni, in reducing the old Italian Comedia dell' Arte to the propriety and regularity of the modern Comedy), it is quite obvious that it also must have repressed much originality, and for occasional extravagance, substituted habitual mediocrity. The pupil will not, of course, proceed to this practice of the expression, till he has acquired considerable facility in the technical departments of the art ; but when he does, it will be surely better to trust to his own "improvvisazione" than to these "improptus faits à loisir" of any composer, however distinguished.

The preceding remarks apply to expression not only in instrumental music, but also in vocal. Vocal music, in addition, has difficulties, but also facilities, of its own. It has to deal with *words* and with *music*, but it is more under control ; it is more intimately and directly the language of the passions. Both these considerations are important : accordingly, Nægeli has dedicated to their regulation a second course, comprising a series of exercises, followed by illustrations on the combination of the musical tone, with the sounds of *language*, beginning with the *vowels* — proceeding then to *syllables* — next to *words* — and lastly, to sentences, and entire pieces, — the song-Grammar, in fine, and song-Rhetoric of the art. It will at once be perceived, that this course is in perfect analogy with the preceding. No department is more sedulously attended to on the Continent. Nægeli's work is in general use. Even in Italy, and at an early period, it was considered of the highest importance (*Arteaga, Storia del Teatro Musicale*, t. ii.) ; and Metastasio is a striking instance, even with the disadvantage of having to treat three or four stanzas, of a felicitous and just combination of the words with

Composition is, in general, considered beyond the reach of ordinary pupils. There is no satisfactory reason for this. It has arisen from too great an extension of the term — too high an estimate of the difficulties of preparatory studies. Yet there is surely a difference to be observed between composition, in its elementary sense, and instrumentation — be-

the musical sounds. In these countries, with some few distinguished exceptions, such as Moore, Bailey, &c., the total neglect of this principle is conspicuous. A more discordant marriage cannot well be conceived, than the marriage of our "music with immortal verse." Not only is the second stanza almost always ill adapted, but the words often of each line. The musical accent scarcely ever coincides with the verbal — sometimes it is at direct variance — the emphasis is lavished on "withs," "froms," ands," "fors," and "bys," while "principals behind like lacqueys wait." Expression in such cases is impossible. It can never advance beyond a general cloudy colouring; all nice individual touches are absurd, or lost. The music generally means nothing but music. The air is heard and applauded and the words read afterwards, or frequently (and it is what they frequently deserve) not at all. Some attribute this to the composer usually having to follow the poet. Perhaps so: though, unless the poet were also a musician, I doubt much whether, by reversing it, either verse or music would much gain. There is a deeper cause: the abuse is borne, the principle is not felt. Nor are these errors of the composer, at all retrieved by the performer. On the contrary, they are considerably enhanced by new abuses of his own. Not only are the words unaccentuated, unarticulated, but sometimes there are no words at all. Instead thereof (especially with Lady performers) we have their shadows, a sort of general slur over, as if it were quite improper, words should pierce through music; they are determined (unlike Cæsar's reader) to sing when they sing, and to read when they read, but never to hazard such an incongruity as the combination of both. Add to this, the malàpropos respiration, often in the most emphatic part of the musical phrase (pardonable, perhaps, in some instances, from weakness of organisation), the meagreness, effort, and pain; and it will be difficult not to perceive, at every note, that they are speaking a foreign idiom, little understood, and not at all felt. Hear an Italian, on the contrary. She *speaks* her music, and *sings* her words; or rather, they *flow* from her, both sung and spoken, — clear, liquid, distinct, and yet music, — as if she merely thought aloud — as if, oppressed with delight, she breathed. There, music is colour added to outline; it has a signification; every word and note, beside its general expression, has that precise and peculiar one which it derives from its position. With us, it is patch on patch; brilliant, agreeable, as colours harmoniously united will be; but nothing but colour, — mindless, meaningless, without shape. Is this to be attributed to an anti-musical organisation, the favourite theory of our detractors? No; but to what so easily assumes its appearance, — an anti-musical Education. We make instruments; singing machines, not singers (I do not, of course, speak of professional Education); yet of what use is all that? The finest ear and voice are only means; mind, passion, expression, are the ends.

tween composition of a single simple melody, and composition where harmony becomes requisite. The first is only an application of the most obvious rules, and may almost go "pari passu" with elementary instruction; the second, though difficult, may be mastered by good methods, with facility. Logier's system of teaching has proved, that even very young children may completely penetrate its mysteries. Instrumentation, indeed, is another matter. There, expression, practice, and talent of the highest order are requisite. The composer, in writing his score, must not only hear his instruments, but hear them all together; all bit by bit composition, every thing less than this simultaneous impression, will bear, however it may be disguised, the appearance of that "stento" and artificial, which is the greatest fault an art can have, whose principal charm is the sensation it communicates of impulse and inspiration. But every one is not called on to write Operas or Oratorios. Because we cannot write a Tragedy, is that a reason why we should not write a theme?

Much, necessarily, of these higher developements must be left to middle and superior, but particularly to special Education; but by no means all. I see no reason why, vocal music being admitted as an integral portion of Elementary Education, not only simple melodic composition, but harmonic also, may not be made a part. Innumerable opportunities for the exercise of both arise every day, in the occupations of a public school. It cannot, of course, be expected that every boy should have an equal taste and feeling for music; few have an equally good voice and ear.* But the best may be selected,

Difference of musical organisation is perceptible not merely between individuals and families, but even between provinces. In France, for instance, it has been remarked, that Picardy furnishes the best basses; Languedoc, and especially Toulouse, tenors and counter-tenors, scarcely to be found elsewhere; and Burgundy and Franche-Comté, female voices of the greatest compass and purity. Yet education bears a large share in these contrasts. French audiences, twenty years ago, imagined that the orchestra played in unison with the singers; a state of ear as singular on one side, as that of Mozart on the other, who in a crowded orchestra at Marseilles started up to correct, during the performance of one of his operas, a single false note. They would scarcely make such a mistake at present. Much of our presumed anti-musical tendencies may be of the same nature, and yield to the same remedy — active culture. The causes, indeed, are

and taught to sing in parts. Harmonies of a simple kind, few singers, those well chosen, diligently exercised, and more with the view of pleasure than application, would soon create in every school, as in Switzerland, a very fair choir. If, too, we add to this the cultivation of instrumental music, which should be indulged wherever decided dispositions were evinced, with each choir might gradually be combined an efficient little band. A better preservative of pure morals — a more delightful addition to their innocent amusements — a more cheerful stimulant to all their exercises, whether of labour, study, or religion — can scarcely be devised. Nor would its effects be confined to the school-room or to childhood; it would soon penetrate the paternal dwelling; in another generation it would be natural to the land. To some, such an accession to the intellectual gratifications of the lower orders may appear trifling; but its benefits would pass far beyond them. Natural taste is not the appanage of a class — it is an aggregate of the feelings and opinions of all. The most refined and sensitive talent, the least apparently within the perception of the multitude, is yet indirectly dependent upon them for its reward — therefore for its perfection. The highest transcendentalism in music must often appeal to the “million.” It is, then, of some importance even to these purists, that their audiences, their judges, should be better qualified. But what is this compared to its moral effects? — to its religious? In Germany they are indissolubly united. How many yield to the music, who, perhaps would have resisted the dogma?’

widely diffused. 1. The jobbing system of our professors and publishers. 2. The deficiency of academies and conservatories for the study of the higher branches. 3. The total neglect of musical education in our elementary schools. The two last-mentioned deficiencies should be, and may be, corrected. Their correction would ultimately lead to the correction of the first.

* “On parviendra de cette manière, à faire chanter convenablement dans l’église, à ennoblir les idées, à toucher les cœurs, à évincer les mauvaises chansons populaires, à réformer morale publique.” *Manuel*, &c., c. vii. art. 4. To effect this fully, however, it will not be sufficient to teach. As in reading we must accustom the young reader to good books, so in music we must accustom the young singer to good songs. Nægeli has added to his *Course* a valuable

In this brief outline, we have been ostensibly confined to the first great division of Intellectual Education — the Rational; but it must not be supposed that from the whole or any part of this course it has intended to exclude the second — or the *Æsthetic*. On the contrary, though considered, for the sake of clearness, separately, the two branches are in fact inseparable. Not one of the studies to which we have referred but in its higher departments is intimately interwoven with it; some even in their elementary processes — others, such as Drawing, Architecture, Music, the moment they cease to be elementary, and advance beyond the mechanical — become, I may almost say exclusively, *Æsthetical*. The importance, therefore, of this division is scarcely inferior to the first — without it, the most technical study is curtailed of its full utility, and all of their intellectual and moral beauty. The cold skeleton of knowledge is given; but it wants the muscle, and the flesh, and the “purple light” of youth — the breathing spirit of life within, by which the man is distinguished from the machine, and wisdom from barren information. Yet of all departments of Education, there is none in this country, I must again repeat, more completely neglected. Even where partial admissions of its utility are made, there is a total inefficiency and ignorance exhibited in its application. Few studies are supposed from their nature to be susceptible of its association; the habit of regarding every thing in its direct profit-and-loss view, without reference to general ulterior influences, has still further abridged that

Appendix of national airs, with appropriate words for the *use of schools*. The French primary schools are provided with similar collections. We have nothing of the kind; but we are extremely deficient in elementary books of all descriptions in this department. Logier's and Schneider's treatises (the last is much used in Germany) are too large for young pupils. Dr. Busby's *Catechism*, though accurate, is difficult; and, besides, it is a catechism. Dr. Crotch (author of the *Oratorio of Palestine*) published in 1812 his “*Elements of Composition* :” they are for a higher branch of the art. A selection from all these, on the plan of Nægeli's, and with illustrations and appendix, similar to his, would, if well compiled and harmonised, be a most valuable manual to the teacher. But who is to teach our teachers? This is the question we have to ask at every step. We shall see later how this is provided for in other countries.

number. Thus between both, its practical power is almost reduced to nothing. It ought to be a principal object in all Education reforms to restore it. How is this to be effected?

Æsthetics are the education of the feelings, in reference to our intellectual and moral faculties and operations. They necessarily apply to the whole spiritual man. We shall have later to consider them in their connection with Moral Education — we are here confined to their application to the objects of Rational. It may appear to some a preposterous attempt to connect the feelings in any shape with several of these branches. Many are purely mechanical in the estimation of those who have most successfully cultivated them; and cannot, in their opinion, by any refinement be sublimated into objects of the sensibilities or affections. It looks like talking of the “loves of the Triangles,” to speak of combining any serious culture of this portion of our nature with the severer mathematical sciences, or even with the minutiae of Grammar, Syntax, &c. Poetry and Eloquence, and the Arts invite the connection, but the Imagination acts as the intermediate. The severer sciences stand bluffly opposed to all advances, even of Imagination herself. But this is but a partial view of their extent and applications. They are not “des mots vains et décharnez, ou il n’y a point de prinse, rien qui vous esveille l’esprit;” on the contrary, they are, with all their forbidding appearances, subjects where “l’ame treuve ou mordre, et ou se paistre” — provided a proper course be taken to excite and direct it.* We have already seen with what facility, by means of a judicious process, the study even of reading, and still more of the mother tongue, may be directed to the most useful *Æsthetic* purposes. Not a step which does not present to the young mind some new

* “Cest grand cas,” says Montaigne, with his usual good sense, “que les choses en soyent là, en nostre siècle, que la philosophie ce soit jusques aux gens d’entendement un nom vain et fantastique, qui se treuve de nul usage et de nul prix, et par opinion, et par effect. Je croy que ces ergotismes en sont cause, qui ont saisi ses avenues. Or a grand tort de la peindre inaccessible aux enfants et d’un visage refrongné, sourcilleux, et terrible: qui me l’a masquée, de ce faulx visage, pasle, et hideux? Il n’est rien plus gay, plus gaillard, plus enjoué, et à peu que je ne die follastre,” &c. &c. *Essais*, l. 1. c. 25.

stimulant to the highest order of feelings. Similar consequences may with the same ease be drawn from the clear connection and irrefragable demonstrations of Mathematics. The beauty of a geometrical problem may be felt as well as comprehended. The perfect beauty of truth — the sublimity of its interminable chains, filling space and lengthening out through eternity — may penetrate the moral as well as the intellectual portion of soul. Natural history may be made, by a thousand examples of the Beautiful and Perfect, not only an eloquent commentary on all the great attributes of the Creator, but a series of the most affecting lessons on the social and domestic virtues — the harmony of all being — the nice adaptation of effects to causes — the utility of all things — the order, and joy, and happiness which breathes and almost exults in every thing around us. From History, and its accompaniment, Geography, if not a loftier, a more active and energetic influence may be evoked. We there read our own nature, dissect the multitudinous man, give body and life to our most inward sympathies, and see every affection of our complicated spirit pass in vivid drama before us. To unravel this, and gradually to ascend through all the tangled web, to the Providence which holds the thread of all in his hands, is perhaps the amplest and most impressive Æsthetic course for old or young student which can be selected. But Literature and the Arts, as already has been remarked, are Æsthetics themselves. The mechanical portion of either, with respect to the rest, should be considered as absolutely no more than the vestibule which opens into the splendors of a magnificent temple. The divinity and the worship is *within*. It is there, indeed, that the fullness of its glory, if with true ritual, and earnest adoration it be invoked, will descend. Every indication of this spiritual excellence should be habitually pointed out to the eye of the pupil. Whether under the manifestation of poetry, sculpture, or painting, from the earliest period he should be taught not to remain contented with their externals only, but to look behind the veil. Poetry should be interpreted by Sculpture, Painting, and Music; they, in turn, by Poetry: they should be considered earthly idioms only, of the one celestial tongue. All

that creates their inward might, that gives them their divine purity and beauty — all that constitutes the true brightness of their all-fashioning fire, should be the unceasing object of his reverent, but ardent, inquiry. It is thus he will gradually draw them into himself, and think them, and speak them, and act them : it is thus that Æsthetics will become an almost secondary morality ; it is thus the grosser man may be melted off by the spiritual, and all the finer perceptions and higher sensibilities of our nature allowed their true ascent to the source from which they are — unclogged by the weight and untarnished by the sliminess of our mortality.

Every school ought to be supplied to such degree, as its circumstances may warrant, with objects of art. In the Elementary schools, a few of the more remarkable busts of our great men — a certain number of familiar but well executed engravings, connected especially with national recollections or domestic manners, — should be associated with maps of geography, history, zoology, &c. We constantly complain of the indifference of our people, not merely to the cultivation of the fine arts, but even to their preservation. In our towns, statues are maimed, if not protected by iron bars and an ever-vigilant police ; in our churches, fees are exacted as barriers against the indiscriminate vulgar ; in our palaces, tickets and permissions are necessary, in order to secure the proprietor against all chance of injury to his property : we have no nice instincts amongst our people — no national love of the fine arts, to rely on — to appeal to. In Italy, every man is a protector of these productions, for every man is an admirer. The Vatican on Sundays is crowded with Sabine mountaineers, quietly enjoying their walk through the noble works of sculpture and painting with which its galleries are so profusely adorned. The festival of the Adobbo of Bologna has year after year taken place, without a scratch occurring to a single picture.* Yet our shops are open, and our parks uninjured. The reason of the difference is simple :

* The Octave of Corpus Christi. During its continuance, the most precious paintings and tapestry are hung up in the public streets. See in the second part of this work, under the head of Italy, for more ample details.

our Education is *commercial*, but not *æsthetic*. To complain of the effect is puerile: it is to complain that we reap what we have sown. A habit of seeing and understanding — but above all, of *feeling* these pleasures at an early period, would make them pleasures during the remainder of life. Bull baits, and boxing matches, and cock-fights, might perhaps still continue; but this would be one more means of weaning the people from those gladiatorial amusements natural only to an uncivilised or degenerate populace. Though we should not form a nation of amateurs, which is not to be looked for, we should form a nation capable of knowing and loving the arts; we should multiply the moral tendencies; we should augment the moral pleasures; — in a word, we should raise the entire being many degrees higher in the spiritual scale.

In the higher schools, these supplies should be abundant. Each school should possess, as far as its means permitted, a gallery of casts, a good collection of engravings, a few paintings, but, above all, what is certainly within the reach of every school, however humble, an entire set of plasters from ancient gems. They are the best history of art — the best teachers of mythology; the most interesting commentators of the “spirit” of ancient literature in every branch; but, above all, they are the creators of a perfect taste — touchstones by which we may test its existence and quality — the truest scale to keep us up to the real tone of antiquity. They constitute “style,” in its most absolute sense — the ideal embodied into reality. An application of this simple expedient would throw an immediate charm over what is now, in almost all our schools, unredeemed, and, apparently, unredeemable barrenness. — Homer, and Virgil, and Horace, would no longer be mere school-books and task-books — they would again, despite of grammars and lexicons, to the young imagination, become poets. As models for drawing in the *Æsthetic* branches of the art, nothing can be imagined better.* Sculpture is limited in its effects: to the young eye it is colossal. But the col-

* I heard David say, that he hardly ever sat down to the first conception of a work, without having a number of these “sulphurs” (zolfi) pasted on his canvas. They form, indeed, a complete dictionary of ancient, and as they are now continued, in the Roman collections, a very tolerable one of modern art.

lection of ancient gems form a perfect anthology of every variety, and each exquisite, either as groups or single figures; and all so proportioned as to be within the reach of all. Models also, as already mentioned, of the most celebrated monuments are indispensable. It is utterly impossible ever to understand antiquity without them. Potter may give the proportions, but can never give any distinct idea of the form or effect of an ancient Theatre, or a Basilica — a single half hour's study of the model will so impress it, that the student need hardly recur to it again. Indeed, an entire architectural series, from the rude rustic wooden support, to the full floridity of the Antonine Composite — with a similar progression of the Gothic, from the Pisan, Moorish and Saxon, down through our Norman and Tudor varieties, to the present day, would be a most useful accession to our school museums. Relievo plans of the chief ancient towns, such as Athens, Syracuse, Alexandria, Rome, Constantinople, would be also requisite. Nor from these collections should be excluded specimens of the objects of most frequent recurrence in the ancient classics. How many have all their lives been reading and writing of "togas," and "fibulas," and "pateras," without any distinct idea of the thing itself? All this is not only of easy application, but I should also think of very easy attainment. The demand once exhibited by our schools and teachers, we should soon have, I am confident, from the industry and ingenuity of our tradesmen, a very ample supply.*

This, however, is the mechanism, or the instruments only, of Æsthetic Education: the education itself requires a more spiritual developement. The teacher should not limit him-

These architectural sets might easily be accomplished by our expert turners. The models of buildings would require to be executed in cork; of cities, in "papier mâché," and coloured after nature. They might be made to any scale from a mile to an inch, 100 yards to an inch, &c. but in all cases they should be strictly exact. I saw Fauvel execute one of great beauty, and on a very large scale, of Athens; and the Swiss mountain regions have repeatedly been so modelled. Small panoramas, also, of the now celebrated towns would be no small addition to the "mobilier" of our higher schools. The expense of purchase would not be considerable, and room in the country not being an object of much concern, the principal objection would be obviated.

self to mere external applications; he should endeavour to conduct the pupil in every instance, where an opportunity permits, to the inward meaning — the animating principle — of the science or art. In some instances, such as Natural History, these almost rise at once from the subject; and, wherever they do, as slight indications as possible will be the best: the same also in the broader traits of history, &c. &c.; too great solicitude prepares the pupil — he sees in it decided artifice — it degenerates into cant. Nothing so fulsome as the eternal “moral” at the end of every observation. It loses all its force, like the burthen of a ballad, by being thus lavished. This is one reason why any work so ostentatiously pious as Bossuet’s Universal History, does not in general produce all the good effect which might be anticipated. There is a visible design, and, of course, in order to support it, system throughout. Such impressions, are exceedingly injurious to the moral purposes of education; more anti-æsthetical productions cannot be conceived. Let the facts be clearly stated; their connection made obvious, in as simple and as *true*, and as *impartial* a manner as possible; and the child then allowed to draw his conclusions for himself. All your duty is limited to the leading him in one or two instances to these deductions, showing him the road, and placing the end of the clue by such statements as the above in his hand. In the more complicated portions of History, a nicer degree of inquiry, and more assistance may be allowable. Many historic actions receive, from their connection with others, so many reflex lights, that it requires a more embracing view, as well as a more experienced and keen eye, than a child can be supposed to possess, to detach the accidental from the essential, and to keep the pupil unconfused by these accessories to the true Æsthetics of his subject. In Literature and the Arts, the task of pupil and teacher naturally and easily combine. Once the habit has been acquired of looking for interpreters, not to the Lexicon, but to the collateral arts, the pupil will eagerly pursue it of himself, and often suggest new views and vivid illustrations even to the teacher. If Greek tragedy be said to have its noblest representative in the self-enjoying repose

and sacred stateliness of Greek sculpture, so are the more vehement, direct, and active passions, divine and human, of the Homeric poems, exhibited in their most vigorous forms, in the paintings especially of the earlier Greek and Etruscan vases. Here is an almost boundless paraphrase of the whole mind of the primitive age. The very horses are not merely heroic, but Homeric — they have the spirit of those of Achilles, the beauty of those of Rhesus; the warriors are all engaged in the man-to-man encounter of mortal combat; the gods are glorified men, sweeping before them hosts and cities, but swept away in turn by each other, or by their own uncontrollable passions. Not only has Olympus come down to Troy, but Troy has gone up to Olympus. Every thing is positive, absolute, energetic. Flaxman could not have more happily selected for his illustrations than from such sources; he knew those waters well: and “pleno se proluit” — he drank deep. It was there only that Homer was to be found: it is in the old Stutgardt and other paintings and monuments of Germany that we can best understand the Faust and Fridolin of her poetry. In like manner, Virgil and Horace may be traced in the Augustan bas reliefs; Seneca and Claudian, in the alabasters and porphyries, in the display and corruptions of the lower Cæsars; Dante, in the stern and solemn of his own Gothic age; Tasso and Ariosto, in the revived literary refinement of the Leos and Lorenzos, &c. This habit of constant comparison and reciprocal illustration will multiply not only the materials of knowledge; but sharpen, to a keener sense, the perception of every description of moral and intellectual beauty. It will preserve the fair and gentle play of the kindly affections; it will fix the mind upon the pure, and bright, and generous, and lofty of our nature; it will preserve that harmony between all our faculties and operations, which ought so much to be the object of our solicitude: in one word, it will add to strength, grace, — to reason, feeling; and thus attaining in all its fulness the great object of intellectual, associate it insensibly, but intimately, with the next branch — Moral Education.

Such is the outline (though, I fear, a very faint and inade-

quate one, but to which I am confined by the limits of the work) of the nature and amount of the *knowledge*, which I consider essential to a good Intellectual Education. I now proceed to the mode in which it should be communicated, or to the second point under consideration — Instruction.

There are three descriptions of Instruction: 1. Individual; 2. Simultaneous; 3. Mutual. We shall examine each.

1. *Individual Instruction* is, in some particulars, the best. The value of Instruction often depends, more upon the receiver, than upon the giver; at all events, and in all cases, upon their adaptation to each other. The avenue to one child's mind is not the same as to that of another. Each must be studied; and that study is not matter of a glance. A child is often more difficult to be deciphered than a man. If this be true, it follows that individual teaching has great advantages, wherever it is practicable, over most others. But this is not the case in schools. To call up boy after boy, and to put each through his lesson, is giving and hearing *tasks* individually, but not teaching. A master following this process, will, at the end of the year, know just as little of his pupils, as when he began. "Come like shadows, so depart," — is often soberly and prosaically true. In a small school, indeed, this difficulty, by a zealous and intelligent master, may probably be overcome; and in such cases individual instruction would, no doubt, be unobjectionable; but then the school must be very small. Where it is otherwise, the evil, I am afraid, is irremediable; and it is not only an evil, but the fertile principle of many others. What is the boy to do, or rather the boys, whilst the single pupil is before the single master? How many cries for attention; for order; for silence! What indifference to these cries; what indolence, carelessness — listlessness, on every side, but within the immediate sacrosanct precincts of the pulpit, or desk! But what is the effect of all this on the pupil under examination, and on his examiner? What are the effects on his temper — on his intelligence — on his conduct? Task-repetition is fatal to any thing like natural impulse; but repetition with endless distractions and interruptions, — repetition from which every thing like mind is excluded — is a punishment, a

torture, worse than that of the tread-mill itself. The pupil considers himself the victim, reluctantly forced from his playfellows, incapable of perceiving any sort of utility in all these exercises, and thinking only how, and when, he may best escape from their infliction. The master, on his side, is regarded as the executioner, and exposed to the half-suppressed gibe, or, in all cases, to the smothered detestation of his pupils. Is this a position for either? Are these the appropriate rewards of the master; are these the forming exercises of the scholar? I can see in all this, nothing but an immense waste of precious time — great abuse of means — great injury to intellect and character — great perversion of all the true purposes of education.* This, in large schools, is inevitable; — but why not, then, have small ones? We are too economical a generation for that. If we could educate by steam, and by millions, no matter how badly, provided it were also cheaply, I have little doubt we should risk the experiment, and congratulate ourselves on the happy audacity of the thought. It would diminish the national debt, by some few hundreds of pounds, and our reports would look as creditable on the table of the House — as they do now. Who is there that does not feel that Education is but a section of Finance? “*Virtus post nummos.*” Our purses first, and our minds afterwards. If both objects can be accomplished, so much the better; but at all events, and under all circumstances, our purses.

This being the case, we have only to consider how the evil may be alleviated. Two remedies are recommended: Simultaneous, and Mutual Instruction.

2. *Simultaneous Instruction.* — The inconvenience to which we have just alluded, — a large school and a single master, — first suggested this expedient to Pestalozzi.† “He pronounced

* “L’enseignement individuel est jugé depuis long-temps comme tout-à-fait défectueux et devant être banni des écoles publiques.” *Code de l’Inst. Prim.* 1834. p. 146. See also, *Manuel de l’Inst. Prim.*, 2me partie, c. 1. art. 3.

† Pestalozzi, however, was not the first who introduced this method: it owes its origin to Lasalle, the founder of the “Congregation of Christian Doctrine.” The first school where it was applied was founded at Rheims, in 1680. The Brothers of this society have constantly adhered to it, but have profited by such ameliorations as the spirit of the times has successively introduced.

every thing to his pupils loudly and distinctly, and was thus led to the idea of making them draw, write, and work at the *same time.*" * The effect he describes as "meteoric," producing a sudden revolution in the child's mind, and at once rousing him to the fullest intellectual activity.† It has long since been adopted in our Infant, and other schools, but not with equal success. The cause is obvious. Union, simultaneous action of any kind — clapping of hands, stamping of feet — has a great charm for all classes and ages, but especially for the uncultivated, and very young. The most monotonous air delights a child, and a savage. I doubt whether an anchor could be heaved without the sailors' call and chorus. The measuring of time, though low in the intellectual scale, is an ingredient of the delight which all combined movement produces. If we add to this, tone, we have the elements of music; and if to music, the feelings of kindly affection or religious aspiration, the impression becomes one of the most powerful of which we are susceptible. Pestalozzi was then right in making use of so powerful a lever in education. But Pestalozzi knew where to stop. He carried it as far as it would go, but no farther. He applied it only to very young children, and not on every occasion. He never used it for the purpose of bringing a subject for the *first* time before his pupils, but confined it solely to *repetition*. The analysis was first gone through, separately, by each child: the lesson written down by the master on the board; — then *simultaneously* for the first time expressed by the pupils — then rubbed out, and sung from recollection; and sometimes, finally, in place of it, a new number or analysis substituted extempore. All this materially differs from the ~~sing-song~~ repetition of pence tables, multiplication tables, &c. &c., but especially from the hymns, religious or otherwise, which children of that age can scarcely understand, but which are nearly universal in our public schools. So far from such methods being Pestalozzian, they are a libel on Pestalozzi. They are empty forms — but not Education.

But though repetition *unâ voce*, and the Teacher's board, go far to bring into harmony of thought and action a whole

school, however numerous, and so multiply exceedingly the power of the teacher, yet it was soon discovered that its application was limited, and that the moment that children had got beyond the elements, a more specific degree of instruction became requisite. How was this to be accomplished? The master could not teach each individual pupil: simultaneous instruction was inadequate: to multiply his assistants was beyond his means. He adopted the only expedient left him. The elder pupils were taught, and trained to teach the younger. He called in the aid of Mutual Instruction.

3. *Mutual Instruction*. — Few methods have been more over-rated and under-rated, both in their principles and applications, than this same method of Mutual Instruction. On its first introduction, it had all the fashionable celebrity of a new discovery.* It was described as the philosopher's stone in education; the single process by which every thing was possible, and every result, a benefit. We are at present somewhat more sober — many of these early glories have been eclipsed. The German Educationists especially, have pronounced themselves very strongly against its pretensions.† On the other side, they are as vehemently supported, by Père Girard, and the majority of the Pestalozzi school on the Continent, and by the numerous disciples of Bell and Lancaster in these countries. The Germans consider this method, of utility, only, where popular education is exceedingly in arrear — but at the best, a mere palliative, incapable of ever supplying the people with a real practical education. Its methods of reading, writing, and calculation, they alledge, are most imperfect. Religious instruction is limited to the letter, which kills, and altogether wants the spirit, which keeps alive. It adds nothing to the moral influence of the teacher — nothing to the developement of feeling or character in the pupil. The most insignificant

The pretensions of Dr. Bell to this honour have been already touched on; they will be further noticed under the head of England, France, &c.

† See also the opinions of the French, or, rather, of the French government, of 1829, on the defects and abuses of this method: — “la plus mauvaise de toutes les méthodes, celle qui est la cause habituelle de tant d'abus and de désordres,” &c. &c. *Circulaire du Ministre, en date du 31 Janvier, 1829.* The *Education Code* of Leo XII. art. 299. prohibits it.

country schoolmaster in Germany does as much for true education, as the entire system of Bell or Lancaster. No German, at all acquainted with the schools of his country, would for a moment think of recommending a system so utterly insufficient to form men, much more Christian, &c. These judgments, harsh as undoubtedly they are, have been in many instances but too much justified by facts. Many of the Mutual Instruction schools, both in France and England, deservedly come under the censure. At the same time, it is going too far, to attach these demerits to the system itself. There are many cases in great degree exempt from them — and which fully show the practicability of applying the method; not only with safety, but with unquestionable benefit. The great difficulty, is to find *Monitors* or Teachers amongst the pupils, sufficiently well qualified for their task. If education were nothing more than a series of lessons by heart, a mere discipline of the memory, the want could easily be supplied: a certain number of “*Répétiteurs*” might be trained, as in France, for the purpose: but when, even in the exercises of the memory, reason necessarily mingles — when the whole course of education is essentially rational — it is rare to find teachers (scarcely older than their scholars) sufficiently advanced to comprehend the full value of their pupils’ answers, to correct their judgment, and to put them in the way of self-teaching, and discovery. If this difficulty were insurmountable, Mutual Instruction would be very limited in its application: its utility would be restricted to a very minor department of education, indeed. Various efforts have accordingly been made, to bring under the immediate action of Mutual Instruction, Reading, Grammar, Arithmetic, &c., still, however, continuing to degrade them to mere mechanical operations. But a worse expedient could not have been adopted. It retrograded instead of advancing education — it was worse than either the individual or simultaneous methods. Under the two latter, the pupil was at least in direct relation with the master, and if, by any circumstance, he happened to be a man of intelligence, there was a chance, he might, by occasional explanations, correct the vices of the system, and introduce some intellectual elements into the dry verbal forms,

with which the youthful mind was hampered. From this chance, by the French method, he was of course excluded. The pupils were still confined to technicalities, but in communication principally with each other. M. Ordinaire attempted a remedy. He proposed dividing the departments; leaving the rational portion of education to the master — the technical, to the monitors. This arrangement, certainly superior to what it was intended to supersede, had still serious blemishes. Is it possible, in all cases, to make this division? and if so, of how small a burthen would such an arrangement relieve the master? If he must still continue to conduct the rational portion of education, he may be said to conduct education altogether. He must, therefore, recur to the simultaneous methods, submitting to all their inconveniences, or give up teaching, not merely schools of 600 or 500 pupils, but schools of 50, or even less. The principle of the original error was still persevered in. The only way by which it could really be got rid of, was not by adapting the teaching to the monitors, but by adapting the monitors to the teaching. This could only be effected by giving them such extra instruction as would render them quite adequate to the task. Such was the improvement suggested, and adopted by Père Girard. But how was this extra instruction to be given? If teachers were to be employed in teaching teachers, it would not materially abridge their own labour, and must naturally restrict the benefit of instruction to a comparatively few. Père Girard had not relied on this alone. He adopted another expedient, which rendered it nearly unnecessary. Far from thinking, that monitors should be restricted to exercises of the memory, he was deeply persuaded of their perfect competency to conduct the exercises of the reason. But in both they required to be guided. This he proposed to effect, not so much by *oral* instruction, as by a series of *books* especially written for their use, and so clear and well graduated, and in such close relation with the course to be pursued, as at once to enable them to appreciate the full value of every answer. The expedient, in great degree removed the objection of age and incapacity. But the master himself did not therefore abdicate his functions. On the contrary, he was at all times ready, not

only to explain away all doubts and to settle all disputes, but also, to examine compositions, especially in the higher classes, to direct in the delicacies of criticism and taste, and in developing, wherever requisite, the more complicated parts of every branch of education. This experiment, the only one till then tried which really struck at the root of the evil, met with corresponding success. The problem which continued so long to baffle the ingenuity of educationists, was thus to a great degree solved. With the advantages of public instruction, were in great measure combined, the advantages of individual.

In the higher classes, Père Girard added personal preparatory instruction, in training the monitors; and this practice has been adopted with the best results in the High School of Edinburgh. Professor Pillans suggests, that, "in commencing new arrangements, the schoolmaster should invariably devote a portion of his time, after or before school hours, or in the evening at his own house, to instruct them in their duties, and charge them, as it were, with the knowledge, which they are to diffuse, next school meeting, over the class or section to which they are appointed."* This, however, will only be occasionally required, wherever Père Girard's system is fully in operation.

The other objections have little reference to the system itself. They arise out of the ignorance and selfishness of parents, and the fears and prejudices of masters. Many still believe that the Mutual Instruction system is a scheming devise of the teacher to shift the burthen from his own indolent shoulders, to those of others. They will not allow their children to be defrauded of the share of schooling to which they are entitled — nor permit them to perform the unpaid drudgery of another. The masters regard it as a perilous innovation: it is new; and every thing is perilous, which is not in favour with parents or guardians.

Throwing out of consideration all this nonsense, and taking it for granted that the real objections have been in great degree overcome, it must be admitted, that the system of

Mutual Instruction possesses very numerous advantages, in large public schools, over all others. Pupils, monitors, master, all benefit, and not merely intellectually, but morally. The pupils and the monitors both learn, and both in the most effective and agreeable manner—and both learn constantly and methodically. The pupils are taught by persons of their own age, and as nearly as possible of their own degree of proficiency; an immense advantage when competent, from the facilities it affords the pupil in proposing his difficulties, and the assurance it gives that he will not be distanced altogether by his teacher. The monitor derives scarcely less profit from his tuition. It is only by exercise and repetition, especially in young minds, exposed, as they necessarily must be, to the pressure and distraction of a host of new ideas, that knowledge can be thoroughly imprinted. Few have the memory of paper—most, the memory of stone. But this repetition is by no means verbal. On the contrary, it is a recasting, a remodelling of instruction already received—a fitting it for use—adapting it for prompt and general communication, to others. It is in communicating knowledge, we best ascertain how much we really possess; it is by bringing our money to light, we are enabled to distinguish the base from the good coin. Each pupil is thus a teacher to the monitor, not less than the monitor to him. He gains, also, by his new position in relation to the master. He enjoys largely all the advantages of individual education. He gains it, as the reward of merit; and thus instruction itself becomes, as it should be, not a pain, but the strongest stimulant to mental exertion. Nor is the master without his share in the general profit. He is spared the tedium of technicalism;—he has no dreary task-work to toil through;—he is permitted to use his powers and acquirements, in a manner the most consonant to his own feelings, and the most advantageous to the improvement of his pupils. It is quite a different thing, hearing the same eternal verb, mangled by sixty listless children in succession, and passing from circle to circle, witnessing in each the most active exhibition of their several faculties, and receiving frequently, from these uncontrolled displays, lights for the management of the characters and understandings of his pupils, quite impossible (if

ever, indeed, they were sought for) under the old systems. But these benefits are slight, compared to its moral influence. In the old system, the relation in which he stood towards the master, necessarily exacted from him habits of submission; but this submission, having for its object the will (often very arbitrary) of an individual, and fear generally for its motive, was of too servile a nature to exalt or develop the moral being. The submission under the Mutual Instruction system, is paid cheerfully, though to a child, often inferior in position and age; and is the expression of the purest and noblest feelings of our nature, love of order, respect for the law, and a deep conviction of the power and rights of intellectual superiority. There are few, however humble, who have not under their direction, at one period or other of life, one or more individuals, and thus are called on to give proofs of good feeling, patience, just and discreet exercise of authority; under the old systems, the child always called on to obey had no opportunity of practising these virtues. The system of Mutual Instruction, on the contrary, by alternately placing him in the position of teacher and of taught, of superiority and inferiority, naturally enforces the exercise of the qualities demanded by each, on one side the duties of humility and obedience, and on the other, the modesty, mildness, and impartiality which ought always to be inseparable from the exercise of power. Each individual is entrusted with a certain share of ability, not for his own use only, but for the use and happiness of his fellows. This truth cannot be too deeply or too early imprinted on the young mind, if we would effectively strike at the root of that miserable egotism from which the great vices of modern Education, and consequently of modern Civilization, as we have already urged, proceed: but this was scarcely practicable under the old systems. The pupil, solely passive, exclusively in communication with the master, had no opportunities afforded him of spreading that superabundance of life which exists within him largely and usefully abroad. The system of Mutual Instruction presents these means. Nothing can be more interesting than to see the eagerness with which a child essays his young powers, the variety of expedients to which he recurs to captivate the attention of his little

class, the earnestness with which he labours to infuse into their minds the spirit as well as language of instruction: discipline better calculated cannot be conceived to prepare the future parent for the high duty of instructing his children, or the future citizen for assisting in the moral and intellectual advancement of his country.

It has already been remarked, that the activity, the spirit, the pleasure with which all this is carried on, tending naturally to produce great frankness and freedom of opinion, gives the teacher innumerable advantages in the management of Intellectual Education. They are still more strikingly of service in moral. No censure is more severe or more just than that of well-educated children. They exercise an influence over each other, when properly organised, far more rapid and energetic than that of any master, however vigilant. The social vices,—arrogance, self-sufficiency, falsehood, deceit; selfishness in fine, in all its disguises,—are soon discovered by this juvenile police, and are sure to receive from their unanimous reprobation the punishment of all others the best applied and the most deeply felt by the delinquent.*

The advantages, in an economical and mechanical point of view, in the easy maintenance of discipline, in the complete employment of time, have long been fully recognised. Under any modification these advantages must appear. But those just instanced are of a different description; they depend for their efficiency altogether on the means taken to qualify for their duties the monitors. If these be efficacious, the teacher and the parent may confidently look forward to the results which have been just described. If otherwise, no substitute,

* For these results, see the *Sketch of the Education, moral and intellectual, in practice at the Schools of Bruce Castle, Tottenham, and Hazlewood, Birmingham*; though, in a late avowed publication of their own, the teachers have admitted with great candour, that the system has been attended with some inconveniences, but of such a nature as to be easily remedied. The same principles are followed in the organisation of the Jewish school at Berlin, and with equal success. (*Ueber die gegenwärtige Einrichtung der Jüdischen Gemeindeschule zu Berlin, von Baruch Auerbach*. Berlin, 1832. s. 26, 27.) [†]At Châlons, the pupils themselves distribute the prizes and places, and they who obtain them are entrusted with the discipline and good order of the school.

however plausible, will be found to answer in their place. The disproportion, confusion, and anarchy, which will inevitably ensue, will render progress of every kind impossible. Instead of the best, Mutual Instruction will rapidly degenerate, and be found in practice, the very worst of the three systems.

The three systems are supposed to be essentially distinct—to exclude each other. Simultaneous Instruction is fitted, it is said, for infant schools; Mutual for Elementary, &c. &c. This, indeed, would be limiting their benefits within a narrow compass. They are each capable of combining with the other, and of extending to all. Mutual Instruction, in particular, in the lower classes, may be united with Simultaneous; in the higher, with Individual Instruction. At no stage should they be kept totally separate. They are applicable to the parish school and to the University. Professor Pillans has justified the theory by very successful practice in both.

A second question deserving our consideration, is the *distribution* of the duty of instruction amongst the teachers. Some prefer the division by *classes*, i. e. confiding one class, without reference to its studies, to one master: others, the division by *subjects*, i. e. dividing the different subjects, without reference to the class, amongst different masters. This discussion between the “Classen system” and the “Fächer system,” as they are respectively designated, has engaged a good deal of attention in Germany and Switzerland, but it is a question almost solely of circumstance. Considered abstractedly, without reference to considerations of time or place, strong reasons may be adduced in favour of either. The

* For more ample developements, see Pestalozzi, *Mother's Manual*. Rev. Andrew Bell, *Instructions for conducting Schools on the Madras System*, 1817. Alex. de Laborde, *Plan d'Education pour les enfans pauvres, d'après les deux méthodes combinées de Bell et de Lancaster*, 1816. Père Girard, *Neue Verhandlungen der Schweizerischen Gemeinnützigen Gesellschaft*, 1825. Vieillard, *De l'Enseignement primaire à Genève*. Gorgoret, *Cours complet d'Enseignement mutuel, contenant son application à la lecture, l'écriture, et l'arithmétique*. Sarazin, *Manuel des Ecoles élémentaires*. Suzanne, *Traité d'Education*, t. ii. p. 387. Naville, *De l'Education publique*. Degerando, *Cours Normal des Instituteurs primaires*, Entretiens 5me, 6me, 7me. Professor Pillans, *Principles of Elementary Teaching*, especially Note C., on *Monitorial Discipline*, and Postscript, &c. &c. &c.

first offers greater facilities in the prosecution of certain studies, and the developement of special branches; the second secures the moral interests of the pupil more perfectly, and preserves more truly the harmony and equilibrium between his several acquirements and faculties. If compelled to select one to the exclusion of the other, the last is to be preferred; but there is no reason why both may not be combined. In the elementary schools, no very ample developement is required; the same master may, without inconvenience, manage the entire: not so in the higher classes of the middle, and in the entire course of Special Schools. In proportion as the pupil advances, his education, in order to be in accord with his wants, must necessarily take a more special cast. Some branches may be omitted, — others will require to be very greatly extended. The “Fächer system” here becomes essential, — the inconveniences arising from its moral defects, or the contradictory pretensions of the several masters, may be easily obviated by the superintending controul of a principal or head master; by the precision of the school regulations; the unity established between the several branches, and by public examinations.

A third point to be determined is, the *form* of instruction: what methods of teaching should the master prefer? In the lower schools, where it is especially necessary to lead the child to mental exertion, the method of analysis is the most eligible. The pupil must examine, observe, develop, combine, appropriate, and apply the ideas he acquires; he must do this in great measure by *himself*. This cannot be effected by heaping on him in a crude form the ideas of *others*. Such a process will absorb his intellectual activity; leave him little time and less disposition for reflection; prevent him from putting to any profit the knowledge he has acquired; extinguish all desire for discovery, and leave him at last to languish in a general intellectual paralysis. — These are not the effects of the Analytic method. On the contrary, it demands from the pupil constant exertion, but, in return, it gives the stimulant of constant interest, and constant gratification. Positive acquirements, visibly increasing accumulations, are

the flattering results. In the higher classes, principles are already fully established: the pupil, it is to be supposed, is thoroughly in possession of the elements. He is therefore engaged, not merely in acquiring information, but in arranging it for application. The more precision, the more compression he gives to his knowledge, the more easy will this application become. Such advantages he will find in Synthesis. He may now, therefore, without injury retrace his methods, and proceeding from axioms and definitions, for the Analytic substitute the Synthetic.

But it must not, therefore, be inferred that these methods are incompatible — the reverse: — analysis cannot be carried on to any extent without the aid of Synthesis, neither is Synthesis possible without previous Analysis. It is only meant, that each process should respectively predominate in that department or stage of education to which by its nature it is most especially adapted.*

* The Analytic and Synthetic Methods have each their partizans, each exclusive, each, of course, intolerant. The Synthetic for the present predominates, in our schools: it is the prolific parent of our grammars, abridgments, catechisms, and other patent processes for instantaneous instruction. Furnish a tutor with one of these ready-made instructors and its key, and his work is done. The analysts, on the other side, proscribe Synthesis; they allow it no quarter. (Condillac, *Origine des Connaissances*, pp. 105. 107.) Synthesis is supposed to possess greater order, greater evidence, greater precision and neatness — “ut omisso, quatenus fieri potest, calculo algebraico,” says Newton, “theorema fiat concinnum et elegans, ut lumen publicum sustinere valeat (*Opuscula*, t. i. p. 170). This prejudice originated in the partiality of his age to the writings of the ancient mathematicians (*Commercium Epist. de variâ re Mathematicâ*, p. 39.), but it was of great injury to science, by effacing the traces of the route by which Newton arrived at his great discoveries. If Synthesis possesses these advantages, they are not very conspicuous certainly in the writings of the ancients; the gratuitous assumption of principles, the disconnection of propositions, the professed employment of the “ad absurdum” argument, &c. &c. are vices which we meet at every page. The most fallacious paradoxes by such means may be maintained without much chance of detection: it is a matter of great difficulty to discover where the reasoning fails. Nor are the pretensions to order and precision better founded: few fall into more frequent and unnecessary repetitions than writers professedly synthetic. These, however, are the abuses of the system, and by no means essential to the system itself. The Analysts, on the other side, are not less loud in praise of their own method. “C’est le vrai secret des découvertes,” says Condillac. “Elle n’offre jamais que peu d’idées à la fois, et toujours dans la gradation la

On these principles must immediately depend the form of instruction in each branch of education. Intuition, simple intuition is the best adapted to the very young. The child

plus simple. Elle est ennemie des principes vagues, et de tout ce qui peut être contraire à l'exactitude et à la précision. Elle est la seule méthode qui puisse donner de l'évidence à nos raisonnemens," p. 111. La Croix calls it "plus fécond;" the method of all recent discoverers, &c. &c. But though much of all this be incontestably true, it is not the whole truth. Reasoning cannot easily be carried on without Analysis. Newton discovered by Analysis, though he afterwards arranged his discoveries synthetically. (*Commerc. Epist. &c. loc. cit.*) But neither can it be carried on without Synthesis. Even Condillac, in the very works in which he most insists on the exclusive use of Analysis, in his "Logique," and "Langue des Calculs," for instance, follows himself a synthetic march. This escapes the reader, from the facility with which he glides from proposition to proposition, contrasted with the difficulty he finds in following Newton; but this does not arise from the peculiarities of either method, but from the almost affected exhibition of all intermediate propositions in the one, and the frequent suppression of them in the other. In his *Traité des Sensations* this is still more visible. In the second chapter of the work occurs a regular definition, and two theorems; and throughout, the reasoning proceeds from the simple to the compound, in a manner quite analogous to the synthetic methods of elementary geometry. The concurrence of each is thus requisite, but the proportion in which each should concur, depends upon circumstances. "On peut avoir," says Pascal (*Pensées*, arts. i. and iii.) "trois principaux objets dans l'étude de la vérité; l'un de la découvrir quand on la cherche; l'autre de la démontrer quand on la possède; le dernier de la discerner d'avec le faux quand on l'examine." Each of these requires an application of the two methods, but each in different measure. We begin by seeking: here Analysis is the chief process. The teacher should not so much give knowledge, as lead the pupil insensibly to its discovery: for this, he must lead, step by step, by the road over which he came himself. Taking him up in the air, and perching him suddenly, conjuror-like, upon a conclusion (the synthetic method), will never teach him the art of seeking, much less of finding; in a word, it will neither teach him reasoning nor discovery. In the second stage, when he possesses this knowledge, he may be allowed to demonstrate it if he thinks proper, as Condillac himself has done, to a great degree synthetically. The third process is, more or less, involved in the other two, and therefore proportionally requires the intermixture of each. These views have long since been practically established in German education. The Analytic and Synthetic methods are concurrently used in the great Normal school at Brühl, and, I believe, in general throughout Prussia. See *Rapport* de M. Schweitzer, quoted by Cousin, p. 103. Dr. Mayo's *Lessons on Shells* is a satisfactory application of the same principle. In that little work every lesson is first analytic, and then synthetic. Dr. Whateley has also used both in his *Logic*. All this is done with a just appreciation of the two methods. Even where simple Analysis is employed, it should be so conducted by the teacher as to prepare most easily for the after-application of Synthesis.

may be allowed to make his observations without any direct assistance.* The teacher is scarcely required to intervene: all he has to do, amounts to little more than to see that nothing thwarts the wise education of nature. If he does interfere, he should confine himself merely to arranging and presenting objects, in such order and manner as may most attract attention, and render observation easy and useful. As the child advances, more aid will be required; but it should still be dispensed with great economy. The teacher should rather stimulate than satisfy; he should see that his pupil observes, examines, judges; but, so far from forcing on him his own explanations, much less his own authority, without explanation, he should be very cautious how he even answers all the questions which are proposed. We often mistake for curiosity, mere giddiness and vanity. A child who desires an answer, and to whom an answer will be of use, will think some time, and search himself, before he goes to another. It ought to be the object of the instructor to increase this feeling, to throw the child in upon his own resources, and make it work out its own mind. It will hence be easily conceived, how misapplied, at such a stage, lectures, and long lessons, and tedious readings, must be. They who indulge in such laborious follies, will soon oppress their child with words, and render him incapable and unwilling to acquire any thing else. He will lean on the reason of *others*,

* Such is the counsel of Pestalozzi, following Rousseau (*Emile*, t. ii.), or, more accurately speaking, human nature. The first lessons of a child are taught, as we have seen, by the senses. His whole life is made up of images. "Il voit toujours la *chose même*, et l'idée, en conséquence, reste particulière pour lui." Even language to him is more a sensible object than anything else. He takes up, indeed, whole sentences, but then he takes them up as mere sounds. When he comes to the age of six or seven we soon perceive this. We are astonished to find, to how few of these sounds he attaches precise meanings—to many none at all. His very volubility is no proof that he understands; it is not mental, but physical. "Children imitate," says M. Itard, "of their own accord, in this differing materially from adults." Like birds, they require only to *hear*, in order to *speak*. Their only instruction can then come from the *object itself*. It is absurd to tell them what they cannot understand from *words*, or what without them they understand as well as you. But the nature of the ideas, and the chain which they are hereafter to form, depends upon you, for it depends upon the objects presented, and the order in which they are presented to observation. That is in your power. So far your province extends, but no farther.

and live and die almost ignorant of his *own*.^{*} At a later period, however, when the habit and passion of enquiry are fully established, a little more license may be permitted. The teacher may then guide, suggest, elicit. He may apply the active stimulæ of direct questioning and repetition. His questions may be so arranged, as gradually to conduct the child to the points which should form the principal objects of his examination; and the repetition may embrace, in a more concise form, its results. The first of these methods is the Socratic or Catechetical†; the second the Re-

* Zeno distinguished his disciples into two classes, the *φιλολογοι*, the words-men, and the *λογοφιλοι*, or the reason-men, and this distinction may still hold good in modern Education. If the latter are rare, we owe it to ourselves. Even where we teach, we wish to teach altogether, and to teach every thing. We use the "maillot" and the "lisière," instead of allowing the child to spread out, and to walk for himself; and then wonder that these weak children grow up weak or crippled men. Guide we may, but so that our guidance shall scarcely appear. The very errors of a child should often be permitted: wait quietly till he be in a position to see and correct them, himself; or, at most, seize some favourable occasion to conduct him gradually to some process which may make the errors appear, and which will require their correction. To learn well, he must often mistake. The correction of such mistakes is more serviceable than no mistakes at all: they imprint—they render cautious—they give sagacity and discernment, which wholesale but borrowed truth can never confer. As to the trash, that "hodge-podge of pedantry," which usually goes under the name of "information," even when true, from our perfect ignorance of the young mind, and our unwillingness or incapacity to take the place of the child, we work out of truth error, and for knowledge breed extravagance. But is it truth? Let our Grammars, and Geographies, and Histories "for the use of schools" testify against us.

† Pestalozzi was supposed to be adverse to the Socratic or Catechetical method. A mistake—he was adverse to their injudicious application. Catechetical instruction, if so it can be called, as it is at present practised, leads to no more than the art of separating or joining words: in itself it is nothing but a parrot-like regulation of sounds without ideas. The Socratic method went doubtless much farther; but without the long previous practice of the Intuitive method, it is impossible it could, or can be applied to any advantage. The teacher who merely takes it up as a form of ascertaining whether a task has been performed, will do nothing. He will have no internal basis for his questions, nor the child any for his answers. Hence the failure at first of Pestalozzi's disciple Kruesi. "They had no language for things which they knew not, and no books which furnished them with a well-framed answer to any question, whether they understood it or not." Children, thus ignorant, cannot be interested. After a few moments their attention flags, and they answer at hazard. It degenerates into a hollow pedantic form. A single observation of their own will often give a greater insight into their mind and progress, than a long string of these set queries. But if Intuition be sedulously practised the case alters: they are then called on only to

peating*: but it will be perceived, that they are respectively but disguised forms of the Analytic and Synthetic.

reproduce what they know. The teacher, indeed, must know, how to limit himself to that, and to understand perfectly whether they produce it or not: but there is the difficulty. “Il faut avoir beaucoup de jugement *soi-même*, pour *apprécier* celui d'un *enfant*”

* There are three kinds of Repetition. 1. Verbal. 2. Methodical. 3. Practical. The first of these requires no illustration: it is merely technical. The second is not so much a repetition, as a re-arrangement of the facts and principles arrived at by previous analysis. The third is the practical and habitual exercise of certain processes of reasoning, or mechanical operations founded on reasoning. Each of these is necessary. In the study of the languages the value of verbal repetition is known — perhaps overrated; but it requires to be assisted by the other two. Grammar and criticism stand in need of very philosophical classifications; and Composition of constant exercise. The sciences do not so much need the first, except in nomenclatures; (but then it is to be observed, that the nomenclature must first be arranged on strict scientific principles, and perfectly understood;) they have to deal principally with the two others. The Sciences are studied with two views: as exercises of mind, or for practical purposes. As exercises of mind, retention and extent of knowledge are of minor consequence; exactness and severity of reasoning are the principal objects. But the practical student requires a different process. He cannot afford to forget. Applications and formulæ, the mechanism more than the principle, is what he requires. It is true, he may recover what he has lost, by reasoning, but this is discovery; to extend it to a science, is re-inventing it — not within the province of a single man. Even if it were, these processes save time, and, with time, labour. Books are not always at our elbow; the particular passage in the particular book is not always to be hunted out, even when they are. The practical student must therefore retain the march of particular methods, the value of technical phrases, so at least as to read without difficulty the principal writers on the science, and be sufficiently in possession of the principal operations, to enable him to work with alacrity, certainty, and precision, whenever required. For all this memory is undoubtedly necessary, and for memory, repetition. But it is not necessary it should be verbal; methodical memory and repetition, or the just ordering of principles, and practical, or the constant exercise of their applications, these are enough. Euler, who was master, perhaps, of a greater number of results and formulæ than any modern geometrician, La Grange, on his own avowal, &c. &c., practised no other method. They made themselves thoroughly masters of the *spirit* of the science, and of the means, when necessary, of recurring to details, but took very little trouble in regularly confiding (as is usual in our scientific courses) any portion of them to the memory. Their conduct is a guide to the teacher. Children especially are willing to escape from the methodical to the verbal, their memory generally being more developed than their reason. The teacher should look to that. Every Socratic or Catechetical Instruction should be followed by one of these methodical repetitions, as much too as possible in writing, and be succeeded by frequent practical applications. It has often been observed, that professed mathematical students are often behind others their inferiors in scientific knowledge, when called on to

In the higher classes the Synthetic method more distinctly predominates. Readings, lectures, misplaced in the lower branches are here appropriate. But, as the Analytic method is not excluded, neither should the Socratic or the Repeating. A lecturer may give his lecture, without any accompanying exercise; or, he may accompany or follow it with examinations or repetitions. Again, he may read his lecture from a printed and published text, or from his own manuscript, or from notes, or he may lecture extempore.* General lecturers are of course obliged to restrict themselves to simple lectures: their auditors are not their pupils. But this does not hold with regard to others. The lecturer who really wishes to teach, who is an instructor as well as lecturer, will, as is usual in the German universities, after having given his lecture, examine by both the Socratic and Repeating methods, whether his pupils have derived from it all the profit which they should. To this examination may be added compositions upon the more important points, discussions conducted under the direction or presidency of the teacher, * &c. &c. The practice of simple reading materially diminishes the life and spirit of instruction, releases the lecturer from the necessity of habitually considering his subject, and keeping up to the level of actual knowledge. It often substitutes for current knowledge, imperfect or exploded theories and applications. Yet absolute extemporaneous lecturing is scarcely less objectionable. It requires great habits of public speaking and long practical

work out a common arithmetical calculation. This arises solely from want of practice. Facility, it should ever be remembered, may be acquired, lost, and acquired again. In all these processes, doing what has been done, is the great art. "Suffer not thy memory to rest," says the Earl of Bedford, "she loves exercise, and grows with it: the more she receives, the better she keeps, and when you have trusted any thing to her care let it rest with her awhile; then call for it again. By this frequent calling her to account, she will be always ready to give you satisfaction; and the sooner if what she was entrusted with was laid up orderly, and put, as it were, in the several boxes of a cabinet."—*Advice to his Son*, No. 13.

* This is especially adapted to the higher classes. Townsend, in his *Travels in Spain*, states, that in the University of Salamanca it is usual for the professors to give their pupils subjects for essays, with a list of the works they require to consult, for their more ample elucidation. These essays are afterwards submitted to discussion.

preparations: the lecturer has thus to contend with two difficulties instead of one. Lecturing from notes, sufficiently ample, but not so minute² as to preclude a variety of incidental remark, appears to be exempt from most of the defects, and to combine the advantages of the other two. It possesses the animation and interest of extemporaneous lecturing—the accuracy and arrangement of written.

But the pupils—what methods are they to pursue? There are many. They may either write their lecture in full, or take notes and develop them at home, or omit both, and trust singly to their unassisted memory. The first, though assisted by short-hand, has great disadvantages. It proposes too much to the student. It is impossible for him to give due attention to the lecture (especially if it be experimental) and to his writing at the same time. Omission of all writing is only allowable when the lecturer teaches from a printed text, an expedient in some cases requisite, or, at least, unobjectionable, as in Geometry, and the more exact sciences.* Note-taking participates in many of the objections urged against writing in general. It renders the connection much less immediate between the teacher and the pupil; it deprives the teacher of all means of judging of the impression he produces; it breaks in upon the connection of ideas; it divides the interest of all parties. At the same time, it must be admitted, that it has also its merits. It requires a sustained attention on the part of the pupil; accustoms him to seize with rapidity and precision the prominent ideas of a discourse: above all, it teaches him to remodel his information in such a manner as may most fit it for the custody of the memory, and prepare it when called on for immediate use. It has thus, on the whole, the largest share of advantage in its favour, whilst straightforward writing has, perhaps, the smallest of the three.

Connected with daily instruction, are periodical Examinations. They are recommended as a means of assuring its

* It is customary in the special schools of Arts and Trade, both at Paris and Geneva, to give the pupil, at the close of each, a lithographic analysis of the lecture.

accuracy, and permanency, and as a strong stimulant to all species of mental exertion. Repetitions certainly are so. The strongest memory requires a frequent recurrence to its already acquired knowledge, not merely with a view of retaining it safely, but of keeping it always clear and ready for application. Examinations are only more extended repetitions. They are destined for the same purposes. But in their application, too much pains cannot be taken, to render them really profitable. As tests, society has a right to require them: as proofs, individuals have an interest in submitting to them. But that they should be rendered truly available to both these views, they should be inquests, and not formulæ. They should be sufficiently extended to preclude the possibility of attributing success or failure to accident, and sufficiently secure and careful to constitute a real proof of desert. The Examiners, for obvious reasons, should, when practicable, be selected from persons not in connection with the candidates: they should examine at different intervals, not merely the nature and amount of acquirements, but also what degree of facility the pupils possess in applying them to use. This will be peculiarly necessary in the Special schools, from the greater development demanded. Care should be taken to distinguish between different tempers and minds, and so to arrange and diversify the methods and queries, that the examination may be accommodated to each, and to all. A good answerer *vivâ voce* may be comparatively feeble on paper; a good writer (master, moreover, of his subject) may either, from want of exercise, or natural timidity, be incapable of answering *vivâ voce* questions. None should be defrauded of a fair opportunity of putting forth their respective powers. If preference, however, is to be given to any method, written questions have undoubtedly the best claim. They most effectually try the real stuff of a pupil's knowledge and intellect, and remove to a great degree all extraneous embarrassments.*

* The objections to "vivâ voce," and "by heart" Examinations are very formidable: they apply to examiners and candidates. 1. The examiners cannot be expected to know their pupils, and this cannot be supplied by *vivâ voce* examination. 2. They are not always sufficiently prepared, and are obliged to recur to technical questions, which have little reference to the development of

The value of examinations, as tests of comparative merit, is far more questionable. They are unfair ; — they are dis-

the pupil's real knowledge. 3. They have not the adequate means in a few hundred questions to ascertain true progress. 4. They have not, from the distance of time at which examinations usually take place, means of comparison between past and present, essential to judge accurately of the pupil's improvement. 5. Oral examination demands a constant effort of memory on the part of the examiner : this produces fatigue and uncertainty in comparing merit. The Candidates are still more injuriously affected. 1. They are obliged to spend much time and labour in preparing, not for the solid and material, but for the subtleties of science. 2. These subtleties are not discovered by his own efforts, but are usually traditional (" *cut questions*"); a practice common to the universities and schools of these countries, to the old French colleges, &c., and so exclusively confined to a few, that, if not studied under particular tutors, they are not to be acquired ; and without their acquisition, no examination, however otherwise meritorious, will pass. 3. Examinations recurring at great intervals require violent and sudden efforts ; the practice of "*cramming*" is about as wholesome in an intellectual as in a physical point of view. 4. The examinations over, all this knowledge, or phantom of knowledge, passes away. La Croix mentions a Garde de la Marine "*reçu le premier des trois ports*," who three years after did not recollect even the theory of arithmetical fractions. 5. All this is not merely useless, it is also pernicious. It neglects the true developement of the mind for the quackery of an exhibition ; it omits altogether the general and permanent objects of Education.

To these general objections may be added others, local or temporary, which add not a little to their injury, in every prominent particular.

The remedies proposed to meet these defects are, 1. *Examinations at short intervals*. Being limited to short periods, they admit comparison, minute investigation, &c. ; better appreciation, consequently, of the candidate's progress, merit, &c. 2. *Queries and Answers in Writing*. They should be on the same subject, to the same class, and with the permission to use books, &c. &c. This obviates the necessity of any effort on the part of the teacher. He may suspend or continue ad libitum : it gives an opportunity of trying the practical knowledge of the pupil by calculations, constructions, and applications, out of place or impossible in oral examination ; it extinguishes all traditional questioning and answering ; it gives an accurate scale, and great facility in applying it, by which to judge both of the relative and absolute merit of the candidate ; it gives great advantages to the candidate ; allows him to collect his attention, to give the best form to his knowledge, &c. ; finally, being a series of deliberate exertions, and not a sudden effort, it develops and practises the mind usefully, and prepares for the true purposes of Education. 3. *Occasional, but judicious applications of vivâ voce Examination*. To exclude it altogether would be the omission of an important portion of Education discipline. Occasions frequently occur in life which require, even from the most speculative, these oral developements of their knowledge. The boy must be prepared beforehand, for these necessities of the man. But then the application must be, as I have said, judicious. Instead of the usual, prepared queries, the candidate should be called on to discuss a position, or to take up the author to whom he had been applying, and to develop any passage the examiner

couraging. The one or two who stand at the head of a class may feel the stings of rivalry—the “*gaudia certaminis*”—the desire, and glory of distinction; but all below—are mere mob,—“*nos numeri sumus*,”—and, of course, are perfectly indifferent who stands first or last in the list. The twenty-fifth or thirtieth place, in the eye of the public, is scarcely distinguishable, at the distance and with the carelessness with which it is generally viewed, from the fiftieth or sixtieth. If the system is to be retained, the best remedy for the anomaly would be to break up these numerous classes into smaller ones, each containing such a number of pupils as to allow every pupil a reasonable chance of at least relative distinction. But place-taking, and class-ranking are of themselves of such equivocal utility, even in intellectual education, that any reform is perhaps superfluous. In moral, experience goes far to prove that they are of decided injury.

Such are the general means with which a teacher is entrusted—such the more obvious processes for the communication of knowledge, in other words, for the useful management of public Instruction. It will have been perceived, that they involve considerations scarcely less important to the due education of the pupil, than the nature of the instruction itself. Knowledge may be knowledge,—sound and useful knowledge,—but it does not exist for the scholar, unless the means also exist for transferring it with ease and certainty to the scholar's mind. To know is one thing, to teach is another. A teacher, it is true, cannot communicate more knowledge than he possesses; yet he may possess much, and still be able to impart but little. The knowledge of Sir Isaac Newton could be but of trifling use to a school, while it was locked up safely in the head of a country schoolmaster. What ought really to interest us is, that part of a teacher's

might think right to select, as if he were delivering a lecture upon it, going through its meaning, its principle, its application, its merits, &c. in fine, through every particular which could tend to prove, that he was in full possession both of its spirit and use. A combination of both these methods would fully test the qualification of the candidate, be a practically useful exercise, and promote, instead of counteracting, the true objects of Education.

knowledge which we are likely to get, not that which we certainly cannot get. Yet this is almost the last thing we inquire after. We are anxious to ascertain how much the teacher *knows*, not how much he can *communicate*. The preceding observations point out some of the instruments by which this can be accomplished. Instructors and pupils must be made to understand each other. There must be an intelligible language between them to enable the former to open his head and his heart, and infuse into the other some of the thoughts and feelings which lie hid there. At present this language scarcely exists. They may use the same words: but this can hardly be called the same language, while they attach to them such very different meanings. We must either, by some supernatural power, bring children up to the understanding of teachers, or our teachers must unlearn themselves, and come down to the comprehension of children. The last of these alternatives is only difficult — the first is impossible.

This closes the section of Intellectual Education. But a far more important branch remains behind. We have still to discuss the means by which may be reduced to practice the principles of Moral and Religious Education.

Moral and Religious Education. — They who would build the great work of human perfection, without calling to their aid the chief instrument by which it is to be accomplished, attempt not merely an impossibility, and secure only a failure, but render dubious, and frequently injurious, those very acquisitions for which they have already laboured with so much care. The Education of the moral man is the education of the most essential portion of our nature.* We shall find in the other educations, which have preceded it, auxiliaries, as long only as they are kept in subordination. The moment they rebel, they are its worst foes.

Moral and Religious Education are essential to each other. Religion is not a mere sanction of morality, it is the highest

— In fabricâ si falsa est regula prima,
Omnia mendose fieri, atque obstipa necessum est,
Prava, cubantia, prona, supina, atque absona tecta
Jam ruere, ut quædam videantur velle, ruantque
Pœdita judiciis fallacibus omnia primis.

Lucret. l. ii.

order of morality itself. They are not to be separated—neither are they to be confounded. Religion, true to its noble name, is pre-eminently “OBLIGATION.” It is the law of DUTY. It is conscience, taught by God in his Revelations, and in the human soul. It embraces, “in nuce,” all the obligations. It extends to the most intricate as well as to the most simple. But this *general* law requires its *particular* developements. New relations arise—new duties are imposed: their specific character—their several shades—are to be determined. The social man, in reference to society at large,—to the several masses of society,—has numberless functions to fulfil. Then come the various subdivisions of these great classifications, each with its line of corresponding duties. The distinguishing and defining these duties is moral science—their practice, morality.

But neither are Religion and Morality to be limited to the mere determination or performance of duties. They go much deeper both in Individual and Natural Education. Their great end is to form the *character* to such a temper, that the practice of each and all of these duties shall naturally follow. Under this aspect they are especially Education.

Religion is our first impulse. Morality soon follows afterwards—Religion is born with us. If we can fix a date for its commencement,—if its origin be not lost in the clouds of childhood,—it may exist, but it will be always feebly—it will sleep at the bottom of the heart—it will not be our inseparable companion through all after-life. And what period can be better suited for its birth, for its expansion than the period of childhood?—Weakness and dependence—the necessity of support—the deep sense of maternal affection—all prepare for that reliance on an all powerful and all good Being, which is the first and most natural expression of religion (under favourable circumstances) in the human soul. For a time, his mother is to the infant, God and Nature. It is round her he throws his little arms in thanksgiving, and to her is addressed his little voice for support. All his words, all his actions, form one continued prayer: love and joy, and confidence, and gratitude, all grow up in the mother’s lap, all

spread out under the "sweet influences" of the mother's eye. He loves what she loves, he loves what she resembles — it is the image of a kind being, — the instinct of sympathy has mixed his little nature with her's, she reciprocally, like the Nature of Schiller, breathes herself into him — they are one. What more is requisite than this for love, and what more is requisite for faith, than love in God? She has already insensibly revealed to his young mind the most ineffable of all mysteries — an all-creating and all-preserving Providence — the being of a God. His mother has only to point to the Heavens above, and to the Earth below, and to talk to him of an all-good and all-loving Father — and the child is at once religious, he sees his parent in God. The sphere of all these beautiful sympathies is soon extended — he looks up to God for all that he once looked up to her. Piety has awakened with Religion in his heart.

With Piety, Conscience also begins. He feels what it is to displease his mother. As she to him was God, so for a long period is she also Conscience. She is his law — the only being to whom he is responsible. She it is, whose eye he sees before him when about to commit some act of disobedience; she it is before whom, even before detection, he feels remorse — the want, the desire of confession — of atonement. She is the outward representative of that inward sense, that being who follows, who sees, who suffers, who enjoys every thing which proceeds from him. In one word, she is his moral self, she is his Conscience.

The first sense then of Religion and Morality is coeval with childhood — the first foundations are to be found in sentiment — in its two strongest manifestations, sympathy and assimilation, in those profound and indescribable instincts which connect the mother and the child. At first, like all rudiments, they are few and weak; but they soon increase and grow strong. The love and respect which the child entertains for his parents, attach gradually to their injunctions — the sense of duty takes root; but when he finds that these very same injunctions bind them also, and not only them, but every one around — when he feels their conduct, in mysteri-

ous unison with the confused intimations of his own inward sense, then the religious and moral impulse is fully confirmed — his Education in both has fully begun.

Sofar we have been dealing solely with sentiment; but though sufficient to create, it is not sufficient to preserve morality. The child *feels* morality, but he is not yet a *moral being*. Reason is yet silent—he wants the great essential *Reflection*. He lives solely in the present. “It was yesterday,” is a sufficient excuse for his little faults: “It will be to-morrow,” a sufficient answer to all our menaces. He does not fully feel his identity—he has no general rule—his sense of duty is attached only to *particular* acts—he has little fixed either in vice or virtue. From this state, however, he necessarily emerges in due time; and then it is that the consolidation of virtue, the formation of character becomes practicable, and demands attention.

With the developement of reflection, it must be remembered that the sensual organisation develops also. The world without assumes new potency — the novelty of existence, now more strongly perceived, kindles in him new desires — the feelings of infancy are weakened — his mother ceases to be his all — a boundless career of self-indulgence and corruption spreads before him — the germs of moral and religious feeling are on the point of being suffocated by the poisonous weeds which every where rise up about his heart. Nature is now no longer sufficient — the wisdom of experience must step in. Its task must be to preserve, amidst such perils, those first feelings of divine origin—that mother-love, which was his first religion, and first morality, in all its purity and strength. On success in this, depends life. It is the vice or virtue — the happiness or misery — of the future man.

But how preserve them? We must find the means to regulate and render them permanent — to direct them wisely, and to render them habitual. But this cannot be effected, without first assuring ourselves of the constancy and direction of that on which they depend. They depend upon the Will.

The Will, then, is the great central power. To render it constant, and judiciously to direct it, thus becomes the great purpose of Moral and Religious Education. This is a matter very important, very difficult, and very much neglected.

There are two systems perfectly opposite adopted in the education of the Will. One would reduce it to an absolutely slavish obedience,—render it passive for good as well as evil; the other would restore it to the uncontrolled licence of nature, and depend only for submission, on exhaustion. Both lead inevitably to its perversion.

A medium must be adopted between these two extremes. The Will must be *strong* enough to *struggle* and *conquer* when requisite: but it must also be guided, even in the pride of its strength, by *proper motives*; and when enfeebled or defeated, know when and where to recover its original force.

Will simply considered without this direction is in itself strength—firmness—constancy. It is precisely the scale by which we measure the amount of true moral being in the man—that which stamps power upon his actions, words, his very silence—which measures the degree of esteem—of mingled love and fear with which he is regarded—which not only distinguishes him in our opinion, but marks significantly towards him the motive and conduct of all our actions. In a word, *Will* is CHARACTER. In the language of the world, it is the *MAN* himself.

Without this strength, this character, there may be much vice, but there can be no virtue. Annihilate it, and at the same time give the best dispositions, there is still no security for goodness. As long as the mere organic impulse continues—as long as the external direction is favourable—as long as the Will of others rules over our Will, and supplies its want—the child or the man (and here they are not easily distinguishable) is to all appearance virtuous. Anxious to please his parents or his teachers, habituated to the reciprocal pleasure which it affords, as long as these motives influence—as long as he continues in a position where such influence can be felt—he will be mistaken for perfection—the little idol will mistake himself. But *good* Will, and *strong* Will, are two different things. This half subjection, this gentle servitude, this willing with the will of others, and in his actions reflecting back their acts—is only not vice. But who will tell me, how long it will remain such? what can assure me, that the negative will not become positive; and that if the wind blows from another quarter, the weathercock

will not veer round with the wind at every gust? Any instrument can write on such a spirit: any impulse, be it only sufficiently strong—be it only more *will* than what he possesses—bears him away, and his feebly resisting principles, and even habits, in triumph before it. Virtue or vice in such a being is good or bad luck. They no more belong to the individual than form does to wax or clay. His whole conduct comes from without. He lives only in the way and in the degree that others choose to live in him. Such men make a large portion of the loose materials of society. They are thought to be merely indifferent—perfectly manageable—and yet they form about the greatest difficulty with which moralist or legislator has to contend.*

But should the disposition run in the other sense—should the sensual nature be too strongly constituted—should bad habits already have consolidated, then the Will, whatever it might have been at the beginning, becomes little more, with all its pretensions to power, than an abject slave who affects to rule his master. It is absolutely paralysed, extinguished—there is no more deliberation, no more choice—the Passions are the Will—they have usurped its place. A wild fatality impels forward the moral being, not indeed, as in the preceding instance, in a diagonal made up of vice and virtue—but straight forward over a railroad, from which escape to right or left is impossible; bound hand and foot, and plunged headlong to inevitable ruin.

If these errors be conspicuous in Individual Education, they are still more so in National. In public schools, for the greater part, the moral discipline pursued is precisely such as to lead to either of these consequences. There are few pupils who do not come under one or other of these descriptions. If the master chance upon the first, he is but too happy to mistake this contentedness of his pupil for virtue, and

* We not only form an erroneous estimate of this passive morality, but a still more erroneous and unjust one of its opposite. In all our moral calculations, we take into account positive quantities only. We number up the good actions performed, but very seldom the bad actions avoided; yet how often is the latter the greater, I will go further, the only true virtue of the two. Men suffer themselves to become virtuous; but, to resist vice, virtue must come from one's self—it must be our own.

his diligence for energy. He willingly allows him to fall into that dependence which produces an inward lethargy—a moral effeminacy, but does not interfere with the good and comfortable order of his school, or call from him in return any counter-developement of the same faculty. Even where this is not intentionally the case, it is more or less produced by the general tendencies of modern education. In proportion to the greater mildness it has recently assumed, there is more reason to apprehend, without some counter-stimulus, these enervating effects. The very conduct of the master himself is contagious. If he be vague and hesitating, above all capricious, or even changeable, not only he becomes an object of contempt to the pupil, but the pupil insensibly imbibes the same qualities himself. On the other side, should he find this faculty too forcibly developed, he generally commits no less an error. If in one instance by enervating we endeavour to subdue, in the other we try by bending to break; we seek by inflexible rigour to crush passions which often successfully defy us, or if crushed leave nothing behind but a caput mortuum—an outward semblance of vitality. Should this task become too fatiguing, as it often does, and the teacher drop the reins, either the young spirit is surrendered up to the wildness of his first nature, or else he lapses off into self-indulgence and sloth. Thus the whole system, on one side or the other, becomes a series of means for the weakening or subjugation of the Will; in other words, an organisation for the eradicating from our being whatever most there is in it, of power and of man.

The first duty then of the moral and religious Instructor is, to *strengthen* the Will; without this, he may depend upon it, he will have neither material nor instruments to work with. Without it, there will be no independence, no firmness. Independence is the only quality with which truth or nature can coexist. The very youngest child has his rights, as sacred, and as much to be respected, as our own—rights more directly from the hand of Heaven, and which he has not abused, as we have ours—he should know them, he should feel them, he should exercise them, he should in all things speak as he feels, act as he speaks—he should freely fling out

the whole of his young spirit before us, and look up fearlessly, as well as fondly, to every human being around. Every shade in his character should be read on the surface; he should not conceive the utility, the possibility—of hiding a single thought. What has he to blush for, what has he to fear—we love and know him, he knows and loves us. Repress this feeling with any false notions of subjection, and all this frankness will soon vanish from your touch—he will become false, suspicious, calculating, servile; at best but, a machine in your hands, and sooner or later a machine in the hands of others.* But give it its natural play, and you not only retain all the mastery you ought to possess over his spirit; but you give him, the most precious of gifts—defence against the encroachments of others—mastery and management of himself. Nor let it be apprehended, that this will run into licence. The inflexible resistance of necessity, the authority of experience, the sway of affection, the very working of this force itself, will gradually create barriers against all excess. Every day it will receive some new modification, even from the obstacles it meets with;—every day it will tend more to that moderation and calm which arises from the consciousness of what it *is*, and what it *can*. He who truly possesses this consciousness will soon mark out his end, adopt clearly his means; and through all obstacles, through all disappointments, boldly pursue it to its attainment. Such a pupil will be patient, as well as independent. One is the offspring of the other; but, remember, I speak of independence and not of arrogance—one is the natural love of self;—the other, is self-love.

But admitting the importance of strengthening the Will, *how* is the Will to be strengthened? When weak, when capricious, what remedies are to be applied? Is Reason sufficient? If not, what other power is to be called in? With the weak,

We constantly hear from our considerate teachers,—“ All I ask is for your own good: to be sure, you cannot yet see it; but of what advantage to *me* is all this? It is for *you* only I am working,” &c. Precisely the language which will be held out to him one day by some religious fanatic, or political charlatan, and for the reception of which you take the best means possible of preparing him now. To wish he should be so over docile whilst young, is to wish he should be credulous and duped and trampled on when he grows up.

Reason assuredly is not the discipline to give vigour. The irresolute reason but *too much*, and *too long*. They see a thousand probabilities, each in succession—each supreme for the time. What they require is to see at once—to see but one—to measure well—to decide when they have measured—and not to reverse, when they have once decided. What then, is to be done? Is the pupil to decide first, and to reflect afterwards—to act without considering the result of his actions? Certainly not; this would be blindness and rashness, not decision. Is Reason then, to argue with the pupil, to show him the *unreasonableness* of this irresolution, by formal logical deduction, and strict moral rule? Unfortunately, the child, thus affected, is not even sensible of his defect. It is a general want of power, and not a specific disease. He cannot be made to understand, wherein he fails. To obey is the great virtue of his code—he can see no harm in following—there is no injunction on him to lead. With him Reason can have no effect. There is no material for Reason to work on. Nor with the capricious is Reason likely to be more successful. Caprice has a certain false air of vigour—it plunges into decision that it may not have to deliberate, and acts that it may not be enabled to recall. But if as Bacon says, “Not to resolve, is to resolve,” so to resolve, is often not to resolve—vivacity is not strength, neither is caprice Will. It has no steadiness—no direction. If it does not sink under us when we lean on it, it starts away from us when we want it. What can Reason do with such? how can it chain fickleness, or give stability to change? Can it renovate the tastes of yesterday, or retain the tastes of to-day? Impossible! Reason can counsel as to particulars; but when she comes to generals, she fails. Thus, though she may succeed in breaking down obstinacy—in communicating firmness, she is comparatively weak.

Is nothing then to be done? Is this most important portion of education without the pale—without the power of education itself? Is it a gift exclusively of Heaven—is it incapable of being developed by man? Much certainly is organisation, but not all. It is true that the means of strengthening the Will are almost as difficult to discover, as strength of Will

itself. But training does much—we must endeavour to train. The practice of self-controul gives power on one side—the practice of decision gives power on the other; occasions may be sought and found, for the exercise of each. When temptations assail, the eye of the teacher should watch and see that they are met and vanquished, that in the words of à Kempis, “The child has become stronger than himself.” When decision is requisite, the child should be *required* to decide; the necessity of deciding gives decision: the faculty becomes active instead of passive; but, above all, the teacher himself should know how to have Will; he should *compel* himself to *command*. He should trace distinctly and decidedly the strict limits between independence and duty; and from thence, no more than his pupil, should he shrink, or swerve. The child should have a determinate future; he should know on what he is to exercise his Will. All doubt relaxes; it is an atmosphere in which it is impossible to keep the moral being up to its true manly stature and muscle—firmly and boldly braced. Hence, all half orders, all obligations suggested rather than imposed, all implied solicitations, all circuitous routes to duty should be shunned. The teacher should know his province, and the pupil will then know his. If this be not done, every word, every action, will be an object of conjecture, of oscillation—regret for what is done, anxiety for what he is to do. There will be no rule, no standard. The number of probabilities to be weighed in every question, will be indefinitely increased. Indecision will be unavoidable. Weakness and capriciousness of Will must follow as a matter of course.

Few teachers are sensible of these truths, fewer still enforce them by their conduct. Private Education, depending exclusively on the character of the teacher, whether parent or tutor, is thus exposed to constant chances. If either be weak or capricious, so will the pupil: he will veer about with all their veerings, and end by having no will, or a will worse than none. Hence the numberless instances of private educations turning out failures. The lawgiver and the executioner of the law, is one and the same. Public Education, in this particular, has great advantages. It establishes a general

code, not for to day, nor for to-morrow, for master, or for pupil, but for all time, and for all. The child accordingly looks to the code, and not to the individual. It is universal—imperturbable—inflexible. It teaches Will.

But it is not sufficient that the Will should be strengthened—it must be *directed*. This independence, unless regulated, becomes presumption; this firmness, stubbornness; these personal forces, unless restricted, by a sense of the rights of others, as well as one's own, egotism and violence. But from what, or whom is this direction to come? To decide that question and to apply it, is the second great duty of Moral and Religious Education. •

In order to restrain or direct the will, it is necessary, but not enough, to restrain or direct *actions*. We may controul them one by one, and yet give no *general* direction. The pupil, with a monitor always by his side, may conduct himself well; but the moment this visible personification of his conscience departs, and he is left alone with himself, there is no certainty that he will either know, or wish to know how to conduct himself so, any longer. No being can be conceived more helpless than one, who has been always in the habit of thus reasoning with the reason, and doing virtue after the virtues of others. In proportion to the assistance he has received, the greater his feebleness when deprived of it. Strike away the crutch, and he is sure to fall; launch him on his own virtue and his own understanding into the world, and he is sure to become the dupe of the first knave, the victim of the first scoundrel he meets with; for it is the fool who makes the knave, and the weak who feeds the scoundrel. Hence the numberless instances of pious educations proving exquisite preparations for the most consummate profligacy. He found it so easy to perform the saint, is it astonishing he should find it ten-fold easier to perform the far more natural part of the sinner? *

* The history of poor "Ververt," that model of absolute piety, corrupted in a single voyage from one convent to another, his virtue assaulted and captured by a coup de main, is a beautiful and *true* type of these ultra-perfect College Educations. Good philosophical reasons could be given for this point-blank contradiction to the satirist's "Nemo repente fuit turpissimus;" but this is not the

Besides good actions, there must then be that by which good actions, whether the monitor is present or not, are produced. We must have some *general* cause for *particular* effects, not limited to place or time, but universal and enduring in its action.

What is this cause? Habits; but not mechanical, but rational—the results of conviction as well as exercise. They must come from Feeling and Principle. Principle is that external and internal law of morality and religion, which God has established for us; and our Feelings are those impulses upon which this law should act, and by which they should be regulated, in order to be formed into moral and religious habits.

The first forms the science, and comprehends moral and religious instruction, properly so called. The second forms the art or discipline, by which this instruction is reduced to practice, by which it is often anticipated, and without which it would be utterly unavailing.

But what is the nature of these feelings or impulses, and upon which of them, and how far on each of them, is principle to act? They are infinite, and infinitely various. Organisation, circumstance, shapes one man differently from another, and the same man, at times, differently from himself. The choice then of these impulses—the selection and encouragement of the good, the rejection and extinction of the bad—is of great consequence. It is not sufficient to produce *good results*; the producing *motives* themselves must be good. If this be neglected, no security for the steady direction to good of any one of our habits, can be attained. The evil motive may produce good to-day; there is no reason why it may not produce evil to-morrow.

Some of these are connected with our mere material existence; others, with our moral, but, more or less directly as modifications of our love of self. Others, more exalted, such as our love of the “Just,” the “True,” the “Beautiful,”

time or place. Suffice for teachers that such is the fact—notorious, incontrovertible; and so it will always be, no matter what the discipline, as long as they make and keep men parrots.

raise us above these physical considerations; others again add to this spiritual elevation, those more impetuous emotions, which from the faintest shade of Sympathy to the perfect devotion of Love, identify us with the being of others, and extend our existence, with the vivacity of personal feeling, far beyond ourselves. Finally, there is that deep and solemn feeling—tender, and noble at the same time,—the first which meets us on our arrival on this earth, the last which quits us on our departure; without which, all others are deprived of half their power, and of all their beauty—the *true feeling of true religion*. From these we have to choose, but their very nature renders our choice obvious. Our physical and selfish propensities require no culture: they grow up without our care, often grow in despite of it. They require strong counterpoises—great compensations. If we do not sedulously raise the more spiritual, the more generous feelings against them—above all, if the religious feeling be not anxiously and tenderly cultivated, all moral and religious education is at an end. To think we can afterwards crush with ease, what we thought too troublesome to “scotch” in infancy, betrays our usual fatal ignorance of materials and means. In a selfish heart, the passions may treat, “*mais elles ne se rendent pas :*” they never capitulate. They now and then disguise in virtue, for purposes of deeper selfishness; but this is not treaty, but treachery. The real being changes not, nor can he change; your education has taken care that he should be for ever unchangeable.

Not then on reason solely, but on the feelings under the guidance of reason, must we rely. So far from attempting to extinguish or even to deaden them, the more they live, and the more actively they live, the better. I pity the child who is so deplorably wise and coldly virtuous, as to be without them. Never should they be left without nourishment in the human heart; never without fountains to drink at; never without exercise; never without aim. When they depart the real man departs with them: patriotism becomes trade; religion, ritual; the affections, etiquette; and the dearest charities of life, “*des convenances*”—things to be taught—virtues to be got by heart. No, no! let it never be the boast of our

religion or our civilisation to reduce man to a petrification let us “know ourselves,” for what we are and what we were intended to be, not machines but spirits — living, thinking, feeling, and so only, perfect men.

Fortunately, Public education, if properly managed, affords in this particular also great advantages over Private. Not that private education, particularly at an early period, does not tend to develop the domestic affections, to a fuller degree than public; but social man, his numerous other impulses and feelings growing out of these, require a ruder and more vigorous culture.* Numbers may be so applied, as to answer admirably this end. Every individual, it is true, requires to a certain degree an education of his own, but what that education should be is only to be elicited, in the collision of a public school. Individual peculiarities are often only discovered by chance, but the more these chances are increased, the greater probability of arriving at this discovery — at the “essential spirit” of the child.

The first feeling to be formed is that of “Order,” — it is useful to the boy, but to the school it is indispensable; nothing can go on without it. Here is the first sacrifice of self to others, the first restraint, the first direction of the Will. The pupil feels intensely the sense, the enjoyment of his own activity. He is as yet without an object — his only want for the present is to develop this faculty. Precepts of order, moderation, tranquillity, appear unnecessary, appear vexatious. But the submission which is required of him, is required of all. The teacher yields as well as the pupil to the universal law; advantages result to both from its observance; he begins to experience personally its utility; his self-love is at first interested, then a nobler feeling, and he at last adopts the restrictions himself, and aids by his adoption in recommending

* “Assuescat jam a tenero non reformidare homines,” says Quintilian, with his usual philosophic elegance, “neque illâ solitariâ, et velut umbratili vitâ pallescere. Excitanda mens, et attollenda semper est, quæ in hujusmodi secretis aut languescit, et quemdam velut in opaco situm ducit: aut contra tumescit inani persuasione; necesse est enim sibi nimium tribuat qui se nemini comparat. Deinde cum proferenda sunt studia, caligat in sole, et omnia nova offendit; ut qui solus didicerit, quod inter multos faciendum est.” Lib. i. c. 2.

and finally in impressing them on others. This feeling, from constant exercise soon becomes habit, and this habit is a direct counterpoise to the caprices of Will. It is henceforward subjected, in some degree, to certainty and regularity.

The next feeling to be developed is the sense of "Justice." The public school, the circumstance of living in common, is particularly favourable to its culture.. The young comer is soon taught by the pupils themselves, that if he would guard his own individual rights and interests from encroachment, he must respect those of others. Hence reciprocity. He learns more and more exactly every day, the true measure of his own pretensions. He becomes patient in difficulties — modest to his superiors — kind to his inferiors — equitable to all. He carries this from his actions to his words, and from his words to his thoughts. The means of keeping within due limits, the spirit of independence, are found. So far now from its degenerating into abuse, it is in proportion to the strength and vividness with which he feels it himself, that he regards and honours its existence in others. But these feelings are still tinged with self; we must get beyond this,—they must be farther ennobled and exalted by the feeling of "Benevolence" and "Generosity." The spirit of community has already taught him to respect the interests of his companions; but this is not enough, he should feel an interest in them, he should join in them, he should assist them; he should know the uses and the pleasures of co-operation. The feelings of self-sacrifice, of self-forgetfulness, of sympathy, of kindness, are now expanded; they should be made constant — habitual, to all. All should be taught to look for their happiness to the happiness of each; each to look to the well being, and progress, and prosperity of all. Where these habits are thoroughly planted, a spirit of true fraternity soon arises, approximating a school in some degree to the image of a large family. From the exercise of such qualities follows mutual esteem, and from esteem affection; affection elevates, and purifies, and spreads the young mind abroad, upon a new creation, upon all other beings besides self. Each lesson, each example, of good now rapidly communicates to all, "interpenetrates" all—educates all. The

teacher will not only be felt in every young spirit, but each will imperceptibly become the cheerful fellow-labourer and co-operator of the teacher.

Connected with these more elevated impulses of our nature is the sense of the "Noble," and "Pure," and "Beautiful" in morals. Here, again, we enter on *Æsthetics*; so harmoniously are linked together all the faculties and sensibilities of our nature. The exultation with which we hear the recital of some glorious act by which millions were saved by the self-devotion of one, or the unblenching constancy of some tender martyr to truth and conscience, or the heroism of a brave and righteous man struggling singly against oppression, though struggling in vain, this exultation is some how or other akin to that which we experience in gazing upon the boundless ocean, or the calm midnight heavens, or the thunderstorm on its way, or in some instances even upon the wonders of human art. Through all a single principle seems to pervade; an indefinite sense of a nature still loftier than our present; a nature of which even this is but the faint image and foretaste, a perfection of which these are only the occasional outshootings, a glory which we are still condemned to see as through a veil. Our hearts are full, and our eyes are moist, and our tongues are silent with these overpowering emotions: at no period do we so thoroughly feel the dignity of our origin and destination. Such feelings are not virtue, but they dispose for virtue. They warm and break the soil for the reception of the sacred seed. They cannot recur too frequently or penetrate too deeply, into the young mind. Unless there be enthusiasm in youth, there will scarcely be feeling in old age. There must be poetry and passion even in our virtue, to make it work broadly or vigorously. The "just enough" will oftener be within the mark, oftener not enough, than enthusiasm will be beyond it. It is the want of passion which produces vice, not passion itself, and the worst of vices, because the most permanent and continual, the vices of permission and omission. Through them the rich retire from their duties to society, and the poor sit down, and refuse to make use of themselves, of the slumbering energies and wealth, shut up in their own arms. If society goes on at all

with such, it is singly by the equilibrium "of their respective weaknesses. They each become the victim of every thing like vigour or spirit which chances to come down amongst them. From indolence naturally follows obstinacy in old prejudices, narrow views, hostility to improvement, opposition to all exertion which passes beyond the limit of the present, or the capacity of the individual. In a word, not only is Life reduced to a mere profit and loss account of material objects, but this profit and loss is usually very ill calculated. A little less of the very quality on which they lean for all their happiness—of the *brute prudence*, if I may so call it, which is their eternal "do-all" and "know-all" in life, would ensure that happiness a great deal better.* The passions are really what inform us of our existence—what give the impulsion to the machine—what waken us to our pleasures. They are the power; but then they must be employed wisely and nobly; and this is the object of a due cultivation of the elevated feelings—of moral *Æsthetics*.

But there still remains the conclusion—the perfecting of this moral developement. It is necessary that these feelings of "Order," "Justice," "Generosity," this elevation and extension of the sympathetic affections—this sense of the "Noble" and "Pure" and "Beautiful" in morals, should receive its highest character from the feeling of "Religion." These may do much; they may prepare, they may dispose; but it is only by this last that a really wholesome and steady direction can be impressed upon the Will. The individual Will of man is subject to his individual fluctuations and errors. The most perfect means of securing it from either is, the placing it in true harmony with the universal and eternal Will of God. This is the rule of duty—these the means by which he is to aim at that final perfection, which we have already seen is the true end of all education—of all existence. This it is, by means of which he can declare himself undauntedly, with a full sense of all

* It is really admirable to see the self-complacency with which these men, "les idoles des gens médiocres," congratulate themselves on their steerage through the world. Their wisdom consists in their silence; "their strength in being still;" their skill, in doing nothing. "Lorsque vous vantez entre vous la justesse de votre esprit, il me semble entendre des culs-de-jatte se glorifier de ne point faire un faux pas."

its obligations, of all its difficulties, for truth and virtue.* This it is, which truly vivifies the heart — which dignifies the intellect — which elevates the simple desire of moral good, the simple aspiration towards its attainment, to a profound and inflexible resolution, to the full height of true morality. This it is which establishes a real unity between all our duties, which renders nothing indifferent, nothing distant; and, from the first step in the path, conducts unceasingly to the point, where life itself seems a natural inspiration of the conjoined influences of intellect, morality, and religion.

To elevate then to this highest degree, these feelings must not only be cultivated and expanded, but so frequently and fully, that they gradually may become habits — a second nature — the man himself. He who has evil dispositions always to conquer, in order to become virtuous, can never be sure of his virtue. It is impossible, in practice, to fight every day battles with our evil inclinations, without losing many. We must look for some better guarantee than this. We must make it as difficult to depart from good as from evil. There is no reason why one habit should not be as easily and as strongly planted as another. We can choose, and we can plant: — seed, soil, season, instruments,—all are in our hands.

Habits are the result chiefly of exercise; and exercise, therefore, in moral and religious Education, should be our chief consideration. But how induce this exercise? All admit its necessity, but how many fail in its application. Compulsion has long been tried, and unsuccessfully. This is natural. Why should that, which ought to be a pleasure, be taught by force, and be made a pain. It is a process for driving out one vice, by planting another. You make the pupil obedient by first making him a coward, then a slave. Virtue, under such a system, must be hypocrisy or inertness. A boy who is forbidden to speak and act, will cease to think; or, if he thinks, it will be for himself, and not for you.

Brute force is then the worst of all agencies to wield our

* “Effort et sacrifice,” says Cousin with so much justice, “voilà les conditions pour savoir quelque chose et pour être honnête; déguiser à l'enfance ces conditions, c'est la tromper sur la vie humaine.”— *Rapport*, p. 68.

moral and intellectual nature. We must use something similar to itself. Fortunately, we have numerous powers of the kind. We have the influence of the teacher on the pupils ; of the pupils on each other ; of the pupil on himself.

The teacher knows little of his profession, if he does not know, that no faculty in a child is stronger than imitation ; consequently, no influence more powerful than example. Let him *be* his lesson, and it will soon penetrate. Let him, in the intercourse of every day, of every hour, seize every avenue, to instil, by *deed*, the sacred theme. Let him be just, and generous, and mild, and kind *himself*, and he will have already preached, and more than preached, these virtues to his scholars. In the silence of the young heart, their unobtrusive voice will soon be heard. He will be surprised by the blossom and the fruit, even before he imagines the root has struck. Virtue is to be caught — it can infect as well as vice. Yet this is never remembered. The Catechism tells the child, to conquer his anger, to be just, to be kind, to all. The Teacher refutes the lesson, by his partiality and violence. The Catechism enjoins him to tell truth to all men. The teacher modifies the injunction ; tell *me* always the truth, though you must not expect that I should always tell it to you.* The Catechism teaches that we are all brethren. The teacher, that this or that man, because he thinks differently, is an enemy ; and that it is possible to be a Christian and a Persecutor ! at the same time.

* Every thing is reparable with children but falsehood : impatience, passion, injustice, they may forget ; they are involuntary, accidental : but falsehood never ; it is crime, — it evinces intention. There is but one way to teach truth ; the teacher himself must be true, positively, literally, universally true ; not only no falsehood, but no approach to falsehood. No false reasons, no false promises, no deceptions ; no cheating for his good ; no trifling, even in jest, with its perfect purity. For his good, indeed ! To deceive a child is at once to render all good impracticable. We not only give a bad example, but sacrifice all credit with him for the future. We renounce at once all education, of which we no longer can be, and are unworthy to be, the instruments. Our power over him depends on his profound conviction that we are incapable of abusing him. If he finds us true, this power continues entire ; if false, that moment, in his eyes, we are no more than a blind irregular force, whose movements, being impossible to calculate, are not deserving of consideration. Children who have never been deceived look upon promises as deeds ; a thread may lead them. Deceive them once, and chains will be insufficient.

Which of the two is he to believe, which is he to follow? Mind not the preacher, but what he preaches, is an old adage, but is it a practicable one? Men appeal, and will appeal, as long as they are men, much more to the conduct of the preacher than to his doctrine. What other proof have they of his sincerity? and why should he call on *them* to believe what it is so evident he does not believe *himself*? But if grown men think and act thus, why should not children? why should we insist that they, who are all sensation, should be more spiritual than ourselves? Children universally appeal from the book to the man; and they do right. It is reason in them. But what are we to think of the conduct of the master? Simply, that, in nine cases out of ten, to him are owing all the vice and ignorance of his school.

The pupils have, perhaps, a still greater influence on each other. They are more constantly and more intimately in contact — they assimilate more easily — they act on each other more directly. Reason must to a certain degree become childish to affect children. Children give it easily that character. Their “public opinion” is as strongly felt as ours, and generally more just — its power too not inferior, when not counteracted by other opinions, at variance or in hostility to it, such as those of their teachers, their parents, &c. &c. Yet here again is another instrument for the formation of habits, which we let slip from our hands, or, what is much worse, allow to become perverted to the worst purposes. Of this we shall later see abundant proof in the actual management of our public schools, be they of what grade they may. The exceptions which occur are few, — but few as they are, they are all-powerful as examples. Hazlewood has done more to open our eyes, than many homilies. The Boy-Juries of that school have shamed us into a true opinion of the competency of scholars to many of the functions of self-government. A French writer observes, that robbers exercise the most effectual of all police, “parce qu’ils s’inspectent, et se souspectent.” Mutual inspection, in such a school as I have described, would proceed from a nobler motive, but would not be less active or extensive in its application. It would exercise all the moral faculties, and all in a manner the most natural and

certain, but all espionage and denunciation should be strongly discouraged; otherwise we shall soon have a moral *gens d'armes*, a bad preparative for the duties of high-minded men, and free citizens, hereafter. The Athenian legislator, to neutralise by gratification the over-ambition of his fellow citizens, multiplied offices to that degree, that it was scarcely possible for a citizen not to pass, many times during his life, from governed to governor. A similar organization might, with still better effect, be introduced into schools. Many a pupil may have an overstock of obedience; they should know how to exchange it for power and command. On the other side, self-assumed superiority should be replaced in that position, for which perhaps society designs it, and be taught the advantage of submission as well as power. If Education, especially moral, be a rehearsal for the great drama of life, it is surely necessary there should be a just allotment of parts—a lesson which, if not now learned, will probably not be learned at all. If Rousseau insisted so strongly on the necessity of learning a trade, in this age of revolutions, with not less justice should we betimes train up the still plastic character to the useful and easy discharge of *all* the duties of life. Nor should this training be confined to our elementary schools—its utility is universal, for it is the preparation for a game in which all must take their part—it should be extended to all. Our fagging system recognises this principle; but what a degraded application of a really noble truth! Between it and what is here recommended, there is the difference between the discipline of a militia of freemen, and that of a pirate's crew. Children must not be permitted to command before they are first habituated to obey—but a beaten servant makes a bad master, and no tyrant is worse than the manumitted slave. This should not be our practice. The code of our little community should rest on the universal will—it should have for its executive the universal honour and love. So legislated for, and so governed, there would be little to apprehend from treachery or rebellion. The teacher would have only to permit—all his functions would be directive. Habits of virtue would form of themselves—the force to form them would come from within.

But, in order to give this its fullest and most extended effi-

cacy, the individual pupil should be set in watch, not only over his companions, but over himself. He must entitle himself to the right of commanding others, by first learning to command himself. This is not possible without self-knowledge — nor self-knowledge without self-inquiry. As in intellectual education, it was made the chief instrument by which the child was enabled to distinguish, to determine, to fix ideas, without which true mental acquisition is impossible; so, in moral, it should be used, in order to render precise our obligations and our dispositions, without which moral progress must always be wavering, — if not vain. The teacher should first apply it, — the pupil will soon habitually apply it himself. Instead of reproaching the child, let the child reproach himself. Exercise his moral tact, increase his sensibility — develop his conscience by thus turning it upon facts. Let him not dwell in dogma and precept — they make professors — we want virtuous men. When he commits a fault, after the first rush of self-love is over, when the first whisperings of remorse are heard — quietly, and at a distance from his other companions, win him back step by step to this inward inspection. Make him observe, examine, account, not for the circumstances only, but for the motives, of his fault; — and not with rebuke and harshness, but with that sympathy and paternal love, which, if he be the child which such a discipline should form, depend upon it, will be punishment and correction enough.* The dread of this confession, the

* This has been reduced to practice, with singular effect, at Holford. When a boy commits a fault, he is sent to *write down a detailed account* of what he has done, the motives and reasons which prompted him to its commission, &c. The effect of this, it is obvious, must be most powerful. Suppose a boy has told a falsehood to serve himself and implicate another, what is more likely to make him deeply sensible of the meanness of what he has done, than the retracing, step by step, the circumstances, reasons, feelings, &c., which urged him to the act. First of all comes the action which he has endeavoured to deny, falsehood; then the fear of discovery, cowardice; the seeking the means to avoid it, cunning; the implication of another, baseness, treachery, &c.: while all this continues a confused heap in his mind, self-love, taking advantage of the confusion, will attempt to disguise its enormity. But let it be thus analysed, and, if he be not absolutely hardened, he must be covered with confusion. Such, indeed, conjoined to an affectionate attachment to all above them, has been the result. So far now from seeking to disguise or excuse their errors, in order to avoid this confusion, they are usually the first to report them themselves.

necessary consequence of every error, enhanced, as it will always be, by the kindness and judgment of a good teacher, will soon be transferred to self-examination, to the confession of his own heart, in the solitude of his own chamber. He will blush to meet himself as he did his teacher, after an act of duplicity, or selfishness, or passion. The censure of the teacher's eye will be weak compared to his own, for conscience will be the court, and God the judge, and he himself will be his own accuser. When once this habit is formed, (and how easily may it be formed !) the master has indeed achieved his work. He has surrounded these young and undefiled spirits with omnipresence and omniscience ; he has introduced the severest and surest of all police (a preventive power, in comparison to which all corrective is weak), into the innermost foldings of the young heart. There is nothing now necessary but punctuality and perseverance. No evening should be allowed to pass without this inquest, and in order that it may be conducted in the most effective manner, even mechanical aid should not be despised. Various have been proposed : that suggested by Franklin, and developed, in an article in the *Journal of Education*, under the name of the "Regulator,"* is excellently

To conduct from this habit of compulsory to voluntary or self-inquiry, another practice is adopted in the same establishment. Every evening a muster is held, when the principal occurrences of the day are notified, and the *offences* mentioned, but without naming the *offenders*. Thus no one is degraded, and every conscience is turned in upon itself. An old conventual custom is in this manner applied, with great benefit, to our modern institutions.

* The "Regulator" is a series of small tables composed of columns representing all the possible employments of human life, and all the relations of the social state. The first and second columns, beginning on the left, indicate the day of the week and date of the month ; the third, the variations of the temperature. The fifteen which follow express by the figures to be written in them, the number of hours to be given to each of the divisions of life, *physical, moral, intellectual, social, and passive, or vegetative*. A column, much larger than the preceding (*Remarks, or Reflections*), is designed to revise the most remarkable incidents of the day. The eighteenth, or last column (*Appreciation of Conduct*), is intended to mark, by a *secret sign*, the good, bad, or indifferent impressions which the past day has left behind it. These tables, of ten days each, containing thirty or thirty-one lines, describe a month ; thirty-six tables, or 365 lines a year ; and followed by a final recapitulatory table of twelve lines, for a summary account of the twelve months, constitute the "Regulator." See, for more minute particulars, *Journal of Education*, No. xii. pp. 72—76.

adapted to this evening examination. A similar table under different heads, as “What are the faults I have to avoid?”—“What are the virtues I have to practise?”—“What are the objects I have to effect?” &c., might, under the name of the “Director,” be used for the morning. The custom of applying these would produce the same attention to the economy of time, and the uses of all our faculties, and the exercise of all our moral habits, which the keeping of accounts necessarily does to the receipt and application of money. Both these tables, on an enlarged or limited scale, as circumstances might dictate, should be in the hands of every pupil. Their habitual employment would be soon conspicuous in their conduct. Self-control would become natural and general. A control upon thoughts as well as actions would be gradually generated,—a moral panoptism, the most efficient inspection which could possibly be established over the whole internal man.

With these three forces in action, is it necessary to say that punishments and rewards would be scarcely requisite? As to punishments, especially corporal, we are rapidly advancing to, I trust, a due sense of their cruel absurdity. The ancient arms of the Grammar School of Louth* are still indeed in favour with most of its rivals and contemporaries; and in educated Scotland, parents themselves still permit and even require the abuse†; but the growing intelligence of the community at large is indubitably pronounced against it, and it has already ceased wherever public opinion has true power. It is only subject of surprise that, in a humane and civilised community, it could have possibly existed so long. A more direct contradiction in Education can scarcely be imagined. In books, and charters, and endowments, we read that our schools were intended to bring up children in the fear and

* A schoolmaster, in the full execution of his magisterial duty, whipping his scholar: legend, a verse from the Proverbs.

† “It is not at all uncommon for parents,” says Professor Pillans, “in entering their child at school, to admonish the master to ‘be sure and whip him well.’ So strangely prevalent is the notion, strengthened perhaps in the people of Scotland by the perverted application of a text of Sacred Writ, that there can be no effectual teaching without rigorous infliction.”—*Principles of Elementary Teaching*, p. 68.

love of God, and in charity and good-will towards all mankind. Enter them, and listen.

“ Quivi sospiri, pianti, ed alti guai
 Risuonavon per l' aere.
 . . . Orribili favelle,
 Parole di dolore, accenti d' ira,
 Voci alte e fiocche, e suon di man con elle.” DANTE.

This is a strange practical enforcement of the precept, a most unnatural mode of instilling knowledge, and charity, and fear of the Lord. Well might Montaigne exclaim, “ Quelle maniere, pour esveiller l'appetit envers leur leçon, à ces tendres ames et craintives, de les y guider d'une trongne effroyable, les mains armées de fouets ! Inique et pernicieuse forme ! Combien leurs classes seroient plus decemment jonchées de fleurs, et de feuillées, que de tronçons d'osier sanglants ! J'y ferois pourtraire la Joye, l'Alaigresse, et Flora, et les Graces, comme fait en son eschole le philosophe Speusippus. Ou est leur proufit, que ce feust aussi leur esbat.”*

Can any thing be more illustrative of the adhesiveness of ancient error, than the obstinacy with which this cruel folly is still retained. No language can be stronger and juster than Quintilian's. In defiance of general custom, and the sanction of philosophy (“quamquam et receptum sit, et Chrysippus non improbet”), he struck boldly at the atrocity. (*Inst. Orat.* l. i. c. 3.) His remonstrances produced little effect; the Roman youth were flogged into grammar and Greek and vice (see again Quintilian and the *Anthology*), till the extinction of ancient literature. On the restoration of letters, we again hear the voice of common sense and humanity protesting against it in Montaigne, and the good Charron, seconding him with an energy as disgraceful to his age, as it was honourable to himself. It was then, as in all former time, “ la coutume presque universelle de battre, fouetter, injurier, et crier après les enfans, et les tenir en grande crainte et sujétion, comme il se fait aux Collèges,” (*Livre de la Sagesse*, p. 590.) But though he justly characterises it as “ très inique et punissable, préjudiciable et toute contraire au dessin que l'on a, qui est de les rendre poursuivans la vertu, sagesse, science, et honnêteté ;” no mitigation followed. The practice continued in full force in France—very nearly to the period of the Revolution. The very bodies most celebrated for their zeal for education were the most remarkable for their application of the rod. The Frères Ignorantins were called “ les Frères Fouetteurs,” par excellence. Since the period of the Revolution it has disappeared in France. There were two enactments on the subject, in 1801 and 1803. (*Recueil des Règlemens concernant l'Instruction publique, depuis 1598 jusqu'à 1814.* Paris, 1814. vol. ii. p. 25. and vol. iii. p. 17.) But the Comte de Lasteyrie, in his letter to Professor Pillans, Feb. 2. 1829, has shown that this was unnecessary ; public opinion has been quite strong enough to put it down. “ L'usage de fou-

But there is not yet evinced the same degree of sensibility to the tendency and nature of other punishments. Though the rod be banished, other chastisements scarcely less objectionable remain behind. It is the mode, in fact, and not the principle, which seems to have affected the public mind. Now, it is the principle which requires consideration, especially in contrast to methods purely moral and self-applied. Are public punishments in schools advisable? Is punishment of any kind? Its application to intellectual education I put out of the question. To whip or scold lessons into boys is, of course, *per se*, preposterous. It is only as a

etter les enfans, ou de leur donner des ferules, était tombé presqu'en désuétude avant la Révolution, il est aujourd'hui *totale*ment réprouvé comme contraire aux mœurs publiques." A master who should strike his pupil "serait considéré comme un homme sauvage et brutal;" and in the schools of mutual instruction "il serait immédiatement renvoyé." "Heureusement on n'a pas en besoin de faire des loix pour proscrire cette *usage barbare*," &c. The same feeling is conspicuous through all instructions addressed to teachers, and the recent punishment inflicted for departure from it at Boulogne, is a proof that it is not confined to books or theory. In Germany corporal punishments have long ceased to be applied in schools, and, indeed, generally on the Continent, wherever Education has made any real progress. In Scotland, with some few récent exceptions, Professor Pillans assures us, it reigns triumphant. Parents give a preference to the schools where it is most prevalent, and a schoolmaster has been bold enough to declare, in print, his ardent admiration for the practice. "For myself," says he, "I frankly confess that this part of my duty is performed *not merely without reluctance, but with positive gratification*." (Quoted in *Principles of Elementary Teaching*, p. 142.) Yet Professor Pillans himself, in the face of all Scotland, has given ample proof of the practicability and advantage of suppressing corporal punishments. For eight years he conducted a school of not less than 225 scholars, without being once obliged to recur to its infliction. Nor was he a solitary instance; the school of Girthon, in Galloway, is another striking example (p. 152.); and the assurances every where received from the parochial masters, who had been induced to follow his recommendation, are not less confirmatory of its *entire success*. (p. 68. and Postscript, p. 141—160.) In Ireland and England, in the great majority of schools, it continues in full vogue. The favourite domain of the flagellants are indeed our parochial endowed establishments. There tawse and birch reign supreme. (See *Quarterly Review*, Feb. 1829.) Well may we exclaim, in the language of the distinguished Professor already quoted, "It is a blot on the national institutions, that the *high-bred gentlemen* of England, at any period of their lives, and, most of all, within four or five years of the time when they take their seats in Parliament as legislators of a great empire, should be subjected to the discipline of a cloister." (p. 154.) And this, too, at a period in which the practice has so much diminished, even in the army. In 1830, according to official returns, there were 655 floggings; in 1832, 546, and in 1833, not more than 370.

stimulant to labour, as a corrective of idleness, that it is for a moment to be considered. Here it enters into moral Education. Is punishment then a good instrument in the management of moral Education?

I should say, decidedly not, either in private or public,—and the more public the more inefficacious. Its advantages are not for a moment to be put in competition with its disadvantages. It is supposed to save the teacher time and trouble—to work expeditiously—to work positively—and to work where nothing else will work. I doubt all this.

A common teacher who is ignorant of a single spring of human action—a blundering mechanic in his trade will, of course, at once rush to this expedient. It is the first instrument which lies in his way; but, in nine instances out of ten, the very necessity of applying it is created by himself. He combines accuser, judge, and executioner in his own person, and in his own cause; and he must not only be superior to most teachers, but to human nature, not to err. Accordingly, the fault is generally on his side, and, with the fault, the passion.* Children see their own interests as clearly as men, and are just as zealous and ingenious in their defence. Whilst the teacher promulgates his laws and penalties, the pupils form their secret confederacy; and laugh both to scorn. A public opinion of their own is set up, a completely contradictory code is established of morality and duty;—all friendly communication, all mutual confidence, all self-enquiry is at an end. The highest merit is to resist the common enemy, with success; the highest courage, to bear, like Spartans, rebuke, privation, and the tawse itself. The master is bewildered by these difficulties—he does not know where to begin, or where to end. He believes in a sort of inherent antipathy between masters and scholars—he sees hostility every where—he is disheartened, and flies more vehemently than ever to the very instrument by which all this has been produced. He takes the school in gross—he finds one boy stubborn, the other insolent, one violent, another peevish—he gives them all the simple

* “Monsieur de Vendôme disait plaisamment à ce sujet, que dans la marche des armées, il avait souvent examiné les querelles des mulets et des muletiers, et qu’à la honte de l’humanité, la raison était presque toujours du côté des mulets.”

Sangrado remedy of the birch. But the very nature of punishment thus abused, is to wear itself out; what was considered severe to-day, will require something still more severe to support it to-morrow. This, however, must somewhere end: and end it usually does, by leaving the master utterly powerless in the midst of his power, and the school so hardened to all applications of kindness and cruelty alike, that education of every kind becomes next to impracticable.

But how stand the pupils amongst themselves? are their moral relations improved? The little republic, if possible, is still more viciously conducted. A sort of brigand fidelity to the body is of course established, and spies, traitors, and informers are victimised without mercy; but there the morality ends. The league is set up by the boldest, and subdues the weakest. It is made to play chiefly for the advantage of the indolent and selfish, provided they be also the strong. Certain restraints, imposed by selfishness itself, may prevent, for mutual interest, collision and warfare amongst each other; but, with all this, might will be always right; and this one maxim, allowed to be reduced to practice, (and who inculcates it more strenuously than the master himself?) will lay the foundation of all vice. The "coward" will be irrecoverably planted in the heart of the feeble, and the "tyrant" in the heart of the strong. From this, an undue appreciation of brute physical qualities will arise in the one — recourse to the mean but necessary arts of cunning, in the other. Cruelty, and apathy, and selfishness, lying, duplicity, and calculating treachery, the natural serpent brood from this single egg, will all spring-up. Cowardice makes half the miserable and dishonourable men of the general world; and here it is permitted to pullulate without check or counterpoise from master or scholar.* And how can it be otherwise? It is

* This is no exaggeration. Follow this boy from school to college, and from thence to the world. The cause, of course, will be disguised, but the results, in every situation, will be the same. He will shrink from the blow in the school, and from the sneer in the college; in the world, he will be always in the train of the powerful, often of the bad. He will fear, in every thing, to avow and maintain his own judgments, he will take care conveniently to modify them by those of others. He will escape from promises into equivocations, and from equivocations into promises again. If an honest man is to be defended against the

impossible to keep inequality out of schools; there is necessarily inequality of age in all our schools; in our upper schools there is inequality of ranks. We all know to what a train of vices even this circumstance will necessarily conduct, unless checked by the most powerful moral motives. But here every possible encouragement is given to its display. Arrogant assumption of superiority, the most wretched vanity — proportionate ignorance naturally follow. The pupil, satisfied with these school pretensions, scarcely looks for any thing more. The successful bully soon finds, even amongst boys, flatterers, partisans, and at last a party; and the trade of after-life, with all its immorality and unhappiness, begins. To *talk* religion or morality, by way of counteracting all this, is utter hypocrisy, or utter imbecility. It will not do, it must necessarily fail; a lounge to chapel, or a chapter of St. Luke run over in haste, is no match for the whole of a boy's waking and sleeping thoughts. It is George Faulkner's single strawberry to half a dozen of wine, by way of a vegetable cure for the gout. The one is an incident, the other his entire being. Dogma may be learned; but morality, under such a system, remains untaught. What a boy wants are *good habits*, before *good reasoning*.

But this may seem an extreme statement, applicable only to extreme cases — to corporal, or at least to severe, punishment. But reproof — what evil can result from admonitory correction of public faults in public? We require examples — a salutary fear must be kept up, to prevent the extension of insubordination. No doubt the motive is excellent; but what are the means? Do examples of this kind produce such effects upon the bystanders? I feel the force of the proverb "proximus ardet," and the thousand and one charges of

oppressions of the many, he will put forward false pleas for his base apathy; or, if the outcry be too urgent, will turn round and hunt him with the crowd. He will take always the circuitous road, even to good. He will pay the price of his honour for wretched vanities, lie to defend his lies, and crawl in the very dust for the smile of men who he knows despise him, and whom he would despise if he dared. In fine, he will, through life, be the cheater and the cheated; a bully when yielded to, a sycophant when spurned. Whence is all this? He has no moral courage. And why none? He was robbed of it at school.

judges, on the salutary effects of hanging, on the community. But I see facts in opposition to philosophers' axioms and judges' charges; and I know that those very crimes, which hanging is most intended to repress in the great world, are engendered under the very shadow of the gallows itself. I see no reason why human nature should be different in the little world of a school. If the offender be unpitied, what a base spirit of selfish congratulation at security from punishment must exist in the bosom of his companions! the child who feels it "*est un enfant à écraser*," he ought to be punished himself. If the contrary, it is much to be feared that a secret indignation will grow up in the common heart, which sooner or later will break out into act. But what is its influence on the offender? If he does not deserve your reproof, he is stung with the wrong you do him; if he does, its whole effect is lost by its publicity; and not only no good is effected, but an injury, in addition, is inflicted. If you be a teacher, with pretensions to the name, you of course admit the inestimable value of sensibility. With it, the judicious hand can do every thing; without it, all you may do will be in vain. And with this conviction strongly in you, you deliberately set out by taking the surest means of blunting it, in your power. What wound, to a boy of delicate feelings, can be compared to the humiliation — the deep, soul-felt humiliation — of suffering before them, whose esteem he so ardently desires? He sinks under it, or these delicate feelings depart. You lose, in both cases, an influence the most effectual, and you lose it in exchange for what? for the prevention of some breach of order, some trifle of discipline; the enforcing of the real for the imaginary; for the accessory of morality, morality itself. You wish that your pupils should exercise that influence on each other's conduct, in your absence, which you exercise whilst present; and yet you yourself are the first to extinguish, or restrict its power. The school of such a teacher, it is possible, may present the appearance of a perfectly orderly establishment to a visiter: his frown may be respected, and his voice not willingly disobeyed; but there will be no confidence — no frankness — no life; it will be master and scholar, but not guide and disciple — no common interest —

no common cause. Give me the teacher whose silence weighs with the pain of a thousand reproofs, on a young and generous heart, and the friendly shake of whose hand sends him to his chamber, weeping tears such as have never yet been won by either rod or reproach.*

* The punishments substituted for the rod, in the French schools and colleges, "consistent à faire tenir l'enfant désobéissant dans un coin de la salle, debout ou à genoux; à l'empêcher d'aller à la récréation, à la promenade, ou chez ses parens; ou enfin, à lui donner des *pensums* (*pœnas*)."
(*Comte de Lasteyrie*.) But, though less degrading and liable to abuse, these may still be applied, by a capricious or violent teacher, to very vindictive purposes; they bear too close a resemblance to direct corporal punishment, and are specifically objectionable on other grounds. Why should kneeling, which is an act of religious reverence, be made a punishment? Why should industry and labour be associated with pain? Such a practice strikes directly at one of the most salutary portions both of intellectual and moral Education, the principle of "voluntary labour," adopted with so much success at Carlberg, and the schools of Hazlewood and Bruce Castle. So far from considering a boy happy because he has nothing to do, the pupils in these institutions fly, for relaxation and enjoyment, to occupation. In the prison of Philadelphia, by means of a similar system, employment is looked on as indulgence, and labour, so far from being a penalty, is hailed as a reward. If these habits and dispositions be valuable, as unquestionably they are, whatever tends to weaken them is an injury. If they be so firmly rooted as to make labour a pleasure, then its employment, in the way of chastisement, is obviously absurd. I question much, too, how far solitary confinement should be permitted. It acts very differently on different natures, and requires the nicest discrimination in its application. But every other punishment beyond this line, should clearly be prohibited. In the Jubilee school at Newcastle-on-Tyne, where upwards of 500 children of the working classes are educated, no monitor is allowed to strike, pull, hurt, or threaten any boy, or give or receive any thing from any boy; and, if he does, immediate complaint is made to the master. If no complaint be made, and the master discovers it, he punishes the boy who allows it equally with the monitor who transgresses. As a substitute for the rod, the system of *merit tickets* has been adopted. Little card tickets, twenty of which are equivalent to a penny, are given to monitors for assiduity, to boys for exemplary conduct, cleanliness, attendance, rapid improvement, &c., and are exchanged for money once a month. The forfeiture of a certain number of these tickets is the only punishment, so long as a boy has any to forfeit: it is only when he is bankrupt, that the rod is ever resorted to. The apprehension that it would tend to produce avaricious habits has not been realised. On the contrary, numerous instances of punctuality, kindness, and generosity have arisen from the practice. (See a very gratifying case, in a letter to *Professor Pillans*, Feb. 20. 1829.) In most of our schools, however, the usual expedient is taking places. Confined to purely intellectual purposes, this may be admissible; but, applied to moral, it is highly objectionable. It destroys all proportion between offences, operates most strongly on the most deserving, and defeats the very purpose for which such arrangement was intended—the furnishing the master, by means of the station which each boy holds in his class, with a sort of intellectual barometer,

If punishment, then, is to be used at all, let it be used, except in very rare cases, in private. There it will work all the good within its reach. Nor let the prohibitory code be so complicated and so crowded, as to expose to the chances of frequent transgression. The spirit, the spirit, is the great object; that secured, give yourself little pain about the rest. Least of all, let it not, after the example of more pretending legislation, create imaginary crimes, or crimes only such in reference to temporary or local circumstances, and graduated, for the most part, not according to their intrinsic depravity,

an accurate index, by which to judge of the slightest variations, from day to day, in his preparation and proficiency. This is utterly lost by turning a boy down, sometimes eight or nine places, for having loitered a few moments after school hours. After all, the best supplanter of the rod, and all ignominious chastisements, is a wish in the master's mind to get rid of it; gentleness and firmness, sympathy with the feelings, interest in the progress, and a truly parental concern for the present comfort and future welfare of the pupil. "Je veux," says old Charron, "qu'on les traite librement et libéralement, en employant la raison et les douces remontrances. Il y a je ne sais quoi de servile et de vilain en la rigueur et la contrainte, ennemie de l'honneur et vraie liberté. Il faut tout au contraire leur grossir le cœur d'ingénuité, de franchise, d'amour de vertu, et d'honneur." (*Ibid.* p. 591.)

Such was the secret of Pestalozzi. Nothing can be more touching than the picture of his establishment at Yverdon. "His children forgot that they had any other home, his teachers that there was any world beside the Institution. So great was the power which he exercised over the hearts of the children, that they generally left his room in tears, after having, with a kiss, promised him perseverance in their efforts to do well; or, if such efforts had not been made, amendment of life." — *Biber. Memoirs*, &c. p. 55—62.

Such also are the leading principle and practice of De Fellenberg. He first makes the child fully sensible of his friendship, and then works upon his heart. "We, ourselves," says a visiter to Hofwyl, "have seen this benevolent man in his establishment, as a father in his own family, caressing each little child as it passes by him, with one of the smallest, perhaps, perched upon his shoulder. When any of the children catch a glimpse of him, they will run to obtain the first grasp of his hand." See, also, the attachment and affection to Oberlin of his flock, whom he had blessed with industry and schools. The suppression of Père Girard's establishment very nearly produced an insurrection. In New England, the youngest children are to be seen waiting with impatience, not for the bell which dismisses them, but for that which summons them to school. (*Kentucky Report*, 53.) But why should we wander beyond our own shores? Can any account be more satisfactory and affecting than that given by Mr. Wilderspin, of the conduct of his pupils, during the last illness of his wife? (*Early Discipline Illustrated*, p. 22.) I know of no arguments more convincing, no eulogies more flattering, of the system just recommended, than these simple and beautiful facts.

but in reference solely to the prejudice or convenience of the lawgiver. A more serious insult to common sense, a more *direct injury to the virtue and understanding of your pupil, cannot be perpetrated. Not only is it rank injustice in itself, but it confounds all notions of justice or injustice. And yet, after having laboriously and cruelly taught this lesson for years together, to your pupil, you send him out into the world, and then talk to parents (as your prospectus requires) of "your excellent moral and religious Education."*

But if the propriety of punishment be so little questioned, it can hardly be expected that much suspicion can exist in the public mind, on the propriety of reward. The great merit of many schools, in the mind even of rational men, is the number and liberality of their prizes, medals, place-takings, &c. It is amusing to see such a scale applied, at least to moral Education. Emulation may excite to competition, and competition lead to exertion, and exertion terminate in success, — but so also may Fear. We have not to look to the results only, as has already been remarked, but to the causes which produce them. Is emulation to be encouraged? that is the entire of the question. If in itself good, there cannot possibly be any objection to its being serviceably employed. If otherwise, even though serviceable, the instrument should be discarded.

Emulation is a more dignified vanity, or envy—in its higher developements, undoubtedly it may, in great degree, be purified from such base alloy—but the danger of the abuse is great, and its corrupting effects most pernicious. No one vice is more completely opposed to those virtues which ought to be the especial characteristics of the youthful heart than envy. Frankness, generosity, elevation of character, soon shrink up, when once this withering canker has got into their blossoms. If there must be rivalry, let it be unprovoked. The stimulus is powerful enough, without our artificial additions. Nor is this the only evil. It is substituting a paltry principle of action for a noble one, teaching practically that there are not in the pursuit itself sufficient charms, and that we must rely, for progress in knowledge and goodness, not on goodness or knowledge themselves, but on miserable secondary considerations,

at the discretion of an individual. True it is, that such is the education of the world,—but it is one of those portions of its education, which, so far from seconding, we should rather endeavour to counteract. *The time will come fast enough, when the prize will have far more influence with us, than the manner by which it was won.*

But Education, as it now is organised, cannot work on without these excitements. Perhaps so—but this is only another amongst many reasons for re-organising Education. I question much, however, whether this be really the case. It is certainly not a necessary deduction from the character of the youthful mind. These excitements will not be required, if not proffered. Unless the pupil be first vitiated by their application, he will not feel their loss. If he must have *competitors*, make him compete with *himself*. Let him compare to-day with yesterday—this month with the last. It will only be an extension of his system of self-inquiry. Let him triumph in the victory over this, or that passion—let him enjoy the acquisition of this, or that science. It will suffice. These are triumphs without alloy—pleasures which will last. Do I ascribe too much heroism to the young pupil—do I draw too much upon what ought to be, with too little reference to what is? I merely urge the extension of a change, as practicable as it is just. It is fact. It has been tried—wherever tried, it has been with the most signal success. *

* * Mr. Zellweger, the pupil of De Fellenberg, has established, in the Canton of Appenzel, a series of schools, in which the only encouragements held out to children is this internal approbation. He is seconded by the governors of the schools, and, amongst others, by Pestalozzi's disciple Kruesi. But need we go farther than a well-ordered prison or penitentiary, that of Ghent, Philadelphia, for instance, and to some few amongst our own? Labour, regularity, cleanliness, what in our schools are effort and pain, requiring not only these stimulants of emulation and recompense to enforce them, are here, in these receptacles of the most degraded and hardened of our species, their own "exceeding great reward;" and so efficient, particularly occupation, that its *privation*, says the Governor of the Maison de Force, at Ghent, "is penalty sufficient to keep ninety-nine out of a hundred orderly and attentive." Similar testimony is borne by visitors to the Philadelphia prisoners, and by Mr. Buxton to those of Bury, Newgate, the Millbank Penitentiary, &c. &c. (*Prison Discipline*, p. 115.) And yet we complain of the difficulty of rousing pure and gentle children; and talk of the utility, of the *absolute necessity* of our prize-and-medal stimulants, our emulative-competition system!

Habits then, but habits produced, and cultivated to their full vigour, by the processes just recommended, are the forces which we must create, if we desire to impress a salutary direction upon the Will. But one only of these processes, the cultivation of the feelings, has yet been considered. The cultivation of the feelings must be accompanied by the instilment of sound principles. Sound principles are the result of Religious and Moral Instruction.

In teaching Religion and Morality, we naturally look for the best code of both. Where is it to be found? There are many excellent. No nation has been without gleamings of the light, in the noon of its darkness; without occasional vouchsafings, from Providence, of the truth. Yet the merit even of the purest is relative. They were wonderful for the time, singular in the nation; their glory is to have anticipated, or to have approached, the best. But where is that best to be found? Where, but in the Holy Scriptures? Where, but in that speaking and vivifying code, teaching by deed, and sealing its doctrines by death, are we to find that law of Truth, of Justice, of Love, which has been the thirst and hunger of the human heart, in every vicissitude of its history. From the mother to the dignitary, this ought to be the Book of Books; it should be laid by the cradle and the death-bed; it should be the companion and the counsellor, and the consoler, the Urim and Thummim, the light and perfection of all earthly existence. But, in earnestly insisting on the teaching, I am not insensible to the manner in which it should be taught. On this depends every thing — this it is, which makes it good or bad. It is not enough to teach the Scriptures; we must remember *whom* we are to teach, and by *what* instruments we are to teach. We are to teach children, and very young children. We are to teach by the means which God has put into our hands. These means are not extraordinary, they are human intellects and human affections, but though the same in each, they are not equally developed in the man and in the child. Each must be addressed differently — each in reference to his own actual condition, if we expect that each should feel and each understand. A child is all sensation, therefore materialises, localises more rapidly than we do; we

spiritualise and abstract with more rapidity than a child. There are, therefore, different routes to the same common end. The ideas of every human being are limited by his experience; a child's are very contracted—ours the reverse. Yet we can only build with the materials we have got: to comprehend new ideas, we can only employ the ideas which we have. A child's vocabulary is even more circumscribed than its ideas, a man's more enlarged; yet through vocabularies only can we come at ideas, through words only can we be taught what others feel and understand. Change the statement as we may, to this position we must come at last. This is the point where all these statements must end. Had we the making of the young spirit, we might have ordered it differently; but such it is, and as it is we must take it, and manage it as we can. Now let us apply these principles to Scripture teaching. Are the ideas of a great portion of the Scriptures such as are familiar to a child? is the language in any analogy with his actual intellectual condition? in a word, will any teacher acquainted with Scripture knowledge and mental science conscientiously declare, that a child can feel or understand either this language, or these ideas? Hence it has always appeared to me a perfect contradiction, or a gross degree of ignorance, the placing the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible, in the hands of youth. The intentions may have been excellent, but there is a total misapprehension of the means. It is right it should penetrate, but the best way to make it penetrate, is not to drive in the wedge by the broad end first. Nor is it only that by such a process we communicate no knowledge and no feeling—that for things we give words, and for religion its mockery: this is only omission of good; and were this all, there might be palliation. But this is not all: positive and enduring evil is effected. Children form their associations with a rapidity quite marvellous—they form them in despite of their teachers, in despite of themselves. A child who meets obscurity where he ought to meet light, and pain where he ought to find pleasure, recollects the difficulty, and fears the pain, in after-life; and these associations cling, no matter what others follow, for ever after to his Scripture reading. Is this just, is this moral, is this

religious? No teacher, no minister of the Gospel, truly such, would, I am convinced, for a moment wish to overlay Scripture knowledge with such egregious disadvantages. But ought he to risk the chances? Ought he to raise a barrier in childhood, which he cannot be certain he will be able to remove in after-life? Is he not accountable, by such a course, for all the indifference, and disgust, and ignorance, which must necessarily ensue. Is this teaching Gospel truth? Is it not rendering such teaching *impracticable*.

What, then, is to be done? and how is it to be done? Follow the law of God and nature. The Scriptures are to be taught—but, to be taught, nature peremptorily declares they must be *understood*. *Such parts* only as can be understood should then become the subject of Scripture teaching. There must then be *selection*, consequently *exclusion*. But the selection must be guided by two rules:—1. Perfect adaptation to the capacity of the child.* 2. As little variation as possible from the order and phraseology of the text.† The first

To adapt to the understanding of a child, three rules must be observed:—1. The idiom of the Bible, where not intelligible from the language itself or its allusions, must be translated into the idiom of the child. 2. Connection must be preserved; additions, therefore, will become requisite, but short, and containing nothing but what is clearly warranted by the other parts of scripture. On the other hand, passages must occasionally be omitted, either as inappropriate to the understanding of a child, or not connected with the passage in question. Transposition also, where clearness demands it, should be resorted to. 3. These extracts being completed, they should be divided into as small portions as the nature of the subject may permit, in order to give the child an opportunity of fully mastering each subject.

† In translating the idiom of the Bible into the idiom of the child, we should always remember that it should be a *mere* translation; the substitution of a more intelligible language for a less; it should never amount to a *gloss*, or *commentary*. There is another motive also for this scrupulous adherence,—the exceeding beauty of our English translation. “J’ai toujours regardé comme une calamité pour la France,” says Cousin, “qu’au seizième siècle, ou au commencement du dix-septième, quand la langue Française était encore naïve, flexible et populaire, quelque grand écrivain, Amiot, par exemple, n’ait pas traduit les Saintes Ecritures. Ce serait un excellent livre à mettre entre les mains de la jeunesse, tandis que la traduction de Sacy, d’ailleurs pleine de mérite, est diffuse et sans couleur. Celle de Luther mâle et vive, répandue d’un bout à l’autre de l’Allemagne, y a beaucoup fait pour le développement de l’esprit moral et religieux, et l’éducation du peuple.” *Rapport*, p. 8. It was, in fact, this translation of Luther’s which determined the genius of the German language. The Italian (Diodati’s) and Spa-

implies both *note and comment*, either *vivâ voce* from the master, or in print, and of the two the latter is more accurate, uniform, and steady, therefore, preferable;—the second, the adoption of the very words of Scripture, when they are not unintelligible, or to a child inexplicable. Both these rules must, of course, vary in proportion to the age and understanding of the pupil. As Education proceeds, the sacred volume itself may be entrusted to their study and inquiry, but the student will come to its perusal with *far different* preparation, both of mind and heart, from what he would have brought with him under any other process.*

nish are not much better than Sacy's. Yet they ought not to have been so. The early Italian is full of naïveté and vigour in the pages of Villani; the Spanish not less so in their old romances. St. Jerome could not have had these advantages. The Latin was not in its youth, but in its old age and degeneracy, when he completed the Vulgate.

* "The Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible;" the "signal shout," as it is termed, to which all Protestant Christians should rally; pithy, epigrammatic: but how does it hang together? What does it mean?

"*The Bible.*" Granted: it was given to all, and should be read by all who can read and understand. Why should they read? to be directed. Can they be directed without comprehending? If so, one Bible is as good as another; a Latin Bible is as good as an English. If not, the first essential is comprehension. It is absolutely necessary that the child should understand.

"*The whole Bible.*" Can a child of ten years old understand the *whole* Bible? Let us, for a moment, try it—let us pass from assertions to facts. Open the sacred writ—the Old Testament, for instance. Take the cleverest scriptural pupil you can find, use all the note and comment you please (you discard both), what meaning will he attach to such passages as Ezekiel, ch. xvi. and xvii., full, no doubt, of the noblest Oriental imagery; or to ch. xl. xli. &c. &c., wholly architectural; or to Isaiah, ch. iii. xlvi. and xlvii., which require *some* knowledge of Eastern habits to be barely intelligible; or to the peculiar *Arabian* scenery of Job, ch. xxxix.—xli.; or to the almost Persian luxury of the Song of Solomon, ch. i. ver. 6—14., ch. iv. ver. 3, 4., ch. v. ver. 12. &c.; or to the pregnant wisdom of the Proverbs, implying such frequent references to ancient manners, or to such allusions as those of Psalms, lx. ver. 8. or cxxxiii. ver. 2. which, beautiful as they are, must present only ludicrous images to a child. But the Prophets, &c. may perhaps be too difficult. Pass then to the Pentateuch: what explanation can he give of the laws of leprosy, or of the ritual of the Jews, or of their geography, or of their pedigrees, or of their families? What is his idea of the object of Deuteronomy, ch. xxii. ver. 9—12., or of Numbers, ch. v., or of a thousand other passages explicable to a man, but perfectly beyond the habitual ideas of a child. Of the historical Books I say nothing, taking it for granted (which is by no means certain), that they are all perfectly clear. Here is a large portion of Sacred Writ, and I have taken the first passages I opened,

If religious and moral teaching could be strictly confined to the generalities of Christianity, no difficulty could be ap-

and purposely omitted many others much more difficult or exceptionable. What is to be done? Is a child to read all this, or is he not? If not, what becomes of the *whole* Bible? If he is, he reads what he certainly cannot understand. And why should he not? say the advocates of the *whole* Bible. "There are difficulties we admit, but they are as inexplicable to the most learned priest, as to the most ignorant peasant. There are difficulties in the volume of Nature. But as it is the case, that although the navigator may not be able to comprehend the laws which regulate the celestial bodies, yet can he be led by their salutary influence to the port of his destination, &c. ; so it is the case, that there is enough of Scripture level to the comprehension of all, to conduct them, &c. &c., to the glory and to the blessedness of heaven." (*Speech of the Reverend D. Bagot, Belfast Guardian*, Jan. 20. 1832.) But this is a surrender of the entire question. Because there are some difficulties common to *all*, the child is to be still farther oppressed with the additional difficulties peculiar to a *child*, and which are only such *because* he is still a child! The difficulties of the "volume of nature" are not thus treated; they are reserved for an age in which, having attained the full developement of his mental powers, the pupil can easily solve them of himself. What should we think of a master who should excuse the absurdity of making children read Euclid, on the plea that there were points in the definitions which still puzzled our ablest mathematicians? What should we think of a navigator not being allowed to look at a chart, unless he consented to read the whole of *La. Place*? There is "enough," doubtless, in the Scripture, level to the comprehension of all, and it is precisely this "enough" which we would select; but why embarrass it with what is more than enough? with what, to the child at least, can be of no utility? Admitted, says a second party; but neither can it be of any harm. Perhaps not; it may be merely absurd; just as judicious as binding up the six books of Euclid with his four arithmetical rules. But are we sure that it will not be of any harm? Are half-caught meanings, imaginary opinions, sectarian distinctions, badges of division, and seeds of discord, of no harm? All this it has produced, and much more. And if it be even doubtful, whether it will produce it, or not, have we a right to risk it? But a third party, bolder than either, steps in, and declares that the child actually *does* understand; that there is a special vouchsafing on these occasions; a sort of semi-inspiration for that particular purpose. This is a miracle: as decided an interruption of the laws which regulate the intellectual, as Joshua's stopping of the Sun was of those which rule the physical world. With miracles we have nothing, of course, to do. Produce the example; bring forward your witnesses; prove the facts; and we shall then believe; but not before. I conclude, therefore, that "the whole Bible" (as far as popular instruction is in question) means either, the Bible *without* understanding it, or so *much only* (pars pro toto) of the Bible as a child can perfectly understand.

"*And nothing but the Bible.*" I do not believe that a single man ever yet read the Bible in this manner. If so, he read it as no man reads any other book. I find a difficulty; I look for an explanation. I seek it in my own

prehended, even where various sects of Christians were assembled together, from the general perusal of the Scriptures.

mind. If I do not find it there, I look to my neighbour's. He suggests, he elucidates, he gives me "note and comment," I care not whether I find it at the bottom of my page, or on his lips; whether I receive it by the eyes, or ears: all I know is, that I receive it. It may be orthodox, or it may not; all I know is, that it is something more than the text. Do children, in this particular, differ from men? What then becomes of "and *nothing* but the Bible."

In all this, I am not so presumptuous as to rely upon my own opinion. I can call in opinions to which even these gentlemen must bow—their own. "We have chosen our motto, and will abide by it," says the Reverend James Morgan, Moderator of the Synod of Ulster. 'The Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible.' But, my Lord, we are not to suppose it is the mere reading of the Bible that renders it thus effectual. It is *acquaintance* with the Bible. It is good that it be read; that it be committed to memory; but it is better" (better, indeed!) "to obtain acquaintance with it. On this point I have said the Kildare Street Society appeared to be defective. It compromised the *explanation* in order to secure the *reading* of them." (*Speech in the Belfast Guardian*.) The whole Bible, and *acquaintance* with it! *Explanation*, and *nothing* but the Bible! How well they hang together!

But there were advocates for the Bible before the Reverend Mr. Morgan, and there are other Protestant countries besides Ulster. What is their opinion and practice? In Italy and France, we, of course, expect to meet (they are Catholic states) with "selections," and "abridgments," and "mutilations," such as "La Bible de Royaumont," "L'Esprit de l'Ecriture Sainte," "Histoires Bibliques," &c., and to hear such instructions as the following: "La meilleure lecture est, sans contredit, celle de l'Ecriture Sainte, des *morceaux choisis* de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament, des livres entiers de la Bible, surtout des Evangelies. Il est utile de traiter ces lectures avec l'ensemble nécessaire pour *faire comprendre* la sagesse des révélations successives," &c. (*Manuel de l'Inst. Prim.*) But what do Protestant countries, and Protestant teachers think? What is the opinion of Geneva, Berne—of Pestalozzi, De Fellenberg, &c.? Pestalozzi's principle (it is exceedingly well developed by Biber, *Memoirs*, p. 459.) was, in the first instance, to make use of a "Child's Bible," or a *Selection* of narratives, "which together would constitute a well-connected course of Scripture, *embodying* such *doctrinal* portions as are within the compass of the *child's comprehension*." De Fellenberg insists strenuously on the necessity of basing all instruction upon the essential principles and conditions of the Gospel, which ought to be, as he elsewhere expresses it, "the object of all our wishes and our greatest exertions." (*Letter to Mr. Duppa*.) But how does he effect it? A clergyman of each church inculcates in his establishment its *peculiar* tenets, and performs divine worship after the manner prescribed by his ritual. What is the result? "The very spirit thus becomes *thoroughly* imbued with, and *sensibly alive* to, religious feeling, while all ideas of intolerance are banished. The Gospel was to bring peace on earth and good-will towards man, and in that spirit does M. de Fellenberg teach it." (*Education of the English Peasantry*, p. 59.) In the Protestant school of

But where this is impracticable, there is no alternative, but to separate the different persuasions, or to leave the reading of

Lenzburg a sifilar course is adopted. "Nos premières leçons se rattachent," says its superior, "à une *choix des textes* de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament dont nous *signalons* l'intérêt et l'importance à nos jeunes élèves." It is only when preparing for confirmation that they are permitted to read "*quelques livres entières des Saintes Ecritures.*" The Catholic pupils are treated in precisely the same manner as at Hofwyl. (*Notice sur la Maison d'Education dans la Château de Lenzbourg*, 1833; pp. 22—24.) So much for Calvinistic Protestantism! Now for Lutheran. "Les Saintes Ecritures, avec l'Histoire Biblique, qui les explique, et la catechisme qui les résume," says Cousin, (*Rapport*, p. 3.) "doivent être la bibliothèque de l'enfance et des écoles primaires:" so they are in Frankfort, Saxe-Weimar, Saxony, Prussia, &c.; but "la Bible n'est pas *entière, comme vous le supposez bien,*" &c. In the Duchy of Saxe-Weimar, where education is in the hands of the Lutheran clergy, Hübner's Bible Histories are used, and we find that the Bible is read only *in part* (being confined to the text of the sermon for the following Sunday), always read with *explanations*, by the *middle and higher* classes exclusively, and only *twice* a week. (*Cousin, Rapport*, p. 42—44.) In Prussia, the instructions given in the Normal school at Potsdam to the teachers are, "Eveillez et développez l'esprit religieux et le sentiment moral. A cet effet, les *histoires et paraboles* de la Bible sont d'une grande utilité. La lecture fréquente, et l'*explication raisonnée* de la Bible sont *très-nécessaires.*" Accordingly, they have such books as would in Ulster be called "mutilations." "The Manifestation of God in the Histories of the Old Testament," "The Life of Jesus Christ *after* the Four Evangelists," and "The History of the Apostles *after* St. Luke," Krumacher's Bible Catechism, &c. &c. (*Rapport*, p. 365.) A similar system is adopted in Holland. In America, especially the northern parts, there are "Abridgments," "Extracts," "Mutilations," &c. without number. But are there none in this country? What are our Bible Stories, History of the Bible, by Mrs. Trimmer, &c. &c., not to mention the late publications of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian Knowledge? So far from regarding "the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible," essential to a Scriptural education, the Committee on Education in 1818 express "the greatest satisfaction in observing, that, in many schools where the National System had been adopted, an increasing degree of liberality prevailed, and that the Church Catechism was only taught, and attendance at the established place of public worship *only required of those* whose parents belong to the *establishment*; due assurance being obtained that the children of sectaries shall learn the *principles* (Roman Catholics are specifically mentioned), and attend the ordinances of religion, according to the *doctrine and forms* to which *their families are attached.*" Where "the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible," has been retained, the results are far from satisfactory. The child gets as far as Leviticus by the time he leaves school, and there he is left for the remainder of his life. In Scotland, indeed, it is still pertinaciously adhered to. "The old and inveterate practice," says Professor Pillans, "of our country schools is to read the Bible *straight forward* from the beginning of Genesis, or, if they deviate, it is to pick out some chapter of proper names, which cannot possibly have any meaning, by way of

the Scriptures to separate, or out-of-school, hours, under the direction of the pastors of the respective communions. Each of these expedients has been adopted, according to the temper of the people or the peculiarities of the case, in different countries.* In these countries, but especially in Ireland, where forgetfulness of sectarian distinctions, and brotherly union of all persuasions, is so desirable, for the cause of a common country, as well as of a common Christianity, any arrangement which tends to perpetuate these distinctions, or to preclude this union, is undoubtedly to be deprecated. To class our national schools under partial designations of Protestant, and Catholic, and Presbyterian, is a contradiction.

puzzle, or as a proof of skill and proficiency. One of these is the almost incredible, yet very common, absurdity of assuming the tenth of Nehemiah as a test of proficiency in reading." But what is the Professor's opinion on this enlightened system of scriptural education? "It would be idle," says the Professor, "to dwell on the *unreasonableness* of such a plan of initiatory instruction. You will find *most* teachers" (and no one knows them better) "either fully aware of the objections to it" (even in Scotland), "or if, as is oftener the case, they never thought of the matter, open at least to conviction." Accordingly, we find his correspondents from various parts of the country assuring him of a gradual change in this practice. "I am happy to say," writes one of the most intelligent, "that both it (the Shorter Catechism), the Proverbs, and the New Testament, have, within the last two years, been discontinued as regular school-books." p. 118. And what is the alteration Professor Pillans himself suggests? "Assuredly," says he, "both from the New Testament and the Old *passages* might be *selected* of plain and interesting narrative, and of simple and beautiful morality, which, with the *running commentary* of a judicious preceptor, could not fail to arrest the attention, inform the understanding, and improve the heart of a child." But this would be "mutilation," and "note and comment." Such a backsliding, though it might be approved by Bishop Warburton, would not be tolerated in Ireland.

What, then, are we to conclude? That the Protestants of Ulster are more Protestant than Protestantism itself, and that their "signal call," "the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but the Bible," has few echoes except within the precincts of their own polemical camp. But it is idle to argue, when we are met only by the same eternal assertions. "Dis-moi un peu tes raisons." "Tarte à la crème!" "Mais il faut expliquer ta pensée, il me semble." "Tarte à la crème, Madame! Que trouvez vous là à redire?" "Moi, rien. Tarte à la crème."

* We shall see later how these objects have been effected, and what have been their results, in the "Ecoles Mixtes" of France and the Netherlands, in the "Simultan Schulen" of Prussia, &c., in the "Common Schools" of America, under the head of the respective countries.

By becoming sectarian, they cease to be national. By thus parcelling out our people in lots, by thus keeping them “parqués,” in their respective pasturages, we recognise a sort of inherent incompatibility; we tell the child that it is in his nature and in his duty to live apart and hostile: we grow Protestants, and we grow Catholics, for future conflicts; and lest, if confided to their own untutored feelings, they should seek in religion only that in which all agree, we take care to point their attention to that in which each differs. We convert into a law of hate what Heaven gave us as a law of love, and degrade seminaries for the universal mind of the country into rival garrisons for a faction. Half our animosities arise from ignorance of each other: we imagine every thing evil, for we are not allowed, either by our own passions, or by those of others, to discover what is really good. “We hate,” as Schiller says, “until we love.” The moment we come into contact, these phantasms disappear. We find that we are each of us much about the same kind of human beings and British citizens we should have been had we been born under opposite creeds and opinions. But it is some time before these discoveries are made; and of how many evils, and of what evils, is this separation and this ignorance in the interval productive! What years of distrust and dissension, how many generations of misery and crime, has it not sent forth from its prolific womb! We have seen these things, but seen them very late. We have attacked the consequences—but the causes are not yet extinguished. It is easy to pass the sponge over the statute book, but not so easy to pass it over the human heart. The sufferers and the combatants are still alive; it is to those who have been neither—to that generation who were *born free*, and not to the freed-man—to that yet untainted generation which is now rising up about us—that the country has chiefly to look. But this will be in vain, if the legislature anathematises the principle, and yet permits the practice. It will be a vain task to preach the union of manhood, if we continue to teach children separation. If we would make the country one, we must begin by gathering up its fragments while they are yet soft. Thanks to our original nature, unsectarian, unpolitical, unsophisticated as it always is, until corrupted by man, this is not difficult.

Children, if left to themselves, will naturally unite. Their animosities and prejudices are not *theirs*, but their *fathers'*. Such mixture of sects and classes is the true discipline, by which these pernicious tendencies should be counteracted. There is no place like a school, to teach universal sympathy, unadulterated Christian benevolence, — I will not say (for it is a very unchristian word) toleration.* Separate at present our children; and the next generation will exhibit all the errors and passions of the old races over again. The Protestant school will turn out its annual show of Protestants — the Catholic schools, its rival batch of Catholics; just in the same manner as an aristocratic school shapes its Exclusives, or a corporation school begets its Aldermen and Police magistrates. The age and country want Englishmen and Irishmen. Nationalism, not Sectarianism, should be the first article of our common charter.

But are the especial tenets of each particular faith to be sacrificed or neglected — that which is their Christianity — that by which they are what they are — God forbid! Each believer should believe what he likes, and as much as he likes (belief is not so common that we should quarrel much about the quality or quantity), nor is it less fitting that he should know what he believes, and why he believes it. A period in Education not only admits reasoning on such subjects, and inquiry, but demands it.† Enough of this, by all

To tolerate, is to bear—to endure what cannot be avoided, and as long only as it cannot be avoided. It is giving as grace, what is demanded as right; giving only, when it can no longer be withheld. It is the expediency of the politician, the insulting condescension of the superior. A Christian should not “tolerate” a Christian. Christ said he should “love” him. A citizen should not be satisfied with the toleration of his fellow-citizen. He who permits may refuse, he who “tolerates” to-day, may oppress to-morrow.

† But by no means at first. Religion beginning with Sentiment, and not, as Rousseau asserts, with Reason, its early education should be analogous. All exercises tending to develop Sentiment should therefore be encouraged; proofs should not be ventured till the rational faculties are sufficiently strong to receive them. Proofs suppose doubts, and are often more effective in creating, than in dissipating them. In affecting to submit to the judgment of a child what is obviously beyond his apprehension, we deceive him and ourselves, and habituate him early to rely solely on authority, or to pronounce without sufficient knowledge to guide him. Whatever you say, it is *you* he believes: you think to enlighten

means; but at the proper time—in the proper place—above all, in the proper manner. Common sense and common charity will not seek to protestantise, no more than it would relish to be catholicised itself. Reciprocity — but true and downright reciprocity — Catholico-Protestant“ reciprocity — no “universal liberty” all on one side. As much of your own food for your own taste as you like, but no forcing it upon that

his faith—he has no faith but in you. He does not require that the existence of a God should be demonstrated: he can conceive a cause, for he feels an effect; and his eternity, immensity, immateriality, are to his understanding as yet inexplicable. Even we ourselves have constantly to struggle between the two tendencies — our imagination, which invests every thing with form, and our reason, which denies its existence. Even in the explanation of the moral attributes of the Deity, we are not sufficiently careful. We put forward a God of terrors, much oftener than a God of love. But fear has a very injurious effect on tender childhood; and it is a cruelty thus to trouble the security and happiness of an age which is so innocent and so very short. When the child thus sees his power and justice called in, on every occasion, to enforce duty, he suspects an artifice, and thinks that, under the disguise of the will of God, we only contend for our own. It is to a God of goodness, to the Father of all being, the Giver of all good gifts, that he should be encouraged to look up — to Jesus receiving little children, to the Saviour raising from the dead the widow's son. If these first doctrines of all belief be difficult to teach, how much more doubtful the expediency of expounding peculiar dogmas? To make a child repeat, word by word, a series of obscure phrases, such as generally compose our catechisms, which can have no sort of connection with any ideas already in his mind, is not to instruct but to disgust him. The very accuracy necessary to be preserved in articles of faith, alarms: a mixture of terror and listlessness takes hold of his young spirit; a gloom and dimness spread over all his religious impressions. What accuracy in repeating creeds can compensate for such an effect? But are we not to teach? certainly we are; but, as I said before, in analogy with the *existing* condition of the child. To this nothing can be better suited than the *historic* teaching of the Bible, aided by the constant exercise of the *feeling* of religion. These histories embrace all the chief articles of faith, all the great moral and religious duties: they satisfy the imagination, as well as understanding, of childhood: they excite, and they gratify, and they imprint. I doubt much, whether the precepts of the Scripture should ever be presented otherwise. Example goes much farther with children, than didactics. But, above all, let there be sympathy and interest in every thing. Mothers, in this particular, have great advantages. If they have an all-important duty, they have also an all-powerful instrument with which to perform it. “When what is sacred,” says Richter, “in the heart of a mother addresses itself to what is sacred in the heart of a child, it is impossible they should not understand and answer each other.” But why not prolong this maternal education as long as possible? Why not make it the education of our schools?

of others, unless you can give with it your own taste also. Remember the fable of the Fox and the Crane: they both gave good dinners, but not for mixed company. As to the good which has been done, is to be done, and must be done, by this compulsory benevolence, I only ask, can benevolence be compulsory? Hence, all attempts at compelling, or insidiously smuggling in, your pet interpretations should be denounced. You have no right to set your polemical spring-guns and soul-traps in this way, on the manor of another. The prohibition of all interpretation, is just as bad. It is an absolute misnomer. Instead of none, it means any. When no rule is laid down, it does not follow there will be none; on the contrary, it leaves it in the power of the teacher, or, what is still worse, of the pupil, to take up the very first interpretation he meets. The very absence of interpretation may be proselytism; the simple reading of the scriptures, may be downright sect.* All this may be defended; but it will be defended in the sense of the aggressor. It may be explained away; but nothing in the instruction of childhood should require explanation. I dare say it is supreme in religious tactics, but I am not for Proselytism but Education.

Let every child, then, have the Christianity which he demands, and can digest, and let him have it frankly, as well as well as abundantly. This is his right; he is a man and a Christian. But this cannot be given by our common school-master. He is incompetent, intellectually and religiously. We all know too well the sort of man-of-all-work he generally is, to expect from him any thing beyond the straightforward task-hearing of the catechism; we all know his church creed. All goes on very liberally, as long as he keeps to "true no-meaning," to generalities — but the moment he descends to particulars — to dogmas, the teacher disappears, and the partisan starts up. Do I blame the man? Not at all. I cannot conceive him otherwise. I cannot imagine that perfect stoic between contending faiths, neutralised to inflexible impartiality by their well-balanced opposition — that semi-

* Evidence of Captains Gordon and Pringle before the Irish Commissioners of Education. *Report*, 18.

Catholic, semi-Protestant — that “*concordia discors*” of Establishment and Dissent, which, like the Demos of the ancient painter, unites in the same person all diversities, and is equally indifferent to all, which the existence of so perfect a monster would imply. If such exist in human nature, he is a very abstract personage; for I doubt much whether he is to be found in English, Scotch, or Irish. The man cannot suspend his creed: he cannot put off his mind. Each faith has undoubtedly a right to apprehend the experiment; each church has good motive to look to other pastors “for the feeding of its lambs.” These pastors are to be found — each church provides them; they are the constituted guardians of their respective beliefs. Education qualifies them for the duty, and Christianity, whatever be its form, inculcates the performance. To none, then, can the Religious Education of youth, in this advanced stage, with more propriety be intrusted, than to those who are, “*ex virtute officii*,” the religious instructors of youth. It is an important department of their ministry, from which they should not be excluded, and from which they cannot, without direct dereliction of duty, retire.* Nor can I well conceive what legitimate objection can be made to this division of religious and intellectual Education — this apportioning of special hours and places to scriptural instruction. What is studiously sought after in other studies, why should it be avoided in this? The very essence of *all* well-ordered Education is strict and minute classification of labour. I might go farther, and say, that to this division and regularity intellectual labour is in all cases chiefly indebted for its acquisitions. Reading Scripture at particular hours is only an additional security, that the reading will be conducted with *attention* and *punctuality*. Allowing other studies

* The Clergy have their duty to perform, but they have also their rights. The most important branch of education belongs to them; they ought reciprocally to be associated in its general direction and support. Even in France, where they have been hostile or indifferent, they have been anxiously invited, under the new Code, to take their part. The apprehensions which may have been once entertained are not now allowed to interfere. “*Aujourd’hui le clergé est vaincu*,” says Cousin, “*le temps de le menager en le contenant est arrivé*.” How this may be best effected, with reciprocal regard to the interests both of the clergy and the state, is judiciously pointed out in his *Rapport*, p. 255.

to mingle with it, must necessarily neutralise and confuse. So far from limiting the extent of Gospel Education, or in any degree curtailing its salutary effects, such arrangements eminently tend not only to remove all obstacles arising from difference of persuasion, but add materially to the weight and efficacy, which every wellwisher to true Gospel instruction must assuredly have in view.

Such is the Religious Education which I would endeavour to secure, not only for the individual, but for every class, from the highest to the lowest in the land — an Education, which, even in its rude and incipient state, already breaks up old habits of recklessness and profligacy, and prepares for that “new man” of order and forethought, of moral and mental dignity, without which I am firmly convinced there is no pervading or enduring civilisation for any community. Nor is it confined within the limits of its own immediate operation. Its secondary effects are still more remarkable than its primary. “For every one whom such an Education converts,” says one whose enthusiasm for the great cause of religious instruction is only equalled by his experience of its salutary effects *, “it may, by its reflex operation, civilise a hundred. It is thus that Christianity elevates the general standard of morals, and so spreads a beneficent influence far and wide, among the many, beyond the limits of its own proper and peculiar influence on the few.” Without such aid, without “this purifying and preserving salt,” there is no soundness in any country. Morals die with religion, and even our more economic virtues sooner or later drop off with that on which they grew. True religious education, far deeper than sectarianism, far wider, is also more powerful in its re-organising effects. It has to do, not with factions, but with the nation, not with transitory or local pretensions, but with real and inward strength, with the natural and enduring character of man. It is transfusible into every duty — harmonises with every situation; it is morality — it is honour — it is patriotism — in their high and holy sense. It is man engaged in the exercise of the loftiest of his powers — in the

most important of his duties, and for the noblest of his ends.

But religious instruction must still be accompanied by moral. The general injunctions of religion should be reduced to their particular and local applications. We should be taught not merely, that we ought to be religious and moral; but in what, applied to this or that situation, to its several duties and functions, religion and morality consists. This most essential branch of Education has, of all others, been least attended to. We send out our youth into the walks of active life, with a general sense of right and wrong; but the specific interpretation, the right or wrong of this or that position, under this or that circumstance, is seldom inquired into, never taught. We are told that Education is intended to form us for society, and yet we are actually educated, as if we had to pass our whole life in a cell. We are told, Be just, be generous, be true: but who tells us, Be a patriotic citizen, a paternal landlord, an honest tradesman, an attached tenant; who attempts to point out to us, in what these qualities consist? To talk of the morality of patriotism appears almost as absurd to some, as to descant on the beauty of mathematics; yet mathematics have their beauty. And shall we say that Patriotism, the virtue which ought to combine all others, should not be virtuous—should not be moral—should have no code—no principle—should be left to the shifting of the political elements—should be the guess-work creation of the passing hour? There is a Patriotism, indeed, of which the world has never wanted bitter proof; a patriotism which has made the very name loathsome; a patriotism; whose beginning, middle, and ending is self; which values country in proportion as it can sell it, and party in proportion as it can use or betray it; stitched up of puny expedients for a despicable popularity—a popularity which its object himself esteems in proportion only as he can coin it into power or gold. In the language of such patriots, all words change their meaning: tyranny becomes liberty, and defeated trafficking, honesty; and chartered insolence, courage; and rapacious profusion, sacrifice; and idolatry to self, devotion to the public; and rehearsed cant, religion; and ever-shifting change, fide-

lity to a common cause. All this is of the trade—the legerdemain—by which the people in all times, from Catiline to Marat, have been cheated of their better selves. But thank God! there is something better worth living and contending for than all this. If such were *necessarily* to be the whole game of public life, happy the man who knew only of the game or the gamesters from the loopholes of his distant retreat. Public life proposes far nobler ends, and, I trust, also far surer as well as juster means. “To read your history in a nation’s eyes,” is something; to feel that posterity will not reverse the award, is more. The approbation which speaks, not in shouts, but in “the still small voice” of honourable men; that approbation which was not bought, which never will be sold, and which cannot be taken away;—such approbation is worth ambition. It is associated with the virtues; it is given by the just, to the good. To aim at such—but far more at the virtues by which it is to be attained,—no matter whether it shall be attained or not; this is the purport of true patriotism. It looks to realities, and not to names; to the “*esse quam videri*,” to serve country and posterity, even though they should never know, by whom they were served. True patriotism is, above all things, TRUTH;—truth in all things, and at all times, and before all men.* It shrinks

No one vice carries so truly its chastisement with it, as Falsehood. Our conduct in reference to others depends solely on our knowledge, and confidence in their character. Where this is unattainable, or lost, the bridge of communication between their mind and ours is broken down. We cannot afford to lose our time with men on whom we cease to rely, of whom we know nothing. “*Ils sont frappés de nullité, quoi qu’ils fassent*,” says a late eloquent writer. “*S’ils nous amusent ou nous instruisent, c’est à la manière des livres; s’ils nous servent, c’est à la manière des instrumens. Mais eux, ce ne sont pas des personnes; il n’ont pas pour nous de réalité. En abolissant leur témoignage, ils ont commis en quelque sorte un suicide moral, et leur existence reste inaperçue. Voyez-les se débattre dans le néant, entasser les gestes, les expressions fortes: nul ne prend garde à eux; l’on sourit et l’on passe.*” But take the contrast to this; the honourable man and the true. “*Tel mot, prononcé par tel homme, répond de sa conduite à jamais; ce mot est lui; il saura le soutenir, quoiqu’il en coûte. Il empreint sa moindre expression du scéau de son âme, et produit une impression profonde en la prononçant. En revanche, les protestations les plus fortes de tel autre ne comptent pas; ce sont des assignats démonétisés, dont on ne regarde plus le chiffre.*” *Madame Necker de Saussure.*

In insisting, therefore, on Truth, we insist on happiness. We assure a *moral*

from falsehood to thousands, as from falsehood to one, nay, infinitely more; in proportion as confidence is bestowed, and detection is difficult, it guards not only against all that may betray, but against all that might mislead. It is no dealer in pledges which it means to break, nor in promises which it cannot keep, nor in professions which it knows to be false. It leaves not its conscience with its constituents, nor equivocates with its duty, when beyond their reach. It is no parleyer, no casuist between right and wrong, the people and self, yesterday and to-day. It has opinions, but they are its *own*, not the livery of a master, nor the fortunate watchword of a day — opinions, thought on, acted on, a portion of its public character, and its moral being, and no more to be torn from it, than a portion of life itself. It believes in the good sense and right principle of consistency, well assured that it would be not less a folly than a crime, to call upon the public to rely without giving them *steady* ground for reliance. The man whose opinions of to-day are point blank contradictions to his opinions of yesterday, has no political identity; he is a floating phantasm, — children and dupes may follow, men have to do with certainties and realities. A good man will change, when he finds himself in the wrong; but a sagacious politician ought to take care, that he be never in the wrong. He who *often* changes, either changes without a necessity, or has a necessity for change. He is either wicked, or foolish. In neither case, is he fit to govern himself, much less to govern others.* True patriotism believes in the policy

existence, far more valuable than a *physical* one to our children, for without it there is no repose, no position in life: the liar is condemned to an existence of the most humiliating agitation. True, he may try to laugh it off; true, he may affect not to think of it, that others may not think of it also: but the secret chagrin, the bitter fruits, are deep in his heart. He is condemned to feel the pain of never being believed, the penalty of never being considered, of never occupying the place of confidence in an honourable heart, and, at the same time, of being obliged to conceal and to mask all this under vain words, which only serve to make it more certain and notorious. What is the stone of Sisypheus to this! Could we wish our deadliest enemy a more perfect curse?

When a country becomes affected by this general disregard to sincerity and consistency, this universal depreciation of language (and it can be brought about by two or three influential individuals,—witness France, in her first revolution, and

of honesty, in the full and final success of honour. In its esteem it is the shortest and safest, as well as the clearest, road to success. It is a staunch hater of all oppressions, no matter from whom, or how they come: it stands, up calmly, but boldly, against all encroachments, whether monarchical or oligarchical, upon popular rights; but not less is it the determined foe of that worse and more humiliating oppression which, under colour of serving the people, uses and abuses the people, for its own ends of power and place, and, once attained, flings them back, like broken tools, to the next adventurer who follows at its heels. Nor is it for the people, against others only, that it strives. It knows its duty, and their interests better. It can defend the people against themselves, and return them services for revilings. It has the courage to obey conscience though it stood singly, and to despise dictation with multitudes at its back. It is no flatterer of mob, or minister. It tells them, equally and openly, their faults, though at the peril of turning both from friends into foes. Above all, it seeks, not by words only, but by deeds, to propagate the faith which is in it; that holy and noble faith, which binds together, in one harmony, all that is exalted in life — Religion — Domesticity — Patriotism — Poetry — sense of the Beautiful, of the Sacred, and the True. Where this is, there may not be much cunning, but there will be no grovelling;

other countries like France), every calamitous consequence may be apprehended to her social and political condition. There is nothing to take hold of—nothing to work with. Her most unquestionable wrongs are scarcely credited; her greatest misfortunes scarcely excite pity. Common language has lost all power, and men who, under other circumstances, with a few phrases might have wielded the most reluctant, are obliged to recur to exaggerations and emphasis, as ridiculous as they are melancholy, at once a symptom and stimulant to the disastrous disease. Such a nation soon loses its self-respect, and with it the respect of other nations, and that once gone, there is no depth of political profligacy to which it may not rapidly descend. Contrast with this, a nation where honesty, frankness, and steadiness,—Truth, in fine, in all its forms,—has been as habitual with the public as with the individual, whose language is sober and measured, whose deeds are in accord with its language; compare its respectability at home, and its moral power abroad, with what we have just been noticing, and then say, whether it is not of the utmost importance, in a system of national education, to provide for the due culture of this first of national, as well as private, virtues.

the individual is in full possession, at least, of himself; he recognises no master, and requires no slave. But it is not in its influence upon the individual only, that its important consequences deserve to be considered. It affects the nation. It raises the whole scale of public virtue. It gives a loftier measure for public men. It strikes at that systematic personality, that pettifogging selfishness, which sacrifices millions to the individual, centuries to the hour; at that habitual love for the little and the low, which disgraces the noblest cause, and fritters away in expedients the most important interests which can engage mankind. No wonder, then, that we should so earnestly insist on the paramount necessity of early disciplining the mind to such convictions. No wonder that we should consider it, an essential portion of all moral Education. If we are to have a country—if we are to love it, as men should love it, not for its sticks and stones, for its rocks and rivers, its heaven above, or its earth below; but for what it gives—for that air of liberty which we breathe, for those institutions which are our bucklers and our swords, for those manners, minds, and characters, which make *living* country to man; then surely are we bound to teach that, by which it may be made most worthy of our love, and our love most worthy of it—that by which its intellectual and moral dignity may be most upheld and augmented; by which public life may be truly made a constant exertion for the public good. To teach this, is to teach true patriotism; to teach true patriotism, is to teach the very essence of morality; it is giving the community the best assurance we can find, for the due exercise of all public duty.*

But it is not to the higher classes, who may be supposed more immediately to be engaged in these functions by their birth and station, that these lessons should be confined. They

* But we should not stop here. Feudalism stopped at family; ancient morality at country; but the higher morality and philosophy of the Gospel embraces Jew and Gentile, the common children of the one parent—human kind. Our patriotism must expand into philanthropy. Fénelon preached this into the religion of France; Montesquieu transferred it to her politics and philosophy. It is the end and hope of modern civilisation (and should therefore be of modern education), to make the lesson “a reality,” the practical creed, of every member of the great family of mankind.

befit all, they belong to all. Even at this moment, a far higher tone of political education is conspicuous among the Middle, than among the Upper or Lower orders of the community — there is an earnestness and depth, a simplicity and single-mindedness, which is seldom to be met with among their superiors; — habits more reflective and inquiring, a nicer moral sense, a greater steadiness and constancy of purpose than among their inferiors. In them resides the real vitality of the state,—and of their virtue and intelligence, the state ought to be especially solicitous. They exercise all the functions to which the lowest citizen may be called — they are not precluded from attaining those, which are more especially the apanage of the highest. To none, therefore, is a true estimate of political morality more essential. On their conduct, most immediately depends that of the other two. Yet they must not be put too strongly in opposition to either. All, by corresponding culture, must be harmonised with each other. The political duties of the Rich have already been detailed — they are obvious. In their quality of makers and executors of the laws,—their first duty is, to make them good; their next, to enforce them firmly and mildly. Both these duties imply all the qualities I have above mentioned. A man must be intelligent and virtuous, in order to be safely trusted with the government of the minds and consciences of others. The Lower classes stand, at the present moment, in a very peculiar position. To preach subordination to them, is an idle expedient. Subordination, to men who feel themselves aggrieved, sounds like cowardice, and slavery. They must be preached into a sense of its advantages, not by words, but by experience. This is not easy, when there is no previous intellectual or moral culture. The most striking practical lessons fall upon a mind so unprepared, sometimes without a beneficial, sometimes with an injurious effect. The time to give these lessons is not when called on by the pressing sense of their want; it is, when the head is yet clear, when the passions yet slumber, before the contagion of bad example has set in. It is before the mechanic has become an Unionist, or the labourer has witnessed unpunished a rick-

burning, that we can point out the danger and immorality of these practices—it is to the child we must address ourselves, if we would wish to prevent the necessity of prohibiting or punishing the full-grown man. In the intellectual department, we have already discussed the importance of making the future farmer, operative, and labourer, acquainted with their real interests. In the moral, it is not less essential to penetrate them, while yet young, with a due sense of their public moral duties. Self-defence is, no doubt, the first of laws, but self-defence and aggression should not be confounded. Union for protection is a far different thing, from union for attack. Yet we all know, how rapid is the transition from one to the other. All combinations of the kind, from the necessity of perfect discipline and implicit obedience, naturally fall, either sooner or later, into the hands and government of a few,—in other words, into the very closest and most corrupt of corporations. A more complete sacrifice of personal freedom for freedom's sake, cannot well be imagined. A sensible man will avoid thus yielding himself up to the caprices of other men's wills, and a true patriot will disdain it. He will not seek for independence through slavery—he will not risk his country for his trade,—while deposing one despotism, he will not raise up in its place another. The two first principles of such combinations (if we are to judge by their operations) strike at his own virtue and prosperity. They infringe personal liberty, and they interfere directly with property. Where neither of these are secure, it is of little consequence who or what the instrument is—in that country there are already the seeds of anarchy or tyranny. Were a true moral respect for either deeply implanted in the youthful mind, there would at least be some hesitation before the young man joined these associations. Were such education general, there would probably be no such associations at all. The peasant patriot would seek elsewhere, and by other means, for redress, if redress were necessary. His industrious home would be the best guarantee for his prosperity—his early discipline the best assurance that, while he knew how to maintain his own freedom to the utmost, he

would never for one instant abuse it to the detriment of another's.

But, besides these great public duties common to all, there are specific obligations attached to the special situation, profession, rank, of the individual. Each require an additional specific morality — a peculiar moral education. The landlord — the tenant — the merchant — the artisan — the lawyer — the physician — the clergyman — all require to be trained for their respective callings. The future Landlord is to be taught with what happiness, what civilisation, what virtue he is entrusted for the benefit of others; he is to be made to understand, how he may best dispense these blessings, and early initiated in that first of arts, as difficult to learn as to practise, the art of doing good. He must be shown that blessings are not conferred without obligations, and that he is no more permitted to throw off the paternity of his situation, than his tenant the filial subordination of his. In the fair division of their respective duties, of their respective labours, of their respective rights, let their mutual power and mutual happiness consist. Let the protected industry, the cleanly and well-ordered cottage, the comfortable farm; and the moral family of the tenant, speak the eulogy of the landlord's stewardship; let the unbarred windows, the unaffected confidence, the unsolicited liberality of the landlord, speak the merits and attachment of his tenantry. And if we advert to the innumerable accessory duties which cluster around these — the duties of the magistrate — of the grand juror — of the country gentleman (that noble designation, so full of our kindest and proudest associations), what room is there not afforded, in the discipline which should prepare us for each of these functions, for the very highest efforts of moral instruction. Nor do the various professional avocations require less preliminary care. If fortune or choice destine to the Bar — we should never for an instant lose sight of the maxim of Quintilian.* In this, as in every other

* “*Rerum ipsa natura in eo, quod præcipue indulsisse homini videtur, quoque nos a cæteris animalibus separasse, non parens sed noverca fuerit, si facultatem*

profession, various are the roads which lead to wealth and eminence; but there is one only, of which respectability and happiness is the termination. If the impatience of the young Advocate brook no delay, and the advances of unobtrusive industry appear too tedious for his ambition—he may smooth his tongue with flattery to the meanest of mankind, when, by their assistance, as it often happens, his speed can be advanced. He may cast aside, when they stand in his way, all respect for station, all admiration for talent, all deference to experience; and with all that—for the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong—arrive early at opulence and infamy. But there is another road, in which success, though slower, is perhaps as certain; which substitutes diligence for intrigue, knowledge for fluency, argument for vociferation, a sense of duty to your client for the affectation of zeal in his behalf, and requires, above all, a scrupulous regard to truth, and a punctilious jealousy of honour—not that honour which silences censure with abusive personality, but that which shrinks from meanness, dreads reproach, and solicits inquiry. The Medical Profession not less demands a sedulous attention to its moral character. If half the disease lies in the mind—if the barb of long and perilous malady is most successfully solicited from its seat by the hand of sympathy—if a kindly tone, an encouraging look, fall with more of healing upon the wound than any mere material medicine,—it is surely important that, from the earliest period of medical education, every care should be taken to give their fullest developement to the benevolent affections of our nature. Every hour in the exercise of these professional duties presents some opportunity for their play. In conjunction with the protecting hand of the landlord, and the solemn counsel of the clergyman, the soothing voice of the Physician is the great civiliser of his neighbourhood. We value, and

dicendi, sociam scelerum, adversam innocentiae, hostem veritatis invenit. Neque enim tantum id dico, cum qui sit orator, *virum bonum* esse oportere, sed ne futurum quidem oratorem, nisi *virum bonum*.”—*Inst. lib. xii. c. 1.*

not unreasonably, that courage to which every community owes its ultimate security. Without a brave population, there can scarcely be an industrious one. Our military and naval establishments are the bulwarks of our whole social existence. But there is another courage—less eulogised, because less seen, but not less requiring than either the courage of the sailor or the soldier, the highest temper of self-devotion;—a courage, whose heroism has not the excitement of the field of battle to rouse it, nor the trophy of the day of victory to reward it;—a courage, which is tried by its own intrinsic value, with no other spectators than the tenants of the sick room, with few other applauses than the approbation of his own heart—such courage is the calm clear courage of the true physician: a virtue of the highest order, a virtue not to be had without previous moral discipline. Roughness of original constitution—the ordinary hardening effects of circumstance, may give a sort of coarse resemblance to it; but the quality of the virtue itself is of a far different nature: its merit is to see the danger, and to brave it—not to rush into the danger first, and to consider it afterwards. Nor is it to these higher efforts of the moral man, that the Physician is confined: a thousand little nameless cordialities, a thousand indefinite charities, a thousand useful counsels, may mark his passage with blessing. To him, next to the clergyman, the poor and humble confide their pains, and from him ask that encouragement and consolation, which the world and the world's laws so often refuse. It is a noble, and a paternal, and a truly Christian vocation, when thus exercised, as it ought to be, in a truly Christian spirit: but if it be, as it often is, degraded into a trade; if the jealousies of the unsuccessful, or the monopoly of the fortunate, are to lower or restrict its usefulness; if it is to be a game played with human lives, for base ambition or still baser lucre; if the science is to be made the accessory, and empiricism the principal—then Education, the moral education of the Physician, is yet to begin. A system which does not provide for this, is a system which permits the most important profession, next to that of the spiritual guide, to be polluted at its very source, and thus trifles by anticipation with the lives and

happiness of every class of the community. Of the Clergyman, it is surely unnecessary to speak. His duty, in all senses, and in all times, is the teaching, not only by the inculcation of divine truth, but by the still stronger lesson of his practice, morality and religion itself. He is, by his very office, a Father — by divine commission, a Pastor. He is the medium, through which come softened all those severer ordinances which are necessary to keep society together. But he is more than this. 'The true Christian teacher is the centre of all the fraternal love, the religious wisdom, the elevated feeling of a neighbourhood. Do we feel astonished at his influence? Can we regret its continuance? Not merely to the sanctity of his office does he owe this inward power — much less to early prejudices, or to abasing superstition — he owes it to "the subserviency of his faithful ministrations to the comfort, and the virtue, and the dearest interests of families — to the efficacy of his household services, to those countless attentions of an unwearied Christian benevolence, by which he has ingratiated both his person and his cause with the heart of those amongst whom he expatiates." His direct aim is neither to purchase a reputation for himself, nor even to advance the temporal comfort of his people — it is to prepare them for immortality: yet, in the single-hearted prosecution of this object, he becomes the all-powerful, though perhaps the unconscious, instrument of those secondary though subordinate blessings, which form the only ones that a mere philanthropist cares for. The true Clergyman is to be found in the home where few are visitants — in the house of mourning, and sickness, and want; not in the dust and turbulence of political discord, soiling the purity of his sacred garments, and humbling the loftiness of his Christian character, with the lowest passions of our nature. He joins the hands of enemies together — he shields merit from the shafts of envy — he exorcises by his very presence all the innumerable malignities of the human heart: he is no stirrer-up of strifes — no whisperer away of characters — no anathematiser of every man's opinion but his own. He is more than tolerant, for he is charitable — if he cannot convince, he does not reject. He is no village tyrant of the poor, no parasite of the rich — he gives

more than he receives. If on the Bench, he forgets not the Christian clergyman in the partisan magistrate; if called to a public meeting, he appears, only to moderate the stormy passions; if compelled to participate in the affairs of this world, he shares them as not of this world:—in all things, and to all, he is the living lesson of Gospel truth.* Such a Clergyman cannot dwell in the darkness of ignorance, without soon converting it to his own light: he cannot pass through the depravity of the most abandoned population, without leaving on his way a large portion of his regenerating spirit. But of how many solemn meditations, of what a long and austere exercise of good, of what an unwearied search after truth, should the early instruction of such a man be composed? To whom is moral and religious instruction necessary, if not to him on whom thousands may yet depend for both? If the state values its *moral health*, if upon this depends every other spiritual and earthly blessing — what care can be too great, what diligence too active, in establishing and conducting, in every persuasion, and for every order, the education of the Clergy? †

* “The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because the Lord hath anointed me, to preach good tidings to the meek; he hath sent me to bind up the broken-hearted, to proclaim liberty to the captive, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound,” &c. &c. *Isaiah*, ch. lxi. ver. 1.

† Yet there are those who object to the grant to Belfast, and Maynooth! What, if the Catholics should object to the grants to Aberdeen? There may be conscience in it, but is there reason? The Protestant will not allow his money to go to the support of a Papist establishment. Well, but what tells him it is *his* money? The Catholic contributes, as well as the Protestant: may it not be Catholic money, and not Protestant? If he be so punctilious on the matter, let him propose that the monies be kept separate, but not that the establishment be suppressed. If he says that a *Protestant state* should not support dissenting institutions, that is another question; that we can understand. But where is the Protestant state? The British government is mixed; the British legislature is mixed; the British state is mixed; so, also, should be British institutions. The constitution ceased to be exclusively Protestant, the day it ceased to be exclusive. The Relief Act, or, to speak more truly, the admission to the elective franchise, the magistracy, the grand juries, decided that. To talk now of the Protestant state and constitution, is to call the king of Great Britain, king of France. The real point, with all true lovers of their country, all enlightened friends of Christian education, is, not whether the people shall be taught their *own form* of Christianity, but whether they shall be taught it *diligently* and *well*. Deprive the Clergy of

But the same solicitude which watches over the moral instruction of the higher professions, should equally extend to that of the middle and lower. They especially need all those lessons which are on the side of reflection and sobriety, and which tend to give a predominance to the moral over the animal nature of man. It is in the inculcation and management of these habits of thinking and acting, and the judicious application of each to particular positions, whether of the merchant, or the artisan, or the agriculturist, that mainly consists the individual and aggregate morality of these several bodies. It is on the useful and modest discharge of their local and peculiar duties, that their real usefulness depends. Specious generalities too often lure them aside from the path of sober and productive exertion. They cannot improve the country, but they will save it. They will not advance it, but they are resolved to regenerate it. But it is not the splendid but the substantial which we want; not crowds of talkers, but a few, at least, among these crowds, who will do, with all their might, the work which heaven and their situation have assigned to their hands. "Any great moral or economical change in the state of a country," well does Dr. Chalmers observe*, "is not the achievement of one single arm, but the achievement of many; and though a single man walking in the loftiness of his heart might like to engross all the fame of it, it will remain an impotent speculation, unless thousands come forward to share, amongst them all, the fatigue of it. It was by successive strokes of the pickaxe and the chisel, that the pyramids of Egypt were reared; and great must be the company of workmen, and limited the task which each must occupy, ere there will be made to ascend the edifice of a nation's work, and a nation's true greatness." And it is this double object — limitation to a small locality on the one side, to tasks which may be surmounted; and, on the other, a due adaptation, by virtuous habits, of the individual to such tasks and duties,

education, and you heathenise and barbarise their flock: leave it to doubt and chance, and you proportionably render doubtful the Christianity and civilisation of the country.

* Advantages of Local Parish Schools, p. 54.

—which Moral Instruction has in view. The Merchant builds upon order and truth, upon precision and punctuality, the fabric of his success; for commerce, to be prosperity, must be other than gambling, and men must lean upon men after all, upon their sound and steady opinion, and not upon calculations or ventures, for their accumulations. Good faith; sobriety of head and heart; inflexible honour, is the coinage, more precious than gold, with which the humblest, in a free community, may purchase good fortune to himself. It may be that the particular effort may fail, but the general balance will always be in favour; in the end, the drop hollows the stone, though many drops may be lost in the way. There is no magician like perseverance. How important the education which gives the future merchant not merely the dead letter of all this, but breathes and digests it into his whole being—how truly important, not to the individual solely, but to the country, whose national glory is her unimpeached national credit, and who has proved, on the largest scale yet attempted, that honesty in masses, as well as individuals, is the best policy. Out of such moral and religious education only, can be educes the real web and woof of a nation's commercial greatness: where it is wanting—where the material fails, or is tangled by the puny stuff of trick and deception, there a specious but flimsy article may be got up in its stead, showy enough, indeed, to attract for a time, but incapable of bearing the wear or tear of events, or giving proof of that long-run usefulness which is, after all, the only true measure of substantial wealth and power. Nor with these inculcations, especially professional, should there be neglected any influence which may tend to mitigate the Mammon spirit of the age,—that “what is he worth?” standard of right and wrong, which runs up with its base alloy into the most delicate as well as loftiest relations of our social system. A merchant so tempered (and many such instances may assuredly still be found amidst all our prostration to the golden Calf), is amongst the noblest types of the national character. To make many such—to make all, if it were possible, such—ought to be the desired consummation of the moral and religious education of our merchants. It is to them, especially morality and especially

religion, and without which, all general or declamatory Christianity will very little avail. In such cases, the general Christian virtue will be absorbed by the specific professional vice. There will be decent church frequenters, and irreproachable, charity subscribers; but the generous and upright merchant—the honest shopkeeper—the assiduous artisan, will yet remain to be found. Nor is it less important that these two last classes should share in the benefits of the same moral instruction. The Shopkeeper is a minor merchant—every quality which is essential in one, is not less so in the other. The Artisan has very peculiar difficulties to contend with, very peculiar duties to fulfil, in the present position of society. To some of these, allusion has already been made. He has discovered a new power, one of immense energy, but unmanageable and perilous in proportion. By his junction with others, the despised individual receives and communicates weight; the cipher, which was nothing before it stood with the integer, has obtained value; all this is flattering and seductive; and, once tried, is not easily put aside. It offers a short road to competency—it proposes imaginary elevation—it gratifies with actual indulgence. Such temptations require a high moral temper to avoid or repel—a still higher to abandon. Once the individual has formed a portion of a mass, segregate him as you may afterwards, he feels that he is not alone, and that thousands are at that hour thinking and sympathising with him. Add to this the delirium of depraved habits, which too frequently arise out of society and idleness, the every-day facilities of corruption in great towns, the compelling force of example; and it will be at once perceived how essential a vigorous system of early moral discipline is, to preserve his virtue and happiness from such contagion. The momentary triumph of the combinator, even admitting all his past wrongs, and all his anticipated success, is, after all, most dearly purchased; he makes sacrifices of orderly habits, of that self-reliance, out of which only true independence can spring, and of that habitual self-respect, which is the truest guarantee of respectability. The apprenticeship which merely

teaches the craft, or the education which merely sharpens the intelligence, will never protect from either vice or misery. Skill is nothing without regularity: knowledge, without habits of modesty and good sense, will only be a stimulant to presumption and dissatisfaction. There is not only no good in the diffusion of such enlightenment, but there is substantial evil. It is much better not to see at all, than to see only through a false medium. The interest then of the individual and the country demand that the operative should be protected as much from himself as from others; and, considering the tendency there exists to aggregation and combination in all its forms, and the action of new forces, hitherto unknown in the social machine, which it has introduced, this duty has now become more necessary and difficult than ever. To accomplish it without the specific professional morality of the situation, is impossible; but morality is not to be picked up in a night—it is a study and a habit—it is education. Of the Agriculturist and his duties, it is comparatively unnecessary to speak. Their due performance is, in great measure, ensured by the moral and religious education of those who are appointed to watch over them. Where the country gentleman, the physician, the clergyman have gone through the moral and religious discipline above noticed; where they faithfully discharge their trust, it is scarcely possible that those upon whom all the influences of their conduct descend, should not evince, in their contented industry,—their domestic purity—their homebred honesty—their straightforwardness—their patience and their courage, reflections of the examples under which they have grown up. What a wonderful revolution that which Oberlin effected, in the period of ten short years, in the Ban de Roche. A district as barbarous as any in these kingdoms—not by miracles, not by societies, not by grants; but by his own feeble arm, but strong heart, by a pure mind, and a determined will—was won over from barbarism to civilisation. What we want are not the materials, but the instruments; not the people, but the guides for the people—such proprietors as De Fellenberg, such teachers as Pestalozzi, such clergymen as Oberlin, to reform

them.* Labour, to the agriculturist, is not only knowledge, but virtue, and the practice of virtue. It is his destined profession; it should form his moral education. Rural schools, in this point of view, still more than in an intellectual, should be essentially labour schools. The pupils stand in an inverted position to the other classes of society; so also should their instruction. The neglect of this great principle has disturbed all modern education. It has forced up into a class for which they were not fitted, and which was already overstocked, large numbers of the essentially labouring population; it has crowded large towns with presumptuous speculators, and disappointed adventurers; it has produced dissatisfaction, recklessness, insubordination, and vice; and where political causes have been superadded (and no materials are better prepared for their application), it has tended not a little to shake, and in some instances, to dislocate, the frame of society. To check, and, if possible, to annihilate these evils, a moral—but especially a specific moral education is as necessary to the agricultural, as to any other order. This education is not reading, nor writing, nor even the acquisition of useful knowledge, nor a just appreciation of their own interests, nor the soundest nor the best adapted lessons of political or domestic economy; there must be the spirit, which will make all this wisdom—the virtue, which will crown this with blessing: this is moral feeling and moral principle, and moral habit growing out of both. Such discipline, shaping the human being to the true purposes for which he was destined, is deserving of the name of Education—it is civilisation. Any other is only a more

* The secret of Oberlin's success is simple. 1. To *do*, rather than *order* to be done. 2. To do *oneself*, as well as *others*. 3. To *do*, until what is to be done be *thoroughly accomplished*. I know no more certain mode of working out reform than throwing the pickaxe on one's own shoulder, as he did in the formation of the road to Strasburg. He conquered prejudice by success, and shamed apathy by example. But, then, how rich the rewards for such struggles! Who would not rather have presented to him "the pen" which had been used in signing the treaty of peace between the Seigneur of the Ban de Roche and its inhabitants, thus terminating a feud of eighty years' continuance, than all the gold given by prince or wrung from peasant, for services real or imaginary?

organised plan for ensuring disorganisation, a more artificial means of extending and perpetuating corruption.

I have dwelt at some length on this department, because it is not only the most important, but, generally speaking, the most neglected. How this has arisen, it is not now my purpose to discuss. The fact is so, and not only in those countries in which moral and religious education has been ostensibly separated from intellectual, but even in those in which it is ostentatiously put forward, as the great groundwork of all. The truth is, that the mistake of words for things, which has infected intellectual, has more seriously injured moral instruction. We call catechising, religion; and dry precept, good habits; and loose general injunction, morality. But it is not enough to make Christians—we must make Christian patriots, Christian gentlemen, and Christian labourers. We must remember that we do not less belong to our profession, than to our species. Moral education will never advance beyond a hollow conventional phraseology, unless it stoops to particulars. It must become *special* to work out special virtues; without due cultivation of special virtue, general virtue is a mere name.

Nor is this the only mistake. The teacher thinks his duty done, the moment the pupil quits school. His duty is done, but not that of the pupil. The education must be continued. In the upper classes of society, this is not difficult. Daily occasions, long leisure, abundant means, provide in most instances for its prosecution. The middle and lower orders are less fortunate. The active and stern interests of life press upon them—physical wants usurp their whole being—intellectual pursuits are overpowered—moral culture is forgotten. The results are obvious. Our capitals are crowded with entire classes of these semi-educated and semi-moral individuals. The contagion, incidental to their position, is not counteracted by any of the old influences. The whole mass of servants, placed, as they are, under the action of the vices of high and low, of their masters and their fellow-servants, are necessarily exposed to every degree of profligacy. So, also, coachmen, publicans, and many even of the trades. In the female portion of society, the symptoms of the same evil

are, if possible, more conspicuous: All this has been unfairly ascribed to education; it is with far more justice to be ascribed to the sudden interruption of education. Undoubtedly, in many cases, intellectual education has given an undue stimulus. It has made farmers' daughters milliners, and tailors' sons clerks, or rather has surrounded these several employments with a disproportionate number of aspirants; but had moral education accompanied, and both been reasonably kept up by after application, the numerous evils which flow from these partial and feeble commencements, need scarcely have been apprehended. This after education, if so it may be called, is in general neglected; or, where applied, it is generally on so limited and local a scale, that its influences are scarcely perceptible. But it is essential. A building does not consist in foundation. If elementary education be justly an object of national solicitude, so also are the means by which this elementary education may be given through every successive period of life, its full value and efficacy.*

Such are the outlines of the three departments into which Education has been divided. I have attempted to adhere rigidly to the principles laid down in the commencement. I have attempted to show the importance of diligently conducting each; the necessity of conducting them simultaneously; the means for effecting both purposes, and the processes best adapted to carry these means into effect. But all this will be of little avail without willing and competent teachers. If knowledge and virtue depend upon methods, and methods again upon the manner in which they are applied, still more do both depend upon the individual to whom their application is entrusted. The difference between a good and a bad school, between an instructed and ignorant pupil, between education and no education, is just the difference between a good and a bad teacher. Better, far better, there was no education going on at all, than education under the guidance of ignorance or immorality. Not to teach, is only the absence of good; to misteach, is positive evil. Yet such is our perfect

* * For some just remarks on this subject see the *Journal of Education*, No. xi. and *Blackwood's Magazine*, No. ccxviii.

inconsistency, that this truth, acknowledged in every other department of society, is denied, at least, practically, in this of education. Who thinks of trusting his apprentice to a novice in the craft, or the training of his horse to an ignorant horsebreaker? It is miserable imbecility to talk of teaching, much less of education, when we have no assurance that we have teachers or educators at all. If it be immaterial whether they be good or bad, then also is Education itself immaterial. If otherwise, how can we insult common sense and Christian duty, by allowing them to teach a single hour, until we have fully ascertained their competency. But this cannot be done at once. Perhaps not; but it can be *begun* at once: at all events, this can be done—no more application of public money—no more building of schools—no more boasting of the miracles performed—the growing glories of knowledge—the universal diffusion of intellectual and moral enlightenment, until it shall be begun. No education, where the educators are not good, ought, for a moment, to be recognised as such. It is an expensive mockery, but not Education.

The first, the very first point then to be placed beyond all chance or doubt, in a good system of National Education, the only point which can assure either knowledge or virtue, are the intellectual and moral qualifications of the teacher. But what are these qualifications? and how are they to be ascertained? If not of the very highest order, they ought always to be such as should fully qualify him, especially for the practical portion of his profession. He should not merely be intelligent, but moral; not only moral and intelligent, but fully capable of transfusing both his knowledge and morality into the minds of others. The highest attainments are useless without this power; they may be gold, but it is yet in ingots. He knows not the art of putting it into circulation. These are qualities not to be discovered by a half hour's examination, much less are they to be taken on trust, and least of all on the recommendation of persons disqualified, by ignorance, and prejudice of situation, sect, or party, from judging. If examination competitions are bad in the case of professorships, they are worse in that of ordinary teachers. They

must, except by miracle, be abused; a far more certain and universal guarantee is essential. That can only be had by the same process by which it is obtained in other professions, by previous special Education. There must be *schools* for teachers, before you think of teaching. You must educate your educators, before you set about education. It is expensive. But is it necessary? that is the material question. The necessity has been long since admitted; it was recognised, virtually, at least, the first hour we talked of Education. But a consideration, not quite so clear, is, how and where are you to obtain pupils for these establishments? That depends upon the state. Certainly, after having degraded to the lowest level one of the highest functions which can be entrusted to man, it is natural we should hear these objections. But the fault is ours, and not theirs. If this were the country it boasts itself to be, if it were a country in which the public really aspired to elevate the human mind, to assign intellectual superiority its proper station, long since its laws would have regarded the profession of teacher, as one in great degree invested with paternal and religious rights. If there be many instances in which teachers themselves have derogated from this dignified position, and converted what ought to have been the most important of social duties into a mere trade, it is only the natural result of our unwise and niggard legislation, and belongs not to the profession, nor to the men.

A Teacher ought therefore to have attached to his position such advantages and consideration, as may naturally tend to elevate it to its legitimate rank in society. But in concurrence with these advantages, he must possess such qualifications as will justify them. He must really make it a profession in the first instance, excluding from it all secondary employments which might interfere with its character, and the respect which it intrinsically has a right to claim; and in the next, he must, by long and assiduous preparation, have rendered himself fully competent for the discharge of its duties.

These duties, in reference to his pupils, are physical, intellectual, and moral; the developing the human frame—the communicating knowledge—the forming of character. He has others in reference to the parents of his pupils—to the

authorities—to the state, &c. All are important, but the first only are immediately under consideration.

The nature of these duties will be tolerably well estimated by duly weighing the suggestions of the preceding pages. It has been held, indeed, that a teacher can teach without knowing, and can inculcate morality without being moral; but were such contradictions reconcilable, the question would still be, not what *can* be done, but how that which is to be done, can be done *best*.

The Teacher must not only be perfect master of the various branches of Education which he is called on to teach, but he must also, in addition, be thoroughly acquainted, both theoretically and practically, with the art of Education itself. He must understand the science of mind, the principles of instruction, the best methods, the latest improvements; and not only must he understand them, but he must have so repeatedly exercised them, that their practice shall be as familiar as their theory. For his moral duties, a still more elevated scale will be requisite. He must be strongly penetrated with the importance of his sacred trust. His religious and moral convictions must be profound—he must make himself thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the youthful heart, and with the best expedients for its correction and improvement; his rebukes must be tempered by modesty, patience, evident justice, good sense, and above all, by unwearied kindness; abstaining in every instance, at all practicable, from punishment, and never allowing himself to be transported by passion or harshness. His praise should be simple and measured. He must remember that it is not sufficient to reward success—he must not dishearten exertion. His manners must be grave, but not austere. Above all, he must be constant, equable, certain—an inexorable regard to truth in the minutest trifle (if, indeed, any thing be a trifle where truth is concerned), and an honourable elevation above all selfish and interested motive, must be his distinguishing characteristics. It is needless to say, that his private life must be irreproachable. If moral teaching be necessary, what teaching is like example. Unless he be all this, he may be a schoolmaster, but he is no true instructor. If he be incapable of discharg-

ing these duties and fulfilling these obligations, even to the letter (whatever may be his talents), he will fail in the high object of his vocation. He may form clever, and well-instructed men, &c. &c. but men, in the true acceptation of the word—never.* Such qualities are, indeed, rare, but they ought not to be so, nor would they be so, if proper means were adopted to ensure them. They will not grow of themselves, but with proper culture they may be made to grow. This proper culture ought to be insisted on; if not to be had, it ought to be provided. Schools for teachers ought to be the *first object* with whoever undertakes to assure to a class or a community a good Education. The nature of the qualifications required, points out the nature of the school. It ought to rank in the intellectual scale, for elementary teachers, as high certainly as the higher elementary schools—for middle schools, as high as the higher middle; but, in addition, the moral department ought to be considerably more developed, and a separate branch of instruction, the Art of Education, “that noblest, but least studied, of all the arts,” as Professor Brown calls it, made the special object of the entire course. It is obvious, that the theoretic instruction of such schools, however perfect, will give very little of that which ought to form the most essential portion of their training, practical instruction. To attain this, there must be actual exercise. The office of

* Mental education being divided into intellectual and moral, some writers have suggested the propriety of dividing teachers into two classes also, Instructors and Educators; the first to be solely engaged in conducting the literary department, the second in communicating religious and moral instruction, forming the character, &c. (*Journal of Education*, No. xiii. p. 76.) On the same principle, there should be a third for physical—a manager of the gymnastic or labour department, unless, indeed, it be thought preferable to associate his duties with those of the Educator. In large schools, and especially in the middle and upper, this classification would be highly judicious. It has long since been adopted by the Jesuits. Their teachers have been always distinguished into Masters and Prefects. In Germany a similar division has taken place. See the pleasing sketch which Cousin gives of M. Schweitzer's teaching, the Educator, if I may so call him, of the *Ecole Bourgeoise* at Weimar. “J'ai été particulièrement frappé,” says he, “d'une leçon que donnait M. Schweitzer à des jeunes filles.” Having described the mode of instruction, he proceeds, “Son maintien est grave, et sa parole douce. Je ne suis pas surpris que tous ces enfans l'aiment, et le révérent. Il m'a moi-même véritablement touché.” *Rapport*, p. 52.

monitor, with such improvements as those already suggested, will go some way to prepare for it; but it may not always happen that the pupil has filled that office; in any case it will not be sufficient to qualify the teacher for the special moral department of his duty. The pupils must, therefore, be constantly exercised in putting their instruction into practice under the eye of the master. This can be effected without any inconvenience, by annexing these teachers' schools to the class of schools for which they are particularly destined. A part of the day may thus be spent in receiving the tuition; another, and it will be an agreeable interchange, in applying it.

The assurance that a candidate has passed through these schools will, of itself, be a far better pledge to the public of his competency than any competition, examination, or public election, be it parochial, clerical, or government commission, or whatever other form it may be thought proper to employ. Admitting the perfect impartiality of such an ordeal, the conclusions it leads to are unsatisfactory. It at best proves a proportionate, but not an absolute qualification. It is little more than the expression of the very vague opinion of very incompetent judges.* Here, on the contrary, is positive study—certain acquirement. It may be much, or it may be little, but the man who submits to it has a vocation; with its importance he is fully impressed; and if so, it is only reasonable to suppose that he has taken adequate pains to fit himself for it. The very certainty he has of many others being engaged in the same pursuit is a stimulant. As things now are, he may have spent a

* Lagrange himself, in one of his lectures to the Polytechnic School, admitted, with that modesty for which he was so distinguished, that it was very doubtful whether he should be able to pass one of these set examinations himself, though on subjects, of course, far below the range of his knowledge. Such, also, was the opinion of La Croix, and of many others of the highest scientific reputation in France. Professor Scarpa resigned his chair at the university of Pavia, because he saw that their effect was to exclude the most deserving. Of what advantage, then, are these solitary formal trials? They may admit the ignorant, and exclude the instructed. They thus cease to be tests. As little faith is to be reposed in testimonials of morality. They are in general vague, careless, and all embracing; they mean every thing, or nothing. No one refuses them, and no one believes them. In cases of this kind we want not jobbing recommendations, but proofs.

great part of his life, for aught we know, as a horse jockey : with a little parish intrigue, he will be found to be, a marvellous proper man. He is too good a fellow, not to be a good schoolmaster. He can cast up accounts, teach the catechism, and serve as clerk : what more is requisite ? *

The high importance of previous qualification necessarily implies the necessity of sustaining it, at least, to the same level ; this is difficult without books, and communication with men engaged in the same pursuits. Each school ought, therefore, to have its teachers' library, and each district its teachers' conferences, where all may meet, at specific periods. Nor should the teacher neglect occasional visits to the model or teachers' school of the capital, to discuss the interests and advancement of his and their common profession, or any similar means, by which he may refresh his information, and still further augment and improve the methods which he has in use.

Such a teacher so prepared, and so disposed to add on every occasion to his means, will be worthy of his high functions. He may not amass great wealth — he may not reach high distinction — but he will give useful members to society — he will contribute more effectively to reform his age than loud talkers and professional patriots, and ultimately find the best of all rewards in the approbation of his own conscience,

* " What do you teach the children ? "

" Nothing, Sir. "

" Nothing ! how is that ? "

" Because I know nothing myself. "

" Why, then, were you instituted schoolmaster ? "

" Why, Sir, I had been taking care of the Waldbach pigs for a great number of years, and when I got too old or infirm for that employment, they sent me here to take care of the children. "

This dialogue, between Pastor Stouber and the schoolmaster of the Ban de Roche (a withered old man, who lay in a little bed in the corner of his school-room), is a type of a state of schooling by no means limited to the district of the worthy functionary. In many places in Switzerland the situation was disposed of, by public cant, to the best bidder. At Basle, half a century ago, they drew the professors by lot. Many schools in the Highlands are taught by broken-down soldiers, and still more exceptionable personages ; in England by " Danes," who read Nazareth for Nebuchadnezzar ; and in Ireland by good scribes at Rock notices, and bold speakers in parish chapels, or at village fairs. Are they so in Weimar ? Are they so in Prussia ? Are they so even in America ? But there the government gives not *schools* only, but *education*.

in the esteem of honest and enlightened men, and the proud conviction of having rendered essential service to his country, and to humanity.

But is all this, flattering as it may be in theory, applicable in practice? Can a peasant-boy learn all this? and, if he could, what would be its utility? To the last query the only answer which can be made, is, of what use is knowledge?—of what use is intelligence?—of what use is morality?—in a word, of what use is Education? To the first, that it is not meant to apply the whole of this course to every individual. Each may select what is most appropriate for his own purposes. In a system of national or public education, this selection should be already made for him. Hence the necessity of *Classification*.

We have already distinguished between “General” and “Special” Education. There should, therefore, be General and Special Schools.

General Education, is the education of the community at large. It should be elementary, middle, and high, or, more technically, primary, secondary, and superior, to meet the demands of the several classes, and of the several individuals of each class. There should, therefore, be “Primary”—“Secondary”—and “Superior” Schools.*

I have an objection to the names, by which these different branches of education are usually designated. To call the education of the lower orders “the Education of the Poor,” is at once to degrade both the poor, and education. It is to stamp it with the brand of pauperism and servitude; knowledge should no more admit an aristocracy than religion. There may, indeed, be a series of instruction, a certain quality and quantity of knowledge, required by one class or individual, which is not required by another, because, their situations differing, so also must their wants. But this alters nothing in the nature of knowledge itself, no more than it does in that of religion. The only point ought to be, the more or less—the elements—the continuance—the completion. No one should imagine that by his condition solely he is excluded from the lists. The whole course should be open to every citizen of a free state, who is urged by his necessities or inclination to follow it.

I adopt, then, in lieu of these opprobrious distinctions, the phraseology of other states, in reference, not so much to the position of the instructed, as of the nature of the instruction. Happy would it be, both for knowledge and freedom, that we could see seated on the same benches, in pursuit of the same common objects, all the several classes of the community. Why should that be impossible in England, which is equally common in Prussia, and in America? Is the “*juste milieu*” alone to be excluded from benefits enjoyed by both extremes?

These, again, should be further divided into schools of the first and second degree, or into lower and higher primary schools — into lower and higher secondary, &c. &c.

The “Lower Primary Schools” should embrace such studies only as are universally essential. They should be within the reach, but not above the wants and situation of the lowest class in the community, and should thus form the great basis of all popular education.* But in order that opportunities may be afforded to such amongst these classes as may wish to add to this education, either with a view of preparing themselves for the secondary schools, or for the general improvement of their condition, higher primary schools should be established, especially in towns, for the further developement of these studies, and the first rudiments of such others, as were too advanced for the course which they have already completed.

With this view the studies might be thus distributed:—

“*Lower Primary Schools.*”— Manual labour; lessons on objects; reading; mother-tongue; arithmetic (four rules); elements of geometry (practical); domestic economy; elements of useful knowledge; Scripture lessons.

“*Higher Primary Schools.*”— Mother-tongue; grammar; arithmetic (rule of three, fractions, decimals, &c.); elements of geometry (practical); natural history; elements of geography; elements of history; elements of legislation; elements of drawing; political and domestic economy; education; elements of music; Scriptural lessons, and selections from the Scriptures.

* The Lower Primary Schools may be divided into the “*Lower Primary*,” properly so called, and the “*Infant School*,” an elementary branch, or preparation for the lower primary, though, to speak more properly, with the French, they are less schools than asylums. When required, by the profligacy, occupations, or absence of parents, they are excellent substitutes for home education; when otherwise (and this is one of the objects to be attained by improved maternal instruction), home education is perhaps preferable. Both may, however, be combined. Two or three hours’ absence in the day cannot materially detract from the domestic affections or influences.

“*Sabbath Schools*” are only inferior forms of the lower primary; substitutes for a better, and which should not be resorted to, except in cases where that better is clearly unattainable. The necessity of daily labour may be so urgent, as to render attendance on the primary school impossible. In such a case a Sabbath school is very valuable. The smallest quota of true knowledge is, of course, better than none at all.

The Secondary Schools should, in the first instance, pursue on an extensive scale the developement of the preceding studies; and in the next, should superadd to these the studies of the ancient and modern languages. The degree to which each should be pursued, should be determined by the rank of the school.

The "*Lower Secondary Schools*" should embrace, in their physical course, gymnastic and industrial exercises. Their intellectual course should comprise in the literary department, the mother-tongue (composition and selections from English literature, &c. &c.); Latin tongue (prose writers); French language (prose and verse); in the scientific, arithmetic (higher branches, applications to commerce, &c. &c.); algebra (elementary); geometry (rational); physics (elementary); natural history (zoology, mineralogy, geology, botany, all elementary); geography (political and statistical, elementary); history (modern, ancient, elementary); legislation; political economy; domestic; drawing; architecture; music (elementary). Scriptural selections, catechism, and elements of ethics, should form their moral and religious course.

The "*Higher Secondary Schools*." In their physical course, — farther developements and applications of gymnastic and industrial exercises. In their literary — mother-tongue (composition; elements of rhetoric; course of English literature; history; and criticism of the same); Latin tongue (poets, composition, literary history); Greek (prose writers); French (composition, course of French literature; history and criticism, of same); Italian (elements), or, if preferred, German (elements). In their scientific — algebra (higher branches and application to geometry); geometry (higher branches and application to physics); physics (elementary); astronomy (elementary); natural history; zoology; mineralogy; geology; botany; physiology; anatomy (elementary); geography (statistical); psychology (elementary); history (ancient and modern complete); drawing; architecture; music (treated æsthetically); history of the Arts. Moral course — text of Scripture; ethics; history of systems (elementary); church history (elementary.)

These schools are intended for the community at large,

and their course is applicable to general purposes. It might be made either a preparation for the Universities, or for the special profession for which the pupil is designed. But should it so happen, as in many cases it might, that a portion of this course, such as the learned languages, &c., exceeded the wants of the pupil, and on the other hand that others, such as mathematics or the physical sciences, were not sufficiently developed for these wants, the pupil might be permitted to apply himself to such branches only, as were most necessary for his purposes, and from thence proceed for their fuller developement, or for such others as he might require, to a Special school.

These Special schools might be divided into three or four classes:—1. Schools of Industry; 2. Schools for the Learned Professions and the Arts; 3. Naval and Military Schools, to which also might be added, 4. Schools for Teachers.

The Schools of Industry might again be divided into 1. Agricultural; 2. Commercial; and these again into subdivisions, according to the different branches of each.

In like manner, the Professional Schools might be divided into Theological, Legal, and Medical Schools, and into Schools for Painting and Sculpture, Architecture, and Music.

The “*Naval and Military*” Schools are classified by their respective names.

The “*Agricultural Schools*” might, “on the principle of the general schools, be divided into higher, and lower. The “*Lower Schools*” should comprise in their course the mother-tongue, arithmetic, geometry, especially as applied to surveying, &c., natural history, geography, &c. &c., at least to the degree pursued in the higher primary schools, together with the elements of agricultural chemistry, practical farming, and domestic economics, to a greater extent than in the Lower Secondary schools. The “*Higher Agricultural Schools*,” besides a greater developement in each of the preceding branches, should especially embrace, in detail, agricultural chemistry, in its several branches; natural history, especially as connected with national produce; botany and geology, especially in reference to agricultural practice; mechanics, construction and working of agricultural machinery; domestic

and political economics, in reference to agriculture, &c.; drawing and architecture, in reference to same.

The "*Commercial Schools*" might likewise be distinguished into Higher and Lower. The "*Lower Schools*" might be kept nearly analogous to the lower Secondary Schools, substituting for the learned languages a more enlarged and practical study of French, and a greater developement of the mathematical and physical sciences. The "*Higher Schools*," besides pursuing each of these studies, should apply more particularly to the detailed study of geometry, especially in its applications, varying of course according to the destination of the pupil; mechanics and machinery, both theoretic and practical; hydrostatics, pneumatics, &c., both theoretic and practical, their applications to be determined as in the instance of the preceding; commercial chemistry; mineralogy, especially as applied to mining; botany, description and uses of natural and foreign productions; geography, in its fullest developement, especially political and statistical; principles of commerce and commercial law; social and political economy in detail; drawing; architecture, especially in its application to the construction of machinery, &c. Some of these branches might be more attended to in some schools than in others, in order adequately to meet the wants of every class. Pupils intended for civil engineers, for instance, and for miners would require, not only a different instruction, but a different degree in the same branches. The civil engineer requires only a very elementary knowledge of mineralogy; it ought to form the principal study of the miner: on the other side, the construction of machinery is to the latter, a secondary consideration; it is the main object of the engineer. The general commercial pupil, again, requires a general knowledge of all these branches, but no very detailed knowledge of any. Their views might be partially attained by being allowed to omit such courses as were least necessary; but this would not be compensated by proportionate developement, (if a single uniform plan were established) in the others. A better arrangement would be a proportionate diversity in the schools themselves.

The Professional Schools would necessarily be regulated by

the state and demands of the respective professions. The "*Schools of Arts*," indeed, would be more under the controul of general opinion. They might also be divided into Higher and Lower; the "*Lower Schools*" might, in most respects, correspond to the Lower Secondary schools, suppressing such scientific details as were found least requisite, in favour of a more minute application to the specific art, the study of which, at such a stage, should be as much mechanical as possible. The "*Higher Schools*," besides continuing the practice, should advance to the theory of each art in ample detail;—perspective; anatomy (if the pupil be designed for sculpture or painting); architecture; theory of music; declamation; the ballet; general principles, technical and æsthetic, of the Fine Arts; their history, intuism, &c. should supersede in great degree the scientific course of the Higher Secondary schools, but the literary course should be retained very nearly as it is.

The "*Teachers' Schools*," or, as they are termed on the continent, "Normal Schools," should be analogous to the school for which the teacher is destined: if for a Lower Primary school, he should have at least acquired an education for a higher; and if for a higher, an education co-extensive with a Lower Secondary. The teachers of the Secondary schools would probably be furnished by the Universities, with an University education.

The Universities are the great establishments for "Superior Education." The studies to be pursued in such institutions should be sufficiently numerous and ample to meet, in every particular, the highest intellectual wants of the community. None whatever, except such as are purely special, should be omitted, and each should be carried, in all its details, to the highest degree of developement, of which it is susceptible. Here no expense, no apparent inutility, no want of immediate demand, should be considered an objection to the endowment of any single branch of study. Unlike all other classes of education, they ought not merely to provide whatever is requisite for *existing* desires and necessities, but they ought to excite to *new*. Here there may be division and subdivision of intellectual labour, without injury, almost to any

extent. As the object, like that in providing a public library[†], is not to provide for a single mind, but for all possible minds, the pursuits of all, in their most minute details, should be consulted.[‡]

But these public establishments for Education do not extend beyond the period of youth. Education lasts for life. There are many who do not commence it till a late period. Each of these circumstances must be considered. Means must be devised to *continue* and constantly augment the Education received, and in some degree, at least, to *supply* its want to such as have not received it, or taken little advantage, during their early years, of the blessing. There must be a *Subsidiary* and a *Supplementary* Education. Under these several heads may be considered public libraries, especially for the people, galleries, museums, botanical gardens, &c. &c., literary and scientific institutions, &c. &c. The advantages which result from such assistance have never been denied. If they have not in every instance produced these benefits, the fault has generally been, either in the narrow and selfish manner in which they have been organised and conducted, or in the general want of such tastes in the community at large, a direct consequence itself, of defective national Education. Let the community be furnished liberally with the means; and the tastes which render such means efficacious will soon arise, and rapidly extend themselves amongst all orders of the community.[‡]

* This has been particularly attended to in Germany. An Englishman entering the library at Göttingen finds a better collection of English history and statistics than he usually meets with, in most libraries at home. Their universities are worthy of their libraries; they are truly, and in every sense, "*Urbi et Orbi.*"

† For more ample developements of these classifications, see Appendix. A.

‡ In the above classification I have not made, it will be observed, any specific arrangement for female education. I did not think it necessary. In primary education the primary schools, with a proper system of separation, will answer for both sexes: the course, with a few alterations, may be easily adapted: the substitution of female work for manual labour; instead of geometry and legislation, a more ample developement of domestic economies, applicable to the several situations of maid-servant, of farmers, mechanics, tradesmen's wives, &c. accompanied, of course, with the specific moral education fitted to each, is all that is required. Secondary and superior education is managed with more difficulty. Formerly, female education stopped at primary, it now requires a far greater extension and more exact cultivation; some approximation, in fine, to secondary.

This is but a sketch of what I conceive National Education should be, to claim the title of "*good*." It may far surpass,

But the course above given, in many particulars, is adapted, almost exclusively, to men : besides, public academies are not precisely the schools fitted for the intellectual or moral instruction of young ladies ; and universities, of course, are out of the question. What, then, is to be done ? That will be best understood by examining what is done at present. The establishments for female education most in use, at present, are, — 1. " Boarding schools," " Pensions," &c. &c. What advantages do they offer ? Public education, generally speaking, renders the pupil energetic, manly, masculine ; all virtues in boys : are they such in girls ? Public education, without great vigilance, exposes to the contagion of immoral companionship, vicious example, &c. If dangerous to boys, what must it be to girls ? Boys are more under the influence of their master, less under that of their companions ; girls the reverse. A wicked boy may stain a school, but can scarcely pervert it : a single wicked girl is for all such evils abundantly sufficient. Besides this, they leave their home. For boy or girl there is no school like the domestic fireside. Boys indeed may dispense with it ; it is always to be regretted, to be sure, but as their after existence is necessarily mixed, half of it passed abroad and half at home, public education is not altogether out of analogy with its after applications. Not so with girls ; their entire life must be spent round the household hearth. To " undomesticate " *them*, to remove from the sacred precincts of home at this early age, the daughter that now is, the wife and mother that is to be, is literally to " unsex " them, and under pretence of education, to exclude that which, more than any thing else, is *their* education. It is true, indeed, that every home is not a fit school for children. But whose fault is that ? Assuredly the parents' : and because they have been guilty of the fault, are they still to be further permitted to profit by it ? It is possible that they may be fond of liberty and dissipation, and children undoubtedly are checks on both ; but so they ought to be. Providence designed both child and parent to form and improve each other ; to be a mutual aid, a mutual developement to benevolence and virtue, but also a mutual controul on selfishness and vice. They love ! they attached ! No, no ; in such a house the domestic affections are all dead. Love—" point de mère, point d'enfant." It is false and fulsome to talk of either, when for the instruction of their children, that upon which the greatest happiness of the dearest objects in life, both here and hereafter, essentially depends, they cannot sacrifice the miserable amusement of a single night ! 2. " Convents." They are, as much as possible, exempt from the inconveniences and perils above noticed, and in these countries, at least, distinguished for the feminine purity and kindliness of their tuition. But they have inconveniences of their own. The atmosphere is too hot-house for the rude air of the world. The transition is too *brusque* ; the formation of character on too limited a basis ; the intellectual developement necessarily too exclusive. Maternal *love* is not sufficient ; maternal *sagacity*, and for that maternal *experience*, is also necessary. 3. " Externats," or colleges, liberally provided with professors, libraries, collections, &c., but receiving only *day* scholars. They answer perfectly well in the higher branches of secondary education for boys. The French educationists, Aimé Martin and others, propose to apply

indeed, the indications here given, but if it does not in some degree approach them, it is not deserving of the name. An

them to female education. But I doubt much either the practicability, or utility of such suggestion. How are country residents to attend? Is such attendance to be ventured without the companionship of a relative? Is a society, necessarily more miscellaneous than even that of a boarding school, unattended with extreme peril to that jealous reserve and sensitive purity which is pre-eminently the virtue and the grace of female education? Though sharing the advantages of home education, not enjoyed in the two former cases, it is proportionally exposed to the evils of public. There is no form, indeed, which public female education can possibly assume, which is not more or less liable to danger: in proportion only as it approaches to domestic, these evils diminish. This is now so fully admitted, that even boarding schools have considerably reduced their numbers; in some cases so much so, as to fall almost within the description of private families. If you can perfectly ensure the morals and minds of teacher and scholars, such establishments are, perhaps, the next best to domestic education. But domestic education itself, is not without its varieties and defects. It is not sufficient that it be private to be good; there are two great classes of private, or domestic, education essentially distinct—governess, and maternal education. 4. "Governess" education. It may be one of the very worst, but can never be the very best form of female education. If the mother altogether abdicates her trust, under hardly any circumstance can it be good; if the governess be only an assistant to the mother, and be a good assistant besides, it may rank next to exclusively maternal education. But where are these good governesses to be found? They are just as rare, as good public teachers. And why not? is any thing more natural? Who is there to teach them? There are no Normal schools in these countries, for either. 5. "Maternal education,"—the true education for the daughters and wives of a moral and enlightened nation. But mothers, it is objected, are not qualified to teach. Many certainly are not, and in such cases substitutes must be provided; but can a stronger argument be adduced for the earnest and immediate extension and improvement of female education? The children of the present day are suffering from the bad system, or the no system, of the past, from the ignorance or neglect of their parents. Ought not care at least be taken, that *their* children should not suffer, in like manner, from theirs? If they have not had the felicities of daughters, let them at least be secured all those of mothers—educate, at least, your grandchildren. What deficiencies exist in the literary department may be supplied, but the loss of the moral influences of the domestic hearth is very rarely, if ever, to be remedied. Secure this in the first instance, and for the purposes of literary instruction, selections may be made from the course of the Secondary schools, and applied, with such alterations as may appear requisite, to domestic education.

But for this there must often be, under present circumstances, assistance; there must be teachers. Teachers' schools for females become, therefore, as necessary as for males. The Primary teacher and the Secondary teacher—the Mistress of the elementary school, and the Governess are both requisite. In Prussia, indeed, such schools do not exist; but then, female teachers are not in such demand, as with us. Men, teach both boys and girls. This is scarcely compatible with either

education, much below this standard, whatever may be the fulsome panegyric with which it may be proposed to our admiration by the ignorant, the apathetic, or the interested, will gradually become a positive nuisance. It will add tenfold to all the previous evils of society, by giving to their action tenfold the extension and energy which they actually have. Half knowledge, garbled information, precipitate reasoning, in nine cases out of ten, no reasoning at all, unbridled imagination, confusion, levity, presumption, will be its intellectual results. Its moral will be still worse. With untutored passions, feeble or headlong will, with his moral habits unformed, his religious opinions mere habits, the half-educated, or ill-educated man, will make use of this new instrument, instruction, as a new means only of personal and perilous gratification; he will profane knowledge by rendering her ministrant to his selfish corruptions; he will sap society, by attacking it where its life chiefly exists, in the seat of its intellectual and moral power. Nor will these evils be temporary, or isolated. There is a principle of attraction in the spiritual world, still stronger than in the physical. Such minds soon aggregate to them others, and out of such aggregations is public opinion formed, and out of public opinion come demagogues, ministers, legislatures, governments, in a word, states themselves. Well may we then pause, before we go forth to this really awful task. Activity may be a great evil, as well as a great good. Not how you run, but whither you run, is the question. Whilst we boast that we are educating, and thence infer that we are raising up bulwarks around our liberties and happiness, we may be laying, for aught we know, in certain and

our very superior, or very inferior morality. If we employ mistresses, we must see that these mistresses be well taught; there are no other means of assuring this, but the establishment of Teachers' schools for Mistresses, as well as for Masters.

To resume — Primary education, for females of the lower classes, may be conducted in *public*, for the other classes, in *private* — Secondary education, if possible, in *private*; by the mother exclusively, if not by a good governess, *constantly* under the inspection of the mother; and if either be impracticable, then, but then only, that form of public education, which most closely approximates to either: the private family — the convent — and, last of all, the ordinary boarding-school, or *pension*.

regular succession, the combustibles only, which, on the very first spark, may be destined to fling both happiness and liberty into the air. What then must we do? We must know what we are doing. Are we educating, or are we not? Are we giving bread, or giving poison? Is it the fruit of the tree of life, or the fruit of the tree of knowledge only, which, if it makes us like unto gods, drives us out of Paradise at the same time, which we thus hold forth to the eager appetite of the country. These are momentous questions: until we can answer them satisfactorily to ourselves and to the community, we have not the right—it is a crime, it is a folly—in what we so gratuitously call education, to proceed a single step farther.

I will suppose, however, that an education, such as I have detailed, if it does not exist, can exist. I will suppose it not only practicable, but in operation. This leads us to a consideration of its effects upon the community, or to the third division of the present Section.

3. *Effects on the Community.*—This question involves many considerations. In the present instance we are confined to the theoretical. Reasoning *a priori* we have to enquire what are the effects which a good system of National Education is likely to produce on the community.

The Physical Education proposed, does not counteract nature, but follows it. It gives the utmost developement to the bodily energies, and applies them to the most useful purposes. The result of developing the bodily energies is powerful, in the first instance, on the health; in the second, on the intellect and morality of the population. The health is secured by removing the seeds of disease, or preparing against its attacks. The intellect and morality are improved by removing all physical causes which may interfere with their action, such as disease, feebleness, want of order, cleanliness, &c. and by augmenting and invigorating the bodily instruments with which both must work.*

* The health of any country and period is in proportion to the extent and degree of its physical and moral education. Compare Europe as it now is with what it once was a century ago, England with France, France with Poland, &c. Mr. Jacob describes the living and inhabitants of Poland, as wretched in the extreme. Its education is not much better. The average of mortality in the

The useful application of these forces is not less important. It not only produces a large amount of positive good, the material fruits of well applied labour, but it induces habits of regularity, industry, and content. Each, being employed in the manner, best adapted to his faculties and position, moves easily, produces the greatest quantity of advantage to himself and others, and can have no motive or tendency to move from it, by violent or capricious transition to any other.

The advantage of all this to the individual is obvious—is it of less advantage to the community?

The Intellectual Education, suggested, secunds in an effective manner this physical développement, and offers additional advantages of its own. It does not limit itself to acquisitions; its object is not knowledge only. It sees every human being endowed with intelligence—the more or less is dependent upon organisation, but still more upon education. It seeks to develope to the fullest these energies in the first instance, and to apply them to the most useful purposes in the second.

To accomplish the first, it begins in a manner the best accommodated to the nature of these faculties, and the state in which they actually are. It seeks to make observing, reflecting, judging children, and, by that means, observing, reflecting, judging men.

Roman States is 1 in 27, in France 1 in 39, in England 1 in 56. Of course, climate has some influence, but not universally. England ranges in the scale of health higher than any other country, except Scotland. The difference between city and country is also very striking. Paris exhibits a mortality of 1 in 32. London 1 in 40, one fourth of which arises from consumption. A still more remarkable contrast exists between the past and present condition of the country. The annual mortality has declined nearly one third in the United Kingdom, and is still progressively declining. In 1780 it was taken in the United Kingdom at the rate of 1 in 40; in 1811, of 1 in 52; in 1821, of 1 in 54; it is now 1 in 56. Our improvement, in this particular, is chiefly ascribable to our improved habits of living, clothing, and cleanliness. In this last item we surpass all European nations. In the article of water, the supply to the Metropolis has been increased within even a recent period, tenfold. A still stronger difference is perceptible between us, and other nations. A French statistical writer calculates the consumption of water at 84 litres to each person at Manchester, 80 at London, 61 at Edinburgh, 56½ at Greenock, 27½ at Liverpool (all commercial towns, it is true), but not more than 5 at Paris. A litre is equal, in English measure, to 1·761 pint.

These habits acquired, these instruments so prepared, it applies them not to purposes purely speculative, indifferent, or injurious. It uses these powers for the acquisition of knowledge, but the knowledge it proposes for attainment is not merely theoretic, but practical—knowledge which gives new means, not merely of avoiding numerous evils, affecting both his physical and spiritual condition, but means also for indefinitely raising both, in the scale of improvement and enjoyment. It teaches him where lies his true interests, how these interests may be best attained, and, when attained, how they may be best secured; it gives him the power of self-conduct, and enlarged means of doing good; it furnishes an inexhaustible source of true and pure pleasures, and extinguishes his taste for false and coarse ones; in a word, it opens to him a new portion of his nature, and immeasurably enhances the value of the other. The physical man is of tenfold power in the hands of the intellectual.

A society of such individuals would be necessarily as superior to one, where these developements were wanting, as an individual so educated to one that was not. A nation is only an aggregate of these societies. But would it be happier? That depends upon the manner in which these powers are employed. This is a material question. A highly exercised mind, and a large stock of knowledge, does not necessarily imply their judicious employment.

Knowledge in itself, is neither good, nor bad. It is merely the instrument for effecting good, or evil. A man who can read Paley, may read Harriet Wilson. The tendency to read the last instead of the first, will depend on accident and example. Making allowance for the additional momentum of the human passions, the tendency will be much stronger, without counteracting powers to check it, to the last, than to the first. These powers are therefore necessary; they are provided by Moral and Religious Education.

The Moral and Religious Education proposed in the preceding pages, addresses itself directly to this purpose. It recognises in the Will the determining cause of human action, but it sees the will itself under the influence of habits, as

habits are under the influence of feelings and principles. It seeks to secure both. It insists on the essential importance of forming early and permanently these habits; it calls in to its assistance, in their formation and direction, the culture of moral and religious feelings, and the inculcation of a code of religious and moral duty: for both it recurs to the Scriptures, but it renders Scriptural injunction special, by applying it practically to every situation in life. It endeavours to carry the Gospel and its power into every condition, to give the moral, the mastery over the intellectual, as it gave the intellectual the command over the physical portion of man. With this, with a wise and firm conscience at the head, it trusts implicitly to the government of the individual, all his sensibilities and all his powers, and fears not to raise them to the very highest degree of perfection, of which they are susceptible. It considers that it thus fulfills the true end of all education. "Knowledge is power," says Bacon. Such an education would be power, wisdom, and virtue.

What is now the operation of this, on society? The two great objects to which we have to look for the happiness and security of society, are its purity and good order. Which is most likely to attain both—this education, or the absence of this education? Let us take two individuals—one educated, the other not—and contrast them. By narrowing our vision we shall see clearer; what will be the condition of these individuals, and their influence on the condition of society?

There are few villages in the country which do not present us specimens of the uneducated: we meet him in the gin-shop, and in the street—he is an idler, a drunkard, a quarreller—we hear of him in every riot, he is an aider and abettor in every outrage. His family are slovenly—reckless—debased—wretched. He is a quarreller because a drunkard, and he is a drunkard because he is idle. But why is he idle? Because he has never felt the value of labour—the pleasure of thinking—the joy of a good conscience. He has never been habituated to form judgments of these things. The powers necessary to form such judgments, have been neglected. He has never been taught to examine, to enquire, to attend. He has become

passive. He feels the pressure of want brought on by his own habits : but how does he try to remedy it? All his life he has been taught to spare, as much as possible, his own exertions, and to hang, beggar-like, as much as possible, on those of others. He is the slave, from laziness, of authority. It is not in a sudden emergency he is likely to throw it off. All his life, he has sacrificed, with the short-sighted selfishness of ignorance, the future to the present, and every interest, public and private, to his own. He is turbulent, but not independent ; he talks of freedom, and is a slave to every man and thing around. But indolence is not a merely passive vice. Better to “ wear out ” than to “ rust out ” has been truly said ; but he who “ rusts out ” “ wears out ” too. No greater burthen than sloth ; no greater consumer of the spirit and body of man, than doing nothing, and having nothing to do. Every day spent in inactivity, renders action more difficult ; every hour which does not add, steals away some instrument of virtue and happiness, and leaves the sluggard more at the mercy of those visitations of sickness or want to which even the industrious are exposed. Nor is this all. Omission of duty, soon becomes commission of crime. Painful reflections now beset him. They are sought to be extinguished, but not by reform. Conscience drives him to fresh vice. This goes on for a time — but health, means, companions, must at last fail. Then it is that he sees, for the first time, how bootlessly he has squandered away the healthy morning-tide, the working hours of life. He has paid down existence, and all that makes existence a glory and a good, in advance. Body and soul are spent. He becomes sullen and sour. Disappointments thicken on him, and they are all of his own causing. His farm is covered with weeds — his shop deserted — his children profligates and rebels — his household a hell. He gradually becomes an enemy to all social ordinance, to law, justice, truth, good faith — to all that makes community to man. He envies and hates the good and happy — he looks on every check as a wrong, on every prosperous man as a foe. Whither is he to rush for rescue from these encompassing evils? The Gospel he never understood — and therefore never practised. His religion is an hypocrisy, or a superstition.

It affords him now no direction in his errors, no consolation in his afflictions. He finds in it neither warmth, nor light. The religion he learnt never penetrated to the spirit; it was a tinkling cymbal,—a jargon of meaningless and profitless words. But crime, which had long been ripe in thought, is at last on the point of bursting into act. He is at last ready for every desperate attempt. Education has been held up as the great principle of all modern restlessness and disorder. Is this the case? Let facts answer. Here are men uneducated enough, ignorant enough, to produce the most perfect quiet, if ignorance and absence of education could produce it. Yet is it from materials like these you are to expect the tranquillity and prosperity of a great nation? Is it in the nature of things, that out of elements so utterly evil, peace and happiness should emanate? Private vice has but to make a few steps and a few proselytes, and it becomes public corruption: individual discontent wants only time and circumstance to spread out into general disorder. Such, indeed, are the real revolutionists; men bad and blind—blind because they are bad—a huge Polyphemus, sightless and strong, waiting only some crafty guide to lead the monster on against society. Nor is such want likely to remain long unsupplied. The state of such a population offers direct temptation to the adventurer. Oracles will be always numerous where there is ignorance, and deliverers where there is discontent. We may laugh at their insolence, and affect to despise their absurdities. But with such an audience they have much better cause to laugh at us. No matter how clumsy the pretender may be; let him but throw by all modesty and hesitation; when he sees events inevitable, let him prophesy them; when forced to submit, appear to choose—follow when he cannot guide—flatter when he dare not strike—crush when he dare—and depend upon it he will never want for followers and worshippers. This is the history, not of popular *enlightenment*, but of popular *darkness*,—not of *knowledge*, but of *ignorance*, through all countries and generations. This it is—and not books, and not schools—which gives victims to the Juggernaut, and rupees to the Brahmin; which devastated America in the name of Religion, and made the French revo-

lution a massacre in the name of Liberty. Talk of reading, truly, as the great principle of popular disturbance ! No popular tumult ever yet took place where the non-readers were not ten times more violent, as well as blinder than the readers. The poison circulates more rapidly by means of reading, it is true (and this is one reason, amongst others, why our modern revolutions are somewhat more prompt than those of our ancestors); but is it only through reading that it circulates ? Are there no such things as speeches, and public meetings ? After all, we have to do not with the circulation, but with that which is circulated ;—what we want is that there should be no poison — no sellers of it — no buyers of it ; or, if applied, that an antidote to the poison should be in the hands of every one, before the poison itself. Reading and writing is this antidote, but not reading and writing singly ; there must be more, and much more besides. If reading and writing fail in doing good, the cause is, that there is *nothing else*. The cause is, not that there is education, but that there is not *enough* of education, nor *of the kind* which the people want. But let us now turn a little to the reverse of this picture. Let us see what such an education,—a good, sound, sufficient, and appropriate education, would produce. Let us take a pupil from one of these schools, educated, as much as possible, on the system we have recommended. Let us suppose that he has been accustomed, from his childhood up, to attend to the common objects around him — to form clear conceptions of each — to combine them consistently — to compare and weigh them, and never to take any thing for granted, never to adopt before he has first proved. Let us add to this, habits of labour and dexterity — whatever can give knowledge and confidence in his physical powers, and whatever can discipline him, by long practice and judicious instruction, to sound and rational morality. Then set him abroad in the world, and see how he will act with this preparation, in his domestic and public capacity. He will be master of all his faculties — consequently, can wield them with suppleness to all the ordinary purposes of life. He will fully comprehend all the objects around him with which he ought to be familiar, and will thus

be enabled to apply his knowledge with certainty and ease. He will not be discontented, because he will perfectly conceive how much his own happiness depends upon himself. He will understand that true independence is the child of good conduct, and that good character is in itself fortune. He will not be found trusting indolently to others for success: he will carve out that success, himself. He will not be disappointed by failures, which reflection must teach him to be inevitable, and experience has taught him to be remediable. He will not drown his mind in the gin-shop, thus attempting, by a sort of moral suicide, to extinguish pain by lethargy, and with a despair, the natural offspring of selfishness, as selfishness is of mental indolence, cast into the same gulf with himself all those beings, parents, wife, and children, for whose happiness he is so deeply accountable. He will feel in the darkest hour that he *can* contend against such evils, for he has already proved, that to contend against them, in nine cases out of ten, is to conquer them: he will also feel, that whether he shall conquer them or not, he is bound by the most solemn obligations to contend, if not for himself, for those who are dearer to him than himself, to the very last. He will not be found in the fair-quarrel, because he will habitually avoid the public-house. He will not be found in the secret conspiracy, because he will avoid the society of those from whom such conspiracies spring. He will not be found hanging for his existence on the eleemosynary folly of his rich neighbour, or the compulsory rate-funds of his parish. He will not claim as "the freehold" of vicious inutility, what the state destined as the last resource only of virtuous, and unfortunate want. The intellectual education he has received, has taught him fully to comprehend the great fundamental principles upon which his rights and happiness are founded; he understands perfectly well, that there is but a certain surplus produce, and that what is expended upon unproductive labour, is robbed from productive. He knows that all increase of such burthens is a transfer only from the labour-fund to the want-fund — that rates depress wages — that the condition of the honest working-man, by such a process, must every day be

more and more deteriorated—that, finally, cultivation, and profits, must themselves diminish—and all classes, good and bad, be involved at last, by a perseverance in such system, in the same common ruin. This just sense of the public interest will not only restrain him from adding his individual weight to the burthen, but will teach him the means, how best he may prevent others from adding theirs; it will enable him, in his capacity of ratepayer, to detect the pretences of the profligate idler, to guide the hand of public benevolence, and to set a stern and steady barrier against the encroachments of improvidence and vice. Moral Education has given him energy, has given him “Will;” and he not only exercises over himself all due controul, but he fears not to interpose, in the enlightened spirit of true justice, between the public, and the corruptions and violence of individuals. He is no intriguer with the overseer; no weak protector of the insolent pauper; no trafficker for personal profit, in any one sense, on the rights or property of the public. If not rich, he is comfortable; he knows the sweets of “eating his own bread,” and “walking up his own stairs:” his cottage is well situated, well ventilated; he has been taught, where to select the best position, how to take advantage of the most wholesome aspect, how to extinguish all the evils of marshy or damp exposure: it is a model of order and cleanliness—not of that holiday neatness which is the cheap achievement of a few vessels of whitewash, the result, perhaps, of the compulsory order, the abrupt reform of some neighbouring Lady Bountiful, got up for the gratification of her own vanity, and as part of the show scenery of her new demesne, but the work of his own hands and of his own intelligence, the quiet gradual growth of well-ordered information, and day-by-day perseverance. Not a tree that he has not planted, and all in the best way and in the best situation; not a hedge that has not been traced out, on the best principles, under his own eye: every expedient is put to profit, every pleasure is associated with utility; he has not received his lessons of “Useful knowledge in vain.” Sickness is a stranger to his dwelling; the hale and rosy cheeks of his family, his own sturdy arms, and broad unwrinkled brow, are

proofs, how well he has learned the art of keeping it at a distance. The flaunt and flare of expensive dress is unknown to his wife or girls, but, in return, you never see their very necessities at the Pawn-office; if the stuff be coarse and the make common, it is their *own*, and bespeaks, in touching language, their virtue and activity. Whatever hour you enter, you will find them occupied, in what to others may appear trifles; but they have been taught to think nothing a trifle to the poor and honest; they know, that out of many of these trifles put together, these "small summations" of labour and skill, a great amount of comfort may be secured at the close of the year; they know, by instruction and experience, how much may be made in the hand of the skilful and attentive, of that, which in the hand of sloth and ignorance, runs to utter waste. It was a part of their physical and intellectual education, to put every thing to its utmost use, and their "labour school habits" have not deserted them, on coming to the real business of existence. Occupation is their life — but it is the pleasure as well as duty of their life, the salt which seasons, and not the wormwood which poisons, existence. Hence, you will not find the children of such a family wandering lazily from street to street, the associates of the unprincipled, the already mature pupils of infamy and crime. The "lessons on Education" which the parents had received, are visible in the virtue and intelligence of their children. They know by what early discipline these tender beings may be preserved untainted to society; they know what arts they must use, to prepare them for the same useful and happy race, which they are now running themselves: they are deeply impressed with the importance of these obligations; they feel fully both the nature and necessity of the trust. Thus, already have they preluded, by giving them early habits of "activity," "attention," order, "truth," "religious feeling," to the education of the Infant and Primary school, and sown the seeds of a new and better generation than that, which is now hastening away. Nor is it easy to say, to what degree of social amelioration, this early maternal culture, steadily and judiciously pursued, in all ranks of life, will ultimately lead. Each succeeding age will more and more facilitate, by such preliminary atten-

tion, the intellectual and moral developement of the public school, and thus lay a much surer and broader foundation for the entire superstructure of Education. It is now, both father and mother find, how *practically* useful, such instructions have become. Their frugal board is surrounded with happy faces; a common bond of unceasing employment, conscious utility, and participation in all advantages as well as exertions, a sympathy in all pleasures and all pains, unite every member of the joyous family together. No wonder that, with such union, every thing goes on so well. The field labours of the father prosper; his vigorous boys borrow from his experience and skill, for he has not only learned the lesson at the "Labour school," but, what is far more precious, acquired the important art of daily adding to it more; the daughters, on their side, profit by the "Domestic Economics" of their mother, and have already contracted by assimilation the habit, almost before its object or utility is known. "Conscience," and "self-controul," gradually grow up; the religious feeling expands; regularity, and peace, and daily augmenting prosperity, walk in their train. The parents bind, by their conduct, to the household hearth, the heart and soul of their children: the children, in like manner, draw into themselves the holiest and strongest of all influences, the heart and soul of their parents. Not from such a home as this, will one or other be ever severed.* Such families have no Prodigal Sons. If, as must sometimes be the case in the intervals of rural labour, certain periods of leisure intervene, they hang not heavy upon the educated peasant: he has no inducement, to disburthen himself of those delightful hours, by coarse sensual indulgence. He has been already provided with *his* pleasures at school. He feels that all the enjoyments of nature are open to him, as well as to the first favourite of fortune. He has been taught how to appreciate and enhance them. His taste has been purified, his understanding elevated; mental gratification has become to him a necessary: He carries his ideas beyond his immediate spot of time, or earth; he has, if not as extended, perhaps as strong, a feeling of the attractions of historical and geographical knowledge, as those in the highest ranks above him. The elements

he acquired at the Primary school, were "just and well imprinted;" he has added gradually to them, since. Or, perhaps, he is more nearly touched by his own immediate interests. If so, his inquiries relative to agricultural or commercial improvement—the result, in his physical education, of the constant association with practical labour, of useful discovery and instruction—find abundant exercise and gratification. The "village library" furnishes him largely with this "subsidiary education;" and in time he has a small library of his own. It is here you see his deepest and dearest convictions, the sacred volume, and the moral discourse; and, perhaps too (for it is not misplaced on the table of the educated labourer), the cherished Poet of his youth. His "imagination," no more than his understanding, has been allowed to lie fallow; Poetry, with "Music," are still the relaxation of the grown up man, as they early were of the boy. Such a man as this, will find no charms in the brute enjoyments of the dram-shop, in the crapulous revelry of the worthless. Idleness and licentiousness will have no hold on him. He is not only pure in his tastes, strong in his affections, but he is firm in his morals. He is accustomed to "self-inquiry" and to "self-command." His "conscience" is sensitive; his "religion" enlightened; his habits of "order," "justice," and "benevolence" are steadily fixed. He never misses whatever solemn opportunities may present themselves, of still more strengthening, by Christian instruction, "the principles" which his moral and religious education had planted. To this sobriety, this abstinence from all gross indulgence, he adds the prudence, and economy, and forethought, which are so eminently the virtues of his situation. He is well acquainted (it formed a large portion of his "Political and Domestic economy" instructions at school) with all the simple but important principles which go to regulate the system of every-day life. He understands how labour and wages operate on each other; how credit and interest enter into price; how a number of consumers may unite profitably in the purchase of a commodity; how very small savings, by steady additions and judicious investments, accumulate; and he has the moral spirit and courage to act up rigidly to these convictions

of his knowledge and judgment. You will not see him purchase on long credit, even for necessities; least of all will he be likely to mortgage, for the vanity or indulgence of the present, the true comfort and independence of the future. His will not be a life of expedients—living from hand to mouth; he will always have enough, of the best kind, and in the cheapest manner. Fearlessly may he look to the future, with such a spirit and such a mind. The Savings Bank, and not the Workhouse, will be his security against sickness and age. Whilst others around him, originally perhaps with double his means, are indebted either to his labour-rate or alms-giving, for their support, he is in full but regulated enjoyment of all that is really valuable in life; and has the proud consciousness of owing it solely to himself—to the wise and persevering application of the blessings of his early education. Well may he walk with an erect head, and a quiet eye! Well may he smile, when he sees his distant cottage, in its pleasant nook, in the evening sun! There is nothing there to reproach him—not a heart which does not bound as he enters—not a sight which is not full of testimonies to the perfect performance of all his duties. He was taught early to be thus happy—to understand the true dignity of labour—the science of usefulness—the glory of being good; he reaps the harvest, as he has sown the seed. Neither God, nor society, have deserted him.

But he has other duties to perform. He is a citizen. For these duties, he is also prepared. He is obedient to the laws, but his obedience is not founded upon ignorance. Short, indeed, and precarious, is the submission of a fool—at the mercy of every sophism of passion or wickedness, which may choose to seduce, or assail it. He knows his rights, but he also knows his duties, and his interests. He has not studied the constitution and legislation of his country, elementary as the study may have been, merely to rail at it. The structure of society, the principles of social happiness, are familiar to him. He sees the value, the necessity, of different grades, for each, and for all. He does not look with envy, but neither with servility, upon the higher orders of society: he respects

them, but he respects himself more; he has learnt, in all things, and at all times,

—— “to venerate himself a man,”

and to bless Heaven, every morning, on his knees, that he was born in such a country, and in the midst of the light and liberty of such an age. He is ready, at any risk of life or fortune—(it was a part of his “moral and religious education”)—to repel real aggression upon his chartered franchises; he has been too well taught to appreciate the value of the institutions he enjoys, to bear tamely a diminution of the blessing; but he is not for that less sensible of the importance of order and tranquillity, less alive to the necessity of maintaining general confidence between all orders, less convinced that out of such alone can proceed public security, and that without public security there is no stimulant for private exertion, or hope for private good. He has been taught (in his elementary lessons on “economics” and “legislation”) the nature of the reciprocal position of governor and governed, of master and labourer, of buyer and seller; whilst he boldly insists that government should do all it can, he knows well that government cannot do every thing; that each man must add his contribution; that it is his duty, if it were not his interest, to do so; that the self-guidance, and self-control, of the individual are, after all, the great sources of the happiness and prosperity of the commonwealth at large. He has compared his condition with that of the generations which have preceded, and with the far inferior condition of others in countries less advanced in civilisation than his own. He may occasionally suffer, but he is not therefore systematically impatient, for he is not ignorant; he knows the cause, and he studies the remedy for his distress. He will not, in his sufferings, lend himself to the madness of every new scheme for bettering, surreptitiously, his condition. He will not shout to every travelling demagogue, who, from disappointment, ignorance, or for personal profit, hallooos him on against law or tax, with direct reference to his own views, but with the least possible, to the true principle, of his sufferings. He has been habituated to “attention,” “reflection,” “judgment;”

the political charlatan harmlessly exhibits his drugs to him. If he listens, he considers and weighs. He is no servile follower of the authority of any man; he recognises no "ipse dixit," no saying of "the Master." At school he was taught "never to *assent* before he was *convinced*, never to form his *convictions* without previous adequate *enquiry*." He now can walk alone; he is not the man, to yield up his approbation or his services (his education has taught him "patriotism," "consistency," and "truth") unless his judgment and conscience can go along heartily and steadily with them. His habits are the result not of compulsion, but of "feeling and principle, gradually strengthening and directing the will;" they do not desert him when required. From his childhood up he has been accustomed "to lean principally upon *himself*;" and now, in the strife and peril of existence, he does not need, to help on his wavering virtue, that priest or teacher should stand by his side. In a word, his whole being is in true harmony; he enjoys thoroughly every faculty; he "utilises" every portion of existence. His health is sound and constant: he laid deep the seeds of a good constitution in the well-regulated labour of the school; ignorance and vice, idleness, drunkenness, misery, discontent, have not subsequently poisoned these early blessings. His mind is as vigorous and as active as his body: his knowledge is every day increasing, every day becoming more "useful," better "adapted to his situation;" it does not raise him above it, but it raises his situation with him; it doubles his gains with his pleasures, adds new zest to his manual exertions, protects him from low and fatal immorality, and by thus assisting collaterally in the advancement of his physical and moral happiness, exhibits the true object of intellectual education. His morality and religion are "well understood" and "well practised:" it was not a religion of words, a faith of memory, which he learnt at school: it was not an unintelligible chapter in the Prophets, or an obscure page in the catechism, long since scattered from his recollection, and leaving nothing but a vague feeling of disgust and difficulty behind; least of all was it the bitter and implacable frenzy of sectarian animosity. *His religion tho-*

roughly penetrated both heart and head ; he comprehended and felt it, and cherished it, from the beginning ; it was "principle" worked into "habit," "specifically and practically fitted for his specific situation ;" and now, therefore, is it not a matter of mere "dead doctrine," but of real, practical, and vivifying "use." Every day required, and every day exercised, it is too natural and necessary to him now, to be blown away by every puff of temptation : fully satisfying the natural yearnings of the human heart for the spiritual and the eternal, it requires no sudden stimulant, no extravagant fanaticism, no pulpit novelty, no tumultuous camp meeting, above all, no base, bigot persecution, to keep up the flame. His piety is manly and enlightened, his moral and religious existence, like his moral and religious education, leans on the physical and intellectual, as on useful ministers. The union of the triple man, at which we have all along aimed, is thorough and complete. Education has done its work : these are the results. Is the picture overcharged ? is any one feature not the necessary consequence of the other ? We have seen the tree, is it improbable that such should be its fruits ? If so, human nature must diverge unaccountably, indeed, from its own laws, and leave us without guide or certainty, in the regulation of the most elementary movements of society. Temptation, it is true, may overcome, and the contact of external corruption may pervert ; but this is no argument against the efficiency of the original culture. The barrier may be thrown down, but it will take time and strength to throw it down, and to pass over it ; little of either will be requisite, if there be no barrier at all. Neither must it be forgotten, that the very extension of this system implies a constantly progressive diminution of both the temptation and corruption. Every family so educated is a material subtraction from the external forces of vice, and an addition to those of virtue. Every labourer, so disciplined, is not only one more rescued from the chances of misery and crime, but he is a guardian and bail for his neighbour, a new augmentation of that moral police which, in every enlightened and virtuous community, watches over the virtue and happiness of the humblest, as well as of the greatest individual.

Is it from such a man, or such a family, or a country of such families, that society has to *dread*? Is it not on such families only, and their multiplication throughout the land, that society has to *rely*? Are such the men to add to the existing depravities of the poor laws, to crowd the profligacy of the gin-shop, to furnish the streets of the capital with midnight riot and debauch, to plan the rustic conspiracy, to guide the nightly torch to the possessions of the farmer, and the landlord? Are such the men likely to glut our jails, passing on from error to crime, from the penitentiary to the hulks, and ending but too frequently in the death and ignominy of the gibbet? Are such men likely to be the demoralisers, the anarchists, the disorganisers of our country? Are such the materials which must be kept down, or got rid of? Is it not clear that without such, all legislation, however benevolent or provident it may seem, will be, in the end, but a waste of labour and time? All institutions which have not, or do not contemplate the having, such materials to work with, must work with the sieve of the Danaïdes. No, no, it is not poor law amendment bills, nor tithe commutation measures, nor emigration committees, nor corn trade restrictions, nor any other mere politico-commercial expedients, useful as they may be as accessories, which can reach, or effectually grapple with, the true evils of our agricultural system. The malady is inward and fundamental: it rises not from the *position* in which men are, but from the *men* themselves. It is with the men we should begin, and they will re-model their position. We must go to the elements and re-order them: they will not be different, when put together, from what they were when alone. If education reforms the individual, society, the aggregate of individuals, can alone be reformed by education.

But the agricultural population, though the great basis, in most countries, of all social organisation, is not in England the most numerous, or the most active element of our system. The manufacturing interest has encroached, and is still rapidly encroaching, on the agricultural. They now form two thirds in mere animate power, independent of the immense accession of inanimate, of the entire productive forces

of the country. Their intellectual and moral weight is still greater. Any corrective which does not go to repress the vices, and to increase the virtues, of this important class, must, as far as national amelioration, largely considered, is in question, be comparatively inoperative. If education be insufficient in energy or extension, to act upon these bodies with the same degree of power and advantage as on the agricultural, it will scarcely produce any other effect, than the heterogeneous exhibition of a country, exceedingly moral and exceedingly corrupt, but equally cultivated at the same time. What would be the result of such contradictory principles of good and evil, in presence of each other, it is not difficult to divine. The weaker body would of course succumb to the stronger, and the turbulent demoralisation of the cities, ultimately spread out, with their furnaces and steam engines, over the secluded virtues, and peaceable prosperity of the country.

But the education we have been recommending, if our former reasoning be just, ought assuredly to produce, in one instance, much the same effects as in another. It is true, indeed, that the original man is materially modified by the circumstances and beings with whom he is in relation, and there is a marked difference between the circumstances of town and country. But then it must also be remembered, that one of the most prominent advantages of this system of education, is its perfect facility of adaptation to every country, class, and situation of mankind. It admits, as circumstances may require, the greater or less application of this or that physical, intellectual, or moral force, either to individuals or communities. The atmosphere in which the manufacturer or operative lives, exposes him to physical and spiritual maladies, which are either totally or comparatively unknown in the country. He requires another description of physical, intellectual, and moral discipline, to counteract these diseases. He has received it. We have only to enquire, how far the action of such an antidote is effectual, and whether such an education is *enough* to protect the manufacturer from the contagion of vice and wretchedness, with which he is perpetually surrounded.

The physical evils to which the operative is exposed, are innumerable. They are the result of the strife, constantly going on, between avarice and civilisation. But the ignorance and depravity of the men themselves, both master and workman, have unnecessarily exaggerated these miseries.* Hundreds have perished by the wasting death of uncleanly habits, confined rooms, fetid atmosphere, deleterious trades, and protracted hours; but each and all of these principles of mortality, so far from having been checked by the sagacity of the legislator, or the humanity of the capitalist, or the regular conduct of the operative, have been allowed to grow up to the most formidable height, by all three.* The legislator interferes feebly and reluctantly; the master, blind to his own interests, like the inhabitants of Louisiana, cuts down the tree for the fruit; and the operative, reckless and spendthrift, living only on the passing instant, seeks to compensate for the privation of all quiet and reasonable enjoyment, by the fierce and furious indulgences of the gin-shop. The weakness of the day is sought to be factitiously repaired by the stimulant of the evening; and the next morning finds the victim, with diminished powers, bending under the same burthens, yet madly intent, notwithstanding repeated experience, to rush again, at night, to the same fatal remedy. This alternation between excitement and collapse, between excessive labour and excessive debauch, this burning out the physical material of life at both ends, cannot last long: he totters rapidly through life, and falls, before he can well be said to exist, an early grave. The aged operative is now almost unknown: his old age, is the wrinkle on the brow of youth, cheeks sunk with premature labour, hairs grey with juvenile debauch. Neither is he ever young: his childhood has passed away without a single childish reminiscence—he is initiated in the gin-glass almost fresh from his mother's milk; he lives with the practised vices, and is pinched with the true misery, of grown-up

* A remarkable instance, of the operation of these causes, was the opposition to the introduction of the magnetic mask, in the steel-filing trade. The men preferred encountering the almost certain abridgment of life, to which they had hitherto been exposed, rather than by the adoption of this improvement, incur the risk of a diminution of wages, consequent on a diminution of danger.

men. And if he flies for compensation to home, he has no true home: a wife sicklied over with the same wretchedness as himself, giving birth to children dying from their birth, a progeny numerous, ricketty, and scarcely able to sustain the burthen of life, till they reach the age when they too, shall be devoted at the same altar; this is the perspective upon which his thoughts of the future must rest; this the inheritance which he is to leave to his country. From this serious error in the *physical* management of this class, necessarily flow a series of *intellectual* and *moral* evils. The cultivation of the mental powers will be careless, or distorted; ill-guided, and ill-applied stimulants, not correctives, will be sought after: indulgence in the violent invective, the base misrepresentation, the seditious pamphlet, the gross and obscene ballad, will be his intellectual gratification. His moral nature will necessarily sink under such combined and continued exposure to perversion. The pestilence of evil society, the mind-fever of corrupt example, will fasten on him and do their work. Ruined mind and body, heart and head, his spiritual still more diseased than his physical being, he will at last be reduced to a mere machine, used as long as the wheels are in sufficient order to do their daily work, but on the first appearance of defect or decay, thrown in the wear and tear of human life, with other similar lumber, coldly or contemptuously away.

But the education we propose precludes all this. Our physical education, even with all abatements of its advantages in a town, seasons for the future endurance of the evils of a manufactory; but it does more, it teaches how many of those evils, now considered inevitable, may be subdued or avoided. More correct notions of the immense advantages, even in a mere commercial point, of health and strength in large masses, are inculcated. The master sees that the good position, the thorough ventilation, the moderate labour, the curtailed hours of his establishment, the cleanliness, the good clothing, the fair remuneration of his workmen, producing, as they necessarily must, greater vigour and greater alacrity, double the productive forces even of the physical machine; and thus, so far from lowering his receipts by this

increase of his expenditure, raise them, if possible, to a higher standard, but at all events place them on a far surer and more permanent ground. The operative, habituated already by his education to the same truths, and finding them subsequently realised in life, instead of counteracting adds to their efficacy and extension. A manufactory, so regulated, is a continuance only of his school discipline. It is the practical application of the theory. If not robust, he is at least healthy; if sedentary, not confined; if not joyous, at least cheerful; never exhausted, though he may sometimes be fatigued. He requires no other means to recruit his forces than relaxation; no stimulant is necessary, rest restores them to their tone. His early discipline taught him the efficacy of alternation in his occupations. He employs one form of labour, to unbend from, or to prepare for another. On leaving the factory, it is not to the beer shop you will trace him. He does not feel the want of its riotous companionship, of its poisonous excitements. His health is sound, his strength unimpaired, and his education has directed him elsewhere for pleasure. He has been early imbued, in the Primary Town school with the first elements of thinking and knowledge. His understanding has been strenuously exercised; his judgment put to trial: he has clear and solid acquisitions; he understands the common interests of his position, and he delights in still further pursuing his enquiries. The "Town Library" provides him, at small cost, with all that is most recent and necessary in each of these particulars. The "Useful Knowledge," which he has already laid up, receives daily accessions. The "Town Museum," the "Mechanic or Literary Institute," the "Botanical Garden," the "Model Collection," all the various forms under which a flourishing system of "Subsidiary education" is supported, furnish him with easy and frequent means of improvement. He reads, but his taste being already formed by useful and wholesome reading, by the wise "moral course of his mother tongue," by the judicious "political and historical elements," by the practical "public and domestic economy" instruction, which he has received, there is no danger that he will turn from food like this, to batten upon garbage. His

habits instinctively direct him *what* to read; and what he reads, the same tastes naturally convert into nutriment and not poison. He acquaints himself more thoroughly with the true principles on which his public and private interests should rest. He examines into the real causes of those social changes, by which his trade, or the trade of those around him, is affected. He provides new safeguards against error, new defences of truth; or familiarises himself still more with those standard works of the language, whose high moral temper, combined with their surpassing literary excellence, are amongst the best antidotes against the coarse seductions of licentious and debasing publications. His has not been an education of reading and writing only, he has not been turned out upon the street with this poor but dangerous gift. The instrument has been confided to his hand early, but early also has he been taught to use it. The various illusions which successively disturb the reason, and so seriously peril the prosperity of others, pass him by. He is not swept into the vortex of every sudden strife, by the passion or ignorance of his fellow operatives. He is accustomed to carry his cool eye beyond the temporary or local evil. He confides boldly in himself, and the future. He understands the working of the machine, and is not fretted up into sudden violence by any transient jerk, or jog. Least of all, for the purpose of an imaginary improvement in his condition, will he rush into those anti-social schemes, generally, the desire of successful or malignant selfishness, which, for the sake of a miserable momentary profit or popularity, compromise all improvement, and cast, on the hazard of a die perhaps, not merely the regeneration, but the very existence, of their country. His "patriotism" will not expend itself in nourishing in the bosom of the land the seeds of political disorganisation, that on the first touch of disaster they may split, not merely rank from rank, but rend asunder the strong and venerable foundations of the social system itself. But not on knowledge only, has he to rely. He is moral and religious: a morality and religion which is bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh, which is not to be seduced or terrified from the guard and keeping of his public and private conduct. He not only knows his

interest, but his duty ; and not only knows it, but has been “habituated” to perform it. Education trained him into virtue : he has preserved the “allure.” He reads the Scriptures, but “not by rote :” it is not a book of pain or penalty, but a book of “consolation and reward,” — the book eminently of the humble and the suffering. He there finds what neither the midnight orgy, nor the political riot, nor the faithless conspiracy can bestow. Such a man will soon build himself a home, and children, where a father may garner up his consolations. He will not have to flee to the companions of the change house for consolation. He will not be found, each Saturday night, in these dens of iniquity, with pale and haggard cheeks, applauding the licentious or infidel jest, plotting the next strike, devising some new means of intimidation or aggression against the resisting and industrious, adding to the inflammatory paragraph of the revolutionary paper, organising discontent and sedition, and, after the stale and filthy debauch of two or three successive nights, with all that is depraved and sensual, in the lowest sties of a manufacturing metropolis, returning, with sleepless eyes, on Monday morning, to his work, — the Sabbath profaned, his health gone, his week’s earnings robbed from his pining family, and the seeds planted of crimes which perhaps, ere long, may consign him to the transport vessel, or the scaffold. Such will be the very opposite of his existence ; scenes of which he will know little beyond the faint report of his fellow tradesmen. His life will be spent in the quiet fulfilment of all his public and private duties : he has received a moral education “specifically” fitting him for each. Amidst all the privations incidental to their position, his honest and industrious family will find, in his virtue, and good sense, and independence, a sure protection against vice and want. They will reciprocally constitute his little world, and by the deep hold which their unaffected reliance and attachment have upon his nature, they will form the best hostages he can give for every description of usefulness to society. Not from him, nor from such as him, has it to apprehend any of those disturbing movements, which, in modern states, seem almost inseparable from great extension of manufacturing industry. Not from him is likely to pro-

ceed any of those terrible revulsions, which not merely produce their own immediate evils, but by their very threatening, render doubtful and unsteady all government, and cast a numbing spell over the first energies of civilisation. He forms a portion of that salutary counter force in society, which, while it adds on one side its momentum to useful and wise reform, checks, on the other, the accelerating motion downward, to anarchy. To him, and to such as him, may we well confide the most cherished hopes of the state. Nor let us suppose that the extension of such a power is difficult: let us not imagine that such influence, even in its beginnings, is limited or feeble. The light of a single such is rapidly reflected by thousands. It is a living premium, acting in every direction for virtue. Its progression is in a constantly augmenting ratio: the facility of its progress increases immeasurably by its extension. But from whence do these blessings take their spring? From the system we have been urging; from the judicious combination of physical, intellectual, and moral education.

It is a vain thing to hope, that where the lower classes of the community have been well educated, the upper can any longer dispense with education. The educated will soon force their superior knowledge on the uneducated, or else take their place. But no dread of this kind, under the system before us, need for a moment be entertained. If there be schools for the peasant and the artisan, and for the peasant's and artisan's wants — if they have their specific, intellectual, and moral education, so also have the noble and the rich. If there be progression, and proportion, and adaptation, in one instance, so also is there in the other; not merely fitting each individual to his particular position, but out of this individual adaptation educing general harmony, and national order, and good. The rich man, in his course of physical training, has not only provided a competent stock of future health, but acquired habits, which fence him from the Sybarite effeminacy of modern society. He is manly, bold, and spirited; he values the bone and muscle of his land, and seeks not to balance against the hardihood and vigor which become the citizen of every free state, the luxurious

privileges of his situation. He shrinks from no privation, disdains no labour. He knows that his first and highest title is MAN. The wholesome enjoyments of nature still retain for him all their primitive freshness: the hot atmosphere of dissipation has not dulled them to his sense. No imaginary malady, no capricious and unsearchable disease, has taken hold of him. He drawls not through a life of ennui, relieved only by the sharp but exhausting stimulus of gambling and debauch. His is not the boast how much of life may be spent down, with the least possible exhibition of the living principle. He is not old whilst he is yet young; his is not the livid cheek, and the shattered frame, and the soulless eye; his is not the enviable peculiarity of "living farther than any other man into death," with the shadowy semblance only of life, the stalking example of the retributions of early and selfish profligacy.* Neither is he the votary of social riot. His days are not wasted away in the rude pleasures of the chase, or the still more barbarous revelries of the table. He believes that man's life was destined for something better than a perpetual fox-hunt. He understands the value of physical exercise, even for the purposes of mind; but he does not sacrifice end to means, he does not surrender every thing to body. His health and strength are derived, not from violent effort, but well sustained temperance. He is moderate in all things, and well balanced. Hence, he is as hale as a peasant's son, and enjoys, to the uttermost, despite of gorgeous boudoir or luxurious dining-room, the whole of his physical being, and enjoys it to the last. The peasant's discipline was his at school. He is receiving the peasant's reward now. On this good stem, grow all wholesome and hardy fruits. He honours the industrious labourer; he knows that from that crude material is evolved the most refined and precious enjoyments of society; he venerates in him the blood and sinews

* "Nul homme," says Montaigne, though in a very different sense, of a king of Macedon, "n'a vécu si avant dans la mort." But let it not be thought I ascribe too great an intellectual or moral influence to physical education. Every day proves the contrary. "Plus le corps est foible," says Rousseau, with so much justice, "plus il commande; plus il est fort, plus il obéit. Toutes les passions sensuelles logent dans des corps effeminés; ils s'en irritent d'autant plus qu'ils peuvent moins les satisfaire."—*Emile*, liv. i.

of the state, the watch and ward of his liberties and laws, the rampart of his prosperity and security. He has sat down at the same bench, and joined in the same games, and endured the same hardships; he has measured himself with original, unsophisticated man, and learnt to esteem himself and others by real and not by adventitious qualities. He feels nothing of that effeminate fastidiousness of the simple and the useful, so common in the ranks of the high born and the ignorant; he has nothing of that suppressed insolence and pompous reserve, with which they imitate the vices, whilst they shrink from the corresponding virtues, of feudalism*; he sees in the humblest man a wheel like himself of the great machine, and his regard is in proportion to the manner in which he performs his allotted functions. What aristocratic feeling he has, is all on the side of virtue. He feels the strongest contempt and disgust for meanness in all its forms, whether in duke, or peasant. He speaks truth in deed, as well as in word, and therefore is as proud as an honest man, and a true gentleman, ought to be.† His courtesy is not ostentatious

* What is the usual result of our present system? Hear one who judged truly both of its causes and effects. "Après avoir chargé sa mémoire ou de mots qu'il ne peut entendre, ou de choses qui ne lui sont bonnes à rien; après avoir étouffé le naturel par les passions qu'on a fait naître, on remet cet être factice entre les mains d'un précepteur, lequel achève de développer les germes artificiels qu'il trouve déjà tout formés, et lui apprend tout hors à se connoître, hors à tirer parti de lui-même, hors à savoir vivre, et se rendre heureux. Enfin, quand cet enfant, esclave et tyran, plein de science et dépourvu des sens, également débile de corps et d'ame, est jeté dans le monde, en y montrant son ineptie, son orgueil, et tous ses vices, il fait déplorer la misère et la perversité humaine. On se trompe; c'est l'homme de nos fantaisies: celui de la nature est fait autrement."—Rousseau, *Emile*, liv. i.

† "Si de Veritate scandalum oriatur, utiliùs permittitur nasci scandalum, quam Veritas relinquatur;" (*St. August.*) so says religion. "Pour être quelque chose, pour être soi-même, et toujours un, il faut agir comme on parle; il faut être toujours décidé sur le parti qu'on doit prendre; le prendre hautement, et le suivre toujours;" (*Rousseau*) so says philosophy. But common sense, and mere worldly convenience and ease, concur with both. A man of deceits must be a man of expedients, therefore a man of study and invention. He requires every day a new *tactique*, a new calculation of probabilities, a new laying of his course. Now all this, to say the least of it, is exceedingly troublesome, and in nine cases out of ten, not worth half the labour which it costs. Truth, on the contrary, requires nothing of the kind; no tacking, no sailership; the wind is aft, the port before; all you have to do is to steer right onward. But there is a third party,

and capricious affability ; he does not peep out of his dignity, to shrink into it on every alarm, again.* He is courteous with his heart and soul, whenever he is so ; and he always is so, whenever he meets virtue and good faith, no matter under what dress, or by what name. These are virtues, — they are habits, as well as principles ; he learnt them in the same school where the peasant learnt urbanity and subordination. His intellectual and moral excellencies spring gradually out of these. He knows he must maintain his superiority amongst an enlightened population, by some better tenure than his coronet and pack of hounds. He does not dwell apart from the opportunities of doing good, in a cold and selfish atmosphere of his own. His life is not a catalogue of fox-hunts, and races, a calendar of lounges from town to country, from watering-place to watering-place, from the Continent to England, from England to the Continent. He holds himself to be more "*adscriptus glebæ*," than the poorest tenant on his land. Strong, indeed, must be the cause which will compel him to abdicate such dignified functions as those of raising the industry, guiding the intelligence, and protecting the morality of those whom society and Providence have committed to his care. The "specific education" he has received, has told him, that he is as much accountable for their virtues and happiness before the supreme tribunal of the Universal Master, as the pastor for those of his flock. But he is not only willing, but qualified to undertake this trust.

the equivocators, who are neither true nor false, and escape in clouds of words, "*obscurâ circumdati nimbo*," from both. These are thought to be treasures in the senate, and on the hustings. The skilful fools ! Lying is cowardice ; but here are men more cowardly than the liar himself. Deception is troublesome ; but here are men who would add to it the trouble of truth besides. And they expect to be called honest, and sincere, and respectable ! Honest ! to be sure they are, as long as they are under-tempted ; and sincere, too, when perfectly certain of being found out. But to hope for respectability is indeed monstrous. What party could trust to them ? The intriguer fears that they will tell truth ; the honest man that they will lie ; and thus between both they are consigned to the glories of the *juste milieu*, and find themselves where they ought to be — on the ground.

* The dignity of little minds. "*Cæterum egressus, statim se recipiebat in principem*," says the younger Pliny of one of the Roman tyrants, who shrunk from approach, because he feared enquiry. *Trajani Panegyry.*

He is not one who will use his magisterial powers cruelly to oppress, nor unjustly to defend. He may not retain the niceties of his prosody; he writes no Greek epigrams for his amusement; he has never recited a play of Terence in his life: but he has been early imbued with the elementary principles on which the framework of society is constructed; he has studied, in his Primary school, the first notions of political and social economy and legislation, all the leading facts of national history and statistics: and these studies have been further developed and applied, during his Secondary and University education, to the peculiar duties and purposes of his situation. There is no danger that a magistrate so prepared, will be ignorant of his duty. He will be no truckler to overseer, or vestry. He will not set up a little vestry senate, a little "scale and measure" system of his own. He is not one who will take to doubling of his own free legislative capacity, "*ex mero motu*," all the evils of the allowance system, — introducing manufactures for which there is no demand; adding tea and sugar, out of pure benevolence for old women, from the parish purse; deciding that parish ale shall be stronger, hot dinners more frequent, and bastard premiums higher, than during the administration of any of his predecessors. He has received the elements, at least, of sound political knowledge; and though he may not be qualified for the higher duties of altering or improving the law, he has, at least, sufficient information and intelligence to protect him from perverting its advantages, or adding to its evils, by blunders and negligence of his own. The same knowledge guides him through the difficulties of other local duties. He is not at the mercy of every powerful partisan; he veers not round to every court, or county influence. He perfectly understands the habits and necessities of the several classes amongst whom he lives; he has steady and well grounded convictions to steer by. He has been accustomed on all subjects, but especially on *these*, to exercise his mind; he has been taught from his infancy "to think." His intelligence has been further strengthened by practice; he searches, he enquires, he judges, he estimates, in all questions connected with his duties, all the consequences, remote and contingent,

as well as direct and collateral, to the subject. He penetrates through the subterfuges of fraud and vice; he does justice whilst others wish, or think to do it; he not only prevents evil, but effects a large mass of public good. And if we carry on to other occupations and objects the same enquiry, in all we shall find very nearly similar results. The educated, the specifically educated corporator, road commissioner, churchwarden, trustee of charities, superintendant of prisons, &c. &c., will be a totally different instrument in the hands of society from the uneducated: he will work in a totally different way, and with a completely opposite effect. Nor let these duties be considered as of slight moment to the well being of the community. Out of such small items, is composed the large sum of national prosperity. The fair assessment, and the judicious application of public funds, is an important act: every act of erroneous charity or ill-merited compassion is a crime against the industrious, in favour of the idle. But that art he has studied, not merely in its political and economical, but in its moral bearings. He knows how intrinsically he may sap the whole mental and moral constitution of a population, by an over easy indulgence in the demands even of real want. His sympathies are under the check of an exercised judgment, not governed by the appearance, or by the moment, but extending over the absent and the future, and as much interested for the prudent rate-payer, as the real or assumed pauper. He is not one who will consent to propagate, by temporary relief, extensive and enduring misery. He has been taught by the education of his "feelings" and "will," to direct and control even their most generous impulses. He is "firm" as well as "wise," "just" before he affects to be "generous," and, regardless of "popularity," of the pain and thanklessness of the duties he is discharging, stands, in despite of the curses of the profligate and the censures of the sentimental, equally aloof from indolence and avarice on one side, from profusion and ill-judged humanity on the other. He is no Grand jury jobber, no seller of the industry and property of a district, for the assumed temporary benefit of some powerful individual. The benefit of the public is his first law; but that benefit he is not only

resolute in maintaining *wherever* he finds it, but he knows also *how* to find it wherever it exists. His studies of "national and local statistics" have protected him from all those numerous absurdities, which form the staple subject of discussions in Trustee Committees and Grand jury rooms. He is sensible how large a harvest of benefit may accrue from judicious present outlay, and, though scrupulous in trenching a single penny on the hard earnings of the poor man's purse, when not obviously to his advantage, he fears not to war against his ignorance when opposed to his good, and sometimes to compel him to do himself, and the community justice, in his own despite. Hence he is just, but liberal; he unlocks capital, *wherever* it is practicable; he shuts not up in districts the industry of the community; he encourages, in defiance of all local prejudices, universal competition; he ventures largely, but surely, on public improvement; he dares be wise in the proper season, and bears patiently the transient jeer and the apathetic doubt, until the appearance of positive good, of the seed above ground, shall disappoint these prophets of evil, and refute, by facts, even the most incredulous. He patiently attempts to engraft upon the most stubborn and unpromising habits, every improvement which experience and reflection may suggest. Habituated to consult with other minds besides his own, he is not straitened by the niggard prejudices of locality. He is beyond the wisdom of his village; he fears not the hostility of village ignorance, whilst in the act of doing national good; he has been taught "will," and he "knows" that he is in the right. But for all this he is no rash experimentalist, practising his crude theories on the unresisting interests of others: "he plants not nails, hoping they will grow."* The education he has received has, above all things, enjoined from his childhood up, "attention," "precision," "accuracy;" "to take nothing on trust;" "to doubt judiciously;" "to prove before he asserts;" "to advance, step by step, to the right and

* As was done by one of the chiefs of Otaheite, a little after the introduction of the arts of cultivation amongst that people by the missionaries, so erroneous were their inductions from obvious facts. But how many "nail-planters" amongst ourselves!

the good." From him need not be apprehended those wholesale speculations, for the sudden regeneration of the country, which, spun from thin air, burst as soon as blown: still less is he one of those impracticable "practicable" men, who, mighty in details, instinctively shrink from every thing which bears the character of completeness or comprehensiveness. He builds up good like a skilful and thoughtful architect, not with lath and plaster; but with "costly and hewn stone:" it is not for the decoration of a feast, but for the permanent use and benefit of generations. Others may seek for the applause, he is satisfied with having performed the service. The lessons of true patriotism have taught him "to serve posterity, though posterity should never know by whom it was served."

But it is in his higher duties, as an integral part of the constitution of his country, that his education tells. It is as elector and legislator that he is enabled to expand these blessings, hitherto within the sphere of the individual only, into general virtue and prosperity. Is it possible that a man, who has received the moral education already pointed out, who is the "true patriot" already described, to whom such a code is a positive and practised religion, not merely the counsel of ancient philosophy, but the very voice of Gospel truth, specifically addressing itself to him, in his Christian as well as social capacity—is it possible that, with these convictions, now become so habitual, that they form his moral idiosyncrasy—his very constitution itself—is it possible that such a man should not choose with the most scrupulous and, at the same time, most enlightened regard to the great and lasting interests of his country, casting behind his back the Satan of all private and petty feeling, whether of jealousy, or fear, or flattery, but above all, of sordid lucre, and should not do his duty on the hustings of his country, as if upon him alone depended the entire good or evil of the ensuing legislation? And if it should be his fortune, or his duty, to stand forward as the candidate instead of the elector, not in such a man will you meet any of those arts by which the momentary approbation of the crowd is generally won, at the large discount of a man's own self-respect and respectability. He speaks "truth," even on

the hustings. "Before all men, and in all times," was his youthful maxim. He has no drugs to sell, and he requires no puffs. He gives no pledges which the higher interests of the state, and even the personal interest of the constituents themselves, better understood, may to-morrow require him to violate, but amply and frankly does he spread before the humblest of his fellow-citizens the entire of his opinions, well convinced that, if he be a man of character, this ought to suffice; and if not, neither ought this, nor protestations, nor pledges, nor oaths, nor aught else. He values his influence, if such he has, as a means only of doing good; nor does he fear to put it to the venture whenever he sees the real opposed to the apparent interest of his fellow-countrymen. In the senate, he performs the honourable duties imposed upon him by the unpurchased voice of the people, with honesty and intelligence. He is a true lover of his country,—of her excellencies, but not of her faults: he is an uncompromising asserter of her liberties, and esteems no sacrifice too great to deliver them down, not only undiminished, but increased, to posterity: but he is no bigot, no exclusionist; he does not hold it to be a part of English freedom to refuse its blessings to others, nor of English patriotism to despise or calumniate whatever is not English. He does not talk of our inimitable institutions, and "national glory never to be defaced," with a total ignorance of the language, institutions, and glory of other nations. You do not see him clinging to abuses because they have lasted, nor refusing improvement because it is new. He does not tremble at every change, or despair at every delay. He thinks with Bacon, and has "learned to doubt with judgment, that he may end with certainties." He comes to the legislation of his country with a knowledge of what has preceded, as well as what ought to follow. He grafts on trees with whose nature he is acquainted, and in a manner in which they will bear fruit. He has studied the art, and, if he has opinions, they have not come to him like inspirations, or by chance—he has formed them, and you can count on them; "he wears them not on both sides, like a leathern jerkin;" he has been taught "the

virtue as well as value of consistency.”* He holds, that if, on one side, he ought faithfully to mirror the wishes, and even prejudices of his constituents (for how otherwise is the legislature or the government to understand the inward heart of the nation), so, on the other side, ought he to send them back whatever superior knowledge and energy, whatever of light and heat, may be generated by the coming together and collision of different character and contrasted experience in the great assembly of the nation. He is not to be seen, on the side of unjust and unwise oppression, lending himself to the expediency-mongers of the hour, sacrificing to the ignorance or indolence of faction the true and solemn interests of his country; this was not the patriotism which he was taught. He hates tyranny as Hampden and Milton hated it: simply, and “sans phrase,” no matter under what shape, or by what party it is exercised, but above all, that worst of tyrannies, which, under the name of religion, liberty, or social order, blasphemes God, and tramples on human nature. “Give me this liberty, to know, to utter, and to argue freely, according to conscience, above all liberties.” Nor is he, therefore, a courtier to the errors and passions of the people: he does not flatter them; he serves them. Parties roll by him without leaving a regret on his conscience, or a stain on his name. He still holds on his course amidst them all, steadily and evenly, without once slackening, or stooping from his purpose, to pick up the golden apple of preferment in his way. And when the race is done, whoever be the competitors, or victors, he at least has won. The political trader may have failed, and the political sharper been detected: even the most successful may sicken over the worthless trophy which, with so much pain, they grasp at last; he has neither failure, nor detection, nor disappointment, to grieve for; *his* end, at least, has been attained. He has done his duty, and the conviction

* Such was the political education recommended by Milton. “The next remove must be to the study of Politics; to know the beginning, end, and reason, of political societies, that they may not, in a dangerous fit of the Commonwealth, be such poor, shaken, uncertain reeds of such a tottering conscience as many of our great counsellors have lately shewn themselves, but steadfast pillars of the state.” — *Letter to Hartlib*.

that he has done it, is his reward. The old age of such a man will not walk in a vain shadow ; he will not exhibit, on the verge of the grave, the miserable spectacle of superannuated powers, and still puerile, and prurient hopes, the vanity and vexation of all human struggles which have self, and the little glories of self, for their only object. His life has been expended for far other purposes. Egotism, whilst its roots were yet tender, before they yet could spread their cancerous ramifications abroad, were separated from his heart. With "generosity," "self-sacrifice," "truth," "honour," "firmness," he began : to the creed and to the worship of his early youth, through peril and seduction, he hath been faithful to the last. The good he hath endeavoured to do, was for men he knows not, and shall never know. *He* may look back over the paths of life without remorse or regret : to him they are not strewn with broken promises, and vile apostacies, and paltry dissimulations, and all the reminiscences of that melancholy game, on which so much of the genius and energy of every age has been lavished in vain. And when at last he sits down to that final account to which all must come, the busiest as well as the idlest in this eventful drama, he complains of neither injustice, nor ingratitude: his efforts were for higher ends than the smiles of ministers, or the shouts of multitudes. Not for them he toiled, but for his country. A defective law amended, an unjust law repealed; wastes reclaimed into gardens; ports opened or restored to commerce; Knowledge conquering Ignorance; and Virtue dwelling with Peace and Security in the old haunts of Turbulence and Crime — these are the triumphs at which he aimed, in which he glories, even partially, to have shared. Education flattered him with no other promise — it pointed to no other goal. It gave him no hope of utility being recognised, or long and laborious services being requited. It never taught him to believe in the necessary concurrence of exertion and success, of happiness and virtue; but it told him, and truly and sternly told him, that, here below, duty and pain were companions; but that, pain or pleasure, successful or not, "duty was obligation," — the imperative condition laid by the Creator on his creature, by the fulfil-

ment of which he could alone testify his gratitude for the past, or accomplish truly his destiny in the future. This was his education — it hath been his life. If fame and honours come with this, they are accessaries and accidents; he neither spurns them, nor strives after them. They change nothing, they add nothing to the interior man, no more than the unsubstantial shadow to the substantial body. In his esteem they bear no fixed value; they are unknown quantities, an *x*, or *a y* in moral power, dependent, not upon themselves, but upon *what* they express, and *how* they are applied. “Success is every thing,” is the axiom of the mere politician; but it is also that of the swindler, the thief, and the assassin. “Success is nothing,” was the creed of Aristides; one may do for the Cleons, the other only can suit Phocion. Success may add to a Washington, but it will not make one. He holds his title to the admiration of mankind by a far higher patent than what any fortune, be it that of Sylla or Cæsar, can give or take away.*

The influence of such a man on those within its action will be strong and permanent. Who can doubt it, but men sunk so low in the slime of vice, the epicurism of public profligacy, as to have lost all belief, in losing all interest in regeneration? But the influence of many such — of a large section of such, in the state — would be in itself regeneration. Legislation, it is true, may be less affected than formerly by the struggle of parties, still less by that of individuals. The nation now substantially intervenes, whenever any really large and valuable interests are at stake. But, with this great advantage in favour of modern government, it is not less certain that this controlling power itself, which is to check abuse, and accelerate improvement, is deeply affected by the character of the body through which it is exercised. Public opinion is, especially, the reflection of the opinions of public men. Wherever these opinions are of a low, debasing, demoralising, tendency, — wherever they substitute the vulgar, the gross, the selfish, for the high, the pure, and the disinterested — wherever it becomes the fashion to laugh at honour as a

* “Occupavi te, Fortuna, atque cepi, omnesque aditus tuos interclusi, ut ad ne aspirare non posses *Tuscul. v. c. 9.*

folly, and at truth as a weakness, and at consistency as an exploded romance, — wherever it is held, that words should be used only to conceal, and not to discover men's thoughts, — in that country, wherever it may be, we must, sooner or later, expect to see the entire range of public life bear fatal evidence of the degeneracy. It will become, under all external pretences of public virtue, from beginning to end, nothing but "attorneyship," in its most profligate sense; a pigmy race of chicane and fraud; its annals a "Dictionnaire des Girouettes;" its parties, "l'Art de Conspirer," on a parish scale; an afflicting combination of the highest interests with the poorest means: patriots quarrelling for office, its most vital questions adjourned through this man's ignorance, or that man's fears; measures on which hang the safety of the nation, degraded into weapons for the keeping or acquisition of place; till at last all public life be brought into disrepute, and the People, tired and disgusted with the masquerade, sink into slavish apathy, or look only to themselves, or to blind chance, for redress. In such a country, we must expect nothing of that bold march, the strength of states as well as individuals, that unflinching will which, grounded on knowledge, working by truth, and aiming solely at justice, has no need of subsidising, through temporary stratagem, the passions or prejudices of any faction. Apprehensions, doubts, expedients, will necessarily take its place; the government will, even in its intentions of good, be timid and suspected; the legislature will not know on what or on whom to rely, and relying on none, none will rely on it: all parties will be confounded; their very designations will become unintelligible; their chiefs will fight under any banner, their creeds will be fitted for any emergency; all principle will be at sea, and uncertainty, and listlessness, and disgust, until the country be roused at last by positive disorder, will prevail in every quarter. Nor will these fatal influences be confined only to the higher levels of political life: they will descend with increased virulence to the lowest. The faction and immorality of the senate will, in its passage downward, become village corruption. The same tone of political morals will soon pervade the entire nation. "Where is the use, the *cui bono* of principle? See how

villainy prospers. It is light only which gives colour, it is discovery only which constitutes crime ;” such will be the simple creed and sentiment of every political adventurer. But this is vile logic, as well as base sentiment. Pursue it a little farther, and it destroys itself. A *people* of scoundrels, was never yet contemplated by the greatest scoundrel that ever existed. Scoundrelism must be select, must be exclusive, must be of the *few*, to prosper. There must be lambs for the wolves : where *all* are wolves, there is as little to be gained, even for wolves, as if they were all sheep. The tendency, no doubt, of this withering morality is, to make *all* men knaves ; but knave against knave is steel against steel — after all, a very unprofitable encounter. To what, then, are its advocates (for it has advocates in this Gospel land, *civitas religionibus dedita* !), in their sagacity, reduced. To this humiliating alternative : — either to the hypocrisy of preaching virtues to *others*, which they *themselves* are much too “ statesman-like ” to practise — or else to the bringing down of *all* society to the morality of a cavern of brigands, or a table of “ rouge et noir,” and leaving to the more or less dexterity of the blacklegs, or the greater or less muscle of the highwayman, the decision of all that keeps man united to man, or makes either country or religion something more than mere names or counters, for the use of the sharpers, political or otherwise, upon this miserable earth.

On the diffusion, then, of a different principle — of a code of public morals, as opposed to this as day is to night — on this, and this alone, can public liberty, or public order finally, rest. Loud professions, hackneyed defences, fulsome declamations, in praise of these great blessings, are to be had from every party, and at any price ; but they in nowise interfere with the most perfect political profligacy : both can dwell together in perfect amity and peace. Not so the principles and qualities, the virtues themselves, which they affect to imitate : they must grow out of and possess the entire man. To hope that, by any mere external profession, they will spread out upon the community, is altogether vain. They will not extend to the imitators of public men, if they be not in the public men themselves. If we seek to give a *conscience* to the *people*

we must first show that their *leaders* and *rulers* possess one. To set up schools for morality, and to teach immorality, "ex cathedrâ," from the highest chair in the empire, from the tribune of parliament itself, is surely a contradiction as criminal, as it is absurd. There, if anywhere, should be found the altar of the country; there, if anywhere, the oracle-seat from which that true wisdom, which passeth all understanding, the wisdom of virtue, should speak out upon the land. In this, and not in flourishing finance, and not in diminished burthens, and not in powerful armies, and not in the show and forms of liberty, does the Palladium of a free and happy community really exist. Elevate political morality, and you necessarily elevate social: all the great guiding influences rise in power and dignity with it: deprave it, and you proportionally deprave every relation, even the most intimate, of life. Of what use are your laws, if you have not that by which alone you can communicate to them their moral force? and of what avail is any force, if moral force be wanting? You make legislation, in every sense, a vicious circle. You are constantly employed in raising barriers against vice and corruption, and as constantly in supplying, even from your own body, the principles and causes which render such checks both necessary and ineffectual. But the political body cannot be pure unless its members be pure; nor can the legislator of to-day be a true patriot, unless the pupil of yesterday be first instructed and diligently practised in true patriotism.* Here, then, as in every

* It is to the neglect of this instruction that Milton traces the decay of all public and professional morality in his day. He complains that the system then pursued sent forth its pupils, "either to an ambitious and mercenary, or ignorantly zealous divinity: some allur'd to the trade of law, grounding their purposes, not on the prudent and heavenly contemplation of justice and equity, which was never taught them, but on the promising and pleasing thoughts of litigious terms, fat contentions, and flowing fees: others betake them to *State affairs* with souls unprincipled in virtue and true generous breeding, that flattery and court shifts, and tyrannous aphorismes appear to them the highest points of wisdom; instilling their barren hearts with conscientious slavery, if, as I rather think, it be not fain'd: others, lastly, of more delicious and airie spirit, retire themselves, knowing no better, to the enjoyment of ease and luxury, living out their daies in feast and jollity. — And these are the errors, and these are the fruits of mispending our prime youth^t at the *Schools* and *Universities* as we do, either in learning meere words, or such things chiefly as were better unlearned." *Letter to Hartlib, on Education.*

other walk, does the vista terminate in Education. If we are to have virtue, we must teach virtue : the fruits are not rained like manna from heaven, they are to be gathered from the tree. Nor let it be said, because such education is still wanting, that to supply the want is impracticable ; let it not be said, that education is incapable of producing even far more marvellous results. Why should its arm be shortened, or its power straightened ? What is more wonderful than what it actually does produce ? Men are not born intriguers, or swindlers — this very depravity, this very distortion, requires training : bad, or good, it is still Education. If it works in wrong so powerfully and so truly, why should it not work, also, with the same truth, and with the same power, in good ? *

* I am quite aware, how totally contrasted all this is, to the prevalent doctrine and practice. But the question is, not whether an opinion be prevalent, but whether it be just. I write on Education Reform : the very word implies there are errors to correct, and abuses to suppress. These abuses do not appear in the seed, but in the fruit. When it is too late to check them, we feel their effects. Our actual system, pursued to its conclusion, is a heap of senseless contradictions. Varro admitted three educations — “*educat nutrix, instituit pædagogus, docet magister* ;” — but these were differences in form only. Montesquieu three also : his are essentially distinct. We have ten times that number, all opposed to each other, each in strife with itself. Up to the age of entry on the world, we are taught virtue and Christianity — virtue on a large cosmopolite scale ; Christianity on the rigid and positive principles of the Gospel. “*Speak truth*,” “*Do to others as you would be done by*,” “*Bear not false witness against your neighbour*,” “*Be just, kind, and generous to all* ;” — this is our catechism ; which if we practise not, we are told we shall be outcasts in this world, and accursed in the next. But the moment we stand on the threshold of the school, and are about to begin the education of public life, up starts another catechist, with a very different morality. He also talks virtue and religion, it is true, but gradually modifies, and paraphrases away, one by one, every one of its precepts. Truth, generosity, frankness, &c. are still commended ; but on examining more minutely, we find that *his* truth is little more than the art of lying with plausibility ; *his* generosity, the gentle code, “*ôte-toi de là, que je me mette à ta place* ;” *his* frankness under courteous forms, universal suspicion ; *his* patriotism, a prudent knowledge of the world, such as Walpole defined it, — “*skill in discerning characters, with the arts of intrigue, low cunning, self-interest, and other mean motives* ;” *his* public spirit, the dividing the shells to others, the keeping the oyster for one’s self. Even these appearances, flimsy as they are, ere long, are thrown aside. The desolating doctrine, the practical atheism, “*Success is every thing*,” is then unblushingly set up, and the Goddess of Reason shamelessly enthroned upon the altar of God and conscience itself. But not only are these educations directly at variance ; but, still more monstrous, they are all combined together. Every Sunday the same

I have thus attempted to show, in all the great paths of life, the probable influence of the system we have been recommending. If faithful to the processes severally described, I am not conscious of having, in any instance, lent too great a power to their operation, either upon the intellect or character of the individual. The labour school, if good, ought to produce such labourers; the town school, if good, such artisans

lesson of early education is again repeated to the same number of professing believers, and every week the same doctrines of worldly wisdom, in open contradiction to those early lessons, are sedulously reduced to practice by these once-a-week saints. Once for all, let us be *one* thing or the *other*: let us at least know distinctly *what we would be at*. If the Gospel be the Gospel, if it be a law, given by God to Man, it must be an *universal* and *unvarying* rule of human conduct. It admits of no compromise; no God and Mammon spirit; no Judas-kissing in friendship; no Tartuffism in religion: Christ has made no exception for Politicians, no more than for Pharisees. If our education be worth any thing, it is as the means of forming, not the *school-boy's* character, but the *man's* character; if we are to leave its lessons at the door on our departure, throw the Gospel into the fire, and, by all means, let us have Lord Chesterfield. Tell us, when we are young, what you so often tell us when we grow old; show us, as clearly as you now do, that truth is folly, and religion bigotry, and swindling patriotism, and honour beggary, and virtue (with Brutus at Philippi), a mere name. This at least would simplify the matter, and exempt us from the necessity of learning two doctrines; one exoteric, another esoteric: one for the multitude, another for ourselves; beginning with an education which we must afterwards unlearn; talking a Christianity which, at every step, we deny and blaspheme with our lives. There would be sense, and almost morality, in that: at least it would lead to morality; for if men taught what they practised, — if they were candid as well as bad, — society itself would soon take the alarm, and, from sheer instinct of self-preservation, “crush the infamy in the bud.” In a word, I would place our lives and our educations, in one way or other, in harmony with each other. If we ought not to pervert early education so as to accord with after-education, are we not bound so far to purify after-education as to put it in accord with early? But how is this to be done? By beginning with early education itself; by giving such an education, to the *very infant*, as will *defy all these corrupt educations of our after-years*. Every man who has a conscience, and good faith enough to ask it the question, that is, who has no intrigue planned or in progress, no spoils to enjoy, no reputation to restore, no rival to persecute, will find this answer I now give him, if he takes the trouble to look for it, in his *own heart*. All I want is, to bring this answer out — to put this conviction into deed. I want to make our Gospel education — not as it now is, in so many instances, a melancholy delusion, but a living, speaking, acting; thoroughly efficient, reality. The task is difficult; but is the difficulty invincible? If I could think for a moment that it were, then, indeed, should I despond: we should not only be fools in attempting so much, but in attempting any thing at all. Education would be a wretched chimæra — the Gospel itself a vanity.

and mechanics; the secondary schools and universities, if good, such gentlemen, magistrates, and members of parliament as have just been described. Mere mechanical expedients, the technicalism of education will certainly not effect it; but if this system differs in any thing from others, it is surely in this, that it dwells not in technicals, that it mistakes not the means for the ends, body for soul, the corpse-like semblance for the living man. It inculcates, throughout, the maxim, — “*Instruire sans inspirer, c’est stériliser,*” — and seeks to inspire with better being, — truly and permanently “to inspire.” This refashioning into an improved nature is then practicable: and if practicable, it places in the hands of society the power of creating anew almost what natures it may please. Society can, therefore, select its labourers, its mechanics, its gentlemen, at its choice, and apply mental and moral power in almost any direction, and to any degree, it may deem fit. What is exhibited in one instance, may be exhibited equally well in thousands. The community may be educated like a school. There is no reason, therefore, why the effects produced by education on a school may not, in like manner, be produced, and with still greater ease and energy, on a community.

What are these effects? The reader has had full means to judge them. Are they salutary, or are they not? Place on one side, national vigor, national intelligence, national virtue, in one word, national prosperity; on the other, national weakness, ignorance, crime, and their inevitable consequence, national calamity. To secure the first, to extinguish the last, — these are the objects, they are also the effects, the salutary effects, of National Education.

I conclude. I have attempted to show, in the preceding pages, that no education can be good which does not apply to the great end of perfection through duty the triple nature, physical, intellectual, and moral, of man. I have endeavoured to point out the means by which, simultaneously and completely, this application may be effected: finally, I have pursued the results of such application, on the virtue and happiness of individuals and communities. I now ask, if the facts stated be true, if the reasoning be just, if the conclusions

be accurate, if all this be really proved, how far should such means and benefits be extended? Is the light and warmth for a few only, or for all? Should Education, in short, be exclusive, or universal? An important question, which we shall discuss, at length, in the ensuing chapter.

CHAP. II.

NATIONAL EDUCATION SHOULD BE UNIVERSAL.

“ Il me paraît essentiel qu'il y ait des *gueux ignorans*. . . . Ceux qui sont occupés à gagner leur vie, n'ont pas le temps d'éclairer leur esprit : il leur suffit de l'exemple de leurs supérieurs.”

VOLTAIRE.

“ Woh' denen, die dem Ewigblinden
Des Lichtes Himmelsfackel leihn !
Sie *strahlt ihm nicht* ; sie kann nur *zünden*,
Und äschert Städt', und Länder ein.”

SCHILLER.

“ We object not to the *utmost possible* illumination of the popular mind.”

DR. CHALMERS.

“ I wonder not much, considering what human nature is, that some should think the education of the poor *an evil* : I do wonder at their not perceiving it to be *inevitable*.”

ARCHBISHOP WHATELY.

IN despotisms, by the word “ nation,” is understood the *king* and his *council* ; they are, emphatically, the state ; but in free countries, the Nation means, the *entire* people, without distinction of age, sect, or order. •

When we say, then, that “ National Education should be universal,” we merely announce, in strictness of language, a self-evident proposition. It is no more than this,—“ universal education, should be universal.”

But this strictness of meaning is not adhered to ; even amongst the most enlightened in this free country, the self-evident axiom is disputed. The fact is, by national, there are many who understand a portion only of the nation ; and, too often, limit that portion exclusively to themselves.

There are four distinct opinions on this important question : they are fairly enough represented by the four quotations cited above.

1. Those who think that education is *not necessary or useful to certain classes*, the poor, &c.—the ordinary religious instruction and the example of their superiors, in their opinion, suffice.

2. Those who think education in the abstract useful, but dangerous, at *certain periods*, and to *certain bodies or individuals*.

3. Those who think education so necessary and useful, that *it ought to be given to all*, and to the *utmost possible extent*.

4. Those who think, that not only should education be *given*, but that it can no longer be *withheld*.

Each of these opinions we shall examine, in order.

1. If the positions in the preceding chapter be just, it follows, that in the abstract, at least, where no peculiarly disturbing or counteracting circumstances intervene, a good system of education (for of such, in every instance, we speak) must not only be of *benefit* to the poor, as well as to the rich, but, in most cases, must be absolutely necessary. If the ordinary religious instruction, or the example of superiors alone, could suffice, wherever there were pulpits, and landlords, the people ought to be moral and happy. But, besides the necessity of insuring that from these pulpits should necessarily proceed sound instruction, and that the example of these landlords should be edifying and salutary (both of which require, as we have already seen, a high degree of intellectual, as well as of moral education), another condition would still be requisite to give this instruction and example their due effect: the people themselves should be *prepared* to receive them. This preparation can only be effected by preparing their intellect and character, by breaking up the soil for the seed, by moral and intellectual culture; in another word, by Education. Under the most favourable circumstances, the superior, whether clergyman or proprietor, can do little with a still brutal or sluggish population. He must begin, like Oberlin, with first de-brutalising them: he must awaken the soul, before he can make use of it; he must first teach, and then civilise. This is true in greater or less degree, whether we have to deal with Indian or European. It is an indispensable condition of improvement. Education thus becomes not merely a benefit to all, but an object to all of the *first necessity*.

But it is more. In a free community, the greatest happiness, of the greater number, is the avowed principle of action. Circumstances, indeed, often detract in practice from this principle. The injury to the minority, if the minority be

more powerful, will often supersede in deliberation and action the benefit to the majority. But where no injury to *any* party can be apprehended,—where good to all may be fairly anticipated, there discussion ought to cease: each is bound to secure to all so unquestionable an advantage. It becomes a positive right; to suspend or delay it, is a direct injury. This is the case with Education. Every man, on these principles, has a *right* to education, as much as to the protection of his person, or property.

But is no injury to any party to be apprehended? are there no circumstances, in our peculiar position, which render it doubtful whether that which theoretically is good may not practically be evil? are we quite sure that the same education, which, under other circumstances and in other countries, is of the highest individual and public advantage, may not, when applied to our own particular and actual case, be productive of very serious individual and national inconvenience? This leads to the consideration of the second opinion.

The peculiarities in our present position, which may be supposed to be most operative, on this question, are, the difference of interests in the several orders in the state, the difference in character and civilisation, between the several countries which compose the monarchy, and our actual social and political condition, contrasted with that of the past, and with that of other countries. Each of these are supposed very strongly to militate against the *universal* diffusion of education: a little examination will, I think, conduct us to conclusions precisely the contrary.

1. *Difference of Orders.* The social *distinction* between the several orders (in this country nicely graduated, and very strongly marked) is supposed to render their *interests* distinct, and often opposite; and this opposition, it is urged, will be still further enhanced by education. But neither of these positions appear tenable. On the contrary, it may be shown (so closely are the interests of all interwoven), that no one class can be injured without also materially injuring all others; and that education not merely benefits the class to which it is immediately applied, but, by its reflex operation and influence, every other class, whether high or low, in the community.

The cause of error, in this instance, is obvious; our judgments are much less the result of general reasoning, than of local prejudice. We see according to our point of view. We pronounce, not for the class at which we are looking, but for that in which we stand. Our own circle is the world; our own opinion infallibility; our most laborious disquisitions little more, when reduced to their true value, than a mode of saying, in many words, what the Duchesse de Ferté said to Madame de Staël in few:—"Il faut l'avouer, ma chère amie, je ne trouve que *moi*, qui aie toujours raison." When we can divest ourselves of these prepossessions, and look with somewhat less of the "*esprit de soi*," and the "*esprit de corps*," upon society, we are then, but not till then, in a fit temper to judge of its relations.

The Rich have no objections to contend with: their claims to universal education, are unanimously allowed. Knowledge is power: the rich contend for it, because it is power. Physical superiority was never theirs: moral, in an intellectual age, is only to be maintained by intellectual superiority. Nor are the poor opposed to such claims. The poor, even in the most democratic states, are governed much more, whatever they may imagine to the contrary, by the rich than by themselves. It is their interest to be well governed; therefore, that their governors should know *how* to govern well. This is not attainable without education. Hence, from a common sense of common interest, both parties concur, and for once an important truth is not contested in open defiance to its clearness and utility.

But the public does not and ought not to stop here. This passive concession is not enough. Universal education amongst the rich is not merely a benefit to be conferred, but a duty to be enforced. It is not that they *may* be educated if they demand it, but that they *must* be educated, whether they demand it or not. To allow enlightenment, is nothing: the country *should not suffer ignorance*. Are we to trust to pilots who have never been off land, for right steerage through the shoals and shallows, the "*scævum mare*," the "*monstra natantia*," of state navigation? If they will not qualify, let them abdicate their functions. We cannot afford to be wrecked, for their præ-

sumption. Sailing before the wind, is not sailorship.* We want men who know how to master the wind; not men who fly into any port, from every difficulty, but men who have the science to fix upon their port, to work for it through foul winds and fair, and the skill and perseverance, through every difficulty, to reach it. These are they in whom we can confide: they are captains worthy of having a crew; they are the legitimate rulers of the community; they are a self-stamped aristocracy. The name itself implies this. It is the government, the power, of the "*Best*." But who are the best? If to constitute "*the best*," it be merely sufficient to possess certain portions of the soil of a country, which they owe not to themselves, but to men who lived some hundred years ago, and not to their virtues, but very often to their crimes: if it be sufficient, to bear certain names known in barbarous periods, and often most known for their superior barbarism, to hold power and pre-eminence, not through their own merits, but through the weakness of others, power and pre-eminence without any admission of obligation; — if this be sufficient to qualify for such distinction; — if such, indeed, be the "*true essentials*" of aristocracy, I have doubtless committed a great error in my reasoning. To such, no doubt, education would

In sailing up the Mediterranean, from Tripoli to Smyrna, a traveller had to contend with the north-easterly winds, for nearly six weeks. On complaining of his disaster to a Turkish captain, whom he encountered on the way, the captain observed, "*it was one he had never experienced; he had always had fair winds.*" He inquired anxiously for the secret. "*I always go before the wind, and not against it,*" was the answer; "*if you do as I do, with the blessing of God, you will have fair winds, like me.*" Bear away before events, and not against them, and, with the blessing of God, you will have events with you. This is the simple recipe of most modern governing. But, from directors and rulers, what we want is, direction and ruling, just as much as steering from the steersman. If the minister is to throw the whole of his duties on circumstance—if he is to take the "*external pressure*" of men and things just as they chance to jostle against him, and not to stamp his genius and his will, his character and "*pressure*," on them—legislation may be performed in one's sleep, and a country governed by the throwing of a dice-box. But why quarrel with effects? we should attack their causes. In this instance they are obvious; want of knowledge; dislike to thinking; fear of willing,—common defects, both of governors and legislators; — in other words, the absence and deficiency of proper political education.

be an unnecessary incumbrance: such men ought, by all means, to be left in the full enjoyment of their ignorance. But such "a government of the best" would be about the worst government that slave could suffer, or magnate impose. Such, however, is not the government of these countries. The noblemen and gentlemen of England boast a far different position. If they be at the head of citizens, they are still citizens themselves; if they be rulers, it is as the *law* makers, and *law* executors of their country. They are, by these very functions, in great part, the formers of her mind, the knitters together of her strength, the keepers of her virtues, the wielders of her destinies. No earthly honour can be higher than a participation in this noble stewardship; but no stewardship ever yet existed, whose difficulties were more truly commensurate with its honours. They are accountable to the future men of England; to a race which, perhaps, shall as far transcend that of living men, as we surpass our ancestors; but who will look back on us, either with blessings or maledictions, as we now found for their happiness or calamity.

The commencements of the various roads which lead to prosperity or misfortune, are now before us; so mingled, it is true, that we can scarcely distinguish them; but so necessary, at the same time, to be distinguished, that a mistake, however trifling, may be the principle of a long series of irremediable and portentous evils. Will it then be said, that the steadiness, the skill, the science, of the engineer, is of no consequence? Shall we allow men to take the charge, not of our existence only, but of that of millions, to whom we are but as a drop to the ocean, without a single qualification which may entitle them to such distinction? Talk of their *right* to govern indeed! No man ought to have a right to misgovern a country! Their right should be their skill to govern *well*. To that all mankind will bow; against every other, sooner or later, even the most submissive, will rebel. The sword of the baron is broken, and the brocade of the courtier is despised. Knowledge is the only sceptre by which the patrician can henceforth hope to rule. The real man is now called for. To give title, in future, to power, the Upper classes must merit it. They must study the real interests of the country, in the interests of the

several bodies which compose it. They must minutely inquire into their complicated relations, not through the coloured spectacles of books, but with their naked eyes and open hands, by inspection and contact, — by personally mixing and working amongst them. They must travel put of their bigot faith, and the fanaticism of their own particular political sect. They must make politics, not a matter of property or birth; not a matter of honour or name, — but a large and liberal study, of human passions, human wants, and human rights, modified by varying circumstances, it is true, but grounded, in all cases, on the equal claim of all men to “good government.” Nor should a single individual of this guiding and governing class be exempted from the duty of such preparation. If not actor, he is inspector; how exercise his duty of surveillance over the conduct of his fellows, unless he understands what that conduct ought to be? Such an Aristocracy, so educated, would, indeed, be “the government of the Best.” It would possess power, and deserve to possess it. Its strength would come from itself, and not from the buttressing, and cramping, and jointing of adventitious circumstances.

All classes, therefore, are deeply interested in the knowledge and improvement of the Upper—the middle and lower not less than the Upper classes themselves. From their ignorance, and what that ignorance has produced, they have suffered nearly as much as from their own. These evils, it is true, are much less perceptible now than formerly, and much less so in England and Scotland, than in Ireland: counteracting circumstances have rapidly arisen to neutralise them. In England, there has been a constant passing of one class into the other, unaffected by the repressive power of sectarian or political distinctions. Few of the old patrician families have survived in their aboriginal exclusiveness. They have received, from time to time, the wholesome renewal of plebeian blood. The Bar, the great “officina” of the peerage, receives its contributions chiefly from the middle, and, in some instances, from the lower classes of the community. The “*novi homines*” sit down, without remark or question, on the same red benches with the “centum of Romulus,” nor is there

greater jealousy observable between them, than what existed, in the Roman senate, between the two families, patrician and plebeian, of the Cornelii. Neither is the operation of this principle limited to the peerage: it is conspicuously at work through the whole extent of the upper strata of society, and is precisely that which gives them their greatest solidity. Without it, there is little doubt that the aristocratic tendency would become so powerful as to separate the masses, and, instead of the compact body which the nation now exhibits, we should have dangerous detached fragments, liable to be dashed against each other by every political convulsion. The *true conservative* element of British aristocracy, whatever its injudicious supporters may pretend to the contrary, is its insensible immixture with the people, not only in *blood* and *rights*, but in *passions* and *interests*: though the extremes may be strikingly different, yet the intervening transitions being individually imperceptible, these contrasts are not attended with the dangers usually accompanying them in other countries. Political questions may, indeed, arise, which may go far to produce the evils, against which this peculiarity in structure so providentially guards. If they be of such a nature as directly to attack the peculiar rights of each order, then, indeed, will each shrink back from the other, not only into separate, but into hostile forces. Such questions at once resolve them into their primitive elements; they strike not merely at their functions, but at their organisation. In such a crisis there is no remedy, but an immediate return to their former connection: harmony, in one way or other, must be restored. The People must be assimilated to the Aristocracy by a larger communication of knowledge and liberty, or the Aristocracy to the People by a timely surrender of impolitic and invidious pretensions; — a larger transfusion than ordinary of the popular element into their order must be hazarded, not, indeed, to the extreme of leaving the state without an aristocracy, but to such an extent as will preclude the chance of the aristocracy separating from the body of the state. Late events, have, more than once, appeared to call for such intervention; but it is to be hoped that it may yet be rendered unnecessary by the cooler sense and growing experience of the Peerage. Were a collision to occur, it is quite clear which body

would be finally triumphant; but such a conflict should not be risked even by the stronger; the victory would be fatal, not to the Peers only, but to the country. Union, then, close, cordial union, cannot be too anxiously cherished by all parties; but by none, assuredly, with more reason than by the Peerage itself. It is upon this combination with the other orders, upon the easy and gradual manner in which it works, that the whole secret of their power depends: it is its existence, hitherto, which has given, in general, such smoothness to the operations of government and legislation; and which, while education mainly contributes to secure, prepares, in turn, for the universal extension of education.*

* The Hereditary-peerage question involves difficulties on both sides. A House of Commons which should succeed in extinguishing or emasculating the House of Peers, would soon raise up a succession of tyrants and tyrannies in its own bosom. A House of Peers which should *systematically* oppose the Commons would soon find itself prostrate before the nation. Accessions *en masse* to the Peerage would not even work the object for which they might be designed. Whig Peers are much more peers, than they are Whigs: to this *commonising* of their House they would be as much opposed as the staunchest Tories. It would be a curious question, in such a case to determine, how far *deserters* from one side, would go to counterbalance *recruits* on the other. An expectant or incipient peer is very devoted; a perfect one, very independent. The Radical commoner and the Tory lord are often found to be but transitory states of the same individual. Over such there is little control; and whatever there is, it is not the control of the people. As a remedy for this, the elective principle has been suggested. It is proposed to elect the Peerage; to convert the Upper house into an American Senate. The proposition is objected to, but not on just grounds. It is not an innovation, neither is it an anomaly. Ireland and Scotland elect their peers; England does not; the real anomaly exists *at present*. So far, an objection is removed with those who hate change, merely because it is change. But whether such change would be for better, or for worse, is another question. For some time, at least, its results would be very different from what is now expected. If the Peerage, as now constituted, were to elect representatives, their representatives would be unalloyed Tories. What neutralising elements exist at present are to be found, not in the elective, but in the hereditary principle. To liberalise the representatives, the first step should then be, to liberalise the *constituency*. But here we are cast into the old difficulty. If the Peers are not to have the choice, are we to throw it into the hands of the Crown, or of the Commons? Either arrangement would extinguish, under plausible forms, the third branch of the legislature, and inordinately increase the power of that branch to which such choice should devolve. Such a House of Lords would soon become either a Privy Council of the King, or a Committee of the Commons. A more manly course would be to vote it at once useless. But what could they protect us against the follies of an "Assemblée Nationale," and such decisions as those of the fourth of August?

It would be a serious error, however, to suppose that these favourable tendencies had been, in every instance, taken advantage of. Quite the reverse. Social life, such as it practically exists, exhibits a constant struggle, in some shape or other, to neutralise or pervert them. The aristocracy of England are notorious for the jealousy with which they maintain, in their domestic relations, pretensions certainly not recognised in their political. As if the real were not sufficient, factitious distinctions and nominal privileges, for which no intelligible base can be discovered, are set up. The capricious classifications of fashion — an insanity peculiarly English — are superadded to the original divisions of family and faction. Hence, a long series of paltry hates, frivolous ambitions, and miserable triumphs; selfishness in its most contemptible as well as pernicious forms, a preposterous arrogance, a secret dislike, a mutual distrust, are generated in every grade of the system. The amalgamation, it is true, goes on by the mere force of compelling external circumstance, but in the midst of all this combining and intermixing, seeds of internal discord, divellents and repellents of every description still subsist. This malady of our social existence is, however, by no means inherent: it is to be found, as we shall see later, in the defective or partial education of the Upper classes, and can best be removed by improving the system, and rendering it, thus improved, *universal*.

In Scotland, another principle has been operative. Clan-ship, though a relic of feudalism, has, in many instances, done as much for man and his interests, as the most enlightened modern liberalism. If it has kept up the claims of the Aristocracy, it has combined with them the still higher claims of the People. It has retained all the rights, filial and paternal, of the earliest periods of society. The proprietor is a father, not in privileges only, but in duties. He values himself, not on his acres, but on the devoted hearts and industrious arms which cover them. He is of the same blood as the lowest of his herdsmen, and therefore governs with gentleness; his herdsman is of his blood, and therefore obeys, with zeal, the personification of his own power and importance. The numerous excellent habits derivable from this

friendly recognition of mutual aid and mutual connection, are every where visible in Scotch practice. They form that unwritten code which often supplies the place, and surpasses the efficacy of legislative enactment. More favourable dispositions cannot be desired for the universal diffusion of Education. Here are no false rights, no absurd pretensions to treat with, nothing which can apprehend disturbance from its extension. Hence, from a remote period, the aristocracy of Scotland have shown themselves zealous for the advancement of moral and intellectual instruction. They have given, in their own body, the example, and been taught, by the enjoyment of the blessing, the advantage and importance of communicating it to others.

But Ireland exhibits a very different spirit: her Upper and Lower orders have neither the harmonious blending of the English, nor the friendly subordination of the Scotch. They are hostile armies; and, through the comparative insignificance of the Middle class, they have repeatedly come into collision. The France of 1789 to a certain degree illustrates this state of society. But, in Ireland, to the French evils, are superadded other and more malignant principles of disease. In France, the Aristocracy, as well as in Ireland, were absentees, if not from their country, from their estates; but in France the people had not attained that facility of criminal combination which so much enhances the evils of absenteeism in Ireland. In France, the hostility between the two orders was the offspring of feudalism: the old supremacy of the man of war over the man of peace, of the noble over the roturier, of the privileged over the citizen; but then, in France they were both of the same nation, the same race, the same faith. The noble oppressed under one title only, that of the noble. Not so in Ireland: to the common hostility between high and low, rich and poor, was conjoined the far deadlier hatred arising from national and religious distinctions. England never thoroughly subdued Ireland, and had the folly always to war against her. She contented herself with merely *garrisoning*, when she should have *incorporated* her. This, perhaps, was impracticable so long as she had a separate parliament: a separate parliament constitutes a distinct "corps de

nation;" the patriotism of such a country must necessarily consist in maintaining this separation and distinction. England governed her, therefore, not in the sense of an integral portion of the empire, but as a dangerous rival; finding amalgamation impossible, she resorted as her only security to division. She set up an opposing creed, an opposing property, an opposing code, all English; and made the rich the exclusive enjoyers and guardians of all. No wonder, then, the functionary was hated with the same hatred as the system; that the Aristocracy was confounded with the hereditary enemies of the country. A sullen servile war, at various intervals, and under various designations, was waged against a body which was likened far more to a hostile nation camping "in transitu," than an integral portion of the same political and social system.* The Aristocracy on their side were not less hostile to the People. They hated and despised; but it was not the scorn of real superiority, it was the spurious pride of sect and party. Here was no clanship; the country was divided between the descendants of the invaders and invaded: here was no transfusion from the lower classes into the higher; aristocracy was religious caste not to be polluted by the admission of the Catholic Paria. It will easily be conceived that such a state of things must necessarily have been prodigal of all sorts of social discords and disasters; such an Aristocracy must have been stained with much ignorance and many vices; oppression debases as much as slavery. Of what use was superior knowledge, when superior force was always ready? Who dared to require instruction from a master? The indolent squire, succeeding to the exten-

* This was principally effected by the exclusion and oppression of the Catholic population; that is, by the excision of seven eighths of the nation. Protestant Ascendancy could not, or would not, see this. It fought for reform, and independence, and free trade, &c., while it neglected the only means by which any one of these measures could be permanently secured. The parliament was never other than the parliament of a faction; can we be surprised it should so often have been the committee of a ministry? When the time came, England quenched its "permissive splendors" with ease. The nation was not there. The people were wanting. So true it is what Machiavelli says, "*Quella patria merita essere da tutti i cittadini amata, la quale egualmente tutti i suoi cittadini ama; non quella che posposti tutti gli altri, pochissimi n'adora.*"—*Istoria Fior.* lib. v.

sive domains of his father, could not be more indifferent to all means of acquiring personal respect than the great majority of this class, heirs to the monopoly of their ancestors, were to the esteem or attachment of the nation. One set of ideas was studiously inculcated,—the inherent, incontrovertible superiority of the favoured class. Every term used in England to designate common rights and common interests was indeed retained. Men talked of country, religion, property, constitution, &c. &c., but their country was faction; their religion, anti-catholicism; their property, many offices and few candidates; their constitution, despotism. Senate, privy-council, bar, corporation, magistracy (to say nothing of the Church, their especial pasturage,) were all and each, their private hereditaments. They held both the legislation and government of the country, as if by patent. From such assumptions soon flowed innumerable other errors and oppressions. Prejudices the most gross, refuted by the experience of every other nation, were taught as undeniable truths; passions the most selfish were encouraged, under the name of patriotism; sectarianism, bitter and blind, in direct contradiction to the wisdom and mercy of the Gospel, was preached as the reformed Christianity of the country. Nor was this a condition of society arising out of some temporary derangement of the political system. It was the political system itself, not merely the practice, but the doctrine, to which every act and thought of the performers, from infancy to old age, was directed. The legislature and the government took the utmost pains to train up the Aristocracy to these perversities. In return, the Aristocracy, so trained, poured in new absurdities and corruptions into the legislature and executive. A detestable reciprocation of vice and ignorance was established. Barriers, almost insurmountable, were raised to the progress of all moral and intellectual enlightenment. The events of the last ten years have, indeed, corrected many of these vices; whatever may be the wish, the power to oppress is in all instances shortened, in some entirely taken away. The letting in of the great body of the nation into their old inheritance has broken up the monopoly; the infusion of a popular spirit has for ever scattered the exclusive

pretensions of sect and caste. The first great act of national incorporation has taken place; not merely of Ireland with England, but of every class of Irishmen with each other. Catholic Emancipation was the first decided departure from the old system of ruling by sections, and encouraging by preferences. It has not only checked existing abuse, but has rendered a *long series of reforms indispensable*. The harmony in wrong is destroyed; a new organisation, more consonant to the real rights and true interests of all, has become inevitable. But it must not, therefore, be supposed that none of the old corruptions remain. The legislature and government have begun to 'do their duty; they have led the country into a new path, but the old impulses are still felt; the course for some time longer must necessarily be in a diagonal. Reformers have unfortunately to do with grown-up men; men who have contracted under another system habits conformable only to that system. It is long before these habits can be superseded, or that another generation can arise with new. The political sanction and encouragement may be withdrawn by a law, but the political education and its effects cannot be so easily eradicated. The actual Aristocracy of Ireland, it must be remembered, are not only pupils of the old anti-national regime, but, as a necessary consequence of such training, are anxious, in despite of all changes which have since intervened, to impart the same to their children. This may be a great folly, and a great crime: incapacitating for the new duties and functions to which under this altered state of society their children may be called, and perpetuating, by the maintenance of the old prejudices, the old distrusts and animosities; but it is not less the usual accompaniment of all changes. It ought not to discourage. Its worst aspect has its consolation. The obstacles which at present are opposed to Education, it clearly demonstrates, arise only from *misgovernment* and *miseducation*. The first of these causes is wearing away; the second must soon follow. So far from considering, then, their existence as an argument for deferring Education-Reform, amongst the Upper classes, it is precisely because they do exist, that it ought not one instant to be deferred. Good government cannot possibly work

without well-educated governors; there is no motive for bad education, if bad government be expelled. The factitious support is, in great degree, taken away; with the unassisted force of the bad habits it produced, we have now only to contend. But to vanquish such—to diminish their resistance to education—there is no better expedient than Education itself. Its diffusion may be difficult, but it is essential. The country cannot be allowed to remain disorganised in all its ranks. The evils of the existing ignorance and perversion are of too enormous a magnitude to be any longer tolerated, without the greatest peril, even to the *Upper class itself*.

The propriety of universally extending education among the *Middle class*, is a more debated question. The objections, indeed, do not proceed from the poor; they have as direct an interest in the virtue and intelligence of the Middle class, as in that of the rich themselves. They are not less their rulers, under a thousand subordinate forms; but it is not in this position that their influence is most felt: they are the counsellors of the poor, their guardians, their mediators with the higher orders; they are in contact with their feelings; they are not without experience of their wants. The greater or less efficiency with which the Middle orders fulfil these obligations, depends upon their mental and moral qualifications—the best of all reasons why the poor should feel deeply interested in the improvement and extension of the discipline by which these qualifications are to be attained. But the rich stand in a somewhat different position. Considering knowledge as power, and assuming that all power, not immediately exerted in their interests, is dangerous, they are guided in their estimate of the education of the Middle classes, merely by the circumstances in which they happen at the time to stand. As long as the Aristocracy imagine they require defences against the turbulence of the lower orders, they make no difficulty in conceding to this intermediate body all the influence which education can confer. They are regarded, for the time being, as the bulwarks of social order, the soundest portion of the nation, the outposts of the Aristocracy, the firmest support of the crown. But the moment the people, in their turn, require protection against the encroachments of the Aristocracy,

and the Middle order stands forward as their champion in the maintenance of a violated franchise, or the recovery of an usurped right, the tone changes; they are denounced as revolutionists—all enlargement of their power is then refused. Now this, besides its gross injustice, betrays, on the part of the Aristocracy, a strange misconception of their own interests. So far from complaining of this flexibility, they ought to rejoice in its existence: it is the very facility with which the same power may be brought to act in different directions, which really constitutes its utility. It is, precisely, because the Middle order is neither the Aristocracy nor the People, but connected with both, that it is entitled to act as arbitrator and umpire between both. The Lower class know little of the Upper; the Upper, perhaps, less of the Lower. They seldom come into contact; when they do, it is often less as friends than enemies. The Middle order furnishes a happy medium for communication: combining the spirit of the Lower with the sobriety of the Upper, they present a safe channel for their respective passions, a neutral ground for parley on their respective grievances; the only means which can prevent, in the long run, misunderstanding and collision between them. It is by this happy combination of compelling and repelling forces, that they are enabled, not only to maintain their own station with due firmness and dignity between the other bodies, but to exercise a vivifying energy and true steadying power over the whole state; an energy and power, be it remarked, not possessed by either Aristocracy or People in their isolated condition, and rarely to be found, even in the boasted balance of the three estates. To exchange for such safety, the most devoted subserviency to their own special interests would be the extreme of folly. All that could be gained would be a greater numerical strength, a larger body of partisans; but this very addition to their power would multiply the occasions for calling it into action. The Middle order would soon be absorbed by the Upper; there would be but two bodies; one struggle would unceasingly be carried on,—poverty *versus* riches, riches *versus* poverty. How perilous such a condition of society must always be, how adverse to every advance of civilisation, has been proved by all history.

One or other of the antagonists usually subjugates its rival. It ends in a despotism, or an anarchy. To preserve, then, the Middle order, in its entire energy and independence, is not less the duty and the interest of the aristocrat who fears the Jacobin, than of the citizen who hates the tyrant.

But this energy and independence is impossible without high moral and intellectual culture. To impose restraints, especially moral, on others, we must obtain their respect. This is not practicable without superior virtue and capacity — nor is either attainable without superior and persevering training. Nor is it sufficient that such qualities should be exhibited by one or two — they should be the qualities of the aggregate; the power of a class is the power of its members, not of its leaders; the education should not only be excellent, but universal. Fortunately, there is no class which can so safely be intrusted with such power, or is so calculated to apply it to useful purposes, as the Middle order. Whether it be to diffuse a sound intellectual spirit, or to preserve a rational morality from the fanaticism of the lower and the indifference of the higher classes, or to maintain unshaken, in the midst of all their passions and pretensions, the franchises of all, they possess, for the discharge of such high and difficult functions, both by character and position, every possible advantage. The progress of civilisation depends upon the due combination of the theoretical and the practical: the Middle order, by the very nature of their occupations, are daily called on for the exercise of that close observation and varied inquiry, and prompt application of knowledge, which constitutes the practical man; with this they have the leisure derived from competence, the comprehensive experience, and the habits of generalising, essential to the theoretical. From this body, accordingly, has emanated the largest share of important discoveries; and though many may have equalled them in the dignity of their speculations, none have surpassed them in the utility, none have made more valuable applications of theory to the real interests of life. Nor is it altogether by individual renown that we are to measure its influence. It is as an entire homogeneous body, equally capable throughout of taking in and giving out light, that the

Middle class is to be valued as a great intellectual illuminator. Its moral influence is commensurate. It is, in fact, the practical religious teacher, the effective modeller of the character of a nation. A respectability won by personal qualities, slowly and painfully acquired, is not likely to be easily surrendered. Such is the case with the Middle order. A truly enlightened Middle order understands its own true interests, and therefore respects the interests of others. It sees that commerce is credit, that credit is character, and that character, under the Argus eyes of the public, is not likely to be obtained by legerdemain. All men are interested in excluding interlopers. Honesty, punctuality, industry, are so much stock in trade. This truth, recognised in England before it was felt in other nations, gave her, more than her seas, and ships, and coals, the start in the race of the world. There was no dexterous jugglery on the credulity of other nations; no happy accident, like that of Alexandria, of Venice, of Florence, of place or time. Her great, her chief art, has been CHARACTER; truth and good-faith—these have been her spells. “To spare the fallen and to smite the proud,” was the talisman of Roman greatness; England has found a nobler, and more durable charm. The word of her merchants may well stand before the word of princes. She says, and it is indeed done. If ever the utility of a high moral standard has been proved, it has been in her instance. Let an Englishman travel where he may, and the commercial honour of his country he will find, has preceded him. His ways will be smoothed by the unseen power; he will go clothed with her moral might; like the Roman of old, he will every where find himself denizen.

Nor is it merely in the social relations of life that such results are observable: in the political they are equally conspicuous. Such habits cannot be friendly either to despotism or licentiousness. A truer friend to freedom than the enlightened merchant cannot be found. He knows that liberty does more than patronage; that monopoly corrupts wealth. But he knows more than this: he knows that liberty gives him, not wealth merely, but all that makes wealth desirable and enjoyable. It is not a mere commercial calculation, but a liberal passion, which expands and elevates every interest of life. Such

men are patriots, not by impulse, but reflection. They have the skill to detect, and the courage to unmask, pretenders. A healthy Middle order knows that it is not every trader with a brilliant shop sign, and all his capital in the window, that is likely to be the punctual and honest man of business. They inquire first into the security of drawer and acceptor before they look to the amount of the bill. Not from an *esprit du corps*, or from faction, or from love of novelty, or from absurd expectations, do they cling to the candidate for public favour. Whilst they have a clear conviction of the utility of progression in the social system, whilst they are deeply impressed with the right which every man has to bring his improvements into the political as well as the commercial market, they feel also that unsteadiness, and change for change sake, is a sure principle of ultimate failure, even in the most promising enterprises. They protect, but they also guide. Universal suffrage is rendered unnecessary by such safe depositories of the popular will. Living by the breath of the public, knowing the bearing of every question on the special happiness of each, and knowing that from such special happiness being well guarded can alone derive the happiness of all, they are not likely to counteract the public good by any unwise or corrupt exercise of their constitutional privileges. Nor are they less proof to popular blandishments. They are not to be borne away from the side of their country by every momentary gust of the popular passions. They have always, in their experience and reflection, counsellors to appeal to from the giddy judgments of the crowd. These are the men who stand out storms which sweep down monarchies, and exile aristocracies; they are the real roots of sound public opinion in all countries, and in all times.

In contrasting these countries with others, these phenomena are still more sensible. The want of this order, or its weakness and miseducation (one is always commensurate with the other), is the proximate cause of the situation in which many of the continental stations still lie. Where there is no Middle order, the prince is master, the nobles courtiers, the people slaves. Should an attempt at righting the system be occasionally ventured, it is sure to come in the most ob-

jectionable shape. A few ambitious lawyers, or disappointed soldiers, venture upon a revolution; the mass of the people remain inert: taxes, and not theories, are the orators to rouse *them*. Such impromptu, and selfish, experiments necessarily fail. The shell bursts before it gets half way. If, on the other side, the people, pushed to desperation, rise (as they did in the first revolution in France) in mass, having no controlling and directing power amongst them, they are dashed about at random, destroying or destroyed, until all parties, fatigued, fly at last to the first despot who will protect them against each other, and, in exchange for freedom, insure them repose. In the last revolution, this was not the case; both management and result were different. France, in the interval, had acquired a *Middle order*. *

From such evils these countries have been long protected; they have long had a *Middle order*. Wherever we pass, it is impossible not to notice how visibly it stands out in every institution. The very punctilio which defines, without separating, the different classes, is a striking evidence of its influence. It proves how deeply a sense of equality, and, at the same time, an enlightened regard for order pervades the community. But England and Scotland have had the advantage of long-continued repose. They have had respectively, too, an education for their middle classes, if not the best, better than what was usually to be met with in other countries. They owed it to circumstances. Scotland passed through a religious revolution. It was a trial and triumph for the graver virtues. It left its impress, especially on the *Middle classes*. It engrafted its character on the education of the country. A thoughtful, steady, and singularly industrious and persevering people has been the fruit. England owed

* This, however, must be taken with qualifications. It is still wanting in many places; and wherever it is wanting, its want produces results analogous to those in the text. "In a town like Lyons, where, between the manufacturers and the operatives, there is not that numerous middle class that exists at Paris, the organisation of a national guard is beset with difficulties." — *Speech of the Minister of the Interior, May 16. 1834.* The same cause which rendered hazardous the formation of a national guard, rendered natural, perhaps inevitable, the discords and disturbances which have lately desolated that unfortunate city.

hers not so much to violent political change as to the almost imperceptible, but regular, growth of her commercial habits, nourished by a well-adapted soil. The old bed of the German character, the Saxon faithfulness, bore up the modern mould. Nor did her internal dissensions sensibly interfere. Her oppressions came from the rod of her rulers, not from the heel of a stranger: whoever oppressed her, he was at least English; whoever conquered, her national pride stood erect. If despotism wrought its evils, it bit not thoroughly into the nation; it was bounded by the purlieu of the court. To judge by the self-adulation of James, or the fulsome doctrines of the Sibthorpes and Mainwarings of the day, we should set down the nation as not distinguishable from other countries in those times of all servility; but under these appearances there lurked a far different spirit. The true English soul, fresh and strong, was still to be found in the cottage of the yeoman, and at the counter of the artisan. The Revolution of 1641 exhibited it to all Europe. To Cromwell is ascribed the glory of having achieved that revolution. A mightier than Cromwell, that of which Cromwell was but the instrument, was the wonder-worker, English intelligence and English resolve working its will in the *middle* masses of the nation. The restoration of Charles II. was a mere royal interlude, in which the great body of the country took little interest: it merely looked on. The Revolution of 1688 was a patrician revolution; the country ultimately profited by it; it was the concluding scene of a great and eventful drama. It thus holds a rank in our history to which otherwise, perhaps, it had but an inferior claim. But the Revolution of 1641 was the revolution of the People, and of the soundest portion of the People; the revolution of the Middle order. It was the revolution which first displayed conspicuously those sturdy and substantial virtues which have since been so amply developed by their commercial industry and greatness, and gave them that station in the commonwealth which they have ever since with so much dignity maintained.*

* This is more strongly demonstrated by comparing our Revolution with that of France. The French noblesse emigrated, appeared in arms under the Aus-

I wish I could add to this catalogue the name of Ireland; but, unfortunately, Ireland can as yet exhibit but few of these features. Her Middle class is just emerging into shape from the political chaos in which all elements of Irish society have so long been confounded. Contrasted in government to the sister countries, she was necessarily not less so in all that government tends to produce. It was in the very nature of Anglo-Irish administration to suppress all intermediate bodies between the oppressor and oppressed. It had excluded, by the law of the stronger, the mass of the nation from national privileges; concentrated all wealth and power, and the means of acquiring both, in the hands of the few; and thus divided the state, the very evil apprehended above, into two classes, Protestant and Catholic, master and servant, rich and poor. Up to 1776, the period of the first relaxation of the anti-catholic code, four fifths of the nation had hardly any inducement, beyond what the Armenian has in Turkey, or the Jew, till recently, in Europe, for the accumulation of wealth. It could not be applied to any of the purposes which usually gratify the honourable ambition of mankind. Thus, with the stimulant to production, the productive power fell off. The Catholics were either serfs or nobles, both equally removed from those walks of active and lucrative industry which are never thoroughly open but to the free. It was not until a milder spirit began to evince itself, that any indications of

trian eagles, and surrendered their country to the unchecked fury of a triumphant and frantic faction. The English continued to reside, refused all mediators in their quarrel, moderated the excesses of their respective parties, and rescued the cause of freedom from unnecessary blood. One produced a revolution, and rendered many of its benefits evils; the other fronted it, and mastered it, and thus neutralised many of its ills. But this would have been impracticable without the cooperation of a substantial Middle order. In England it was to be found; in France it scarcely deserved the name. It had no separate existence. In some places it was overwhelmed by the people; in others, it hung on the noblesse. The *bourgeoisie aristocratique*, courted by Robespierre, "had in them," as Lanjuinais observes, "an innate spirit of *feudality*, which led them to despise the *canaille* and envy the noblesse; they desired equality, but only with such as were above themselves, not such as would confound them with their workmen." A few months after they were the *partisans*, and finally the slaves, of the rabble.

commercial industry and prosperity were shown amongst the Catholics. Even this, too, was more attributable to the success which the exiles met abroad, than to any encouragement vouchsafed at home. It may easily be conceived, that from so anomalous a state of things could scarcely originate any of the elements which go to the formation of a Middle order. Such a body, neither now nor at any time, can spread out under the shadow of the penal statute, the church anathema, or the proselytising school: it requires, for its creation and culture, perfect equality before the law; perfect protection of all rights; perfect communication of all privileges; citizenship, in its true, impartial, and universal sense. Accordingly, the act of 1792 scarcely found such a body in the south of Ireland. Since that period, and precisely in proportion to the relaxation of the Penal code, it has gradually grown up. The Relief Act of 1829 gave still further means and room for its developement, and thus may be said to be the first guarantee, of a really national description, for the formation and continuance of a Middle order. It broke down the unnatural and unwise restrictions which had previously distorted the course of national intelligence and energy, and allowed every individual talent and exertion to find its place. Disturbing circumstances, it is true, have since intervened, which have not yet allowed the country fully to profit by these advantages: but these circumstances are transitory, and, even in the midst of them, the growth of such a class is every where becoming more perceptible.* At the same time, it must be confessed, that it still struggles with the vices of its origin.

* There are two classes of landlords in Ireland, very distinct in their position and character. "The one," says a competent evidence, "are owners in fee, the other are in immediate connection with the cultivators of the soil. These, I should say, are the most numerous and influential, though, probably, as yet, they are not, as a class, *old enough* to compete in amount of rental with the other class to which I refer, and who form the richer aristocracy, possessing large territorial revenues, but being less influential, because less in connection with the occupiers of the soil. They are, generally speaking, persons of capital, independent of their landed estates, devoted to the improvement of those estates, and careful of the condition of their tenantry, and, in most cases, persons who have made their own fortunes, and are now dealing with estates as they formerly did, with the capital by which they acquired them." — *Mahony, Letter on Tithes*, p. 18

Unlike the Middle order in England and Scotland, it bears not on its brow the consciousness of old triumphs. It has stolen, slowly and painfully, into existence. It does not yet feel the conviction of intrinsic power. A Middle order derives its physical and moral influences principally from commerce. Ireland is not a commercial country; her Middle order is yet weak. It shares, indeed, the passions and qualities of the other two orders, but such chiefly as are most objectionable. When such are the elements, the body itself can neither be very prosperous nor very powerful. It wants the qualities by which power and prosperity are to be attained. Accordingly, it is constantly suffering, in one shape or other, from this want. In its private relations, it experiences it in the disorder of commercial transactions, in the falling off of customers, in the precariousness and discomfort of its daily existence;—in its public, in the little and inefficient control it possesses over the two other orders. So far from being considered, as in England, a high mediator between their respective pretensions, it is looked on as a mercenary to be hired or forced over to either party, in every political strife. Hence it has no compactness, no political position. It does not stand out as a firm, distinct, commanding body in the state. It fears both, and is feared by neither. At the first stir, it shrinks away from its place. We see two hostile armies, Radicals and Conservatives, rich and poor, in array, but no intermediate to prevent their shock; no Middle order, checking, enlightening, directing both; no third estate, more powerful than the other two, affecting to rule none, yet vigorously and usefully ruling all.

This is a great and embarrassing defect in the condition of any country. Wherever it is felt, the whole mass of society must be constantly oscillating between over government and no government at all. Ireland has given ample proof of an approximation to each. Had she earlier possessed a Middle order, she never would have endured an Orange ascendancy, on the one side, nor a Catholic helotism on the other. The moral influences of order and liberty would not have been in abeyance; distrust and combination, violence and weakness, would not have been found in company. But this, again, is

only another expression for ignorant and bad government. Good government would necessarily have produced a Middle order: a Middle order in turn would have rendered good government indispensable, and inevitable.

It thence follows, that any government which has a true wish to regenerate Ireland must early direct its care to the strengthening and enlightening this important body. Until it shall have taken deeper root, and established a much surer and more extended influence, the work of legislation must always be exposed, even in its wisest and best intentions, to frequent impediment. • How is peace to be expected, where elements, the most hostile, so far from being separated or moderated by the energetic intervention of a controlling body, are hourly liable, from its feebleness, to be brought into collision? How is order to be established, where there is, between conflicting passions, no umpire? How is security to be looked for, where there is no stay? The minister, for a while, may steer dexterously enough through these moving islands, but no one can calculate the hour when he may be caught and crushed between them. A country so situated is in an uninterrupted revolution.

But, against this mass of unquestionable advantage, arising from education, one objection is urged: so futile, indeed, that it is implied rather than avowed; an objection, it should be hoped, confined to few; the offspring of ignorant selfishness, or puerile vanity. It is apprehended that the Middle class may become too enlightened for the Upper. The Aristocracy are apprehensive of being overtaken by the People! It is a subject of just congratulation that they are: a more salutary fear could not exist. Fortunate for themselves, fortunate for the whole community, that the inferior class thus presses so closely on the heels of its superior! It is the animating and impelling principle of society. No doubt, an educated Middle class will, in the nature of things, eventually become the masters of an ignorant Aristocracy; but it is in the hands of the Aristocracy itself to avert this. To preclude such transfer of power, they have only to become proportionally more enlightened, and better educated, themselves. To drag back a competitor, instead of making efforts to pass before him, is

a very uncertain and ignoble means of winning in the race. A high-minded Aristocracy should disdain it. Their pride should be to challenge, and their glory to distance, competition. If the Middle class shall, by their advancement, compel the Upper also to advance — if, by their exertions, they shall drive them from their indolence, and rouse them to the advantages of a better system, instead of injuring, they will render them the noblest of all social services. Such pressure, instead of breaking up, will consolidate; it will place them in thorough harmony with the other masses of the state, make them as useful to others as others are to them, confide to their hands the secret of true power, superiority in REAL qualities, and fence them round with the only protection either certain or durable — the *rational* attachment, and *deserved* admiration, of all classes of their country.*

The great majority of the country is favourable to the utmost extension of education amongst the Upper and Middle classes. Not so when there is question of the education of the Lower. Here every shade of opinion is observable, from those who would give them the most unlimited share of information, to those who would give them none at all. The objections to the education of the People appear formidable when thus taken in mass: when reduced separately to their true dimensions, their importance vanishes. They may be classed under the five following heads: —

1. The Lower classes are disqualified, by their position, from acquiring knowledge.
2. They have not sufficient time for acquiring it.
3. They have no use for it, when acquired.
4. It is not only of no utility, but of positive injury, to the Lower classes.
5. It is not only of injury to the Lower classes, but to the other classes of the state.

1. *They are disqualified by their position.* “What have great, whacking, eating lads, who ought to earn their own bread in the fields by useful employment, to do with *schools*?

* “La plus grande de toutes les économies, puisque c'est l'économie des hommes, consiste dans les mettre tous dans leur véritable position.” — *Talleyrand, Rapport sur l'Education.* 1791.

He had two lads, seven or eight years old, now scaring away birds, who earned two shillings, which was a great relief to their poor parents. Their hands would generally be found rather dark, and their fingers more thick and horny than was exactly fitted to give them facility in writing delicately. It was *highly injudicious to teach the poor people to aspire to any thing but labour.*"* So says Mr. Cobbett, and so say, with Mr. Cobbett, the whole host of the beef-and-pudding philosophers of society. This is a remnant of the old John Bull school. Let a labourer into the secret that he has a mind, what a perilous, what a cruel discovery! It is quite sufficient for *him* to know that he has legs and arms; that he is, has been, and must ever be, a delving machine for the use of his superiors; that there is no happiness for a human being comparable to his daily quota of bacon †, and that the chances of this great gift are exactly in proportion to the want or scantiness of Popular Education. The Emperor of Austria declares, that "he prefers loyal subjects to learned men;" this is, "de son métier:" but to hear such doctrines from the lips of Englishmen, and addressed to Englishmen, from men who, free themselves, talk in such earnest language of their regard for the freedom and interests of others—from men who, born to labour themselves, have attained the very position which they now hold by aspiring after something more than labour, is worse than ridiculous. Pursue the paradox to its true consequences, and it will come to this:—If educa-

* Mr. Cobbett's Speech on Mr. Roebuck's motion for a Committee to inquire into the state of English Education. See also his *Register*, nearly of the same date.

† "Only a very small portion of the globe is carnivorous; yet in England we are so accustomed to the gouty luxury of meat, that it is now almost looked upon as a necessity; and though our poor, we must all confess, generally speaking, are religiously patient; yet so soon as the middle classes are driven from animal to vegetable diet, they carnivorously both believe and argue that they are, in the world, remarkable objects of distress; that their country is in distress; that things 'cannot last:' in short, pointing to an artificial scale of luxury which they themselves have hung up in their own minds, or rather in their stomachs, they persist that vegetable diet is low diet; that being without roast beef is living below zero; and that molares, or teeth for grinding the roots and fruits of the earth, must have been given to mankind in general, and to the English in particular, through mistake."—*Bubbles from the Brunnens*, p. 332.

tion is to be refused to the people, lest it should inspire them with desires above their condition, so also, in consistency, should every exercise which may have a similar tendency: total exclusion, therefore, not only from politics, from political functions, from self-government in every shape, from Newspapers, "Registers," Magazines; from all species of political speaking, listening, and reading; but also, from whatever regards the improvement of their very labour processes themselves — no agricultural ameliorations, no cottage economies, no social reforms, no bettering of their position, no desire whatever to better it; — all this provokes thought, teaches to aspire, distracts from the manual operation, is above the labourer's condition. Few men will be bold enough to push the argument to this extreme. The most sturdy opponents of Popular Education would yet allow the people a decent share of political duties and privileges. They have no objection to the better cultivation of their land, and the more orderly appearance of their cottages. But how do they follow up this principle in practice? They entrust the people with power, and prohibit all instruction how they are to use it; they call for improvement, and cut off the means by which improvement is to be attained! If the people of England are to have no schools, because they are "a whacking," eating, meat-craving, and porter-loving generation, truly a meat-craving, porter-loving, and "whacking" generation will they remain. If boys are to be kept at "scaring away crows," because it is *thought* they can do *nothing else*, truly, nothing else, in the end, *will they be likely to do*. There are things which cannot be comprehended without preparing the mind to comprehend them; men will not reason and reflect, without having been taught and practised in the habits of reflection. Mr. Cobbett, indeed, seems to think otherwise: he writes books for the people; and yet deems it injudicious that the people should learn how to read them; he appeals to their judgment, and would yet exclude them from the means of forming it. But Mr. Cobbett may be safely left to Mr. Cobbett; no man can refute him with half the eloquence he can employ himself. To make and keep the people stupid, and then maintain, because they *are* stupid, they should not be

taught, is about as rational a position as to maintain, because we have made men slaves, we ought not now to make them free. Had such argument been listened to, there would not, at this moment, be a free nation on the earth : had such reasoning been applied to instruction, there would scarcely be an enlightened one. At one period or other in the history of every nation such objections have been urged. But the enjoyment of freedom and of knowledge fortunately fit for the proper exercise of both. Men do not walk, but by trying to walk. A nation, no more than an individual, is to be instructed by theory. If the labourer were to be left in ignorance until he should become sufficiently enlightened to desire knowledge, he would probably die as he had lived, and generations would perish like individuals. Pushed to its extreme point, it would leave the savage in the forest, and the slave in the mine ; the man of the nineteenth century would be little better than the uncivilised cotemporary of the Egberts and Harolds. And if we are not to push it to this extreme, I should like to know, at what point are we to stop. Where is the precise boundary between enough and too much ? Is it a matter of hours or acres—of this latitude or that—of taxes or governments ? a matter of accident, and not determinable by the natural capabilities of the human mind ? It may be difficult, indeed, to bring grown-up men to such discipline—their minds are often as callous as their hands ; but the “ boy,” physically and mentally, is yet tender : and with boys, and not with grown-up men, has education to do. The disqualification asserted, is mere assumption. Disqualified for what ? It is not proposed to teach the labourer Latin and Greek. He is not to be surfeited with the useless and difficult. Nothing but what is *easy* to any human being, nothing but what is *useful* to every human being, is to be his lesson. He is to be made not a *bad scholar*, but a *good labourer*. It is surely no great task, to do by *rule* what one must otherwise do at *random* : it is no great draw upon mental exertion to learn the simplest and most certain processes of practising one’s own trade ; of giving greater value to one’s own industry ; of putting to greater profit one’s own economy. To enable him to do this, and to do it promptly and well, is the object of intel-

lectual training. But intellectual training, though important, is not the main object of education. The main object is *moral* training. Is the labourer disqualified, by his position, for this? Is he too stupid to comprehend the distinctions between vice and virtue, the nature of his private and public duties, the importance of exertion, the happiness of good conduct, the respectability of honesty and principle? If so, why does he go to church? The same obtuseness which disqualifies the boy for the school, must equally disqualify the man for the sermon. If the daily teacher cannot succeed in inculcating these doctrines and enforcing these habits, what can be hoped from the weekly preacher? The argument, in consistency, ought to abandon him solely to himself. But what would be the result of such abandonment? The mind and mental faculties, from want of exercise and nourishment, would fall asleep. Every day he would more and more degenerate; more and more approximate to the beast; more and more appear disqualified by his position for instruction; more and more seem destined, in America to the condition of a slave, in Russia to that of a serf, in England "fit only to be trained to labour from the very first moment he is able to work." But from what would all this have proceeded? From any inherent incapacity in the labourer himself? "No; but from the absurd belief that such incapacity originally existed. We first take every pains to *create* the defect, and then complain that it is *incurable*!"*

* The Deaf and Dumb are condemned by Aristotle, at a single stroke of the pen, to *irremediable* ignorance: the Code of Justinian deprived them, as acknowledged and incurable *idiots*, of all civil rights. The Abbé de l'Epée states, that in some countries they are put to death, as *monsters*, when three years old. Philosophy itself has shared in the general error and injustice. Guyot of Gröningen, Cæsar of Leipsic, Condillac, &c., have denied them most of the intellectual and moral faculties. The Abbé de l'Epée was actually persecuted, on theological and political grounds, for having ventured to think otherwise. It was thought "highly injudicious to teach them to aspire" after any thing but eating and drinking. Even the Abbé Sicard himself asserts, in his earlier works, that a deaf and dumb person is "a cipher in society, a living automaton," &c. &c. But of late years a wider and juster spirit has prevailed. Their disqualification has not been taken for granted; the experiment of education has been tried upon them, and, by *being educated*, they have been discovered to be *worthy of education*. The reputed idiot has been restored to rationality; the cipher found to be of some value in society. Contrast with the *assertions* of preceding writers the favour-

2. *They have not sufficient time.*—What is the time which a child requires for labour, what for instruction? This depends on circumstances. A child, from the age of six to ten, cannot be employed on field labour fifteen hours per day. His health would suffer, and the work would be ill done. Judicious arrangement is necessary, not only to economise the animal machine, and thus preserve it for future exertion, but also for the better management and apportioning of the work itself: both are materially served by occasional relaxation. The labourer works harder, though for a shorter time; the work is better and more quickly done. But what is to be done with these hours of relaxation? how are they to be employed? Why not at school? But school is not relaxation. Why not? it depends solely upon the manner of conducting the school. Where the school is well conducted, it is, as it ought to be, a place of pleasure, and not of pain. But these surplus hours, spared from labour, will not be sufficient for instruction. Why not? the same principle which regulates the application to labour should regulate the application to instruction. Two hours per day have been found sufficient, when properly employed, in Switzerland. Where is the child who, out of fifteen hours per day, has not two hours to spare? But, “there is a place,” says Mr. Cobbett, “to which day labourers would much rather go, after their labour was over, than to school, and that is—to bed.” Possibly; but why go to school at night? why not go in the morning, or at noon? Their labour, it is alleged, is too valuable for that. It may be valuable; but we return again to the position, that fifteen hours’ labour is too much for any child, and there ought always to be, for the sake both of the labour and labourer, two or three hours, out of these fifteen hours, to spare. Were every word of the objection just, it is applicable, after all, to a

able testimonies, founded on *facts*, to their intelligence, of M. Bôbian, the colleague of Sicard, of M. Piroux, their lecturer at Nancy, but especially of the enlightened Degerando. Had we remained satisfied with assertions, and left them, on Mr. Cobbett’s principle, where they were, we should assuredly have produced the incapacity described; and then, probably, maintained, with Aristotle, that it was intrinsic and irremediable!

certain period only of the week and year. Can they work on Sunday? Can they always work in winter? What is the value of their labour then? In that blank season of the year, hours and days are passed away, in idleness, by the fireside. Why not give these hours, or a portion of these hours, to instruction? Why not give sufficient instruction to enable them to spend them to some good purpose, to put them out to profitable use? Why not balance the summer against the winter, the season of labour against that of rest? This has been done in Scotland and in Switzerland. The Scotch and Swiss are as industrious and as prudent as the English. They do not complain of want of time for instruction. They *make* it. Their fields flourish, though their children go to school.

3. *They have no use for instruction.*—This depends upon the nature of the instruction. If it be not calculated to improve the condition to which society destines them, if it be inapplicable to their every day wants, if it does not give them greater skill and steadiness in the management of their domestic concerns, if it does not better qualify them for the discharge of their private and public duties, if it does not infuse a more enlightened and active spirit of religion and morality, if it does not develop *usefully* their understanding and their feelings; in fine, if it be an education *totally unfit* for the people, it may certainly be admitted, that of such education the people can have no earthly *use*. But such, surely, is not our education. The very first essential of the education for which we are contending is not its extent, nor its elevation, nor the number of things learned, nor their seeming importance, nor their facility,—though all this be worth attending to,—but, above all things, and in all things, its *applicability*. Let the peasant have the peasant's education; and the gentleman the gentleman's: that is, in plain phrase, an education which will teach each to do better what they otherwise may do ill, or, at least, what they cannot do so well without, as with it. To say that such an education is of "no use" is a contradiction in terms. Whether such an education *can be given*, is another question. Those who maintain that it cannot, reason from the single fact of English education. Doubtless, if we were to be confined to such evidence, and that English edu-

cation were unimprovable, such conclusion would be just. But is this a fair mode of reasoning? May not this apparent impracticability arise, not from the nature of education itself, but from our want of knowledge, our want of means, our want of exertion in conducting education? Have we examined what other countries have done? have we ascertained how other countries have succeeded? Is there any reason why *we* should not succeed also? Their habits are not ours. True; but it has not been shown that the difference between us is so radical as to preclude us from applying, to the instruction of our labourers, expedients which have been applied with such admirable results to theirs? Until such assertion can satisfactorily be maintained, we are not entitled to assume that education is "of no use" to the people.

But, even were these results less conspicuous, we should pause before we doom so large a portion of our species to so great a privation as that of moral and mental light! The People, even in the rudest societies, are surely something more than a mere animated piece of mechanism. They are something more than a mere flesh and blood machinery, for the purpose of elaborating so much surplus gratification for the exorbitant desires of the few. Are they, then, to be limited irredeemably and exclusively to mere *bodily* operations? Is the *spirit* to be starved in the midst of matter and material processes? Is the Mammonite philosophy of the age to allow them no place at the intellectual banquet? Why debar that immortal nature, which they possess in common with the proudest in the land, from its natural pasture? why incapacitate the peasant from filling up, with mental pleasures, the interval, at least, of his bodily exertions? If such be the inheritance to which they are inevitably doomed, Heaven has given its glorious light to few. But surely this is a strange blasphemy! God is the Father of *all* his creatures: the Giver of *good* gifts has given nothing in vain.

As long, then, as education can give pleasure, without injury to the individual or to the public,—as long as it innocently enhances enjoyment, or diminishes pain,—it is not a matter of indifference; it is a substantial benefit—it is of use. The pains of the labouring classes are already too

many, their compensations too few, to justify the slightest unnecessary interference with so scanty a stock of happiness. Strong, indeed, must be the case, imminent the danger, evident the injury, which can thus authorise us to take up the square and balance. Is this the case with Education? Do these evils and dangers march in its train?*

4. *Education is of injury to the Lower orders.* — It distracts the labourer, it is alleged, from his manual pursuits — it gives him a distaste for labour, a presumptuous opinion of his acquirements, an erroneous estimate of his power, and of society — it renders him discontented with his condition — indolent, envious, reckless, vicious. Were such the results of *Education*, little doubt could be entertained of its pernicious and perilous tendency. But are they not rather the results of its *abuses* or *defects*? Do they even *exist*? If they do, may they not arise from sources totally different from those stated. Is it just, until these points be ascertained, to sit down, and, with our arms crossed as if each had been fully proved, to anathematise Education?

We fall into this mistake from obvious causes. We have but one measure. We take *English* education as the only type of *all* education. Because a very bad and limited system has turned out 'a bad batch of pupils, we decide that *all* systems, for *all time* to come, must necessarily do the same. English education, in most instances, gives reading and writing — a smattering of ciphering — a jargon of the catechism — a spouting by rote of the Scriptures. Here is no *applicability*, no labour teaching, no practical knowledge, no practised piety, nothing fitted to the real wants, habits, and prospects of the labourer. He gets nothing but an instrument of knowledge. He may use it, or misuse it, as he

* These are mere worldly reasons, urged because they are those which are most listened to, and often conclusive when all higher considerations fail. But a stronger motive than any here stated, will weigh with the Christian philosopher. Men are *responsible* beings, intrusted with faculties for the better performance of earthly duty, and the attainment of eternal reward. This is their destiny; we have *no right* to stand in its way. It is a *crime* to neglect or repress these faculties. The steward, who buried his talent, was exposed to the rebuke of his heavenly Master. Can we compel, without guilt, in others, what it is criminal to permit in ourselves?

thinks fit. It is a gun in the hands of a boy. No means are given to direct its use, no pains taken to insure that he shall use it well. Is it singular, that, without this direction, he should use it ill? Is it singular, that the *bad use* of knowledge should produce *bad results*? When a *good* system of education shall produce the same, then, but not till then, we may rail against the evil effects of Education.

The fact is, all these evils arise, as has been already said, not from the gift, but from its privation; not from its qualities, but from deficiency in these qualities. Why does the labourer form an erroneous estimate of himself, and of society? Not because he knows *something* of either, but because he does not know *enough*; not because he has been educated, but because he has *not* been *properly* educated. So it is in every other walk of study and life. The young metaphysician dissertates on free-will and causation, the young mathematician on axioms and no axioms, the theologian on justification and election, with no less ignorance and presumption than the labourer on the tyranny of capitalists, the injustice of machinery, and the "god-like voice" of the people.* To bring down this presumption to its proper level, there is but one expedient; confront it with *true knowledge*; humble, not by censuring for what has been learnt, but by insisting on the necessity of learning more. Nor is this the only ground of vanity. The education given is not only *imperfect*, but is given to *few*. Now, it is, not so much the acquisition, as the distinction which the acquisition confers, of which men are vain. No gentleman now boasts of his knowledge of reading and writing, of his knowledge of French, &c.; yet time was, when even these acquirements were sufficient to confer distinction upon a gentleman. It would have been rather absurd to have attempted putting down this "presumption" by

* "Are they dustmen?" asked Mr. Dyer, in determining a police complaint against some interlopers who had been carrying off ashes from a house in St. James's Square.

"*They* dustmen?" answered the "riggler," with a look of huge disdain. "No, they arn't; they're only *bricklayers*!"

This is only another version of the "presumption" of Schiller's philosopher:—

"*der kleine grosse Mann*
Hans Metaphysikus."

prohibiting reading and writing, &c.: a much surer method was adopted, or rather forced itself into adoption; reading and writing gradually became general,—no one was vain of what every one could do. Now, there is no reason that what is true of reading and writing, and French, should not also be true of any other mental acquirement; or, that what has succeeded in the instance of the gentleman should not equally succeed in the instance of the labourer. Pedantry, or self-conceit, is, after all, the child, not of *knowledge*, but of *ignorance*: to play it off with any degree of success, there must be a foil, there must be ignorance beside it. It is precisely for this reason that it is most observable in societies, and individuals, passing from a state of ignorance to one of knowledge—there are few at first instructed, the great mass is still untaught; the few take advantage of their position, and the more, perhaps, because it is transitory, and lord it over the many. But these evils, which arise out of the very nature of a transition state, and, of course, pass with it, are not to be confounded with the effects of a permanent principle. They have far more to do with the state which they are *leaving*, than the state to which they are *hastening*: much the wiser mode to terminate them would be, not to go *back*, but to go *through*. It was an error of this kind which dictated the sumptuary laws of the little Italian republics. The political economists of those days shuddered at the presumption, the insubordination, the total dissolution of social order, which was to ensue from the portentous introduction, amongst their people, “of silks, purple, and fine linen.” They, too, had recourse to prohibitions, restrictions, discouragements; all, doubtless, in the spirit of true patriotism and profound political wisdom. A wiser spirit, and a surer, than their statesmanship could boast of, protected them against their own folly. Man, and his wants, prevailed against their statute book. Silks and fine linen, in the face of the law, grew general. *Presumption* ceased with *use*; and what the law itself could never effect was effected by its violation. So is it with Education. Create prohibitions, and you create distinctions, and with distinctions presumption. You produce the very evil you wish to suppress, or you produce nothing—

your laws are either bad, or ineffectual. The wiser course would be, to consult first with human nature, and then to legislate under her inspiration and inspection. Make Education as universal as the light, as necessary as the air; make it the common enjoyment of every human being; and we shall then hear nothing of "distinction." Let there be no privileges, and there will be no presumption.

If all labourers be instructed, the labourer will cease to be presumptuous. If the labourer be not presumptuous, he will soon cease to be "*discontented*." * Continue to raise the other classes in proportion as you raise his, and you will keep all society in its original relative position. The whole shell will swell out simultaneously. There will be no jagged prominences. No one body will be elevated into an unjust pre-eminence over others; but the entire mind, character, resources, of the country will be enlarged. The labourer will see others before him still, higher places filled, competition as active as ever, competitors as superior to their predecessors as he is to his. If a momentary vanity should urge him to aim at situations beyond his powers, experience will soon correct the illusion. Where this experience is general, it is just as probable that the merchant, who has passed through an university, will throw by his ledger in disgust, because he cannot be a peer, as that the labourer and operative, who have passed through the "town" or "country" school, will infallibly strike, because they cannot attain the station of a merchant. If Education has any thing to do with the opinions or conduct of either, it is only on the side of good; but the fact is, necessity, iron necessity, is the great reconciler in the matter. The tide, which the sudden force of Education carries towards certain professions, will, at first, flow rapidly; but as soon as these professions shall be fully

* "Several of them (the Brahmins), it is true, lamented," says M. Jacquemont, "that the treasures of knowledge only rendered them more miserable, by isolating them from the rest of the nation, by giving them notions and desires of happiness under forms forbidden by the laws of caste," &c.—*Letters from India. Letter to M. V. de Tracy*. A similar feeling is to be found amongst the few instructed men to be met with in the East. How is this to be remedied? By restricting, or by extending, education?

supplied, it will gradually return to its accustomed bed, and society be again restored to its equilibrium. Neither is there any thing in the condition of the labourer, more taxing to human exertion, more detracting from honorable self-respect, than any other occupation; on the contrary, agriculture, if we reason from realities, and not prejudices, is the truly noble occupation of life. The labourer finds in his habits another principle of adhesion: the impulsion which could dislocate such a class must uproot the whole of his nature, cut off all associations, break down existing connections, and produce a revolution in comparison to which changes of constitutions, and cashiering of sovereigns, are mere trifles.

But does this discontent *really exist*? or is it caused by Education? Where is it to be seen? In the agricultural districts? in the manufacturing? in the rick-burnings? in the strikes? All these results proceeded from causes which had no connection with Education. It was a question of eating and drinking, wages or no wages, living or starvation. The steam-engine, not the press, was the great agitator.* Such, too, as they were, they are gradually passing away. Machinery has not been put down; universal future interests have not been sacrificed to such only as were local and transitory. The very sufferers themselves are beginning to see the advantages resulting from their sufferings, and have already received for them, in many instances, compensation. The workmen at Paisley and Glasgow have shown how much can be endured, and how well. What other community ever exhibited such temper and patience, and under such trying circumstances?† Where is this feeling generally more striking than in those very towns where Education has most advanced? A century ago, such causes

* How few of those engaged in these agrarian disturbances could read and write! See Reports of various trials, at the period. How few concerned in the Union strikes could do much more! The Press throughout, instead of exciting or supporting, opposed these movements.

† Mr. Maxwell gave the following details, in the House of Commons, June 11. 1834, of the sufferings at Glasgow:—

A man, with a wife and five children, works as a weaver, and is assisted at the loom by his two sons.

The united earnings amount to 9s. per week.

The deductions are as follow, during the same period:—

would have produced very different results. A famine then generally ended in riots and insurrections. It now terminates in meetings and subscriptions. For the Lord George Gordon tumults, we have a peaceable procession through the metropolis. Disorder has diminished with ignorance, bigotry with communication. There may be less dead quiet, but there are fewer occasional revolts; less of lethargy, but less also of fever. Were the pressure of other causes removed, we should hear nothing of the irritating tendency of Education. If these causes act on Education, as they do upon every other circumstance of our social condition, the fault is not in the object acted upon, but in the agents. We forget what is their effect on ignorance. Would an ignorant population be more patient under such trials, than an enlightened one? Look to Lyons and Marseilles.

But if the tendency of popular instruction, it may pertinently be asked, be to disturb, and excite the people, why allow their children to read the Gospel? Of all instruction, the Gospel, under certain points of view, is the most likely to render them discontented with their situation. In no one book is the original equality of man more strongly inculcated, contempt for the rich more prominently put forward, feelings leading to the most extended republicanism every where, more discoverable. The "powers of this world" are as dross before the "children of light;" it is to the despised of the earth, to "the poor in spirit," to "fishermen," to "publicans," and not to the Prince, nor to the High Priest, nor to the Doctor of the law, that the secrets of the kingdom of God are confided. The very essence of early Christian government, in conformity with the Gospel spirit, was "equality, and fraternity:" the first professors formed, in the heart of a gigantic despotism, a

| | s. | d. |
|--|----|-----|
| For wear and material, and rent for shop for three looms | 3 | 0 |
| For fire for house and shop | - | 1 0 |
| For house rent for one apartment | - | 1 0 |
| For oil for house and shop | - | 1 0 |
| For starching, twisting, and carriage | - | 1 0 |
| | 7 | 0 |

leaving only *two shillings* to feed and clothe *seven* human beings for *seven days*!

free, if not an independent, state. Various sectaries, acting both on the doctrine and example, with too little reference to the inevitable changes of time and place, attempted, in after times, to force into civil government the same principles. We know the results. The history of the Anabaptists and Independents show, at every page, to what disorganising consequences even "Gospel enlightenment," without proper safeguards, may lead. But do we therefore prohibit the Gospel? Do we fear to place it in the hand of our peasantry? Assuredly not. There are doctrines in the same sacred pages, which constitute these very safeguards. If the Gospel be read as it ought to be, with due attention to these, danger need not be apprehended. True it is, that the peasant can scarcely guide that attention himself; but there are others who can. We therefore call them in to assist him: but this assistance once given, we are no longer doubtful of the results. Here is instruction, here is enlightenment, from which we expect the most salutary fruits. Why, then, do we shrink from Education? What is it, but another modification of the same process? If, with a judicious instructor, Gospel teaching does not infuse dissatisfaction, why, with similar precautions, should any other branch of education?

That idleness should follow from discontent, is quite natural; that increase of crime should follow from both, is not less so; but that both necessarily proceed from, or are unchecked by, Education, is an assumption absolutely gratuitous. If the positions in the preceding pages be just, it will be difficult to show any connection between education and vice,—certainly none between good education and vice. It is just as impossible it should exist, as between *true* religion and vice. It may be true, indeed, that neither interpose as strong barriers as could be desired; but, because they do not effect *as much* as we desire, it is no proof that they effect *nothing*. The fair way to judge both would be, to see what the *same* nation, religious and irreligious, educated and uneducated, but in other respects as nearly as possible under the same circumstances, would produce;—I say, under the same circumstances, because, reasoning of their operation under different is reasoning of different operations. This would, at once, enable us to ascertain what really proceeded from

education and what did not: it would point out what other producing causes intervened, the amount and extent of their several actions, and to which the aggregate effect was mainly to be set down. Until this can be done, we have scarcely a right to take a general vague fact, concomitant with, or existing, perhaps, in despite of, Education, as the consequence of Education. It would be just as reasonable to suppose, in an algebraic equation, that a quantity, absorbed by a greater, was the chief producing cause of a result: yet, in the practical part of the work, we shall see how frequently this has been done. The presumed augmentation of crime in England has been held forth as a direct argument, not only against Education in England, not only against education as it now exists, but against education elsewhere, against education generally, wherever, and whenever applied to the People. On inquiring more minutely and more extensively, we shall be led to very different conclusions. Not only have erroneous deductions from facts been hazarded, but the facts themselves been misstated. Were both otherwise, it would still be difficult to deny that Education, though inefficient, had not exercised a considerable resistance. This resistance is so much detracted from the force of vice; its diminution, or removal, would be so much added. If the resistance be not commensurate to what it has to resist, the *fault is ours*, and not that of *our instrument*. By many of our habits and institutions we add new energies to vice, but abstain, at the same time, from proportionally strengthening and improving Education.*

* The more we reflect on the nature of Education and Crime, the more we shall be convinced that there is *no true eradicator* of crime, but Education. Severe penal codes, active police, poor laws on the most liberal scale, are all substitutes and palliatives. The eye of the ruler is not all-seeing: the most active executive cannot be at all times, and in all places, with its people. To check crime, we must check the disposition to crime: to prevent act, we must generate an omnipresent control over thought, set up the man in watch over himself, and make conscience the universal keeper.

This is not attainable by mere Punishment. From the extreme difficulty of graduating and applying it (its intensity depending as much on the individual as on the punishment itself); from the uncertainty of its application even when well graduated (the innocent suffering for the guilty, and thus inflicting a double injury on society); from its inefficiency in attacking innumerable forms of vice

To him who admits the preceding positions, it will scarcely be necessary to proceed farther. If the education of the

(which cannot, it is true, without producing still greater injury, be subjected to legislation, but which are not less amongst the most active principles of depravity and disorder);—Punishment, even in its most preventive form, has not yet materially reduced, and it is very doubtful whether it ever will reduce, the large sum of moral evil under which society groans. In its present state, it is infected with abuses, which render it quite as much the teacher of new vices to the young, as the reformer of old vices in the old. Vigilant police affects more the preventive and precautionary character; but it is still, at best, much more the application of a physical than of moral power, and demands sacrifices much too large for any blessing. It interferes with the rights and comforts of the well conducted, on the plea of defence against the aggressions of the bad. The “home inspectorship” of Russia and Austria poisons what constitutes the very happiness of home life; it proposes to secure, by constantly attacking, domestic freedom. Poor laws, under their double aspect of provision for the permanently disabled, and employment for the able bodied, though not only a preventive but curative discipline, and so far preferable to either of the preceding, depend, for their good and evil in execution, not merely on the administration, but on the manner in which the population to which they are administered are prepared. In the case of England, where the preparation was bad, they were not only rendered evil, but the evil rendered so great, as to throw serious obstacles in the way of all better discipline. The fact is, we commit two radical mistakes; we allow nothing for the influence of mental habits on crime, or of education on mental habits. Crime is not abrupt impulse, nor inexplicable instinct. In some rare cases, it may be organisation; but in the vast majority of instances it is the exhibition, in act, of long indulged desires, settled by indulgence into passions. Where organisation is the cause of crime, punishment, of course, is cruel and absurd: to punish a lunatic, is a sort of lunacy itself; it is raging against an irresponsible agent. Many of the most marked atrocities of all times may rank in this category. Crime, in such cases, is disease; a Monomania which the hand of justice is called on, not to chastise, but to cure. The works of Pinel, Georget, De la Broussais, Spurzheim, on the Continent; at home, those of Conolly, Barrow, Combe; have placed this matter beyond doubt. But if the Penal law be ineffectual, not so is Education. If the monomaniac is not to be punished, it does not follow that the monomania may not, by timely and proper attention, be mitigated or prevented. Much of this seeming organisation is of *gradual growth*. It lies for a long time in germ. In the child it is a predisposition. A “*folie raisonnée*,” as Pinel calls it, if unchecked, will soon run into an “irresponsible mania.” No one, as Locke observes, is altogether exempt from such tendencies. The influence of circumstance and things, in calling them thus into action, is immense. Imitation alone, on some natures, is sufficient: on what other grounds can we account for the periodical visitations of the Suicidal Monomania, such as occurred at Lyons, Versailles in 1793, at Rouen in 1806, at Paris in 1816, &c. &c.? At its height it may appear uncontrollable, but in its commencement it may be managed as easily as most other diseases.

labourer be of no injury to the labourer himself, it can surely be of none to the other orders. It is on this, indeed, that

Cases far more decidedly organic have yielded to skill, time, and perseverance. Hysteria and Epilepsy have their beginnings; whether they cease or increase, depends upon treatment. Thus all, or nearly all, may be reduced to formation: crime is chiefly the result of previous training. What that training may be, is in our hands. Education can wield mental habits as it pleases. A greater proof cannot be given, than the very objection urged against it; than the present state of England itself. Crime, it is stated, has not materially decreased; juvenile crime is now more than ever notorious. The innumerable instances of thieving, shoplifting, profligacy, drunkenness, amongst children of from three to ten years old, given by Wilderspin and others, leave little doubt upon the subject. All this co-exists with Education, but an education which touches them not, an education which passes them by. Their education is of a different complexion. Bad instruction at home, bad examples of bad parents, or of bad managers for bad parents, wicked associates of all ages, and in all crimes, abroad, — these are their teachers. Where such is the preparation, all other education usually comes too late. It does not take up the child of nature, but the child of man — diseased in heart and head. The evils, which are sure to follow, are set down to Education, and not to that which prevents Education from working. The stream must be taken higher up. It is much easier to guard, than to rescue. It is some consolation to find that this *can be done*: that if these young spirits are so easy to be perverted, they are not less easy to be protected from perversion. Infant schools have produced, and are producing, not miracles, but the natural results of good means. In the establishments of Mr. Wilderspin there is an almost total exemption from the very vices which have just been described. Crimes against the person gradually diminish with the advance of civilisation: crimes against property are often found, comparatively, to increase. This is supposed inevitable. The supposition is hasty. There is no reason why one class of vices should not be repressed, as well as another. In Mr. Wilderspin's schools, dishonesty and falsehood are quite as rare as violence and inhumanity: the out-door education is fully overcome. Nor is its influence limited to the rising generation. The child reforms the parent. Instances the most striking of this salutary power may be found in the *Report of the Edinburgh Infant School Society*, 18th of May, 1832, and especially in the Appendix which accompanies it; in *Wilderspin's Infant System*, pp. 129—140. 241—247., &c. &c. Thus do these institutions almost realise the anticipation of Fichte (*Reden an die Deutsche Nation*, p. 469.), and well deserve the fervent eulogium of Schwartz. "Ja, es ist hier ein Tempel, wo man mit den Kindern Gottes Nähe fühlt. — Wo einmal eine solche Anstalt eingerichtet ist, so ist sie zugleich eine hohe Schule für die Erwachsenen, & für die ganze Stadt." *Die Schulen*, p. 3. (Leipsig, 1832.)

But early education will prove inadequate, without early occupation. The idleness which often succeeds application, on leaving school, is of all others the most dangerous. Evil society is always ready to seize upon the idler. The indulgence of a few weeks scatters the discipline of years. The state should not quit its guardianship at this most critical period. It should, on mere policy and

the anti-educationists build their chief objection. But they argue in a vicious circle. They first contend that because it

economy, continue its education. A part of this is useful employment. It should protect society against *idle children*, if it does not wish to have to contend against *reckless and desperate men*.

If Infant schools and constant occupation be good preventives of crime, Reform schools on a good system are not less excellent, both as preventives and correctives. The impression which the company of adult criminals produces, even upon adults, is most powerful; what must it then be upon an age in which the propensity to imitation is tenfold stronger? A better classification in prisons in some degree remedies this, but it can scarcely ever be so precise as to secure against *all* its evils. A boy may be a man in crime, though a child in years. Here age, and even delinquency, afford insufficient data for separation. We want something more. The principle upon which prisons are chiefly permissible, is their power of reclaiming. If they do not reform, they do little. For this, the *first* indications of vice should be attacked, and not allowed to consolidate, by repetition, into character. The true remedy, therefore, is not so much chastisement, as habits. But habits are the work of training. If, then, they have been neglected, they must be formed; if lost, they must be renewed. This is to be attained by the establishment of "Reform houses," forming the connecting link between Schools and Prisons.

The outcry against Education should, then, be directed against its defects. If it has not yet very sensibly diminished crime in this country, it is because it is not the kind of education which is calculated to diminish it. "After having made, by this legal enactment, education universal," says Dr. Julius, in a letter to the Author, "Prussia has found that *instruction alone would not do*, but was calculated to place sometimes even weapons in the hands of a blind man, if the means of cultivating the higher and more elevated faculties were not opened to the pupil. This has been happily performed by placing on a religious and moral foundation every thing that is taught in the school; by imparting to the young teachers, brought up in seminaries, an enthusiastic (not fanatic) feeling for their holy vocation, which makes them true missionaries of Faith and Virtue, &c. The facts which correspond to these positions are to be found in the *diminution of crimes committed by children* in Prussia; and in the foundation of numerous Houses of Reform for Juvenile delinquents in that country, in Würtemberg, and throughout the whole of Germany." These statements are further proved by official documents in the two works of Dr. Julius, his *Jahrbücher des Straf-und-Besserungs-Anstalten*, 10 vols. Berlin, 1829—1833, i. e. a "*Journal for Prisons, Popular Education, Pauperism, and Charitable Institutions*," and his "*Lessons on Prisons*," translated into French by Lagarmitte, 2 vols. Paris, 1831. How easily similar means may be adapted to our state of society, and with results equally beneficial, may be collected from the *American Reports*, *Barton's Prison Discipline*, pp. 126—152., and other more recent works. Were these partial experiments rendered general; were Infant schools, Labour Asylums, and Reform schools, made an *integral* part of whatever system of National Education might be adopted, we should soon hear little of the progress of national crime. How this may be effected, under proper management, and a better general administrative system of Police and Charity, as well as Education, will be shown in the sequel.

is injurious to the other orders, it must be injurious to the labourer; and then, because it is of injury to the labourer, it must be of injury to the other orders.

5. *It is of injury to the other orders.*—The whole frame of English society, it is argued, is screwed up to the last turn of the wheel. The least dislocation of the orders will produce inevitable ruin. A certain conscription of human sinew, a certain expenditure of human soul, is essential, not merely to our greatness, but to our very existence. It is perilous in the extreme to allow these beings, from whose waste we derive life, into the secret of their strength. Education does this, and disturbs the entire machinery. The ploughman climbs up into the place of the operative, the operative of the gentleman; wheel is locked in wheel—cog jars with cog—every motion produces new impediments—till at last we feel, in the very next round, there must be a general crash. Such is the effect of so suddenly introducing a new force, with whose power we are yet but partially acquainted. But the whole of this reasoning turns on the most unsatisfactory data. Education is not thus *abrupt* in its effects: an educated people does not start up in a night. The progress of Education is one continuous stream, at times rapid, at others slow, but never torrent-like. The generations are gradually linked, and though you perceive the changes by comparing the extremities, not so by comparing any one link with that immediately preceding, or succeeding, it. Like all other gradual changes, it adapts, or is adapted to, the circumstances around it. It wears itself a passage; it finds itself a bed: the thin threads of the mountain rivulet, “those saws of nature,” cut down into form the eternal granite Alps. Here is no dislocation. The argument, if good for any thing, is reducible to the anti-machinery, or anti-steam, objection. In its simplest expression, it is anti-Reform. No operation of Education has acted with greater energy and abruptness, than these mechanical contrivances. But has society suffered in consequence? Sufferers, of course, there have been, amongst those engaged in the old system, and unwilling or unable to advance to the new: but society has not suffered. To such transitions all communities not only are exposed, but, in one

way or the other, are never exempt from them. Sometimes it is a mechanical, sometimes a political, sometimes a religious phasis through which they pass. They moult their old plumes but to receive plumage brighter and stronger: they are sick during the season, but from the sickness they spring forth with renewed health. England can no more exempt herself from such alterations, than any individual Englishman. The nations who surround her, leave her, in these matters, no choice. To secure her against such contact, a deep sea of hatred and ignorance must flow between. There should be a prohibitory tariff of all communion; no press, no shipping, no bridge, mental or mechanical, by which one mass of men might parley with another. But even the obdurate ignorance of Spain could hardly achieve this. The whisper, if not the shout, of change would still be heard; the improvements of other nations would be smuggled: under all restrictions, a secret cipher correspondence with foreign mind would be kept up. Nor are these restrictions merely nugatory — they are perilous. What under a free intercourse would be merely agitation, under such restraints becomes conspiracy. The knowledge so had, like all stolen knowledge, is garbled: the truth is mixed up with error; there are no means or opportunities of correction. It is alloyed with presumption, jealousy, intolerance. If, sooner or later, it breaks forth, all these evils break forth with it. To prevent this, there is but one expedient. *Give* what otherwise will be *taken*. By giving, you acquire the means and right of purifying, regulating, and directing: you become the master of the new power, instead of the new power becoming yours.

The progress of popular Education is not abrupt, neither are the effects of its progress injurious to the other orders. Necessity, as we have seen, on one side, and the natural tendencies of knowledge itself on the other, guard against these consequences. A class of labourers, or operatives, like a single labourer and operative, as soon as they find out that all the world read and write, and that men must do something beside reading and writing to earn their livelihood, will feel little inclination to sacrifice their livelihood to reading and writing. A workman is not less inclined to manage a steam-

engine, nor a farmer to conduct the succession of his crops, because he knows something of the *principle* upon which he *practises*. On the contrary, the conversion of a mechanical into a rational agent greatly lightens even the mechanical labour. But the great fallacy of all this is, that there is no fair consideration of the *whole* question. The accounts are not balanced, there is no *per contra*, not a word of the *evils of ignorance*, as a set-off against the *evils of knowledge*. It is taken for granted, that an ignorant population must necessarily be a submissive one; that stupidity and moral order go hand in hand. The whole experience of history protests against this monstrous assertion; but were it as true as it is false, dearly indeed would such brute submission be purchased. What would become of all the arts of life? Who would most suffer by their diminution, or restriction? Is the Upper class less interested in their preservation and advancement than the Lower? Assuredly not; and yet we attempt to reconcile this undoubted fact with our hostility to *popular* instruction. Do we not know, that the wider and more numerous the chances of improvement, the greater likelihood of improvement itself; and that every restriction upon moral or mental culture is a direct restriction of these chances? * We cannot tell, “à

* It is almost superfluous, I should hope, to insist on the constantly increasing importance of the general cultivation of the sciences, even to the *lowest* classes in the community. Remote as the first closet suggestions of a discovery may appear from the purposes of our daily existence, the application is no sooner made, than an immediate impression is visible through the entire range of society. New exhibitions and applications of the powers and materials of nature to our physical as well as intellectual wants, new scope for the operation of capital, new means for the acquisition of wealth, new manufactures, in fine, in their thousand complicated forms and results, immediately open to our industry. Not to speak of the consequences of the new and extended employment of steam, which have already added so immensely, by the economy of time and labour, to the productive forces of the country (*Babbage, Economy of Manufactures*, s. 334.; *Dupin, Forces, Productives de la France*), we can scarcely yet calculate what may be the consequences to the community of many minor, but still important, discoveries. Faraday's correction of the Striae in optical glasses, Barlow's Correcting Plate, neutralising the errors of the magnet, materially add to the precision and safety of navigation, and to the accuracy of all kinds of nautical and astronomical observations. The substitution of iron for stone in building, and the application of its tenacity on a large scale, — an application now extending in bridges even to stone construction, — gradually tend to

priori," who are to be the luminaries or the blockheads, any more than we can tell who are to be the future benefactors or criminals, of the country. We are not justified in dooming, *beforehand*, any individual, much less any class, to inevitable ignorance. We know not where the future Watts, and Newtons, and Miltons of the country may lurk. We ought to give every opportunity for their manifestation. How is this practical without *universal Education*? *

produce the most striking changes in architecture. «Even in literature the reflection of its light is perceptible. We owe to the *scientific* processes, with which Dr. Young's mind was stored, the most remarkable literary discovery of modern time, the interpretation of the Hieroglyphic language of Egypt. Geology is yet in its infancy; but the very controversy going on at present, between the advocates of the Lyell and Conybeare theories, from the variety of facts which it is likely to elicit in its progress, may doubtless lead to the most practical benefits. I have said, the commonest walks of life are affected. How many lives might have been saved by the most trifling knowledge of Chemistry! How often do we hear of labourers and servants perishing by suffocation from charcoal, and the descending into confined wells and pits? How many, from mistaking for Epsom salts, oxalic acid, and not being acquainted with the antidote which chalk or whiting furnishes, by converting the poison into the oxalate of lime? How many might, with a competent knowledge of Geology, have avoided the enormous expenses incidental to a fruitless search after coal in strata where it could never have been found, such as the experiments in the Kimmeridge clay formation at Dorton Camp, at Sunning Well, Bagley Wood, &c.?—See *The Utility of the Knowledge of Nature considered, with reference to the General Education of Youth*. By E. W. Brayley, Professor at Bruce Castle School. The injury done to the Hartz forest, and to the elms in St. James's Park and Hyde Park, in 1824, might have been prevented by an earlier knowledge of the desolating powers of the "Bostrichus Typographus" and the "Hylesinus Destructor." Even at this moment, we have to lament the consequences of confounding, in the construction of our navy, the *Quercus sessiliflora*, liable to the dry rot, with the *Quercus Robur* of Linnæus, the true naval oak—"a distinction," observes a writer in the Quarterly Review, "not even suspected at our Dock-yards." Instances might be multiplied *ad infinitum*, equally illustrative. If the sciences be thus universally useful, why should a single individual in the country be defrauded of his right to share, to the fullest, in their advantages, or of his chances of adding, in any one way, to their treasures and applications?

* "Boyle entitled one of his Essays thus remarkably, 'Of Man's great Ignorance of the Uses of Natural Things;' or, that there is no one Thing in Nature, whereof the Uses to Human Life are yet thoroughly understood.' The whole history of the arts since Boyle's time has been one continued comment on this text. Nor are we to suppose that the field is in the *slightest degree* narrowed, or the chances in favour of such fortunate discoveries at all decreased, by those which

But if the dangers apprehended were at all probable, still should such dangers be fearlessly encountered. Is the state, so anxiously sought to be preserved, a happy or a wholesome one? Is it not a state of constant social malady? If our public policy be only to prolong this tottering existence, miserable indeed is all its boasted art. It cures us of some evils, to give us others; it suspends anarchy, but fears to make us free; it multiplies means, but spends men, things, and time, at downright loss. Such a policy does not so much defer dissolution, as make

have already taken place; on the contrary, they have been incalculably extended. Science, therefore, in relation to our faculties, still remains *boundless and unexplored*," &c.—*Sir John Herschel, Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*, p. 359. "It is no detraction from human capacity to suppose it incapable of infinite exertion, or of exhausting an infinite subject."—*Jackson, Four Ages*, p. 90. While Sir Humphry Davy, in his *Last Days of a Philosopher*, exults over the practical results of the progress of physics, chemistry, and mechanics, which he may well describe "of the most marvellous kind," and to which he himself was so illustrious a contributor, Mr. Babbage, with still greater eloquence, in the admirable chapter which closes his *Essay on Manufactures*, p. 307., after observing the very small number of objects in the vegetable, animal, and even mineral world, which have hitherto been cultivated and rendered useful to man, continues,— "All these, in their innumerable combinations, which ages of labour and research can *never exhaust*, may be destined to furnish, in perpetual succession, new sources of our wealth and of our happiness. The farther we advance from the origin of our knowledge, the larger it becomes, and the greater power it bestows to add new fields to its dominions" (p.315.). But these, perhaps, are triumphs within the reach only of the Upper class. Mr. Babbage is of a different opinion. "It is highly probable that, in the next generation, the race of scientific men in England will spring from a class of persons altogether different from that which has hitherto scantily supplied them. Requiring, for the success of their pursuits, previous education, leisure, and fortune, few are so likely to unite these essentials as the sons of our wealthy manufacturers, who, having been enriched by their own exertions, in a field connected with science, will be ambitious of having their children distinguished in its ranks" (p. 313.). Does he apprehend from this, any disturbance of the orders, any injury to the community? Far from it—"the country would thus gain for science, talents which are frequently rendered useless by the unsuitable situations in which they are placed." Without noticing, in confirmation, the number of distinguished co-operators from these ranks amongst ourselves, it may be observed, that the discoverers of *iodine* and *bromine* were both manufacturers, one being a maker of saltpetre at Paris, the other a manufacturing chemist at Marseilles; and the inventor of balloons, filled with rarefied air, was a paper manufacturer at Lyons, &c. &c. Will Education diminish or increase the number of such discoverers? Are such discoveries of no utility?

us feel it beforehand : our ministers, instead of governors, become "gardes-malades;" our whole effort is, not that we may live, but that we may not die. But of what use is it, to make corpses walk? what we want is living, active man. If the frame of our society be thus rickety, the sooner we are compelled to break it up, the better. If our Lower orders, the moment they read and write, are to dash all our institutions to pieces, all that still remains in our power is, to see that they begin their mob-work in a manner to themselves, and to their country, the least injurious. Under such circumstances, it is idle to dispute of more or less ; unless we extinguish Education altogether, we do nothing. But this is not in our *power* : in a despotism it would be difficult ; we live in a free state. If our society be thus crazy, the fear of touching it will not prevent it from falling to pieces. If Education be an overwhelming torrent, it is not by attempting to dam it up in certain state or church channels, that we can hope to shut it out.

But is this the real state of the country? Are we, indeed, on the eve of dissolution? Have we come to this, that we, who boast of our institutions, as the perfection of human virtue and enlightenment, shudder at the very causes to which they owe their birth? Have we only now, *for the first time*, discovered that we have eyes, and must not see ; ears, and must not hear ; tongues, and must not speak ; understandings, and must not understand? Are all our future efforts to be "to stand still?" Have we, by the very exercise of those faculties which God gave us to be exercised, and which, in proportion only as they are exercised, fulfil his will, but more nearly approached to our destruction, more certainly insured our ruin? What an incomprehensible web is all this ! What a strange commentary on the benevolent ways of Providence to man ! No : there may be spots, and there may be obstacles ; but far be it from us to mistake the spot for the body, or to doubt that what has brought us thus far, will not bring us farther still. If our country be in a perverted condition, common sense will tell us to take every measure to rescue it from that condition ; but it will not tell us to restrain knowledge, lest that condition and knowledge should clash. By such a fallacy any abuse may be maintained. It says, in other words,

“no investigation of your affairs, lest you should discover you are a bankrupt; no consultation of a physician, lest he should declare you in a consumption; no examination of your house, lest the dry rot may appear to have got into the beams. Perish indolently, rather than encounter manfully: the exertion of getting well is more painful than illness itself.”* If the evil, indeed, could be retarded by ignorance of its existence, such course might be right; but no state was ever yet saved by its citizens shutting their eyes to its coming fate: of all guardians, the most ignoble and precarious is Ignorance.

Our country is not in this condition: if it were, not only no restrictions on Education could rescue it, but its rescue or restoration could only be hoped from the diffusion of Education. If a tendency to disturbance of the orders exists, it arises, not from the new force, but from its misapplication. If Education does harm, it is because it is not distributed in the proportion, and to the bodies, required. Enlighten all, and you protect all: you restore, instead of destroying, your equilibrium; you establish peace on lasting foundations; they who would purchase national content with national ignorance, calculate on shadows. It is a condition which any day may change, and which, ultimately, must change, do what they will. By Education, you raise up, in all orders in the country, mutual guardians and responsible inspectors for the interests of each; you give the true elements of sound public thinking, and purify, to the utmost, that strongest of all sanctions, our own conscience, speaking in the voice of our neighbour; you secure in the national mind an intelligent tribunal, to which, under every difficulty, a *just* and *wise* government may fearlessly appeal; you provide, against the impetuosity and blindness of national passions, habits of thought and foresight,—against the frenzy of the present, the experience of the past. Each order gradually reforms the other; and bears down, by

* The eternal plea with all ministers of all parties, whenever they wish to prorogue improvement, and to keep place. To believe them, the state is always in a sort of “petite santé.” The movement must be conducted in a sedan chair. A life in no danger of being lost, would be of no value. The legislature joins in these apprehensions. It is this which gives our whole government and legislation so valetudinarian and uncertain a cast.

the attrition of their different opinions, the asperities of sect and party. Every one gradually falls into his position, and the position which every one occupies is that which he ought.* Present inconveniences may appear to render somewhat questionable these consequences. In the first giddiness of acquisition, in the "bland fumes" which ascend from the wine of knowledge, there may possibly be mixed much error and some folly. But we must not quarrel with this passing evil. We must pour in *more* education, not regret that we have poured in *so much*. If, in such circumstances, there springs up a more than ordinary growth of heated politicians, a larger tribe of credulous followers,* and naturally, between both, a greater degree of insane and often dangerous turbulence, it is simply because we have not yet poured in *enough*. It is not that the leader knows *more* than he ought to know, but that the people does not know as *much*. To meet this, we have no better remedy than to raise up, as expeditiously as we can, judges in the people by education, who will take care that neither leader nor ruler break their bounds, or abuse, selfishly, their people-given power.†

* This progression and adaptation is the great secret of all education, and, indeed, of all government. "Elle est l'art plus ou moins perfectionnée," says Talleyrand, in his celebrated *Rapport* (1791), "de mettre les hommes en toute valeur tant pour eux que pour leurs semblables, de leur apprendre à jouir pleinement de leur droits, à se respecter, et remplir facilement tous leurs devoirs; en un mot, à vivre heureux et à vivre utiles." This "value," however, and the performance of these "duties," are attainable only step by step, and day after day. What the Greek Gnostic writes, in the language of the Eleusinian mysteries, to his son, is as applicable to classes, as to individuals: — "Δεῖ γὰρ τοῖς πρώτοις ἀποδύνασθαι τὴν ἀγροικίαν, καὶ τὰ μικρὰ ἐποπτεῖσθαι πρὸς τῶν μιζόντων, καὶ χορεύσθαι πρὶν δαδουχῆσθαι, καὶ δαδουχῆσθαι πρὶν ἰεροφαντῆσθαι."

† Milton had a bolder reliance on the final victory of reason over error, than our anti-educationists: — "And now the time is speciall is, by privilege to write and speak what may help to the further discussing of matters in agitation. The temple of Janus, with his two *controversal* faces, might now not insignificantly be set open. And though all the windes of Doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so *Truth* be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple: who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the best and surest suppressing. Yet when the new light which we beg for shines in upon us, there be who envy and oppose it, if it come not first in at their *own* case-ments. What a collusion is this! whereas we are exhorted by the wise man to use diligence, to *seek for wisdom, as for hidden treasures*, early and late, that another order shall enjoyn us to know nothing but by statute."—*Areopagitica*.

It is in this point of view,—its influence on public Order,—that popular education, in reference to the Upper classes, has chiefly been considered. But there is another point of view, not less important to rich and poor, to high and low,—the influence it exercises on public Liberty. Popular ignorance, in the minds of many, is as intimately associated with attachment to free institutions, as with regard for public tranquillity: a most false and dangerous doctrine, exposing to despotism, or anarchy, the entire frame of society. The Upper classes may think it sufficient, for their protection, that they alone should be enlightened; but the most enlightened Aristocracy, without a proportionate degree of intelligence and morality among the People, may be masters of the People, but cannot themselves be free. How can they count one hour upon a mass, which, at any time, may belong to any master? An ignorant people are sure to be tools, at one time of the crown, at another of their leaders; an army to enforce tyranny, or a rabble to let loose licentiousness and terrorism on all who stand in their way. Instruct the Aristocracy as you may, when the people is ignorant, on whom, or on what, is their knowledge or wisdom to work? An ignorant people cannot *obtain* or *defend*, for they cannot justly *value*, free institutions. They know not what they are, whither they lead, why they benefit, or if they benefit at all. The most beneficent of legislators, on such materials, labours in vain. Hence the immense difference between a charter “octroyé” by an absolute sovereign, and a Bill of Rights demanded by a people. Freedom is not a placard, stuck up at the corner of a street, nor a resolution dictated at a public meeting, nor a petition signed by wholesale, nor a speech. nor a dinner, nor a vote of thanks. It is a *living* spirit, felt *within* and *around* us; a thing, not of words, but deeds; the guarantee of all our social rights; the first of those rights itself. Freedom is not devotion to a name, nor silly passion for a phantom. All this may be tyranny, and the worst of tyrannies.

“ In mad game
They burst their manacles, and wear the name
Of Freedom, graven on a heavier chain.”

Freedom is not partisan justice, nor sectarian charity, nor compromising truth. "Comprenez bien comment on se rend libre," says a late writer. "Pour être libre, il faut avant tout aimer Dieu, car si vous aimez Dieu, vous ferez sa volonté; et la volonté de Dieu, est la *justice*, et la *charité*, sans lesquelles point de *liberté*." But what does an ignorant people know of all this? The words are on their lips, it is true; but they are words without meaning, or with meaning the reverse of the true. "To the lantern with the aristocrat!" exclaimed, with equal zeal, the two workmen who were overheard, in the beginning of the Revolution, disputing on the royal Veto. They tear in pieces De Witt, and adore Marat; their ruling passion is the "*besoin de ramper*." From such to hope the ward and watch of a nation's liberties is a folly, and, if liberty be holy, an impiety.

Not so with an educated, a *truly* educated people. "They *know* their rights, and, *knowing*, dare maintain them." Even for their mere material interests, much more for their spiritual, they *understand* and *feel* that liberty is indispensable. The highest is powerless, the humblest insecure, without it. Inviolability of person and property, impartial distribution of justice, equality before the law, freedom of conscience, and freedom of speech, are, in their estimate, *necessaries*. No blessings of despotism can compensate for their want or loss. The gifts of arbitrary power are false and "weird;" "its bread tastes of salt." Industry cannot prosper under the patronage of an oppressor: where tyrants reap, few indeed, and slovenly, will be the sowers. Where the king's finger can lift the latch of the poorest, in that country there can be no home. Where the sword prescribes the creed, before those altars there may be a ritual, but there can be no religion. Boldly; then, and firmly, will such a people stand up against the slightest encroachment of despotic power; sternly, and unto the death, will they contend to secure these franchises. An educated people is moral and religious; just, therefore, and generous. They know that, as without religion there is no liberty, so, also, without liberty there is no law of justice or of charity; no union beyond that of the horse with his rider; no morality, no religion, no law of God, amongst

men. *True* religion cannot be propagated by intolerance, nor *true* liberty by tyranny. Wherever they see either, wherever they meet men slandering, persecuting, proscribing, in these holy names, they know the cause is not from God, but from man; they turn from the false prophet and the calf worship with loathing and disdain. Not *for* others, or *by* others, but *for* themselves, and *by* themselves, through the grace of God and their own stout arms, clear heads, and lion hearts, are they free. They work for their own harvests, and are industrious; they fight for a commonwealth, and are brave: the peer's freedom is the peasant's, and the peasant's the security of the peer's; each therefore is the willing and trusty guardian of all. To such a people, religion, liberty, all that is worthy of the keeping of men, may be boldly confided. In what better hands can it be placed? With such watchers before our doors, we may sleep in peace. Not a cottage in the land but is a pledge for our rights; for not one which does not contain men who are not only free like ourselves, but, like ourselves also, *know thoroughly what it is to be free.*

If, then, next to religion, liberty be the great guarantee of human happiness, — if it can neither be established nor preserved but by knowledge and virtue, and that knowledge and virtue are the appanage only of an educated people, — who is there of the Upper class, or indeed of any class, so dead to his own special interests, not to speak of those of the community, as to stand a moment longer in the way of Popular Education?

II. *Difference of the three countries.* — Such is the question of Popular Education, abstractedly, without reference to its applications. But this is only half of the argument. How is it to be applied? The countries differ — differ in character — differ in civilisation. What may be good in one, may be questionable in the second, bad in the third. The gift may be good, but are they all equally fitted for its reception? It is not pretended there is any inherent incapacity in any of the three; but the capacity of one may be more developed by time, by situation, than that of another, and, therefore, more susceptible of immediate culture. This is, again, a matter of

circumstances. What are these circumstances? In what do they consist?

.III. *Circumstances of the country.* — They are modified in England by Reform, Unionism, &c. &c.; in Ireland, in addition to these, by the Poor Law, the Church and Tithe Questions, 'Prædial Agitation, &c. Is there any peculiarity in any of these which ought to be considered a sufficient objection or obstacle to the universal diffusion of Education?

1. The spirit of Reform is abroad, — there is not only no aversion to change; but, as some will have it, an overweening belief that change is every where necessary, and, wherever effected, will prove all-sufficient. It has come; but could it have been prevented? Human nature and human history protest against the presumption. Reform was not an isolated event. It cannot be detached from the great drama. If the parent of the future, it is not less the child of the past. The seeds of Reform were cast in the mighty struggle between the men of the north and the men of the south, between old and new, between strong habits and strong will, between the established and the protesting faiths, at the period of the Reformation. That was the first great change. The Reformation generated the semi-religious, semi-popular, Revolution of 1641.* The masses had, for the first time, begun to work during the contentions of the Reformation. They exhibited their full force during the Revolution. It was the first time in England that the people were really called in to take their part. Before that period, revolutions were limited to changes, not of tyrannies, but of tyrants. Whoever was master, the people was slave, "per servir sempre o vincitrice, o vinta." To the struggle of the Revolution succeeded an interval of almost slavish repose. Many, however, there still were, who rigidly wrought their opinions into their conduct, and acted up to the extreme spirit of the change.* Some

* "Il ira loin; il croît," was said of Mirabeau; and events justified it. It was the same deep conviction, which gave America freedom. With all their fanatical adherence to the very letter of the Levitical law, of which so many strange instances are preserved by *Hutchinson* (*History of Massachusetts*), there was, amongst the colonists of New England, a bold and lofty spirit, which spurned power, trod on pelf, and looked up to trial and suffering, to bonds and stripes, for country and conscience sake, with exultation. Of such stuff is the true patriot.

perished at home; others were driven into exile in America. They were the remote fathers of American independence. They laid up the sparks in the heart of a simple people—time and circumstance roused them into a flame. It was another Reformation, another Revolution, another Reform; another war between the old and new: not the mother-church, but the mother-state, first denouncing, then compelling, and finally losing, her colony. Nations do not read history, but they see history. It is difficult for a revolution, even on a minute scale, or in a remote part of the world, to take place, without rousing the sister nations to gaze upon it. It is difficult to see abuses attacked, wrongs avenged, rights established abroad, and not to think on their own abuses and their own wrongs, not to yearn for their own rights, not to look into their own strength, and not to venture on their own revolution. France (the France of 1789) was taught her revolution by the American revolt of 1787. She followed up the lesson in too headlong a way. The old and new, in her instance, were too vehemently and directly opposed. The collision was proportionally greater, the struggle more sanguinary, the victory dearer, and more dubious. These, however, were modifications of the principle, not the principle itself. England felt the change in France, as France felt the change in America; but two circumstances rendered it, in her instance, gradual and safe. England had already passed her proving days. Her new struggle was comparatively against few abuses. France had to contend against the oppressions and corruptions of centuries. She had to fight all her battles at once. There was another cause. War, and its stern interests,—a war beginning for glory, but soon becoming a war for existence,—drew off the attention of England from her domestic necessities. Her reform was adjourned. She found it necessary first to conquer a country, before she could sit down to improve one. But all this time Reform was silently and secretly going on. Year after year it was fought in the partial campaigns of the Catholic Question: it was the same principle, though the parties had somewhat changed. Year after year it was resisted; but by nothing more than resistance is just reform rendered rapid and sure. Accordingly, the passing of that

question was not more wonderful than that the year 1829 should have followed the year 1828. It was the last link of a chain of causes and effects which not only no minister, but no party, had power to break. It was not the iron will of Lord Wellington, nor the wise pliancy of Sir Robert Peel, which passed it: it was passed by each single event, however small, which went before. All that present men could do, was, with dignity, to make way. Emancipation, from effect, became cause, and passed, in its turn, Reform. Out of its loins it sprung. Reformers were ashamed of being less successful than Catholics. England was animated to a rivalry with Ireland: we showed them how the victory might be won. "The lesson was not given in vain. Those who then, for the first time, awoke, and, from the French revolution downward, had been sleeping in that "pleasing land of drowsyhead," place and pension, wondered at all these things, and laid the blame of the great event on the blunder of their chief. But they might as well mistake the blast of the trumpeter for the cause of the battle. He did not cause Reform: he merely decided the precise hour of its passing. As a mere question of place or power, this might have been important to the placeholders and placehunters. But as to the event itself, it was beyond his control; the utmost resistance opposed to it could produce only a few breakers, but not prevent the waters from passing on. To achieve this, it would have been necessary to have climbed upward to its "dark sources." Toryism should have stifled it in its fountain bed of the sixteenth century; Churchism should have drained it off in the Protestant Reformation.

Not only, then, was Reform an event which carried the nation before it, instead of being got up by the minister, but it was an event growing indirectly out of the very causes to which we owe the whole framework of the national religion and policy. To appeal against it, is virtually to appeal against them. It is in some measure to belie the great watchword, "Freedom of thought and speech." It is to traduce our ancestors, and to convert what has hitherto been regarded as a righteous revolution, into an inexcusable rebellion. If the principle justified the past, how is it that it should not justify the present? Every great change makes way for others still

greater behind it. The oldest establishment was once new : it was by innovation that legitimacy began ; by protesting, that what is now authority, first obtained power. It is idle, then, and inconsistent, to look with reproach on the past. Our reproaches cannot undo what has been done, but they may render what still may and ought to be done full of difficulty and danger. The duty of true citizenship is now to guide, and not to neutralise, Reform ; it is to recognise the power, and to turn its action upon objects, and in directions, where it may work with safety and utility. Is this more practicable *with*, or *without*, Education ?

The great object of Reform was to place the government more in harmony with the governed ; to allow the action of the public Will fuller and freer range, upon every department of the public interests. The present is eminently the age of *public opinion*, — argument, discussion, inquiry, are spread over a larger surface of men than at any former period. To shut this out, or to let it work in a lateral or opposing direction, was justly considered as fraught with danger. It was, therefore, allowed its legitimate influence ; it was taken into *partnership*. But it is also the age of *public impulse*, which is very easily distinguishable from public opinion. Impulse is the blind result of the irreflective and sensitive faculties ; the mere animalism of society : opinion presupposes a series of inquiries and judgments, time and thought. Impulse leads into every folly ; opinion checks impulse, and directs it. But this, again, depends upon the nature of opinion : it may be sound, or unsound ; a heap of false judgments, or a well-ordered collection of true ones. Which of the two it shall be, depends upon previous training. The direction of impulse, and the formation of opinion, become thus most important objects of Public Education.

Many of our public movements are the consequences of mere impulse : impatience, giddiness, versatility, intolerance, are its natural fruits. These are usually laid to the charge of public opinion ; but it is precisely because there is little public opinion, and a superabundance of public impulse, that such excesses take place.

To give, then, a proper direction to Reform, it is essential

to improve, to the utmost, both Opinion and Impulse. The training which effects this in the best manner, is the best. Bad education, incomplete education, will not effect it. It will necessarily lead to the establishment of erroneous views, unjust feelings, and obstinate prejudices. Partial education will not effect it: it consigns over the ignorant many to the instructed few. In either case, an *unsound* public opinion must necessarily prevail: under the management of such an opinion, what must we expect from public impulse?

But the people will increase, it is urged, in their demands in proportion as their eyes open: they will ask for more, as they get more. This is not just: the People are never more extravagant in their demands, than when they know not *what* to ask. An educated people are, doubtless, fond of *Liberty*; but they know quite well *how much* they should have, they know *how* it is to be had, they know how it is to be *kept* when it is had: they are not less fond of *Order*. There is no more efficient check on exorbitant demand, than a *true* measure of the interests and rights of *others*, as well as of our *own*. It is this mutual respect, combining with the sense of their own rights, which, like the combination of the centripetal with the centrifugal force in the physical world, keeps every community, and every class in each community, in its proper orbit. Ignorance leads on to rash aggression and inordinate pretension: it cries for the sake of the excitement, and not for the sake of the cause.* No man is more violently bigoted, and absurdly insolent, than he who never stirs out of his own provincial town. To moderate opinions, you must extend observation; you must multiply opportunities and means of comparison, to justify selection; you must teach content by reflection, and reflection by experience. Sound sense and popular tranquillity thus become synonymous: both are the offspring of Popular Education. It directs sagely, but vigorously, the attack against abuses: by combining perseverance with dis-

* "Jean. — et puis c'est si amusant de courir les rues, et de crier avec les autres.

"Maître. De crier . . . quoi?

"Jean. Est-ce que je sais? on crie toujours —"

Bertrand et Raton.

cretion, it makes useful reforms practicable ; by reforms in time, it intercepts revolution, and thus gives the best of all pledges for constantly progressive improvement. The advocates of Reform are taunted with "impatience." It is merely anxiety. They have, with much exertion, obtained the mastery of an important instrument for the correction of ancient abuses. Is it singular they should wish to use it? Do the abuses continue to exist? That is the main question. The enlightened reformer is earnest for improvement, but not for crude or for half improvement ; he is for amelioration, not for change. He well knows that a grown man cannot be created in a night ; the French revolution has shown him the fragility and futility of ready made, or impromptu, constitutions. But he does not therefore think there is any value in slowness for slowness' sake. He complains that there is no general and harmonising plan before the country, but that all is "*alla giornata*," got up for special purposes, through momentary impulse, and with little or no connection with what is gone before, and what is coming behind. He complains that there are laws, but little scientific legislation ; much digging of holes, to fill them up again. With this expenditure of years and labour, with this adjournment of regeneration, through indolence and ignorance, rather than fear, no doubt he is disappointed, but not impatient. He can allow much for the present moment, much for the inadequacy of the instrument, much for the resistance and friction of parties, much for the intrinsic difficulty of reform itself. This reflection is the true drag-chain upon the "*mouvement*." It is to be found in the grave and steady habits of a thinking and educated people, and not in the passionate interference of any faction, nor even in the decisions of the legislature itself.

But this education, fully to work its effect, must be *universal*. Ignorance, no more than immorality, can be allowed to remain in patches, up and down the population. Every such anomaly indubitably affects every thing around it. It is not only that Education cannot fully act upon this ignorance, but this ignorance, in turn, very perniciously acts upon Education. It is constantly making inroads upon its outskirts, constantly neutralising its best influences. The collisions to

which the state is subject arise out of this very hostility. If smoothness is to be given to the march of alteration, it is only by harmonising the elements and forces from which it is to proceed. If one portion of the state drags one way, and the other the contrary, both will be left at the mercy of every party and contingency. *Absolute* ignorance and *absolute* slavery are more easy to govern, than *half* knowledge and *half* freedom. The portion already acquired creates an irresistible necessity for *all*. *No one spot* should, if possible, be left in the public mind, where the charlatan, political, medical, legal, or clerical, may fatten unmolested, — *no ignorance* where the professional or popular swindler may invest his hopes, and calculate his fortune, at the expense of his country. It is thus, only, that any free government can hope for quiet, or stability. As water will rise as high as, and no higher than, its fountain head, so a free government rises or sinks precisely according to the standard of *general intelligence* and *virtue*. Neither are to be found, when “the whole head becomes sick, and the whole heart faint;”— Bills of Rights and Acts of Reform in such cases, are mere pieces of parchment. The *people are not free*, nor *can* they be made free: but it does not therefore follow, that they may not become, and continue, turbulent.

If Reform, then, is to be conducted to wholesome results, it is only through a bold, steady, and really public opinion; it is only by a spirit of inquiry, reflection, and decision; it is only by the subjugation of impulse and passion, and the substitution, instead, of a prompt, firm, and enlightened public Will. * This is not possible without Education. Nor is this all that is required. Unless these qualities act in masses, they will be comparatively inoperative, they will be absorbed. To be of efficacy, they must be sufficiently extended. This is not possible, unless Education be universal.

2. Another feature of the times, it is alleged, is hostility to the Established Church. By many this hostility is attributed

* No Will, individual or national, which is not enlightened, *can* be firm. It may be headstrong and obstinate, rash and fierce, and its flatterers may call this firmness. But firmness perseveres, *because it knows*: it is dauntless because it *sees*, not because it is *blind*. Nothing is more nearly allied to weakness, than the vehement decisions of an ignorant man.

to Education. It is argued, that when there was *no education* there was *no hostility*; ergo, &c. &c. But is this a calumny on the Church, or on Education?

What religion is that which fears knowledge? It affects to be built on truth, and it shrinks from inquiry. Such an institution bears in itself the consciousness of a fraud. A fraud cannot be divine — such religion is not Christianity. To this dilemma are these Christian champions reduced, who would build up their authority on popular ignorance!

But, of all religions, Protestantism has least reason to complain: her very name testifies against her. Her creed is *opposition*, not *authority*. Her strength, if you believe herself, arose from the sudden enlightenment of Europe; her salvation, if you now believe her, depends on stopping short in the midst of it. The Church, in passing from resistance to enjoyment, has forgotten the pledges and professions of her youth. She places herself in a false position, every way, by such conduct. She protestantises to the Catholic, and catholicises to the Dissenter. If she be still Protestant, — if she be still for free judgment, — let her instruct, in every way, the people, in order to enable and to qualify them to exercise it. If she be for authority, let her not scoff at the Catholic for maintaining the very same doctrine, with this difference, that the Catholic is at least consistent. He retains the dogma of his forefathers; whilst the Protestant denies the very principle by which his faith was established, by which it claims the title of a reform, and not of a revolt.

But the real fact is, that the hostility is not directed against *Protestantism*, but against *Churchism*; not against the spiritual dogma, but the temporal power. Such a temper as hers is favourable to the diffusion of knowledge: and; under other circumstances, perhaps, the Church of England, so far from apprehending its advances, would have been the first to have stood forth for its universal propagation. But the faith and the establishment are not to be confounded; the Church *professing* may be favourable, but the Church *enjoying* is not: or, to speak more truly, it is not the Church, but the Aristocracy *through* the Church, who affect to see, in the protesting of the Dissenters against abuses, the extinction of all Protestantism;

and in popular instruction, the overturning of all moral order, the only true assurance for permanent civilisation.

Hence, while comparatively little solicitude is shown for this or that article of belief*, a most tremulous anxiety is evinced for every shilling with which, more or less, the external profession is connected. A more signal instance of a complete wheel round, from the Reformation to the Church which it professed to reform, cannot be conceived. Inviolability of Church property in the mouth of a Catholic is at least intelligible; in that of a Protestant, it is a self-condemnation. If Church property be inviolable, what must we think of the Reformation? if Church property be not inviolable, what must we think of the Establishment? When did this inviolability *begin*? when is it right it should *cease*? If by inviolable is meant what under *no* circumstances should be touched, we come at once to the position, that, on one side, the present Church of England is a sacrilegious usurper; and, on the other, that if, by any new change, the country should secede from the Church, and leave, as was the case in more than one instance, the court of one religion, and the nation of another, it would still be right, it would still be an imperative duty, an act of justice and piety, to leave the court in the enjoyment of the old establishment, and to throw the burdens of the new religion, the church of its choice, upon the nation. This is a strong case; but, to judge by late events, not altogether an impossible one. The sects which now press round the Established Church are what the Established Church *once was*: they fight her with her *own* tactics; they are not yet enervated by the Capuan indulgencies of wealth and power; they are seasoned soldiers, in array against one, who has long ceased to be a soldier at all. The Church may yet awake, and find herself, as in Scotland and Ireland, a staff without army, a shepherd without a flock. Were such a catastrophe to ensue, surely the boldest of her champions would not continue to maintain these preposterous

* See the late discussions in both Houses on the admission of Dissenters to the Universities. The subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles seems to have been retained, not so much because the Established Church believes in them, as because the Dissenters do not.

pretensions. If not, exceptions are already established: the only further question to determine is, at what *specific* point such exceptions commence. At what proportion of professors to population, of duty to salary, does curtailment become legitimate, and this "inviolable" property become violable? What was sacrilege yesterday, at what hour to-day does it become religion?

But the really material question is, not so much the motive or justice of the quarrel, as how the quarrel, having already occurred, may be best and most speedily adjusted. Once commenced, it will not of *itself* subside. Such is not the course with the public questions of the nineteenth century. Is ignorance, in such an emergency, a natural or safe ally? Will it *subdue*, what it could not *prevent*? Because it was the blind defender of Church rights and Church revenues yesterday, is that any reason why it should not attack both Church rights and Church revenues as blindly to-morrow? The Independents and Anabaptists of the Reformation were not, as masses, better instructed than the popular masses of the present day. Their ignorance was no protection, even to their fellow Protestants. The same reasoning holds good at present. It is not the most educated amongst the Dissenters who are the most violent. The Unitarians are as fond of tranquillity as the Church herself. The quieting effect of instruction is scarcely less than that of wealth. Ignorance, on the contrary, like poverty, is never certain in its effects. To-day, it produces the most abject submission; to-morrow, a rebellion, and perhaps a revolution.

The "protecting power" of ignorance, has, however, in most cases, been given up. The more clear-sighted amongst churchmen begin to perceive, that danger or abuse is not removed, by removing the means of appreciating either. They see that the Education revolution has in great part already taken place; and, more wise than the Bourbons, instead of refusing to recognise it as "non advenue," are attempting to discipline it to their own purposes. They would now gladly, under the name of "*national*," enlist the new force in their *own particular* interests. The corporation interest pierces through all. But Corporations are only depositories of the national in-

terests, and, consequently, creatures and instruments of the national will. The moment they depart from this will, and substitute their own,—the moment they set up their own particular interests against the interests of the commonwealth,—that moment they pronounce their doom; the nation has no choice but to break them up, if they will not change with the nation. In such cases the wiser course is the latter. The Church would cede bit by bit; but this reluctant liberality is attended with all its usual disadvantages. It does not less deprive men of power; and it does this,—which is folly as well as loss,—it converts every concession so made into a stimulant to ask for more. Emancipation in 1825 would have been received in a different spirit, and would have worked different results, from Emancipation in 1829. Tithe extinction in 1830 would have been a boon; in 1835 it will be a conquest. By such resistance the People in turn are taught resistance: that nothing is to be had but by *force*; that *fear*, and not *justice*, is the sure instrument; that government must first be trampled on before it can be persuaded: these are the fatal lessons inculcated by this forcible-feeble policy. The “majesty of the law,” indeed! there is no majesty in menaces which cannot be executed—no law either just or desirable which does not take its spring in the feelings and interests of the community. The more or less of emolument or privilege ceded or conquered, is a trifle compared to such consequences. Here is a radical unsettling of the *whole* public mind, a contempt for *all* constituted authority, a training to *constant* agitation, not for the *object* itself to be obtained, but for the *habit*, and the excitement which the habit gives. This is what is truly to be apprehended; this is the “popular education,” which is most to be eschewed.

The Church and the People have a long balance to settle. Her talent has not been doubled; her stewardship has not been faithful.* Happy had it been for her, that “her mitred front” had been less seen in courts, and her ways been more by the bedside of the dying, in the dungeon of the captive. She has ceased to be the *People’s* church, in becoming too

* Witness her conduct in the payment and management of Queen Anne’s Bounty, the First Fruits, and Irish Parochial Diocesan Education, &c. &c.

much the church of the *Aristocracy*.* The People could not starve, and they have chosen pastors elsewhere; they were not fed, and they will not pay. A deep retributive feeling has been long lurking at the bottom of the national heart. It has now found its way. It is not in the voice of John Knox, or John Calvin, that it speaks,—a milder spirit is more consonant to the present age, but its power is not less prevailing: neither ecclesiastical manifestoes, nor changing ministers, nor partisan magistrates, though they may delay, can stay it. To deny that the growth of knowledge and intelligence, that inquiry and discussion, have given it greater extension and force, would be to deny the intrinsic powers of mind and truth; but to suppose that to check one will check the other, is to betray a total ignorance both of cause and effect. Church Reform has begun: it began the very day that Parliamentary Reform was passed. It arose out of acknowledged abuses, deep-felt grievances, and the increased power of public opinion, and the determined will of the

* Not to her dogma, not to the venerable associations connected with it, not to the influences of her ritual, not to the intrepidity and eloquence of her professors' teaching, preaching, and civilising in the most remote quarters of the earth, is the power or duration of the Catholic church, amidst all changes of human policy, to be solely ascribed. She has another charm; deep sympathy with our suffering human nature, no matter under what condition or climate it may lie. Whatever has been her wealth, she has never disdained to walk with the *poor*; whatever has been her power, she has stooped to the *suffering* and the *abject*. If one hand smote the crown of princes, the other smoothed the sick beds, and poured comfort on the hearts, of the people. More noble instances of self-sacrifice, in its loftiest sense, are scarcely to be found in the history of our species, than what we meet with in the annals of the Catholic church. Nor is this the spirit of a time, or of a country. It is as conspicuous to-day in the Sister of Charity, as in the St. Charles Borromeo of the seventeenth century; equally strong in the luxurious capitals of Europe and in the wilds of America: not a fire kindling and dying with the breath of a single preacher, but an integral and enduring spirit, the religion itself. In the late cholera pestilence, so far from avoiding the visitation of God, the Catholic Sisters of Charity petitioned to be sent where most it raged. Thither they were sent. Was this new? It was the heroism of every day. The Catholic clergy of Ireland, in epidemic after epidemic, have hung over the sick bed when every human attachment shrunk from the scene; they have buried the dead when no earthly relative dared to stand by. Of such things no human being can read without a feeling of exultation. They do honour to human nature. Protestant or Catholic, we cannot forget that we are men. Need I ask, what is the religion most likely to cling round the popular sympathies? Which is the religion of the *rich*, which of the *poor*?

people to give that power effect. To avert its march, popular ignorance, restrictions on knowledge, are insufficient. The Church, if she be corrupt, should correct herself before correction comes up from below. If she be pure, why should she fear correction. To what does she owe, on her own exulting assertion, the successes of the Reformation? Let her fulfil the great behest of the Gospel of Light, by illuminating all men who come into this world, and trust for its consequences to the Divine Teacher who healed the blind, and willed that his name and works should be known to all nations and generations.* Let her shepherds "feed their flocks," and not "themselves," unlike "the shepherds of Israel;" and, in the day of visitation, "the sword of the Lord will pass them by."† In a word, let her, on one side, in a large and unsectarian spirit, throw open the doors of knowledge to every class and persuasion, however opposed to her‡;

* "He, therefore (as you may sum up the argument in a few words), who opposes, either by active measures, or by the example of his neglect and inactivity; he who shows himself in any way unfriendly to the education of the poor, is evidently an opposer of the diffusion of *Christian knowledge*; an opposer, that is, of the *Gospel itself*; which is no less than '*fighting against God*.' And you may add the tremendous warning given by our Lord respecting any who should 'offend one of the least' of his followers; i. e. be a hinderance, an obstacle, to his being led into the way of salvation: 'Whosoever shall offend one of these little ones, it were better for him that a millstone were hung about his neck, and that he were cast into the sea.'—*Dr. Whately, Sermon for the Benefit of the Halesworth and Chediston National School*, p. 29.

† Verse 2. "Thus saith the Lord God unto the shepherds: Wo be to the shepherds of Israel that do feed themselves! should not the shepherds feed the flocks?"

3. "Ye eat the fat, and ye clothe you with the wool, ye kill them that are fed: but ye feed not the flocks."

4. "The diseased have ye not strengthened, neither have ye healed that which was sick, neither have ye bound up that which was broken, neither have ye brought again that which was driven away, neither have ye sought that which was lost; but with force and with cruelty have ye ruled them."

9. "Therefore, O ye shepherds, hear the word of the Lord:

10. "Thus saith the Lord God, Behold I am against the shepherds; and I will require my flock at their hand, and cause them to cease from feeding the flock; neither shall the shepherds feed themselves any more; for I will deliver my flock from their mouth, that they may not be meat for them."—*Ezekiel*, chap. xxxiv.

‡ "Where there is much desire to learn," says Milton, "there, of necessity, will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion, in good men, is but knowledge in the making. Under these fantastic terrors of sect and schism we wrong the earnest and zealous thirst after knowledge which God hath stirred up in

and, on the other, lower that weight of wealth, those earthly incumbrances of pomp and power, by which she is impeded at present in all her moral and religious functions. So may she pray *consistently* that the kingdom of *heaven* may come. So may she meet inquiry, and not *fear* it. If Truth be with her, Education, thus treated, will be her friend, and not her foe; instead of "the staff of reed," which, "when she leaneth on it, breaks beneath her," she will find it a sword of the spirit of God, a buckler of defence. This may rescue her from the shadow of death which compasses her round; nothing less can. The rich "establishments" of papal Spain and Portugal have crumbled; and does the far more gorgeous Establishment of Protestant England, with these wrecks around her, hope for immortality?

A third objection, which is urged against the universal diffusion of education, is the extension of "Unionism," and the dissocial doctrines to which it is supposed to have given rise. But from what does Unionism itself proceed? From Education, or the want of Education?

Unionism is an effort to remedy a real or reputed grievance. As long as it did not affect the liberty of others, it could not be considered a crime. So long as Unionists left others free to help themselves as they could, it was only just to leave them also free, to better themselves as they could. It originated from anxiety to raise the condition of the workmen. The anxiety was natural, the object good: but what were the means? Had they just views of their efficiency, of their application, of their consequences? If not, from whence did the mistake proceed? From the continuance of ignorance, or the extension of information?

The men engaged in these combinations entered them with the most crude notions. They knew little of their working, still less of their effects on themselves, and on society. Success

this city. What some lament of, we should rather rejoice at; should rather praise this pious forwardness among men to reassume the ill-deputed care of their religion into their own hands again. A little generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and some grains of charity, might win all these diligences, to joyn and unite into *one general and brotherly search after truth.*"—*Areopagitica*

they considered certain ; but success depended upon the proportion which their subscriptions bore to the capital of the masters. They knew nothing of either. Had they met with this success,—had they brought the masters to the terms they proposed, — they would still have been placed in difficulties. They expected an immediate rise in their *own* wages, the *same* amount of employment, and the continuance of low wages, and low prices, in reference to every one, and to every thing else, things which the least experienced ought to have known to be altogether incompatible. Failure they seem never to have contemplated ; still less its inevitable results, — the necessity of soliciting anew for the same work at the old wages, or for any the masters chose to offer, the certain influx of foreign workmen into the places they had just quitted, the loss of time and skill, the expenditure of former earnings, the contraction of bad habits and heavy debts, &c. &c. Once they had asserted *their right* to combine and strike, they imagined they had effected every thing. But this was undisputed, and, at all events, a matter of secondary consideration : the first point, to a starving man, should have been, not the practicability of the measure, but its expediency. Before they gave up what they had, they should have ascertained whether the master *could* give them more, — they should have seen what would be likely to happen in case he should give them more. Wages do not depend upon will. They are determinable by the number of men in the market, the introduction of new machinery, the demand for the article, &c. &c. A strike could only operate, even if successful, in overstocking a market already full. It could only operate in forcing the master to give more than he could reasonably give, — consequently to give too much. A master who gives too much, must *charge* too much, or lose ; in either case, there must be a diminution of employment, and, by degrees, a migration of the trade itself elsewhere. Whether successful, therefore, or not, the Unionists could not benefit : they placed themselves in that precise position, where every step must have been followed by injury, — where victory itself was defeat. This, too, it must be remembered, is a mere financial view of its bearings ; in a social and political aspect, its con-

sequences were still worse. A man entered an Union to vindicate, as he thought, his freedom; he had scarcely entered, when he found himself a thorough slave,—not a slave to a master whom he might quit whenever he thought proper, and whose tyranny, at worst, was restricted to one man, and to one portion only of his daily existence, but to a master, multiform and multitudinous, who met him everywhere, and at all times; who, under the name of liberty, established an inquisition, and, with visions of plenty, cheated him even of the little good he had still left.* All these things, familiar to any one who had at all read, and reflected, and doubtless well known to the leaders, who, as usual in such experiments, have very different objects, though the same language, with their followers, seem to have been totally unknown to the operatives. Had they been taught sound principles in their Town Schools, such results could not have happened. Unionism is thus the offspring, not of Education, but of its want. We see a crowd of squalid artisans press round an inflammatory proclamation or a delusive placard in the street, and we rail against Reading and Writing. We should rather regret, that when they had

* “The head-quarters of the Potters’ Union are at Hanley in the Potteries. The whole number consist of nearly 12,000, including the potteries of Liverpool, &c. The amount of the different contributions is nearly 600*l.* per week. There appears to be a regular *staff*, who are kept without work, who live in clover, and exact as much deference from their lieges as the Great Mogul; yet at one of their recent meetings a law was passed, that no workman should touch his hat, or offer any token of personal respect, to his *master*! On the death of any member, some hundreds of the neighbourhood follow the body in procession, two deep, linked by the finger, and carrying a sprig of thyme, or other similar emblem or symbol. They “halt,” “front,” “dress,” and “dismiss,” by word of command. All local and parish business is now wholly conducted under their influence and dictation, where they choose to interfere. A few days ago, the parish business of a large town was taken away from a widow, with a family of nine children, the partner of whose deceased husband was a surgeon, and she still retaining an interest in the firm. A new surgeon, who was almost a stranger, and a person of inferior practice and experience, was supported by an order from the Union Lodge, and was appointed by a large majority, many tradespeople not daring to vote against him, or the shops would have been proclaimed! In Newcastle the servant girls are about to form a Union, embracing the whole tribe from cook to scullion, and ‘I’ll hire you to be my master,’ is no longer a good joke.”—*Country Paper*.

In Paris, the coffin-makers had their Union, or corporation. The prefect of the Seine tried to break up the monopoly. Petitions were immediately poured into the Chambers, complaining of this infringement of their “vested rights.”

been taught how to *read* a placard, they had not also been taught the *truths* which would have enabled them to detect a fallacy, and to laugh at an impostor!

Out of Unionism, its preposterous hopes, its disorderly habits, its vicious and shallow pretensions, accompanied with the distress which necessarily follows in such a train, many, doubtless, of the dissocial doctrines which all reasonable men deplore, have been engendered. They are daring, wild, and desperate, and strike not merely at the acknowledged abuse and the passing party, but at the very framework of all society.* They appeal openly to physical force, and propose, as an end, a millennium of popular usurpation. Moral evils are to be redressed by the bludgeon, and universal freedom to be propagated by tyranny. The most odious of all despotisms, that which, under a feigned solicitude for the interests of the many, provides only for the profligacy of the few, is set forth. Nor is it disguised in hesitating or mystical phrases. The bribe is open, unequivocal in language, addressed to the coarsest passions, recommended by the most indiscriminate ribaldry. But is this the result of Education? Is it likely to be increased, or extended by its amelioration, or extension? More distinct evidence of its want, and the fatal consequences which its want produces, can scarcely be offered. That a crafty few, in any state of society, should willingly employ such instruments to excite the sleeping passions of the multitude, is quite possible, but that such means should be successful, without a large mass of ignorance and immorality in the people on which to act, is scarcely credible. In this, as in everything else, there is a balance between demand

* See the "Outlines of a new Constitution," published at the office of "The Man," Middle Row, Holborn, 1834. One of the articles of this radical Magna Charta decides that no man shall possess more than a certain quantity of land, and that all soldiers who shall have taken part in the war of liberation shall receive sixteen acres. The Unions of Paris, or Sections of the Société des Droits de l'Homme, assumed as titles, amongst others, "Death to Tyrants," "War to the Châteaux," "the Abolition of Property," "the Mountain," "the European Insurrection," "St. Just," "Marat," &c. It is such quackeries as these which throw a slur on the cause of true liberty, and, by frightening the rational and honest from its support, inflict a far more deadly wound on its great interests, than the most arbitrary acts of the most arbitrary government.

and supply. Such monstrous doctrines would not be listened to five minutes, by a truly educated population.*

As Education is not the parent of these evils, it is not from Education that they can expect support. There may be a few amongst the Unionists who are instructed, but it is because they are *few*, and not because they are *instructed*, that they work as they do. There is inequality in the amount of knowledge, consequently in the amount of power. Authority, and not inquiry, is the moving force; *partial*, and not *universal*, education is the evil. To neutralise and extinguish it, universalise, instead of restricting, Education.

In proportion as Education approaches this term, Unionism and its consequences must decline. If ignorance holds it together, knowledge must dissolve it. A certain period must, of course, elapse before this knowledge penetrates. It is quite natural that, when once such combinations are effected, any mass of men thrown into the hands of others, notwithstanding all their tyranny and hypocrisy, will, for some time, continue to cling to them. Their self-love, their interests, their imagination, and sometimes more honourable feelings, are engaged. They have been oppressed, and are still determined to resist; they bear subjection, that they may enjoy power; they have given promises, and are afraid or ashamed to retreat from them. But these motives are not long-lived. The operation of their system, so different in *reality* from what it was in *anticipation*, not understood at first, is at last felt. A "strike" well resisted by the masters soon puts it to the test; and, though this is an occurrence not always to be counted on, it must, in some instance or other, occur. The first decisive example of the kind checks the evil: the progress of inquiry and reflection is thenceforward rapid; juster principles are established, men recur to other expedients, more consonant to sound social and economical principles for redress: recruits fall off; and, at last, the original body either breaks up, or perishes by inanition. Not, then, by authority, nor by

Deficiency of legitimate employment for their mental and physical faculties idleness and restlessness, the want of occupation, in conflict with anxiety for occupation, these are the great generators of your village and tavern statesmen.

violence, are Unions to be put down. Reason and knowledge are more than sufficient to do the work. Let the people have the *means* and *opportunity of judging for themselves*. "Not that we are so unreasonable as to demand of any man," in the language of Sir John Herschel, "an instant and peremptory dismissal of former opinions and judgments. All we require is, that he will hold them without bigotry, retain till he shall see reason to question them, and be ready to resign them when fairly proved untenable, and to doubt them when the weight of probability is shown to be against them." This disposition, these habits, would render Unions impossible, or innoxious. But are they to be had without universal Education? If so, from whence are they to proceed?

But, admitting the expediency of extending Education universally, even under present circumstances, to England, it does not thence follow, it is urged, that Ireland is equally fitted for its reception. Not only are most of the preceding objections applicable to her condition, but she labours under many other difficulties peculiarly her own. Most of these arise out of the views and mode in which the question is argued. Irish Education is never *generalised*. It is always a question of this faction or that, of this faith or that, of this man or that; a question, in fine, so narrowed by the special experience or immediate self-interest of the several combatants,—so little referring either to the nation at large, or to posterity,—that it is a matter of no surprise, after the innumerable conclusions we are coming to every day, that no true conclusion should be come to at last. Every thing in Ireland is provisional and piecemeal,—its government, legislation, parties. Such it has been for centuries; such it seems destined to be for many a year to come. Three or four nations always in presence, yet never permitted to embrace each other, snatching up every thing around them, submitting to every degradation for the pleasure of mutual attack, converting laws into weapons, and institutions into ramparts, making the Temple a fortress, and the altar a throne,—such is, and such has been, Ireland. Education, of course, has largely shared in the fate of all her other institutions: there is no such thing as a national, much

less an universal, system of public instruction yet established. There are several hostile systems, several parties all brandishing their several educations against each other, and one great party (which would absorb, if permitted, all others), who are for no education. One urges, that it is not the time; that there are other measures, such as Poor Laws, Tithe extinction, &c., far more pressing: a second, that Ireland has already been over-educated, and it would be far better to diminish, than to increase, the stock: a third, that the country still continues too agitated, to permit the introduction of this, or any other of the arts of peace. Each of these are, more or less, anti-educationists. The fourth party affect to be its strenuous advocates. The men who compose it profess great things: they are for *universal* Education; but on one condition,—provided it be *their own*.

The “Poor Law” question is doubtless of great moment, but not of less difficulty. Its good or evil can never be argued *à priori*: it depends almost exclusively on its *modifications*. A Poor law, in a small state like Holland, and in a large state like England, in a thriving state like the Netherlands, and in a poor state like Ireland, is, in each instance, a very different question. If we appeal from theory and authority to experience, we find the experience contradictory, and great and weighty names on opposite sides. It is obvious, then, that much investigation is necessary, and, for much investigation, much patience, and some time. Nor is this all. Church property must be settled, Church reform complete, before we build up a system, whose foundations must, in great measure, depend upon these very alterations. This cannot be done in a day: and is Education to stand still all this time? Why should it for an hour? What is there, in Education, at war even with the physical prosperity of the people? What is there in the proper instruction of the poor, which impedes the wholesome working of a good “Poor law system?” What is there in it, which is not guarantee that such system will work well? Education, as we understand it, is the disciplining of mind and body, so as to make them as useful as possible to each other. So far from diminishing, or even deferring, it augments and accelerates the means by which a livelihood may

be obtained. Send a batch of educated, and another of uneducated, boys into the market. Which of the two will be most likely to obtain purchasers for their industry; which of the two will first find employment, will keep it longest, will make it most profitable to himself, and to his employer; which will give and gain; which will be most likely to feed others, and to be well fed himself? Education, so far from giving a stone instead of a loaf, gives *two* loaves instead of *one*. Besides, what prevents the two operations from going on *together*? If schools be not as necessary as poor-houses, what precludes poor-houses from being established *with* schools? One thing at a time is a good proverb; but a thousand things are done, and must be done, every day, at the same time, and are not well done unless they be done together. Now this is one of them. The generation going off the stage may not be much benefited; but the hale and firm core of society, they who are now in all the summer energies of their being, they are under the influence even of the youngest amongst us. All improvements in education radiate upwards, as well as downwards and around. The unbelieving husband has been converted by the believing wife; the corrupt and indolent father will be shamed into exertion and virtue, by the pure and active boy. If we wish to rouse the people to industry, we must create the stimulant in *the people themselves*. Here is an instrument ready at our hands. Will Poor Laws effect this? Is the erection of Workhouses, while ignorance and immorality are left to fill them, sufficient? Is the creating of reservoirs for these waters of bitterness, which, pressed down in one place, rise in another, all that is required? I know of no means to cut short these streams, but taking them in their fountain-heads; I know of no means to stifle mendicity, but to stifle first, as far at least as we can, both ignorance and immorality. If this can be done *without* Education, well and good: but if not,—if nothing, on the contrary, but Education can effect it,—not the slipshod, meagre substitute now in use, but Education, ample, genuine, universal,—then *we must teach as well as feed*; or, to advance one step farther, we must teach that we may feed, and ought not to feed unless we also teach. I would not build up Poor Laws, how modified soever

they might be, until I had first assured myself that they would be used only as *occasional* remedies, and not be looked to as the ordinary existence of any one portion of the nation. A nation of medicants is bad; but a nation of legalised uneducated paupers is intolerable. The law itself, in such a case, would be the greatest of all bars to melioration. Under such a system, Education itself would be impracticable. It would grapple with the monstrous evil in vain. There would be two educations in constant strife,—the education of the poor-house, and the education of the public school: which of the two, amongst a population with such habits as the Irish, would be likely to prevail, it is not very difficult to divine. So far, then, from Education being allowed to wait until Poor Laws shall first be established, it *ought, if any thing, to precede them*. To bear such a regimen, requires great previous training. Even liberty may be turned into a curse by ignorance; how much more so a system, whose very blessings are still problematical? If a country were intended to be consigned at once to all the evils of irretrievable poverty and ignorance, no more adequate means could be devised, than “to *feed* first, and to *teach* afterwards,” to establish first Poor Laws, and then Education.*

The “Tithe” and “Church property” questions interpose, no real obstacle to the diffusion of Education. The opposition is a righteous opposition; so far, it must doubtless be extended and strengthened by the extension of intelligence and information. But it must equally be remembered, that this very intelligence, and information, have given it a moderation which it otherwise could not have had. Tithe is an old

* “It is a most important question for Ireland, whether you will submit for a time to its mendicity, or exchange that mendicity for a regular and compulsory pauperism. Now, on many accounts, I would prefer the former to the latter alternative: and one of my reasons is, that education will at length quell the one, but not the other. The mendicity of Scotland gave way in a few years to its education. The pauperism and education of England have, for many years, advanced contemporaneously. I should exceedingly regret if, under the influence of an impatience to be delivered from this evil of mendicity, you should, in getting rid of that which is *conquerable* by education, precipitate yourselves into that which is *unconquerable* by education.”—*Dr. Chalmers, Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, on the subject of the Irish Poor.*

grievance, pressing alike on the physical and moral happiness of the nation; a grievance which has been always more or less resisted; the only difference between the resistance of the past and the resistance of the present, is not so much the amount of hostility to the odious impost, as the more enlightened, organised, and civilised manner in which this resistance is carried on: this is greatly in favour of an educated as opposed to an uneducated age; it is proof that the diffusion of knowledge has humanised this war like every other. Nor is the excitement to be exclusively attributed to the people. The government and legislature, have certainly agitated and advanced the question, quite as effectively as the people. Looking now at the debates during the last three years, one is amazed how such perfect indifference to the simplest principles of national economy, domestic history, and universal European experience, to say nothing of the general disregard to the obvious workings of the human heart, could have been so long endured by a legislature which boasts to be the very foremost of the whole civilised world. We are now arrived at a timid recognition of the principle which was hooted, as only not sacrilege and sedition, in 1831. Thus far has parliament got, but the nation, as in 1830, is still *before it*. The pending bills, &c. &c. simply show (there was no need of heaping folio on folio, "*Pelio Ossam*," to prove it) that legislature and ministry are about to capitulate with the country. Present opposition is a mere haggling about price — there is no "inviolability" talked of now. The principle is conceded. In a word, if the people shall extinguish tithe, their opponents will have the principal merit of having taught them how to extinguish it. They have accustomed the tenant to withhold, and the clergyman to look elsewhere for, his salary: more than that, they have compelled the people to rate high their strength, and to measure it, successfully, with the church, parliament, and government united. They have thus done the very thing which they professed most not to do, and they have done it, exclaiming to the people at every step, that they did it sorely against their will. To think, after the examples of Emancipation and Reform, that the nation would stop short, and wait patiently till it was the convenience of church

or minister to hear them, was surely a most singular presumption. Parliament, and Government, would not lead, and it is compelled to follow. Had they got *before* the people, they might have turned *round*, and prescribed their march. This, now, is nearly impossible; but they can, at least, accompany with a cheerful and steady step; they can, at least, study a little better their position, and not continue to mistake the past for the actual condition of the country. But in such a case they only who are in the *wrong* will fear education. In Ireland, even in the midst of all this irritation, nothing is to be apprehended, by the real lover of his country, from its présence, every thing from its absence. It is necessary to the Dissenter, to teach him moderation; necessary to the Churchman, to teach him liberality; necessary to the People to restrain, necessary to the Aristocracy to bend. The People have not been the aggressors; they have borne long and patiently, but in the too ardent prosecution of their rights, they may overvault their interests; — they may, in attempting too eagerly to prostrate others, fall over the prostrate themselves. The Aristocracy must learn how to yield with grace, and to be wise in time. Nor, on the other side, do these questions oppose any serious obstacle to the progress of Education. They distract, it is true, the public attention, but the distraction is not considerable, and in any case cannot much longer endure. The Country will not suffer it, — the Church, for its own sake, ought not to suffer it. Already are these measures decided in the public mind: the legislature and government can no longer, without peril, delay their ratification.

A revolution will not be necessary to work this change; nor will it be possible to provoke, even a semblance of one, to prevent it. The Protestants are not the Orangemen, no more than their religion is the Establishment. It is a calumny to confound them. They are men and Irishmen; they bear with as little patience as the Catholics, if with more discretion; the burdens of this pseudo-benefit upon the energies and resources of their common country. They know the interests and duties of Protestantism far better than its constituted guardians; they wish to see the Reformation reformed from

its abuses; they believe the Gospel, and cannot understand how Christ requires the assistance of Mammon, or their faith can be upheld by other means than those spiritual ones, by which it was first planted and extended. Against these Protestants, as well as against Catholics; against their own flock, as well as against Dissenters; against the united intelligence and independence of the country, will these weak abettors of old abuses have to contend. It is idle to talk of "nailing colours to the mast," — the ship is taken. Sir Robert Peel so menaced, and gave Emancipation; Lord Wellington so protested, and proffered Reform; others, as sagacious and as bold as either, so resolve, and will yet have to consent, no matter how reluctantly, to Church reduction, and Tithe extinction. Not from such opponents has the progress of Church Reform any thing to apprehend. Emancipation was passed when they were in the full pride of power and place; and is it now that government, legislature, the chief moral and intellectual power of the country, are to quail? It will be thought that this political war must necessarily be much coloured by religious feelings. Much of this is seeming. Politics, it is true, have masqueraded under the flowing garb of religionism, and, for a time, with success: but the farce is nearly over — "*solvuntur risu tabulæ*" — the naked "*loaves-and-fishes*" argument is seen, — "*le pauvre homme*" of the Establishment is understood. One after another the strongholds of the oligarchy have been taken; and even Education, which, next to the Church, was the great fortress of their strength, has been delivered up into the hands of the country. Their opposition to the new system of Public Instruction, or, indeed, to any system but the old, was in true keeping with every former resistance. It went on the presumption that every thing in Ireland belonged as of right to them, — mind, conscience, intellect, — and should be held only under their "*suzeraineté*." An education not favourable to these pretensions, or which could not be converted into an instrument for their support, it is not at all surprising, should at first have been suspiciously or reluctantly received. But when Public Education was in their hands, it effected little, even for their own purposes. It did not prevent another education (among

Catholics) from going on at the same time; an education, from its very exclusion from state favour necessarily hostile, from its want of communication with other persuasions naturally sectarian, and which, as it was the education of the great mass of the country, must have at all times combatted, often counteracted, and in the end, perhaps, have absorbed theirs. Even for their own interests, much more for those of the community, the system should long since have been modified, or given up. But the hostility of Conservatism, vehement as it may be in some particular spots and cases, must soon pass away. It is a matter, in great degree, of time and place, the result of mistaken views, unfounded alarms; but by no means to be confounded with a hostility to education, in the abstract. When these pretensions and terrors shall have subsided, this adverse feeling to the present system will subside also.

A third Agitation, "Prædial Agitation," has been set down alternately to Tithes and Conservatism. There is some truth, and some error in each statement. The true originating causes must be sought for deeper; but it is not calumny to say, that additional energy has been given to their developement by both Tithes and Conservatism. The pressing grievances of the lower classes are, and have always been, agricultural: whether the landlord be Catholic or Protestant, he is a landlord still. At the same time the cry against the body, like most other cries, though founded on truth in the gross, is false and exaggerated in details. The loudest now against the holders in fee, are the middlemen; yet the middlemen themselves were the chief instruments of the very dilapidation they affect to deplore. Nor are the middlemen in all cases to blame; they were, as I have said, instruments. War prices, which they imagined would be eternal, competition for land, inordinate, and inevitable in the absence of manufacturers, — political power, accruing from its possession, forced into an unnatural current the capital and industry of the country. A momentary impulse was given by this stimulant, — produce and rent rose, landlord and tenant both prospered; there were, comparatively, few prædial disturbances, exclusively such, during the war. But with the peace the stimulant and excitement ceased—the collapse commenced. The tenant was the first to feel it, and, after struggling some

time in vain to pay his rent, was compelled to call for abatements. They were long resisted, and at last forced. Sometimes flight did what no remonstrance could effect,—a “caput mortuum” of land, an exhausted soil, was all that was left in the hands of the middleman by the impoverished cottier, in payment for long arrears. These disasters were, for a while, staved off. The middleman, thinking the change arose from the changing seasons, and not from permanent causes, persevered in paying and living on his capital until he, too, was at last drained of his accumulations; and between the landlord, who insisted on his war-price, and the tenant, who paid nothing at all, as between two millstones, was finally crushed. In this manner, from the year 1816, there was gradually going on, in Ireland, an elimination or secession of middlemen; salutary, no doubt, if it had been followed by the creation or restoration of a better order, and a more friendly connection between the head landlord and the occupying tenant. But the landlord’s turn now came; mortgaged, as he thought, in fair proportion to his property (sometimes the result of extravagance, sometimes of family engagements), he leant for punctuality on the punctual and large payments of the middleman; the middleman was extinguished, the tenant pauperised, the mortgagee inexorable; he found himself with rents half paid, with debts doubled by the operation of a Currency Act, on the very verge of being ruined. What was he to do? His land swarmed with paupers not of his own creation, — men, who, so far from paying rent, asked for charity. He had no capital himself, the legislature had interfered with it: what was he to do? An almost unanimous feeling of this evil, naturally enough, arose; an almost unanimous resolve to get rid of this burden, eating up estates without profit to proprietor or cultivator, starving the tenant, and leaving the landlord unpaid, as naturally followed. The error was not in the resolve, but in the execution. It should have been *done*, but not done as it was done, *cruelly*, and *at once*. This was the blunder. It was fatal. Wherever committed, a long train of evils soon followed. Large masses of misery and immorality were rapidly swept from one estate, but to be lodged on another. The *country* gained nothing. The

weight, whether it pressed on point A, or point B, still pressed on the country. But, if it gained nothing, it lost much. The disease not only still continued, but was increased. These forcible ejectments irritated, excited. They roused the vengeance of the sufferers; they banded together those who still remained on the land, for mutual defence. If it succeeded in removing one party of tenants, it rendered the removal of the next very nearly impossible. Nor did the evil stop here: from the mass, it penetrated to the individual. Not only general clearings were resisted; but even the partial change of one occupier for another. The bad took advantage of the general spirit; justice and injustice were confounded; cases the most unwarrantable were maintained with the same desperation as those of whose justice there could be no doubt. The landlord, from being too much master of his property, ceased to be master at all. A large floating mass of turbulence and violence was thus insensibly generated, ready, on all occasions, for the highest bidder: it was pressed successively into service wherever Absenteeism and Aristocracy and their oppressions fell with the greatest severity upon the peasantry. Limerick sent out the relics of her servile insurrection to Clare, Clare to Tipperary, Tipperary to Kilkenny, both to the Queen's County. Day-resistance was followed up by nightly. Idleness and crime mixed with real suffering. A heterogeneous conspiracy soon knit around; and proceeding, as is always the case where extreme poverty, partial laws, and negligent police unite, from slight to great offences, the attack on property led to the attack on person, and a regular civil war (not less war because it was not carried on by armies), of lower against higher, of poor against rich, the most dangerous of all civil conflicts, was waged in the very bosom of a powerful community. The government and legislature had, all this time, instead of abating, been adding fuel to the flame. Their vacillating laws, reeling from one interest to the other, as one or other wheedled or frightened them, without any real knowledge of either, — each pressing on the heels of the other, and thus heaping together four or five different orders of things, three or four conflicting arrangements of property, —

went far to double and treble this confusion. The outbreaks of Limerick and Clare had been checked, one by the bayonet, the other by the gibbet; but there the reform and redress stopped. The orifice was shut up, but the fire left to smoulder on. It soon found other vents, others of these "atri spiramina Ditis," to burst from elsewhere. It was soon evident that this "straw-in-the-window" legislation would never do. The Queen's County Committee sufficiently proved it; every subsequent event has confirmed these proofs. To lay the entire blame on religious and political agitation, was easy, but absurd. It existed distinct from, and anterior to either. The share they had was that of accessories, not of principals. The Tithe oppression, naturally enough, was mixed up, in the mind of the Catholic population, both with their religious and agrarian grievances: that "Prædial Agitation" should have occasionally fraternised with "Tithe Agitation" was, therefore, precisely what might have been expected. The clearing landlords were often absentees — tithe enforcers — hereditary Orangemen. It was quite natural, that amongst such a complication of titles to their enmity, the people should have made little or no distinction. In the mean time, tilt ran the legislature to its old Sangrado remedy. "Saignare, et —, resaignare" — bayonets, Commissions, Court martials, Coercion bills, &c. Vigorous measures, in the height of danger and apprehension, may be requisite. Men pull down houses in a conflagration, not from an indifference to property, but to prevent the loss of more. Once over, however, they do not neglect inquiring into the cause, and rebuilding, as soon as possible, what they have been obliged to pull down. This is what the legislature has not yet done. They have given coercion, not redress: pulled down the house, but not taken steps to repair the walls, or to prevent the recurrence elsewhere of the old flame. This is the great sin. Are the causes undiscoverable, or irremovable? If so, government is useless, or our governors do not understand their craft. The truth is, the fault is theirs above all the parties concerned; the tenants are not to blame, the middlemen are not to blame, the landlords are not to blame. They have been, throughout,

the mere chessmen of the government and the legislature. The whole has arisen from *rank ignorance* in the several parties. That ignorance may be pardoned in some, not so in others. Had the tenants not been injudiciously multiplied and grievously oppressed by the middlemen; had not the middlemen eagerly accepted the invitation of the apathetic landlord; had the landlord known something of the simplest questions of social and political economy, something of the laws which regulate his most ordinary interests and wants; had the legislature known how to enlighten him, or been ordinarily enlightened on any one of these subjects itself; had the government been competent, or desirous, to direct to such considerations in due season the legislature, not one tithe of all these evils had ever occurred. There would have been few pauperised tenancies, few extinguished middlemen, few ruined mortgagees, — no clearings, no Whitefootism, no Coercion bills. The government would have had full opportunity and means, unembarrassed with these causes and consequences, to cope solely with political anomalies, absurdities, and oppressions. There might have been agitation, but it would have been not “*prædial*,” but “*political*.”

• These questions, then, are transitory; it is in the power at any time of a wise and firm government to extinguish them: they oppose, therefore, no permanent or real obstacle to Education. But is it so with the habits they have generated? Is nothing to be apprehended from what they have left behind? An “*agitation*” may be got rid of, but how get rid of the “*love of agitation*?”

The Irish have contracted by indulgence a taste for polemics of all descriptions, especially political and religious; but this mental epidemic is no argument against the earnest and immediate diffusion of Education. It is an effect: put down the causes, and the effects will cease with them. Exorcise the agitation, and the passion will perish with what it fed on. Granting it even a longer duration, I see no reason why Education should therefore stand still. Education provoked it not; Education, instead of increasing, mitigates its violence: under proper regulations, it may even be converted to the service of Education. Political turbulence was long prior to

the introduction of instruction. It is the offspring of human wants and anti-human laws in fierce and constant conflict. Long before the elementary class-book was known, Irish peasants clanked their chains, “servi si,—ma servi ognor frementi;” and wreaked their “wild justice” on the head of their oppressors, by the peremptory law of popular insurrection, and midnight assassination. Our annals were then stained, not with the scattered crimes of individuals, but with the desolations of districts. Does human nature, whether Irish, English, or Scotch, under such circumstances, ever exhibit itself otherwise? It is the effect of ignorance to rouse passion, and to dull reason; to keep down man to the passions and follies of the child. The child strikes at what is nearest, and revenges on chairs and tables blows he has inflicted on himself. So is it with the great grown child, uncivilised man. Take any popular agitation you please; the grosser the people, the more ignorant and uneducated they are, the more brutal, indiscriminate, and useless, will also be their agitation. “On ne fait pas des révolutions avec de l’eau de rose;” says a French politician. He reasoned from what he saw;—he had to deal with the sanguinary and ignorant—sanguinary, because ignorant—inhabitants of his own country. Ireland and England have proved the converse of the axiom. Emancipation and Reform were tests; these things might have been done, but not *thus* done, a century or two ago.*

* “The conclusion irresistibly impressed on the mind by the consideration of the progress of the French revolution is, that the error lies more in the head than in the heart, and that it is by the *incessant application of false principles to the understanding* that the atrocious actions which excite the astonishment of posterity are committed. Without doubt, there are in all troubled times a host of wicked and abandoned men, who issue from their haunts, stimulated by cupidity, revenge, and every evil passion, and seek to turn the public calamities to their individual advantage. But neither the leaders, nor the majority of their followers, are composed of such men. The *political fanatics*, those who do evil that good may come; who massacre, or encourage massacre, in the name of humanity, and imprison in that of public freedom; these are the men who are most to be dreaded, and who, in general, acquire a perilous sway over the minds of their fellow-citizens. The worst characters of the revolution, who survived the scaffold, were found in private life to have their humanity unimpaired. Barrère is now (or was very recently) at Brussels, where his time is devoted to declaiming on the necessity of *entirely abolishing capital punishments*; and yet Barrère is the man

The more, then, of Education you infuse, the more temperance and smoothness you give to all popular movements. This, *à priori*, appears natural; it is rendered incontestable by facts. The two events just noticed are often adduced to prove the exciting effects of Education. They go to prove directly the reverse. Catholic Emancipation, in particular, may be instanced. No popular victory, even on the admission of its opponents, was ever achieved with more moderation. It was a triumph truly of reason; the struggle was worthy of its result. Multitudes of all conditions and ages, in peaceable and firm array, marching forth to the re-conquest of their inheritance, with the light and fire of God's eternal truth and justice before them, was truly a noble moral spectacle, worthy of the gaze of all mankind. No orphan mourned their laurels, no cities groaned where they had passed. But what gave them this steady temper, this "Dorian mood," this lofty reliance on other arms than those of flesh? The spirituality which intellectual and moral power infused. The rivalry of sect with sect, the friction of popular meetings, the stirring of human spirits could hardly take place, without producing a general fermentation of thought throughout the land. Those who think that the meetings of the Catholic Association alone give a fair estimate of this great mental change passing over the spirit of the country, judge very partially. In every village, in every knot of houses, a small image of the great prototype existed. The great instrument of all was the Press; but the lessons of the Press would have been the seed falling on the rock, without the previous breaking up of the soil by Education. Elementary Education was the ploughshare. It was this revolution which prepared for that outward one which so soon followed. Self-respect,

who proposed the famous decree for the annihilation of Lyons, beginning with the words,—"Lyons faisait guerre, Lyons n'est plus;" and constantly affirmed that "le vaisseau de la Révolution ne peut arriver au port que sur un océan de sang."—*Foreign Quarterly Review*, No. XXV. Can stronger evidence be given of the necessity of a sound political education, of an education for the head as well as the heart, of every individual who is likely to be engaged (and who is not?) in the political transactions of his country?

moral restraint, were to a great degree generated; obedience to intellectual superiority followed. To this Emancipation owes its chief value.

This struggle, it is true, left Ireland a nation of politicians; but the fault was not in the struggle, but in its protraction; not in Education, but in its partisan and exclusive application. To Toryism and Churchism we owe both these consequences. Toryism planted Radicalism, and Sectarianism distorted Education. There was great error, in the time and manner, in which these two great gifts of liberty and instruction were given. These mistakes we still rue. But if committed, it does not follow they are without remedy.* The Irish are not organically a nation of politicians; they are politicians as long only as politics continue to be their first interest. In this they do not much deviate from the general laws of human nature. A nation, passing from a state of bondage to one of comparative freedom, will not at once subside. It cannot be hoped, that it will surrender itself up to the quiet culture of the arts of civilisation, until it shall have at first assured itself laws and institutions by which the fruits of such culture may be enjoyed. Neither should we mistake our little span of life for the lives of kingdoms; these temporary evils are but specks in their destinies: we should localise less, and generalise more. At the same time, it should never be forgotten, that constant

* Not only was the "concession," as it was insultingly called, given in an injudicious way, and at the latest possible moment, but no sooner given than seemingly repented of, and, as much as possible, neutralised in effect. The whole question was not, as it ought to have been, got rid of at once. Adjustment of Tithe, of the Vestry Laws, of the Church, should have been promised and commenced; private ambitions indulged, personal merits acknowledged; the Catholic not only rendered admissible, but admitted into the honours and emoluments of the constitution. Emancipation (I dislike the term) was not so much the manumission of a slave, as the rendering back his birthright to the originally free. The minister proposed to settle the Catholic Question, and left four or five Catholic questions behind. Its former opponents now triumph; its former supporters desert; but there is no ground for either change. If Emancipation has not tranquillised Ireland, it is simply because what was *begun* has not been *continued*; but how infinitely less chance of such tranquillity there would have been had it not been begun at all! Emancipation, without other measures, is inadequate; but every other measure, the very best that statesman could devise, would be utterly inefficient without Emancipation.

political agitation is no more a natural state for a nation than constant fever for a man. It is, at best, but the result of disease, latent or obvious, in the system; a temporary evil, endurable only for a final good. But the possibility of attaining it must be very clear and positive, and, above all, it must be *a good*. An agitation excited, or even endured, for less than this; an agitation prolonged a single day beyond what is absolutely requisite for this, so far from being liberty, is not even a preparation for liberty. I know of no darker treason to the best and truest interests of country.

It is not, then, of such I speak: no good citizen can contemplate such a state of things as permanent. But a good citizen is not, therefore, to be debarred at any time from the free and full discussion of all public affairs. The exercise of such a right, so far from standing in the way of Education, is as eminently favourable to its diffusion, as Education, on its side, is to the wholesome exercise of such a right. If the minister feels and fears it, it is because he ought to fear it. Abuses are still maintained. Wherever abuses exist, and in proportion as they exist, Government must make its mind up to this spirit of dissatisfaction. There are no means of expelling it, but by suppressing them. It is an additional abuse to suppress inquiry, or Education. Of all governments, a reforming government ought best to know this. If their system were to make men happy by stratagem, and to carry them on by stealth to prosperity,—if their measures were so bad, that they required only to be examined to be detested,—this dread of National Education might be intelligible: but a government, which professes to regard all this charlatanism with contempt, and to govern the People through the ears and eyes of the People, so far from discouraging, ought to challenge inquiry; for, in such cases, it would be inviting approbation. If the vices of the political or social system are to be considered a plea for withholding instruction, the more abased in wretchedness and oppression a country is, the less the quantity of knowledge which should be vouchsafed it. On this principle, the ignorance of Russia, so far from being a reproach, is in the eternal fitness of things. Ill housed, and ill fed, sharing unequally the fruits of their labour, the Irishman, on the same principle,

ought not to be instructed, lest he may become, by instruction, too sensitive to these miseries. The evil, on such a supposition, is not in their existence, but in his feeling. But it so happens, that these are precisely the things for the feeling of which he does not require your instruction. Suppress instruction as you may, you cannot suppress his physical nature. Read or not read, men are men: they feel the stings of hunger, and the shiverings of cold, and all the whips and scorns which an unemployed and suffering population are heirs to, without aid of slate or primer. To check this discontent, it will not be sufficient to check schools. You must go to a deeper remedy.* This done, as much discussion, as much inquiry, as much education, as you please. Confidence begets confidence; the lowest man in the state feels that he is working for himself. He obeys, but from love; he loves, but from conviction; he defends and supports, but it is from the deep sense that he is defending and supporting interests as dear to him, as to the first proprietor in the land. His very censure is useful to his rulers; it controls and enlightens. If he blames, it is to improve. To say that such a man, with all

* To those who consider Ireland incurable, I would recommend the following. It is a *British* experiment. Why should it not produce the same results in Ireland as in India? M. Jacquemont visited "Mhairwarrah, the former Abruzzi of Rajpootanah." He thus describes the change wrought in that hitherto savage district, by a *paternal*, but *energetic* government. "I saw a country whose inhabitants, since an immemorial time, had never had any other means of existence but plunder in the adjacent plains of Mahrwar and Maywar; a people of murderers now changed into a quiet, industrious, happy people of shepherds and cultivators. No Rajpoot, no Mogul emperors, had been ever able to subdue them: fourteen years ago, every thing was to be done with them; and since six or seven years every thing is done already. A single man has worked that wonderful miracle of civilisation: Major Henry Hall, &c. &c.; and without taking a single life." What was the process? "Major Hall did not *punish* the offenders; he removed the *cause* of the crime, and made the crime *useless*, even *injurious* to the offender; and it is *never more* committed." Now for the result. "Most of them had shed blood. They told me they knew no other mode of life. It was a most miserable one, by their account. They were naked and starving. Now, poor as is the soil of their small valley, and barren their hills, *every hand being set at work*, there is *plenty of clothes and of food*; and so sensible are they of the immense benefit conferred upon them by the British government, that willingly they pay to it a tribute of 500,000 francs, which they increase every year, as their national wealth admits of it."—*Jacquemont's Letters from India. Letter to M. V. de Tracy.*

his temporary follies and frenzies, will not in due time prove a better citizen, and in the end build up a wiser, freer, and better community than a heap of slaves, packed down quietly and mutely together, is to say that the fiery and impetuous charger promises worse, in the breaking, than the dull dray-horse, who does not, indeed, throw his rider, but is not likely in the hour of battle to bear him on.*

But this is still a partial view of its advantages. The anti-educationist takes it for granted that Education must be necessarily, under all circumstances, directed *against* government. Why may it not be exerted in its *support*? He assumes that it is the natural ally of the unprincipled and the turbulent. Its true nature is to detect and repress both. An instructed people will appeal from their passions to their reason, from the surface to the substance, from the mask to the man. No minister need ever hope to tranquillise, until he employs the People for his pacificators; but no people are competent to this duty, until they can understand the difference between their *false* and *true* interests. This understanding cannot be communicated by an act of parliament: it is the last crowning result of a long and laborious series of educational training.

But if such be the effects of Education, how comes it, it is asked, that they are not exhibited in Ireland? If Education could produce them, we surely have had enough. Yet what are the results? What is her social and political condition? What is her agricultural and commercial prosperity? her

* "Dr. Mandeville says, in the treatise I have just alluded to, 'If a horse knew as much as a man, I should not like to be his rider.' And he is right, not only for the reason which was in his mind, but for another also. It would be not only *unsafe*, but *unjust*, to treat a *rational being* (which on that supposition a horse would be) as a *slave*. A horse (or any other brute that we domesticate) is a slave: it may be treated with humanity and care; but it is governed and kept to work, not for its own benefit, but for its master's, to whom it belongs as property."

"If the lower orders are to be the property, the slaves of their governors, and to be governed, not for *their own advantage*, but entirely for the benefit of their rulers, then, no doubt, the more they are degraded towards the condition of brutes, the more likely they are to submit to this tyranny. But if they are to be governed as rational beings, the more rational they are made, the better subjects they will be of such a government." — *Archbishop Whateley. Sermon for the Benefit of the Halesworth and Chediston National School, 1830, p.15.*

literary celebrity? her public opinion? her domestic quiet? Will any man conscientiously say that, in any one of these respects, she is an object of envy to other civilised nations? Yet Ireland, it is urged, is educated — and over-educated. So far from having too little, she has had too much; instead of attempting to force Education forward, a rational man, and a true patriot, ought to seek rather to keep it back.

This would be quite right if the evils just mentioned could be traced to such a source. But the fact is, Ireland suffers not from over-education, but from half-education, and mis-education. Ireland is a reading and writing nation, but not an educated nation; she has a long way to travel to reach that happy consummation. Hitherto she has had to labour, not, indeed, against the want of a system, but, what is far worse, against the existence of a bad one. To this her present condition is distinctly to be ascribed. Reading and writing have been seized and applied, in their respective interests, by her several factions. They read, but read only what receives the “legatur” of the existing agitations. Hence her whole mind is, necessarily, partisan. The consequences are quite natural, and are every where conspicuous. But this is not the place to enter into these details. It is sufficient to recognise the existence of the malady, and to indicate its principle. In examining the character and process of Irish Education, we shall have ample opportunity of pursuing both farther. The evil, it will easily be perceived, lies, not in the minds, on which instruction operates, but in the nature of the instruction itself. The remedy is not in repressing, but in improving. It would be a fatal folly, indeed, to mistake the quantity for the quality — or to suppose, because Ireland has been ill instructed, she has been surfeited with instruction.

To believe the Irish papers, we should suppose this opinion had made some progress. Many now avow themselves “charitable” and “enlightened” enough to allow the Irish people an education. They think the barbarian should be civilised, and those who sit in darkness allowed to see the light. But when we apply for co-operation to these educationists, we find the only light which they patronise is one of their own kindling. They call this home-manufactory, national; and this

bigot-benevolence, Christian-love. We hear of the extraordinary anxiety of the people to be furnished with the exclusive merchandise. A little time and a closer approach dissipate the illusion. Closed schools, rejected grants, schoolmasters without scholars, and scholars without education, testify against them. The "patent article" does not sell. The fact is, an education which is not general, cannot be called a public education — an education which is not in conformity with the wants and wishes of the majority of a nation, is anti-national: it is the education of a party, and a monopoly: the education of a sect, and a persecution. The truly enlightened and truly charitable friends of Education must know, that there is nothing bestowed where nothing will be received. To proffer an education which must be refused, is to insult as well as to deny.*

On a serious consideration, then, of the circumstances of the times and country, I can discover no legitimate obstacle to the Universal Diffusion of Education; none, certainly, which, will not yield, if not to the vigorous intervention of the government and legislature, to the slow but certain agency of time. But this inquiry might have been almost spared. It seems to go upon the presumption, that Education can be stopped. The great absurdity of the anti-educationists is to believe their theory not only just, but practicable; not only that Education ought to be suspended, repressed, or prohibited, but that it *can*. This is a great error. Education is inevitable, as inevitable as the progress of steam and reform. Every thing in the past and present proclaims it. Every part of the great mass of civilised man is passing, in some way or other, through the process. How can it be otherwise? Give men faculties, and opportunities, — and advancement is unavoidable. "Forward!" is the strong cry of the human heart. This may not, at first, be perceptible. The valleys may still seem to sleep in darkness, but the day is on the high places; the noonday sun will, ere long, be felt in their deepest depths. The most indifferent objects are converted, by their magic touch, into utilities — from ap-

* This applies especially to the Mildare-street, and other preceding systems. The New system has for its chief object to remedy the defect.

parently the most worthless juices, we secrete nourishment and strength. These are not vague declamations, they are statistical as well as metaphysical facts. Indifferent as our education still is — limited as it is — it still evinces a great increase in numbers, and a still greater improvement in discipline. Proselytism, religious and political, has everywhere pressed into its service the new power. This is natural. The rivalry of sect with sect requires recruits, instructed as well as zealous. Nor is this limited to schools — to education, technically so called. It is perceptible in every walk of life. The club, the reading-room, the newspaper, the magazine, the mechanics' institute, the public meeting, are all educators. In every transaction, the schoolmaster's voice, loud or low, is heard. Those who reason on the intellectual and moral changes through which we are passing, for the most part, however, make this mistake, they confine themselves to home. They argue as if we were existing *in vacuo*; as if there were no crossing, counteracting, influencing atoms around us. They carry with them all the old prepossessions of our insular situation, when we were truly an island — when our wooden walls were not only bulwarks, but separations; and our institutions and habits not conductors but repellents to neighbouring mind. That time is past: not merely because war has ceased, but because the effective communion of nations has commenced. Countries begin to know their real interests, and will not easily allow themselves to be again played against each other, gladiator-like, for the sport of their masters. We are gradually forming a large European family; whatever vibrates at one end of the web, must inevitably be felt at the other. It is idle, then, to think of legislating and governing by ourselves. The thoughts and words of others burn and speak in us, even when most we believe that we are ourselves alone. Other countries are advancing before us. They are educating their people in mass, whilst we hesitate whether we should suffer ours to educate themselves one by one. This cannot continue. One wheel in the great machine cannot stand still, while all the others are impelled onward. England will not be kept behind Europe. Toryism itself will not hang behind England. The Tory of to-day would not

be recognised by the Tory of yesterday. While he protests against innovation, he is an innovator. Much as he vaunts his doctrine, he would be sorry to see it in deed. It would imply stagnation, retrocession, inferiority. Tory as he is, he is too sincere a lover of this soil of Britain to desire its degradation. But be that as it may, Education, with or without him, like a strong man late aroused from sleep, walks on. We cannot prevent, we may direct. Men and women will read : we can teach them *what* to read, and whatever they read to read *well*. Thus far extends our power, no farther. Mis-education may be checked, but not Education.

I stated, in the beginning of this chapter, reasoning on preceding facts and arguments, that Education was a benefit, a necessity, a right : the modifications arising from difference of order, country, and political circumstances, so far from militating against this position, confirm it. They not only admit the Universal Diffusion of Education, but absolutely require it. Whilst, then, I am for its highest improvement, I am also for its widest extension. In one word, I am, with Dr. Chalmers, for the utmost possible illumination, not only of the popular, but of the entire national mind. Whatever is less than this, is defect. No order, no sect, no class of men, can be in future left out. The whole world is hurrying on ; if one class would prevent another from pressing and trampling on them, the only way to effect it is to press onward themselves. If they would still retain their superiority, let them convince themselves it can only be done by bringing new claims into the market, not by lingering with the old. A system of Education which does not favour this progression is an anarchy. It heaps class on class : by keeping any one stationary, it dashes the others against it. An education, which professes to provide for the order, interests, and happiness of a country, must therefore provide not only for *all the faculties* of each particular man, but for *every particular man* in the country. Such an education is, in itself, not only *enlightenment*, but *order*. It is only when it departs from, or does not reach this, that evils follow. It is only then that the struggle between young and old, between experience and adventure, between the downward stream of habit and the

NATIONAL EDUCATION SHOULD BE SUPPORTED

CHAP. III.

NATIONAL EDUCATION SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH PERMANENT MEANS FOR ITS SUPPORT.

“ Every school that is established, every child that is educated, every log school-house that is built, are *new and additional pledges* for the *perpetuation*, and the *growth*, and the *moral influence* of your institutions.” KENTUCKY REPORT.

“ Lords and Commons of England! consider what nation it is whereof ye are, and whereof ye are the governors: a nation not slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious, and piercing spirit; acute to invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse; not beneath the reach of any point the highest that human capacity can soar to. What wants there to such a towardly and pregnant soile, but *wise and faithful labourers* to make a *knowing people*, a *nation of prophets*, of *sages*, and of *worthies*.” MILTON.

THE Education which embraces in the most perfect way the whole man, we have called a Good Education; applied to every individual in the nation, a National Education. The question now is, how this education may be best supported.

But what do we mean by *best*?

It cannot apply exclusively to the most economical system. Such a thing as *gratuitous* education, strictly such, is scarcely to be found. Alter the form as much as you please, let the support come from voluntary societies or benevolent landlords, from the state or from the people, MONEY there must be, in some shape or other, and coming from some person or the other, before the machine can be set in motion. This cannot be prevented by any expedient; all that can be effected is, that the monies so coming be applied to the purposes designed by the contributors, and in the manner the best calculated to work them out. Of course *economy* enters here; for lavish expenditure, either of private or public funds, implies diversion from their true object, ignorance, negligence, or corruption in the application. So far, economy is necessary; to carry it farther would be impolicy. A mistaken

economy, in such a case as that of education, is a great folly and a great cruelty. It is a folly, because, truly speaking, it is not economy: it generates disorder, and then expends to put it down; but regiments cost more than schools, and special commissions not less than regiments: to save pence, it expends pounds, shillings, and pence: it reduces the school-master's salary by a few hundreds, and lavishes millions on barracks and constables. It is a cruelty; for it produces vice, and then punishes it; it erects gibbets, and supplies them with malefactors; it renders crime inevitable, and then rages against criminals. There should be enough, but neither more nor less than enough. If economy be essential, it is this alone which should be called economy.

But a system of education, however efficient, which does not last, or, however lasting, which is not efficient, is a system either ill-established, or ill-supported. To establish well, and to support well, two qualities are demanded, efficiency and durability.

The best plan, then, for the maintenance of a "National System of Education," is that which, while it does not neglect *economy*, provides that such system shall be *efficient*, and *durable*.

But how effect this? Shall it be provided by "the individual," or "the public;" by "the state," by "the people," or by "both?"

This is a material question. Accordingly, it has engaged not only the attention of private individuals, philosophising in their closets, but of nations legislating in their senates. Scarcely a country in Europe pursues, in this particular, a uniform conduct. America alone offers exemplifications of all three, frequently in the body of the same state, sometimes even of the same townland.

This arises as much from original circumstances of manners and habits, over which philosophy and government either could not, or would not, exercise any control, as from any existing peculiarities of character in the people, or any particular adaptation of this or that system to their social organisation. Nor is necessary to look much beyond ourselves for illustrations of each of these circumstances. Our own country

furnishes as much diversity in character and institution as could possibly be desired for any experiment. We deal, however, for the present with theory. Our argument confines itself to *à priori* reasonings. We shall pass subsequently to illustrations. They are to be found in abundance in most of the education systems of Europe.

The general tendency of our government and people is to leave every thing as much as possible to *individual* capacity and exertion. That this is wise in a community such as England, in an age such as ours, reason and experience seem to demonstrate. No state, however enlightened, or liberal, can measure the means and adaptations of individuals with the same accuracy as the individual himself. Self-love, where knowledge guides, is an infallible instinct, which no legislative knowledge can surpass, or supply. All that the state can, or ought to do in such instances, is to shovel away obstacles. The well, once disembarassed of the stifling sand, will find its way in a river over the plain. Let society work of itself—together, and in good time, it will join and bind with “a curious felicity,” a self-knit permanency which no state-joiner, however cunning, can hope to achieve. Prohibitions, bounties, protections, are the awkward expedients of impatience or arrogance; they would help on society faster than it can go. The boy plants a bean, and takes it up to see how it advances; he handles and forces nature, and nature, in return, sends him up a sickly and stunted plant. How many trades and occupations which, left to the silent vigour of their own nature, defended from the protection of government, might ere this have spread out into the fulness of true strength! In an evil hour government insists on-encouraging them; they take up the bean, and kill it, in their anxiety to make it grow. The state garden is generally behind that, of its neighbours. It has not the “*spiritus intus alens*” of wholesome vegetation. Nor is the public less injured. Preference to one is proportionate injury to others. It often transfers the rewards of industry and genius to inactivity and incapacity. England contrasted to France, both to Austria and Russia, are examples. In England every thing is done by the *People*, and belongs to the People: it is “ours;” a glorious title, which

breathes of the commonwealth, and more than aught else insures ardent and universal effort, certain and constant security. It is a community of goods on a large scale; every man feels that the country depends upon him, as much as he upon the country; kings are the crowning sanction, but not the essential of these enjoyments. The deep foundations are laid in the popular heart and hand. But in countries where every thing is "royal" or "imperial," where the all-absorbing ONE meets you at every step, from the grain of salt to the marshalling of millions, — where the People, even in what is destined for themselves, are seldom called in to take their part, these improvements, not being grafted on the only trunk which is immortal, generally dwindle, or drop off with their royal or imperial stem. Temples and palaces may flourish under such systems; but the People will dress ill, and feed worse, so long as they thus lean, exclusively, upon a master. The thousand comforts of domestic life, the result of centuries, the growth of a policy from which deviation in general has proved an injury, are subjects of just triumph. This system was not an accident. It came slowly, it was slowly received. It was the reward of repeated trial, and unceasing effort. It is now recognised as part and parcel of the venerable wisdom of the land.*

* The English are essentially an *experimental* people, even in their pursuit of abstract science. It is the natural result of their commercial and manufacturing occupations; they, in turn, owe much of their improvement to this matter-of-fact tendency. The French, on the contrary, treat even the most obvious facts with the pomp and circumstance of abstract science, "involving," as Professor Leslie complains, "the plainest truths of mechanics in the intricacies of algebraical formulas." — *Dissertation Fourth* (prefixed to the seventh edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*), exhibiting a general View of the Progress of Mathematical and Physical Science, chiefly during the Eighteenth Century, p. 616. If we are to judge of each mode by its results, we need not blush for our country. Our suspension-bridges, rail-roads, and steam-machinery, may bear a favourable comparison with those of France. Our suspension-bridges have evinced, without exception, the soundness of the system on which they have been constructed; whilst that of M. Navier, opposite the Hôtel des Invalides, at Paris, with every advantage of the most profound investigation of the theory of these structures, fell in from so simple a cause as the giving way of the attachments of the chains. What share the policy, or habit, noticed in the text, of leaving much to the ingenuity and activity of the people themselves, may have had in producing this pre-

It may then be asked, if such be the case in almost every object of social life,—if, in so many instances, both public and individual gain by open and general competition,—why should *Education alone* be made an object of government protection and management? Why should it not rather be left to individual effort and intelligence? There is no reason, surely; why the laws of demand and supply should in this instance be different from what they are in every other. If there be the want in the country, there will be the desire to satisfy it; and if there be the desire, no great time can elapse before the means of gratifying it will exist also. In one word, if the nation be sincerely anxious for education, it will look for it, as it looks for an increased quantity of Baltic timber, or of French wines. An education market will be opened; the quantity and quality, like that of every other merchandise, will be regulated according to the quantity and quality of the public want. If, then, it be found injurious to force a market on the public—to glut them with articles not required, or of a finer quality than what the means of the community can pay for, is it less absurd to compel them to take in more education than they may desire, or of a description which is above their exigencies or capacity? Is it not against all principles of political economy, mental science, and common justice, thus to attempt forcing on them a supply for which there is no demand? is it not ridiculous to drug men with instruction when the thirst and hunger for instruction are wanting? You may make canals, as in Ireland; but it is another matter to create commerce for them, when made. It would be much wiser to wait till the commerce first existed, and then leave the commerce to create the canals. Instead, then, of establishing boards and inspectors, of voting large sums of money for the building of schools and the remuneration of schoolmasters, instead of legislative enactments and government instruction,

ference for the *practical*, is an interesting subject for discussion, both to the metaphysician and the statesman, but beyond the limits of this work. See, also, the Baron Dupin's recent observations, on the superior excellence and extent of English roads.

would it not be better to leave the whole, like the fisheries, or the linen trade, or the silk trade, or any other trade, simply and wholly to itself, and trust to the growing necessities of civilisation for a demand in this luxury, as in every other, and, as an inevitable consequence, for an ample supply amongst the people themselves, whenever such demand shall chance to appear?

It must be admitted, there is some ground for this reasoning in theory; neither is it altogether contradicted by experience. The reports of the American States, where education is understood most to flourish, though varying on the point, suggest some reason, at least, for hesitation. It has been found in some cases, as in New York, that, with all the efforts of government, Education did not advance faster, or was of a better character, than when left exclusively to its own efforts. In Sweden, the provinces where education is altogether in the hands of the People, and unaffected by any ministerial interference, bear a rather creditable comparison to those in which a contrary system prevails. In the Netherlands, the Philosophical Colleges, avowed government establishments, did not succeed. Something of a similar remark has been made on the Primary and Secondary schools in France. But we need not travel for illustrations beyond Ireland. Her government education, up to a late period, has been a series of failures. All this renders at first sight dubious the policy of taking such institutions out of the hands of individuals, to vest them, either partially or exclusively, in the hands of the government.

But let us now turn to the other side of the question. The force of the above argument, in a great degree, depends upon the justice of the analogy between Education and other articles of demand and supply. But is the analogy just? A good metaphor is not necessarily good logic. Is Education to be compared to the ordinary articles of commerce? Is it to be considered in the light of mercery, jewellery, and hardware? Is its demand or supply to be measured by the laws which regulate that of other markets? Is it not rather to be regarded in the same point of view with the Police, with the distribution of Justice, with all that immediately belongs to the

government and administration of a country.* In the preceding chapter it has been shown, that Education not only acts as a Police, but as the most effective of all police — that which prevents, instead of correcting, and precludes the necessity of punishing, by eradicating crime. Now if Government be allowed to assume, without imputation, the ordering and management of one, there is surely no reason why it should not be permitted the management of the other. No government, no people, could, for a moment, think of applying the above reasoning to its armed force or courts of justice. No government could afford to wait, in these matters, until the people should call for them. A barbarous nation would never call; or so slowly, that it would nearly amount to the same thing. The very delay would continue the barbarism; it would more and more adjourn the demand. Such cases require the *direct* intervention of the legislator. It is his duty to see that the people, whether they like it or not, be saved from misery and crime. * Habits are of slow growth, and often of very accidental formation. It is the duty of the legislator to see that the habits formed be good habits; that they be formed with certainty, and with as much rapidity as may be consistent with that certainty. It is his duty, if the people be reluctant or sluggish, to induce or compel the people to these habits, in the same manner that he requires from them other duties and sacrifices, equally necessary for the good of all. No mercy is shown in the hour of pestilential epidemic to the ease, pretensions, or scruples of the individual; all obstacles are swept away, and wisely swept away, before the paramount interests of the community. The uneducated may complain that they are compelled to education: the criminal might, with as good

Germany has not only adopted government interference in *practice*, but reduced it into *principle*, as we shall see later. — Schwartz, *Die Schulen*, p. 310. Zachariä, *Vierzig Bücher vom Staate*, 1830, § 128. This latter, a lawyer, argues the question as a principle of law? He grounds it on the right which the state already exercises in the disposal of lunatics, idiots, &c. as well as police. "Man kann hinzufügen, dass die Kinder der Unterthanen zugleich als *Landeskinder* zu betrachten sind. Ganz so hat sich der Staat auch der Geistesschwachen, der Gemüthskranken, der Taub- und Stummgeborenen, u. s. w. anzunehmen." With this view Schwartz coincides, extending it to Vaccination, to precautions against epidemics, &c.

reason, complain that he is compelled to reform. The instructed and moral should not be exposed to the contagion either of ignorance or vice. If sacrifices are to be made, they should be made by those who ought to make them: there is no reason why the sound and deserving should be surrendered to the caprices of the worthless and corrupt. The very object of all government is nothing but this; and its goodness or badness is chiefly to be measured by the greater or less certainty in effecting it. Courts of justice, the public force, prison discipline, are some of the means which it employs for this purpose; Education and religious instruction, others: when well conducted, they are the most powerful of all. Indeed, the real power of any depends principally upon Education. Habitual obedience to the laws, reverence for the authority of government — which in a free state ought to be no other than the collective authority of the people themselves,—against the aggressions of individuals, is the most important of all lessons. Where this is firmly implanted, the constable's staff is more potent than parks of artillery. A wise parent does not allow his children to run waste and wild, until nature shall cry within them for moral and intellectual food. In some children, no doubt, such impulses are strong and early; in others late, or not at all. Government has the experience and authority of a parent, and is called on to begin. The theory which says, "I will make no roads until there first shall be markets," says,—only in other words, — "I will make no roads at all." Wherever roads have been made, markets have followed. The wholesome circulation has flowed, the moment the ligament has been taken off; industry has found a vent, capital a convenient investment. Had government waited until the People had called for roads, until they had felt their necessity, or were provided with the means of making them, years might have elapsed before the road would even have been thought of. Nor would this delay have been immaterial. It would be equivalent to so much positive loss. The public purse would have been defrauded of such amount of capital as would equal the sum which might have been accumulated by the making of the road in the interval. The individual would suffer not less than the state. His productive powers might as well not

exist; for he would not feel it necessary to call them into action. Men do not always know their wants,—they must be shown them: it is only by having gratified them, they folly feel the desire of gratifying them again. Apply this to Education. There are parishes where no sort of intellectual communication, no idea of the utility of education, exists. In others, there is a vague and dusky idea of its advantages; but, from poverty or indolence, want of means, or want of exertion, it leads to nothing. In either of these cases, the chance of such communication being speedily established by the inhabitants themselves must be faint. Yet, until it be established, what a loss! what a robbery, if so I may express it, of intellectual capital! How many new wants, new desires, new efforts of the moral and mental being, in case it had been established, might, in the interval, have sprung up! How many new markets for the intellect and virtue of the population might successively have been opened! Such is the march of all ordinary industry; how much more so of that in which every species is combined! Is it not civilisation, in its thousand kindly beauties and glories? Is it not improvement, peace, security, in their strongest, yet gentlest, shapes? What government, except a despotic one, imagining its power dependent on the blindness of its servants, would think it just or politic to “bind such influences up?” Why, then, should they not encourage them? Why should they not open the road? Why should they not insinuate the want? Why not develop the desire? Why not extend and strengthen the power? Why not guide to the enjoyment? It is true, indeed, that poverty may ultimately yield to industry: in some thirty years, the peasant may be enabled to purchase what you must now bestow; but why wait for these thirty years? How much sooner will he be enabled to purchase, if Government will give him the means for a time! The very want of means is concomitant, not only with a want of Education, but with a due sense of its utility. Such sense cannot be communicated by any other master than experience. The intellectual, in this, has an advantage over the physical: of no other appetite can it be said, with so much truth, “l'appétit vient en mangeant.”

These observations, it is true, are more especially applicable to countries where a general and strong effort is required. Yet their adoption is not to be confined to such cases only : they have been tried under the most contrasted periods and circumstances. We shall see Russia and the New England States, at opposite sides of the political scale, acting, in this instance, on the same principle, and with the same success. — If in Ireland the interference of Government has failed, it must be attributed much more to the nature of the government, than to the good or evil of government interference in itself. Education was not only used exclusively for government purposes, but these purposes were anti-national, anti-educational, local, temporary, sectarian, corrupt. The object was to generate a pattern set of state doctrines, a Pretorian band of opinions, around state abuses; not to excite a wholesome spirit of thinking and acting in the entire body of the state. Hence, while they taught Protestants anti-Catholicism, they took little care to teach Catholics at all. It would be as senseless to argue from such a case against Government interference, as against Education itself.

The argument thus preponderates in favour of State Management; but the good or evil, as we have just seen, solely depends upon what description of management that may be. There is a wide difference between admitting a principle, and admitting its applications. The applications, in this instance, may be very various. A government may take the whole national education into its hands, and compel, by severe penalties, every individual not only to frequent its shop, but to frequent no other; or it may interfere, by supporting and regulating, without monopolising, or compelling exclusive attendance on its schools; or, allowing competition, it may still require attendance at some public establishment, as the condition for obtaining its rewards; or, leaving this to the option of its people, it may limit its interference to simple support and regulation; or, it may content itself with support, without insisting on regulation; or, finally, it may limit this support to occasional and conditional aid. All these are different modifications, differing in very great degree, to be determined by time, place, and other adventitious circumstances.

If Education should not be trusted *exclusively to the People*, still less should it be trusted *exclusively to the Government*. Monopoly, of all kinds, is odious and pernicious. It begins by attacking the public in favour of the individual, and ends by injuring the individual himself. It overshadows, whilst it imagines it protects: if it shuts out the rude visitings of the elements, it shuts out the sunshine too. It would prevent man from walking, lest he should dash his foot against a stone. It dulls ingenuity, numbs effort, quenches desire, checks discovery, restricts civilisation: it tames down society to a machine. If this be true in the walks of commerce, how much truer in the domains of mind! Commerce, at the sight of shackles, "spreads its light wings, and in a moment flies." Mind, if possible, is more fastidious: it droops beneath command, or rebels; it flings off all control, or falls a slave at the chariot wheel. Either of these evils is great. In the one case all knowledge dies; in the other, it becomes a base and dangerous tool. In Ireland the experiment was tried. The Government set up its exclusive manufactory of mind, fenced it round with immunities, and discouraged competition. Did the monopoly flourish? Just as much as all other monopolies. The people, rather than take the article from the Government, set up an article of their own. Even where it was admitted, what did it produce? An evil and unhealthy uniformity. Minds were thrown into the government furnace, and out they came exclusionists, jobbers, Pharisees, after their rulers' own hearts. Yet what department of our institutions ought to be more free? To grind ideas for millions, after the one mercantile type, is stopping short in the onward progress of civilisation. It establishes ancient Egypt in the midst of modern Europe, perpetuates a series of intellectual castes, shuts up knowledge into a sacred science, and erects teachers into a sort of government priests. Such an education would not only be a reflection of the existing abuses of Government, but a permanent bar to their correction. It would act in a vicious circle. In a despotism it would perpetuate tyranny by perpetuating slaves; in a free government it could not, consistently with freedom, endure many years. Next to the imposing a particular church, the imposing, per-

force, a particular education is a grievance. It is the imposing of prohibitions in that very department in which, of all others, it is most difficult to prevent smuggling. What a host of officials becomes instantly requisite, what a preventive service of placemen and churchmen (an espionage to which all others are light), to detect and denounce every shred of knowledge which does not bear the government stamp ! The contraband article becomes more valued from the moment it becomes contraband : its price rises with the efforts made to shut it out. To circulate a book in Italy, advertise it in the Index : to crowd a conventicle in England, attempt to put it down. Nor is the utter inefficacy of this intellectual police the only absurdity. The Government sets up as professor general of morality : and what a growth of lies, evasions, duplicities, perversions, the natural consequences of all preventive systems, it immediately produces under its protecting and prohibitory rule ! It might be expected that there would be some balance of good in return,—that the mental food provided would at least be worth all this cost. It is quite the reverse. *Exclusive* Government Education does not even answer the purposes for which it is designed. It is soon converted into a job, of course an expensive one, and thus strikes at the root of every principle upon which a true system of national education ought to repose. It does not even deserve the name ; it is necessarily a fractional, separatist, sectarian, oligarchical, and not a national, education. Even where Government has succeeded in establishing it, this very character will render its permanence dubious. Negligence on one side—on the other, hostility and activity—will not allow the exclusive government system to prosper. It soon falls into a plethora of wealth and indolence ; and if it does not perish of its own lethargy, ere long its more vigorous rivals, always on the watch, always increasing in zeal as in energy, soon seize the happy moment to twist it from its seat, and to set up with the accumulated advantages of popular partiality in its place. This is the history of all *exclusive* corporations, from the patrician corporation of Rome to the ecclesiastical corporation of the Church of England. .. Change their names and means as you may,—the evil flaw of *exclusion* and *monopoly*

allowed to remain,—they must die the death of their predecessors, and perish by having too much to enjoy, too little to do.

If, therefore, I should be sorry to leave education solely to the management of the People, I should feel not less reluctant to intrust it solely to the management of the Government. I would not have exclusion any where. Government should not be allowed to monopolise, but it should be invited to interfere. All portions of the state should co-operate; but the guiding, controlling, and governing portion should do more—it should guide, control, and govern Education. Of what nature and extent this should be, still remains to be determined.

Now this must vary considerably in different states and at different periods. There are, however, certain conditions common to all, which cannot be neglected in the consideration of any. The first of these is an immediate deduction from the principles just noticed. If Government interfere, it should be beneficially. To interfere beneficially, it should have, in the first instance, the co-operation of the People. Without the co-operation of the People it is obvious that all interference of Government, whatever may be its intentions, must be powerless or pernicious. Such interference would differ little from the monopoly, and exclusion condemned above. It is nearly the same thing whether Government prevents the People from taking advantage of the means offered, or offers them an article which the People either do not want, or do not like. No manufacturer would act on this principle; if he did, his customers would not be so likely to yield, as the manufacturer to fail. But when I say the People, I mean the People. I do not mean a portion, much less a very small portion, of the People; much less that portion which is comparatively independent of education, and which can always, wherever competition is allowed, with or without Government, obtain it. I mean the whole, if possible, but, at all events, the clear majority; above all, that portion which, from greater ignorance and fewer means, is in most need of education. It is quite essential to the success of any system of National Education, that this portion, at least, of the nation should co-operate. But how win their co-ope-

ration? Is a government, which should enlighten and *teach*, to yield to the prejudices and follies of a people, who *are to be taught*? Were the private master so to act, he might, no doubt, be sufficiently acceptable to the idle scholar; but, in return, what would the scholar gain from such a master? To win the co-operation of his pupil, unwise and servile crouching to his follies and prejudices is however by no means requisite. At the same time, there is not more necessity for rudely thwarting them. They should be gently removed, not forcibly pushed aside. There are even prejudices which may be won to the opposite ranks; follies which, by a little management, Wisdom may not disdain to employ as her handmaids. No obstacle which can be removed ought to be allowed to remain; but neither ought any obstacle to be raised, to exhibit merely our strength and agility in overleaping or removing it. These obstacles and prejudices, with patience, and justice, and time, but above all, with the spread of knowledge itself, will be easily got rid of; but each of these conditions is requisite. The interference of Government must be a just interference, a patient, and a wise, and a slow,—it must be a really enlightened and enlightening interference. Its plan, whatever it may be, must be impartial towards all, and impartial in every particular. The State ought to have no favourites—no pets. There ought to be, in this matter at least, no primogeniture; no English to the exclusion of Irish, no Protestant Jacob to whom the Esau of Irish Catholicism should bow. Education should not be of *any* colour, but susceptible of *all*. If this be once admitted, justice must follow. Under such a system, there will be no jostling of rival institutions for the annual parliamentary grant; no summing up of so much party zeal and sectarian intolerance, as so many items in the account, as so many claims (instead of the real discharge of real duties) for the monies of the State. The true emblem of a free state is the civic oaken crown in one hand, and the military laurel crown in the other, with the inscription of *FOR ALL* at the base. The People should not be forced to wear any livery, or to receive any franchise, right, or privilege, as the bribe or reward of partisanship. Their claim is simple. Education is not the property of Government; it is their own. Its

end is to make better citizens and better subjects; it should be co-extensive with citizenship and allegiance. They pay, and should be repaid; they give, and they should receive. Government is the steward, and has for the proper management of the funds its per centage; but, because it is allowed this per centage, it is not to be permitted to distribute the funds otherwise than the rightful owners desire. It is downright fraud to take from all, and to give only to a few. It was this which made Irish education, in the first instance, a robbery, and then an oppression. The people claimed either to have their own money back in order to apply it to such purposes themselves, or at least to be protected from persecution carried on with their own money. Both were refused. The Government education went on; the national money was spent; but the People remained not only ignorant, but became discontented. Such a system was stupidity and injustice, bad government and bad education.

Government interference must be *patient* and *gradual*. Too violent a change, too sudden an effort to rouse sympathies not yet awake, will not do. It is ineffectual and injurious, bad philosophy and bad policy. The co-operation of the public, if rudely summoned, will not come. Too strong a tone of authority rouses suspicion; suspicion, in a community where competition is free, soon grows into hostility. The People cannot comprehend, at first, the meaning of such call; they do not understand the necessity of education, — they have not experienced its want or use. The first duty, then, of Government, is to inspire this feeling. This cannot be accomplished without some knowledge, and more time. Compulsory enactments are, for this reason, more likely to be effective in an *advanced*, than in an *early* stage of education. The reason is obvious. In every man already educated, there is an ally. One of the strongest effects of education is to convince a man, every hour of his life, in every faculty, of its value. This value makes him earnest for its improvement and extension; and the more convinced, the more earnest will he be. Compulsory laws, in such a stage, will only act against the stragglers. The great mass of the community will give their sanction; the few reluctants must obey. In such a stage,

compulsion will succeed.* It will complete, in a short period, what might otherwise have taken much trouble and too much time. In the very beginning of education, on the contrary, another course must be adopted. It is then, that gentleness and persuasion,—that gradual, almost imperceptible, developments, — that rewards, that solicitations, that patient and persevering approaches, through the predilections, and prejudices, and even passions of the country,—must be the main instruments. The purblind must not be confounded by too abrupt a rush of light. They must be brought from greater darkness to lesser; from night to twilight, from twilight to day. They must have time to taste, in order to like: they must be allowed to digest, before it can be expected the food will nourish. Habits must be allowed quietly, but firmly, to form and fix. Like the conversion of wood into stone, time it is, the unceasing action of the one cause, which steals away the old material, and insensibly deposits the new. So should it be with government: the old man must, almost unknown to the being itself, be gradually melted off, and the new as gradually, particle by particle, be deposited and steadied in its place. It is after years that the change is felt: the living machine grows into reasoning man. No harsh and sweeping ordinances should then, unnecessarily, proceed from Government: abuses should be dissipated, rather than excised. The savage should be considered, even in his shyness; he should be won over by kindness, and not violently driven forward to the genial uses of civilised life. Government should study for this, in the first place, the nature and habits of its people, — how formed, by what circumstances, in what seasons; how much is owing to primitive organisation, how much to the after action of social or political life. It should thoroughly sift, and perfectly understand all this, — the men, the place, the times. The sluggish, who require the spur, are not to be treated as the hot and heedless, who require the bit. One community may lie in the thick and confirmed obstruc-

* See the conduct of Prussia, in her provinces on the Rhine. She enforced Education in the hereditary dominions, where it had long been established; in the newly acquired territory, where the reverse was the case, she *invited* it.

ion of ignorance, and be well content to wallow, at ease, in that oblivious pool; another may be rushing on, very fearlessly, no doubt, but very blindly, to the goal, and, from its very impetuosity, be every moment in danger of dashing against the post. One must be shaken vigorously from its torpor; the other requires little more than to be directed in its course. To one, premiums, inducements, penalties, must be held forth; to the other, advice simply, and information. The neglect of these considerations is the fertile principle of most of the disappointments and failures we daily meet with. If, on one side, by too sudden and rigid a mode of proceeding, the hostility of large portions of the country is likely to be excited; so, on the other, by too immediate and lavish a concession to applications, a corresponding negligence and apathy are produced. The bread of labour is, of all others, the sweetest. What a class, or individual, attains by a wish only, is soon supposed to be scarcely worth the wish. What contrasts exist between mountainous and valley districts! The mountain is poor, but the inhabitant is always industrious, and generally comfortable; the plain is rich, but the inhabitant is generally indolent, and frequently poor. Difficulties overcome beget a facility in overcoming difficulties: a valuable habit is far more valuable than any single acquisition to which it may lead. Nor is this all. There is another motive for activity, another guarantee for security. The acquisitions of joint exertion are joint property; for this joint property there will necessarily be a joint zeal. If the people receive *all* from government and give *nothing* for what they receive; if they have only to *ask* for education in order to obtain it; if they have not even to ask, but merely to *accept*; on all the principles of human nature, the people will value little the gift so proffered, even should they accept it; and, valuing it but little, will feel little careful to turn it to account. It will, in every sense, be a mere Government education, the property of Government, not theirs; it will be an easily acquired education, therefore despised; it will be an education which they did not set up, and which they do not think themselves called on to maintain. But, besides this, there will be another evil. Such an education is a gratuity,—it is a charity: what

the poor-house loaf is in a physical sense, this is in a spiritual, — the unearned bread of sloth and mendicancy. He who receives it, stamps himself a pauper. This humbles, degrades, demoralises. If in one sense it is education, it is anti-education in another. Self-respect and self-control, the two great reciprocal springs of the entire machine, are broken or blunted. How inconsistent to teach, in words, the duty of labour, the sweetness of honest acquirement, the honour of well-sustained independence; and in deeds, that labour may be a duty, but it shall not be required; that honest acquirement may be a pleasure, but it shall be discouraged; that independence may be an honour, but it shall not be permitted! The taint of such contradictions will cling to it. It will be taken thanklessly by the idle, and reluctantly by the industrious. Half the grace and utility of the gift will be lost by this fatal association with alms-houses, overseers, and settlements. Education, to be such in its useful and honourable sense, should be rescued from all humiliating defilements. It should be set up over all the grovelling passions of our nature, a rich prize for those who know how to woo and win it; easily attainable to the rich, not beyond the reach of the poor, but from both requiring sacrifice; both *giving*, that both may *receive*.

The People should, then, be called on, as well as the Government, to contribute their funds and exertions to the establishment and maintenance of Public Education. The amount and proportion of such contributions must depend on circumstances. They should be regulated by time, place, and means; by the peculiar position of the respective countries and classes for whom the education is designed. This matter will be discussed when we treat of application: we are here limited to theory.

But the calling on the People to *contribute to the support of Education*, either in funds or exertions, necessarily implies a permission to the People *to interfere in the management and control of both funds and education*. This is but strict justice. However applied, the money still belongs to them. Government cannot, without risk of nullifying its own pretensions, and injuring instead of serving Education, reject this claim.

Nor is it only strict justice, but strict policy. More efficient means for "utilising" the system cannot be devised. By requiring contributions and co-operation, you put in action all the stimulants of property; you allow the People,* by sharing in the management, to evince how strongly and beneficially such stimulants can act. No funds are more liberally contributed than those given by the People.* No institutions are managed better than those where the People themselves are invited to intervene. Contrast Corporation with Subscription Institutions. On which side do the advantages of economy, efficiency, and utility generally lie? One is generally a job, the committee property of a few: there are too many and different interests concerned in the other, to allow jobbing to go on in peace. A constantly urging motive for surveillance is kept up. Every man is resolved to have the full value of his money, his share of importance, for the share of funds or trouble which he gives. This is eminently an English passion. It is a symptom of frugality and accumulation, of persevering and successful industry, every where to be hailed and encouraged as a sign of the best social health. It is true, indeed, that this intervention is often more controlling than directive: business cannot easily be done by multitudes; and the fact is, in the long run, no business is so done. The multitude always devolve the management to others, after the first novelty is over, and seldom resume their functions unless specially summoned by some very urgent circumstance. This even in the most democratic states is visible; often more visible than in aristocracies themselves. In every assembly there is sure to be a Hume, who does not usurp public matters, but to whom public matters gradually fall. The crowd reserve only their tribunitian or veto power; they allow the machine to go on, until they receive a jerk. Such an arrangement combines as many advantages, and as few disadvantages, as possible. Business is done with precision and activity; vigilance is exercised, in every question and account, over the

* It is an old remark that countries with representative institutions are much more heavily taxed than countries without them. The People tax themselves. It is not the amount, but the mode; the robbery of a penny is felt more than the gift of a pound.

“why” and the “when.” To the village as to the town, to the country as to the capital, such organisation is applicable. How it shall be applied,—how participation shall be shared, and powers distributed,—must depend on the question, how far this right has been purchased by contribution, and how well it can be exercised; in other words, the contribution on one hand, and the capabilities on the other, should be the measure of the proportion which the People should bear with the Government. It is obvious that this proportion, as well as that of the funds and co-operation from which they spring, must eventually be determined by actual and local peculiarities.

But the management is not intrusted to either Government or People for the mere self-gratification of power. It is not sufficient to show that it is every way practicable; it must be proved, by the benefits it tends to confer, that it is worth reducing to practice. It must be proved that Government interference is calculated to procure advantages to the People. Unless this be effected, no matter how generously, mildly, and unostentatiously it be exercised, the People will reject it as a clog. What, then, are these advantages? how are the People to be persuaded they are such? To persuade the People, there is, in the long run, but one expedient—“*Esse quam videri*”—to *be* rather than *seem*. Give the People decided and unquestionable proof; and, no matter what may be their resistance at first, in the end they will acquiesce. Knowledge itself, as it advances, will wash the blindness from their eyes. If Truth be with you, the very light you spread will more clearly show the crowd that it is Truth. But TRUTH *it must be*;—government must not be an empiric. Solid, downright, intelligible truth, must be the indispensable characteristic of all its improvements. All experiments for winning the People by ingenuities, and surprises,—knacks at educating, as children are wheedled into study by toy-things,—are not only absurd, not only an oporose kind of idleness, but a serious and lasting injury, both to Government and People. They abridge immeasurably the power to do, and the disposition to accept, good. Fresh attempts, even when judicious, are embarrassed with difficulties by such a course; the wisest arrangement seems

only an accident, a felicitous blunder into good, an unconscious jerk into common sense. Truth, then,—truth first, and truth last,—ought to be the directing principle of all Government management. This truth must be sought by patient, minute, dispassionate inquiry, until found: when found, by calm but firm resolution, despite of party clamour, convenience, or time, it must be effectually reduced to practice. A Government which will not, or cannot, do both, ought not to interfere at all. No evil, in these matters, is worse than oscillation between good and bad principles; the loosening and tightening the reins by caprice or chance; the impelling forward the People towards certain hopes, and then pulling them back, through fear or sloth, to leave them in the same or a worse state than they were before. A government, which has finally made up its mind to take upon itself so important, but so difficult, a task as the training and wielding the mind of its people, ought to arm itself with a fortitude and a perseverance of mail proof. Difficulties it will meet from human nature, from party feud, from religious intolerance, sufficient to tax the loftiest enthusiasm, and the most vigorous and dauntless purpose. But this very steadiness in right is, in itself, a weapon. Men argue, from constancy, favourably. Such a course soon enlists numerous co-operators; numbers will gain numbers, and success generate success. But to effect this, there must be *real value*. The utility of such interference must be certain and conspicuous.

To insure this, Government interference must be *enlightened*, and *enlightening*. Government must not interfere unnecessarily; nor too frequently; nor where others may interfere with more justice and effect than itself. But where such is not the case, it must *boldly*, *peremptorily*, and *decisively* stand forward: the “*dignus vindice nodus*” is there; common sense will applaud, and true freedom acquiesce. To combine together the energies, intellectual and moral, of a people, to direct them in the most easy manner, and in the shortest time, to objects of recognised public utility, is an end worthy of the efforts of any country. If these ends can be attained by the Government more rapidly than by the People, they ought the Government to step forward before the People, and the People

gratefully to make way for the Government. But is not this the case with Education? Leave it to the People, and what is the result? If they educate, they educate in *sections*. One district is provided with schools by general subscription, or individual munificence; another is left to its own apathy, poverty, and ignorance. This produces a most heterogeneous state of society. You generate elements the most diverse by the same laws. Nor are such contrasts perceptible only between educated and non-educated districts; they are scarcely less striking between the several educated districts themselves. In the country, districts, generally speaking, we must expect to meet a very different state of things, from what may be found in towns. In the first, we shall find the schools surrendered to their own guidance, from remoteness of situation, or difficulty of communication: little knowledge existing either on the true principles or judicious application of education; recent improvements are unknown, ancient errors persisted in; books necessarily few, and of the worst description; the masters, from want of competitors, good example, and a high standard of excellence, are ill chosen: local feud and private patronage combining to enhance these several evils, and creating a direct interest in their continuance. It is little to say that such schools, so governed, very inadequately answer the purposes for which all schools are intended; the main point is, whether, under a different direction, such purposes might be attained. Town schools are more favourably situated. They are not, in general, exposed to the evils just noticed; they have not to contend against the causes which produce them. Improvements are usually known as soon as their utility is proved by satisfactory experiment. Nor are they merely known; they are soon adopted. Necessity compels it. Rival establishments spring up by the side of the old—they avail themselves of the new discoveries; the old establishments cannot continue obstinately to adhere to the old processes without incurring the certainty of becoming sooner or later their inferiors, and being at last excluded from the market. Competition is far too active, success too decidedly the prize, not of zeal only, but of skill, to lead to other consequences. The operation of such causes

soon becomes obvious. Teaching, in large towns, necessarily advances, through mere force of position and circumstance. Education is brought, by the operation of public opinion alone, in some degree to the level demanded by the wants and knowledge of the country. Here, then, we have three distinct stages of Education. In the last district, education is tolerable and progressive; in the second, indifferent and stationary; in the first, there is no education at all. A community, so constituted, tessellated thus of different educations, and consequently of different minds and characters, must, of course, present very different and often hostile aspects, and necessarily lead, despite of all external compressing circumstances, to frequent internal confusion—to constant discords in the working of the social machine. To obviate this, there are no other means than the establishment and maintenance of a due harmony in the system. No one, surely, will think of effecting this by reducing the two last classes to the state of the first: they will reverse the process, and attempt to raise both to the state of the last. But how go about it? *Can* the People do it? *Will* the People do it, or even attempt to do it, until they be perfectly convinced that they *can*? Now, for this conviction, there must be an alteration general and complete—a civilisation in the country districts, equal in every particular to that which exists in the town; that is, a civilisation which can be only brought about by Education, and which yet must take place, on the preceding reasoning, before Education can be begun. It is true, perhaps, that the People may ultimately attain this civilisation; the time may come, when they may be fully qualified for the task: but we want the Education *now*; we cannot afford to *wait*. This, then, is a case in point—one of those instances in which, the People's exertions being comparatively ineffectual, it is absolutely necessary that another power should be called in to aid the People. Does such a power exist? Can the Government effect it? Now it is this precisely, and this above every thing, which the Government can effect, and in the very time and manner required. Government can establish this very harmony, so desirable to the country and the individual; Government can extend it, when established, with compara-

tively a trifling effort, to every part of the land. Government can share with the poor the superfluity of the rich; can dissipate the blindness of the ignorant with the light of the informed; can call into active and universal aid, all tending to the same point, all passing through the best channels, the dispersed forces, the isolated intentions, the ardent but inoperative feelings of each portion of the community. Government, in one word, can balance and adjust, can rectify and compensate for the injustice of place or position, and out of the scattered elements educe that perfect beauty of co-operation, both in principle and practice, which constitutes the use, safety, and importance of every description of social machinery. Government is the centre, necessarily, of every political and social force. Nor is it less the repository of every new accession of intellectual and moral knowledge. All improvements in the science of mind, in the art of teaching, must pass under its eye, must be within its reach. It can grasp, not only the discoveries within its own realm, but, from the wise communion between the more enlightened nations of Europe, the discoveries and improvements of other countries. The People, though theoretically collective, in their practical operations, act individually; they embrace little beyond the village aspect, the transient convenience, of a subject. Without extensive experience it is impossible they can generalise; and without generalising, there can scarcely be any true philosophy in their arrangements. The "best possible" of the village philosopher, is often the "worst possible" of the national. But Government, never individual, always universal, pervading every thing, and watching over all, must, by its very nature, possess that moral and mental ubiquity, absolutely essential to the fair construction and permanent maintenance of any system which affects, to provide for the mind of an entire nation. This it is, which renders it so far better suited than the People for all functions of a directive character. This it is, which entitles it to be invoked by the People itself; not, indeed, to oppose the People, but to act, as in other instances where the executive becomes necessary, as the counsellor and minister of the People.

The operation and utility of this power are very easily illus-

trated. They are peculiarly striking in the two branches upon which Popular Education especially depends—the choice of Books, and the choice of Teachers. The first of these instruments, their number, quality, and management, cannot be too carefully attended to. The advantage which the moderns possess over the ancients does not lie so much in the superiority of modern knowledge, as in its far more general diffusion. The want of Books has kept one country centuries behind another—one district in the same country, ignorant of the other. Books are the life-blood flowing to the members from the heart of society. How are they to be obtained? how are they to be selected, employed, preserved? Parishes, left to exclusive parochial management, will for the most part remain without them, merely from not knowing *where* to look for them, or *what* or *how* to choose. Such as they do possess, they will owe, probably, to the generosity of the next rich neighbour: the Patron will furnish some, the Priest or Parson, others; the Schoolmaster one or two. Nor is it merely for schools that books are necessary. We have already adverted to the mistake that Education ends with “schooling.” It is then, for many, it really begins; at all events, it is then that every means should be furnished for its continuance. This is so true, that an Education which thus stops at the threshold of the Parish school-room, and is not carried into the cottage home, can scarcely be considered an education. The peasant wants something more than an education of words—he requires habits: these are not easily formed by the tutorship of a few years. How are they to be attained? The Schoolmaster cannot, alone, furnish the means. He cannot walk with his scholars in the various paths of after-existence: they must, the moment they quit his side, begin to live on their own life, draw on their own mind, put forth their own arms, exist by, and for themselves. Means ought to be furnished for this. If it be worth while giving an education, it is worth while giving the best; if it be worth beginning, it is worth continuing. Here it is, that Books are invaluable. The Parish library is not only the auxiliary, but the substitute, of the Parish schoolmaster. It constitutes the intellectual capital of the little community, the treasure to which the Parish school-

ing furnishes only the key. But how is it to be formed? By whom?—from what? If the quality of the Books be bad, so also must be their results. Upon this quality depends, whether reading shall become a great evil, or a great good. Who, then, are to select them? The Patron?—the Clergyman?—the Schoolmaster? Are they competent? are they willing? Are they likely to choose, when they do choose, the best, the most economical, the fittest publications for their juvenile or adult readers? Have they the means? the time? the opportunities? If in one Parish, have they equally so in another? And is the country, whilst professing the utmost zeal for universal Education, thus to trust the very means upon which so much of every species of popular education rests, to a rare, a local, a temporary contingency?

The People here require the hand of their rulers: what they cannot do themselves, others must do for them. Government must see that these means be supplied to every Parish in the country. But more than this; it must watch, with a vigilance not to be turned by any individual, body, or circumstance, from its ward, that whatever it does supply should be of the best quality, and be specifically suited, by its economy, facility, and universality, to its purposes. The importance of selecting proper Teachers has been already insisted on. It is still more important than the selection of books. Good books may become unprofitable without good Teachers. Knowledge is not always to be found, even where it most abounds: there must be communicators of the treasure,—there must be instructors. By whom are they to be chosen? by whom provided? Popular Teachers must unite two qualifications; they must be acceptable to the People, and they must be qualified to teach the People. The most admirable lessons will make little impression on an unwilling audience. It is quite right that the People should be attached to their instructors; and it is not less obvious, that this attachment cannot exist without confidence. Confidence is the offspring of esteem; and the first requisite for such is, that the object of it be, in *part at least*, of their *own* selection. But it is not less requisite, that he be fully qualified to *justify it*. The Teacher must, in every particular, be *fitted* for his

situation. His character and capacity must be unquestionable. But who is to judge of this? who is the *best qualified* to judge of it? The People, in general, are sufficiently competent to judge of *character*; not so of *capacity*. They may feel, perfectly, that the candidate is irreproachable in morals, conciliating in conduct, well known for decency, regularity, and attention to all social duties. But they can form little opinion, or at least little *sound* opinion, of his qualifications for teaching. To educate, a man must be educated; and to judge of the qualifications of an *educator*, a man must in some degree be qualified *to be one himself*. But where are these judges to be found? In the mines of Cornwall? in the mountains of Wales? in the wilds of Connaught? Even if the judges existed, where exist the subjects for their selection? Good Teachers, educators in the true sense of the word, are not to be found amongst the ignorant. If they were, it is not likely they would remain there, or, if they remained, that they would be selected by the Parishioners, in the remoter parishes of the Empire. Even in towns, how few who can teach at all! and of those few, what a miserable proportion who can teach well! From whence, then, is to come, in the first instance, the supply? and, in the next, the selection? Assuredly, not from the blind, but the enlightened. They only who understand what Education really is, can educate the candidates for these important functions; they only can wisely choose between them, when the public exigencies require a choice. Not, then, in the hands of *the People* should lie either the training, or selection, of public Teachers. It is a task to which the *Government alone* is competent—which, for the sake of the People itself, the Government should boldly and largely assume.

Nor is this all:—in the preceding argument, I have kept clear of local and temporary considerations; I have reasoned on pure abstract grounds; I have considered the People as incapacitated, only by such circumstances as may be supposed common, in most cases, to all the People. But if to these difficulties be superadded others, arising out of particular periods and positions: if with their ignorance we combine passion, prejudice, bigotry, and turbulence; if we find

them not only under the direction of weak judgments and limited experience, but that even this judgment is perverted, and this experience garbled, by long-continued feuds, religious and political hatreds, aristocratic and plebeian pretensions, by discords, disturbances, and frenzies, of every hue of virulence and duration: how is it possible, that from such a guide we can expect discretion? that from such election can proceed the sound judgment, impartiality, and elevation which are so absolutely requisite, especially in such countries and circumstances as our own, in every public Teacher? The election, conducted under such influences,—(as the electors are, such must be the election),—will be nothing else but a furious battle between interests, and for objects, as remote as possible from the true purposes of public instruction. The political partisan, the religious fanatic, the monied intriguer, will usually be the victor; the modest and virtuous scholar, of course, the vanquished: the school-room will be converted into an arena for rival ambitions; and Education itself, which ought to be the moderator of all the riotous passions, and the institutor of all the political and domestic virtues, degraded into the weapon of party, the teacher of every species of private and public animosity. To rescue Education from such abuse, to rescue the People from the People's passion and folly, is to render a good and great service both to the People, and to Education. It is to interpose between their true and false, their temporary and permanent, interests. To effect this, we require an *external, compressing, and repressing* power, an intelligence fully adequate to comprehend the universal interest, a solicitude to provide impartially for it, and an energy and activity to carry such provision into execution. Is this to be found in the People, in sections of the People—in the People ignorant—in the People excited? Where are we to look for it, but in the Government?

But the Government, it is alleged, is already too *powerful*—giving it these attributes, we give it Education; giving it Education, we give it a power which embraces every other—we surrender into its hands the direction and mastery of our entire political and religious, our public and private, existence. Is there any reason to think it will not abuse it? Are the

men who constitute it usually exempt from the ordinary vices and tendencies of humanity? Shall we trust to any body of men the complete disposal of our own, and our children's prosperity? To these apprehensions, the answer is simple. What we so much fear to do, we have done already. If power is to be lodged no where, society is one great blunder. We should, in consistency, return to our forests. What are our religious, judicial, political establishments; but sacrifices of the many to the few — of a part, for the whole? If Government is to be merely an irreflective, mechanical instrument, we ought to adopt the code of the Athenians, plead causes before thousands of judges, and abstain from the appointment of a single officer until he had first been polled for, in every district in the kingdom. The discovery of the advantages of delegation, is one of the great boasts of modern liberty. To it, more than to superior judgment or moderation, modern free states not only owe their security, but their freedom. A representative and executive body are equally necessary in every free state; but to give each their full value, it is not less necessary they should be directive than delegated. The one checks the defects of the other: the directive character rescues the delegated body from the inertness of a mere agent, and the delegated precludes the abuse of the directive. It implies responsibility. Once *establish* this principle *firmly*, and *act* upon it *rigidly*, and you may enlarge the directive powers as much as you please. The point, then, for us to consider, is not *the more or less of power* which we intrust to Government, but, *the more or less fidelity*, the *more or less capacity*, with which this power is wielded. If the country be free, it is, of course, assumed that it possesses the means to insure this. It can enforce the faithful discharge of these duties, by both punishment and reward. Its ministers are amenable to its legislature, and its legislature to the country. Why, then, should it shrink from using, in the largest and most efficient manner, its own instruments to do its *own* behests. If the case, indeed, be otherwise—if any of this machinery be defective—the argument, of course, alters. Then, indeed, jealousy is in place. We cannot, without great probability of abuse, vest the governing of the mind of the country in ministers who are independent of

legislators, or in legislators who, in turn, are independent of those from whom they are, and for whom they legislate. But, in such a case, our duty would be not to stop here: it would not be enough to rescue Education from their hands; on the same principle we ought to rescue from them the Pulpit, the Judgment bench, the Public force. But would this be possible? would it be less than the dissolution of all government? 'A simple and juster course would be to reform it. Purify the source, and the streams will be pure. Place the Legislature and Executive under the control of the People; and the People may safely allow them to direct and check, to force and govern, for them, as they please.

That such is the actual position of our Government and Legislation is devoutly to be hoped. If not, we have yet, in every thing, as well as in Education, to begin. If it be, the apprehension of intrusting Government with the direction of Education is futile: it is a palpable contradiction. The *People govern*, and yet they are to be debarred from *employing their servants*; they are not to administer Education, through *their parliament and ministers, for themselves!*

When I propose, then, to intrust the administration to the Government, it is not for the sake of the Government, but of the People. I intrust, therefore, only so much of it as the Government can administer better than the People; the rest I leave to the People, for their own management, as well as use. There is thus no reason why, in both the instances just given, the People should not also intervene. If the Government, on its side, provide Books, the People should not be restricted exclusively to their use. No particular pattern should be insisted on, as the sole, the essential of education. Government should show, and lead; the People should be invited and induced to follow. In like manner, Government should teach and select the Masters; but the People, on their side, should be protected from the imposition of hostile and obnoxious teachers. They should be required to take the government qualifications, but not necessarily the government man.

This principle, then, and this principle extended throughout, is what ought to regulate the distribution of the different shares of co-operation and management which should fall re-

spectively to the Government and to the People. The Government, being more qualified to take the initiative, *should be the first to contribute the funds, the first to organise the schools, the first to provide the materials*, whether of *Books or Teachers*, for the People. In one word, the Government should be, essentially and constantly, the directive and impelling principle. The People, on their side, should be the aiding and supporting. They also should give their contributions; but they should be consequent on those of the Government, extended over a longer period, and paid in support of such objects as do not require large and immediate disbursements. The Government should establish—they should maintain. *They should repair the schools, support the schoolmasters, and augment the libraries* which the Government had bestowed. Out of this combination, out of this division of labours and powers, a sort of moral personification of the real wisdom and energy of a free and enlightened state would arise. The Government would be the eye, the People the arm; but with such a dependence each upon the other, that if from the Government the People learned how to see, the Government, in turn, should learn from the People how to act. If the People could ascend, as well as the Government, to general principles, or the Government could descend as well as the People to details, always independent of each other, they would necessarily exist in the state of continued discord; their connection could scarcely subsist. But in the harmony which circumstances have thus fortunately established between them, scarcely less the result of their qualities than of their deficiencies, every thing tends to one common end. It is difficult to say who most contributes: each receives the impulse of the other; each in its turn obeys, and both at all times are masters.

Such, then, is the principle; but how provide for its application? Here, again, we have to deal with modifications of time, place, and men: they are objects of subsequent deliberation. For the present, we can merely advert to what immediately arises from the preceding considerations, and applies equally to every case where the above principle is admitted.

If the Government is to have the initiative, if the Government is to originate, to establish, to direct, it can only be by means of order and system. So vast an object as Education, scattered loosely amongst its several departments, will produce confusion in the management of these departments, confusion in the management of education. If left to the care of every one, it will not be taken care of by any. Order thus implies subordination; and subordination, a distinct and well-organised department—a department confined to Education alone. To constitute such, there ought to be consultors to deliberate, and a head to direct; in other words, a *Board* and a *President*. But, to preclude abuse, he should be responsible to the Legislature. The President ought to be a *Minister*, and, to preclude as much as possible change and disturbance, — here disturbance would be peculiarly injurious, — a *permanent* one. Nor will this be sufficient. The People must not only have a security against alteration, but also against ignorance or favouritism; they must have a due motive for confidence in the wisdom and impartiality of these organs. They must be chosen in harmony with their feelings, and as much as possible from persons well acquainted with and sympathising in their wants. The People must not be solely in the hands of the Aristocracy; nor a Dissenting population in the hands of the Establishment. The Board must be constituted of the representatives of the different classes, and of the different persuasions, of most influence in the community. Such should be the organisation: the means to work it, should be in harmony with it. The Board, so constituted, should have under its control large funds, for the building of schools and the general originating of Education; extensive establishments for the education of Teachers, due provision for the publication of Books; and Officers sufficiently numerous and qualified for the inspection and superintendence of the entire machinery. The People, on their side, should be equally provided with their organisation, and instruments. They should have their “School Committees” and “School Officers;” their power of “School Assessment,” their funds, their financial control, their inspection. The friendly and reciprocal play of these several powers will secure not only

their free action, but their unbroken permanence; they are guarantees each for the other: so far from being opposed, they are allies; they are not for the individual, but for the community.

I have thus attempted to point out, in as concise a manner as my limits would admit, the absolute necessity of an *uniform* and *permanent* system for the establishment and maintenance of National Education. I have shown that the means by which this great end can *best* be effected, are the cordial and energetic combination and co-operation of all the elements, religious and political, of which the nation is composed. I have endeavoured to prove, that, to give this cordiality and energy its fullest extent, there must be a fair and general participation of rights and influence; a proportionate distribution of burthens, labours, and powers, amongst the co-operators, in accord with, and corresponding to, the constitution, position, and capacities, moral and intellectual, of each. Finally, I have specified, as far as general considerations would allow, the particular mode in which this general co-operation, and proportionate distributions, may be accomplished.

This closes the first part of these labours—the THEORY of National Education. The characteristics and advantages of a good system of National Education, the obligation of universally diffusing it, the means by which it may be permanently established, have been successively developed. In all this, the argument has been conducted solely on *general principles*, with as little reference as possible to *individual applications*. It was necessary, at first, to place on an incontrovertible basis, unembarrassed by local and temporary considerations, the great, universal, and enduring truths on which all education, in all times and countries, should rest. But *unapplied* principles are of little *use*; and no master, after all, is more convincing with the public than *Experience*. If we would reduce these principles to action, it will be necessary to inquire how far, in what way, how long, and with what result, they have been reduced to action before us. This is easy. Other countries have been placed in positions similar to our own. From the manner in which they have overcome the dif-

APPENDIX.

A. *Mutual Instruction.* (p. 212.)

THE hostility noticed in the text to this method in Germany, as an instrument even of elementary instruction, has of late been somewhat mitigated. Diesterweg, Greverus, and other recent writers of great practical experience, and fully alive at the same time to the importance of substituting intellect for mechanism in education, have strenuously advocated its application, under proper restrictions. The truth is, political as well as philosophical considerations (though not to the same extent as in France, where for a time it was absolutely the "shibboleth" of a party) appear to have mingled their injurious influences. Diesterweg insists strongly on the moral results of the method, even in after life; Greverus sums up with impartiality the arguments on either side, and points out the arrangements by which all objection, even on the side of those most apprehensive of the effects of education on the lower classes may be thoroughly obviated. It need only be added, that his views are borne out by experience wherever such arrangements have been conscientiously and perseveringly adopted.

"The school," says Diesterweg (*Der Unterricht in der Kleinkinder Schule*, 1832), "should prepare for life: the child should not only *learn* in the school, but *live*; in the school freshness and gaiety should universally predominate; in the school the child ought already to graft into his existence the most important virtues of ordinary life. Where life is, there also will assuredly prevail activity, the closest sympathy of all the members (*Ineinandergreifen der Glieder*), reciprocal assistance in all their common labours. Yea, the more activity can be introduced amongst their little ranks, the more will the school be independent of the continual intervention of the teacher; the more the working of the whole depends upon each individual member, the more delightful will school-life necessarily become. Not the teacher, but the scholars themselves, should be the instruments employed to develop to the greatest degree this activity; the strength of each should work, and combine with that of the other, in the same manner as the several parts of

a large and skilfully constructed piece of machinery. The teacher, indeed, must breathe into them that strength from which all after-movement must proceed ; but the less this is done with noise, with clamour, and other similar stimulants, the more agreeable to all will be the entire organisation. Whatever is to be done in school, let it be as much as possible confided to the scholars themselves ; let its whole external action be so ordered and regulated that the teacher, except on rare occasions, shall not find it requisite to interfere. Their coming and going, their leaving their bench and returning to it, — all this must be determined by clear regulations, and rendered by degrees habitual to the scholars. Each bench should have its scholar, male or female, whose duty it should be to take care of the external business of the bench ; for instance, to give out and to take away the slates and pencils, and when done with to restore them in order to their place. In addition to these, the teacher should prepare Assistants or Helpers (*Helfer*), to conduct the repetitions or practice of such lessons as had been already taught. This arrangement is of great utility, especially in exercises of reading and writing ; indeed, it might be added, in every branch of instruction. Should the size of the school permit it, the scholars should at the appointed sign assemble in little groups round the assistants, and begin their exercises. In the mean time, the teacher may either instruct a class himself, or walk about from circle to circle, and give assistance wherever it may be needed. Provided the assistant has skill and judgment enough to seize the attention of the children in the right way, and to exclude from amongst them every thing approaching to disorder and impropriety, there will soon be generated in the school, by this method of teaching, such a system, flowing from within (*von innen heraus quellend*), as cannot be attained by any other ; the means will be discovered of training children to the formation of a character the most important in human life — a disinterested combination of labour, and an active community of interest with their fellow-creatures ; in a word, life itself will be gradually raised to the most perfect degree of organisation of which it is susceptible. It is as the awakener, then, as the guide, the fashioner of the youthful powers, that the teacher fulfils most especially his vocation ; and it is thus that school instruction may best be directed to the improving and perfecting of human life." (P. 200—202.)

Greverus justifies these views in detail ; in many of his positions he is directly opposed to Schwartz : the whole question depends, however, on the manner of the application. Schwartz judged of the defects of the theory from the abuses he saw in the practice :

Greverus wishes to show that these abuses may easily be avoided, and that, if avoided, the theory itself (reduced faithfully to action) can only produce good.

“Many improvements have been introduced into our popular schools in the present age: the income of the teachers has been raised; their education, the methods of instruction generally, have been greatly ameliorated. There are, however, more or less, very general complaints of a great and still unremedied evil; viz. the quality of *instruction* (*Lehrkräfte*) is not in due relation to the wants of the persons to be instructed (*Lehrbedürfnisse*): one teacher is compelled to teach too many, and too great a variety of children. Many, probably, the majority, of our popular schools are attended by upwards of a hundred pupils, and still the number is everywhere on the increase. For this number there is generally not more than one single teacher! To teach these children efficiently, they should be divided into at least five classes, each of which would require its own particular instruction. Now, taking the daily instruction to be given at five hours, one hour would thus fall to the lot of each class; but how many to the lot of each individual? Even the most active and skilful teacher cannot so divide himself as to pay adequate attention to all these classes—to assist all, to advance all: he must keep back either the worst or the best amongst his scholars. Nor is the adoption of a middle course a better expedient; it has in all times greatly contributed to restrict or diminish the progress of our schools; and, though I were to admit that a superior teacher, in the full vigour of youth, might be capable of advancing, as far at least as could at present be expected in any of our popular schools, a hundred children of different characters, I should like to know how many such superior teachers—how many thus active and persevering are there to be found. Even though they were, how soon is it probable they would wear themselves out? No man is likely to exercise such a profession for any length of time.”

“To this notorious defect, in our popular schools, an effectual remedy may be found in the method of Mutual Instruction; the essential character of which consists in this, that the intellectual and moral powers of any one individual, when once they are excited, may be applied with advantage to the developement and advancement of the powers of all,—in other words, to the general education of the school,—much in the same manner that by stirring that portion of the fire which is nearest to us, we give it new strength, and gradually diffuse its energy around: in other words, the most intelligent and forward of the scholars teach, under the inspection of

the master, the most backward, ranked, according to their respective capabilities, in one or other division of the classes. Over each of these presides a 'Decurio,' or 'Monitor,' who is not required to teach every branch of instruction belonging to each class, no more than each class is required to consist of precisely the same number of scholars. Five Decurios, such as have been described, are placed under the superintendence of one 'Centurio,' and these again under a 'Chiliarch,' or the Master, who sets the whole in motion, and determines and directs, on a well-digested plan, the duties respectively appertaining to each particular Decurio or Centurio. The exercises which in a more especial manner may be advantageously conducted by this method, are all such as more immediately enter into the category of skill or address (*Fertigkeiten*),—such as reading, drawing, writing, arithmetic, in acquiring which so many interminable hours are at present wasted; to which also should be added bodily exercises. But to those other branches which profess more particularly to form the understanding or the disposition, Mutual Instruction is by no means suited. At the same time the Decurios may be usefully employed as Repeaters (*Repetenten*) in conducting exercises of the memory, in the languages, and in numbers. Above all, it is essential that this method, like every other, should be applied with intelligence, and modified according to the peculiar character of the judicious teacher himself, if we desire that its full merit and the greatest degree of efficiency of which it is susceptible should be elicited. To employ it mechanically, or rather as a purely mechanical instrument (its fairest characteristic, in the opinion of some; that by which it is most advantageously distinguished from all similar methods), leads to a mere display of address beyond what the most intelligent teacher, to say nothing of those of more moderate abilities, such as compose the majority of the profession, can possibly admit with advantage into any school. Nor is it applicable to a hundred pupils only: on the contrary, I am fully convinced, from my own personal experience, that 500 may with ease be managed by a single teacher; nay, I will go further, and maintain that large numbers of scholars are more desirable than otherwise, inasmuch as the order, the quiet, the rivalry of so many, penetrates each particular individual with a feeling of enjoyment and emulation, and renders him more earnest to connect himself intimately with the mass, and form one amongst such numbers. But it is not therefore to be contemned in a school of fifty. It is, however, beyond the scope of the present work to enter into farther details on the special applications of this system. Institutions, where it has been adopted, are to be

seen in Denmark, London, Paris, &c., where the inquirer may convince himself of its utility by actual examination; or he may consult on the subject the writings of Von Möller (*Über die Anwend.: d. Gegens — Unterrichts, in Volksschulen. Altona, 1826*), and judge."

"Although the assistance afforded by this instrument be sufficiently obvious without any further discussion, it may still be not altogether irrelevant to place in one view under the eye of the reader its principal advantages. The most conspicuous is the opportunity it furnishes to exercise at one and the same time the whole school; an opportunity not given, or to a very limited extent by any former system of instruction. By means of this regular exercise of the powers of all, all are proportionally roused and improved: were the efficiency of the scholars appointed to teach but half as great as that of the single master (the reverse of which is the fact, for no one can have any conception of the emulation of these little under-teachers, provided they be properly trained for the purpose), still the gain to most of the classes would be striking; taking the teachers at 10, it would be as 5 to 1. Mutual Instruction accustoms the pupil to *order* and *punctuality*: these qualities are its very soul, without which it is preposterous to speak of Mutual Instruction. By its means every thing is conducted by a look, in time and measure, which no one dares to violate, and by means of which the senses become sharper, and observation, dexterity, and accuracy gradually form into a sort of second nature. This love of order and punctuality can no more be instilled in a popular school by a single teacher, in the midst of a crowd of rude scholars, without such assistance, than it can be in a company of soldiers without the aid of subaltern officers. By such assistance, however, punctuality and order, not merely from the influence which the example of others exercises, but from the pleasure which harmony naturally produces, pass without effort into habit, and grow into another nature. Such training may possibly be termed *drilling*; I am not disposed to quarrel with names, provided the results produced be good. Amongst these, I may single out as one of the most beneficial, the good discipline and spirit of subordination which Mutual Instruction leads in its train. And, in my mind, a greater benefit could not be desired, at a moment like the present, when the lower classes (the mechanics and manufacturers for instance) are so often in open revolt against all order, duty, and law, than that they should be taught from their youth upwards obedience to such ordinances as shall be prescribed for them. And is it not as likely, that, after an eight years' course in school, they should carry away with them into every-day existence some portion of these regular habits, as that well-trained

soldiers, after long service, should distinguish themselves in all after life by their love of order and spirit of subordination? In addition, this punctilious attention to regularity stirs up the energies of the pupil; this harmony, this well-ordered co-operation in labour, has a peculiar and intimate influence on the human being, as every one may observe in a well-disciplined army, whose force appears doubled by its good discipline. By the instrumentality of Mutual Instruction, the inspection exercised over the individual pupil, over all his faults and weaknesses, is considerably greater, inasmuch as, instead of two eyes and ears, twenty are constantly on the watch over him, suffering nothing, however light, to escape unnoticed. When once faults are noticed they may easily be corrected, even where the power of a single teacher cannot again penetrate, or if it should, at so great an expense of time as to interrupt or restrict the instruction of all the others. The boy who is sharply observed, who can no longer count on concealment of his faults, will be the more on his guard, in proportion as he is more ashamed of his weakness in the presence of his equals than of his elders: thus, the qualities of the better conducted portion of the class will gradually appear personified, and in active operation amongst the remainder."

"Another marked advantage which this method of Mutual Instruction is capable of conferring (though I have nowhere seen it in reality), is the additional time it allows the teacher to advance his more intelligent pupils, who, in an ordinary popular school, are now compelled to halt, from the backwardness of their companions, and who in the intervals, when the teacher is engaged with those last mentioned, are usually left to themselves, and from their very vivacity and quickness led astray. Let us take a school of a hundred scholars, regulated on the principles of the Mutual Instruction method, assuming the classes on an average at ten (for, as already stated, it is not necessary that the number of scholars in each should be precisely the same), we shall have ten Decurios or Superintendents of Forms (*Bankvorsteher*); by the side of these latter let there be placed an equal number of substitutes, by whom each may either be relieved, or his place supplied, in case he should be prevented from attending the school. To these also may perhaps be added a certain number of such as may be considered of the same rank, having equalled in intellectual activity the preceding. To these twenty or twenty-five, thus selected from the entire hundred, the teacher may consecrate half of the whole time of the class, or at least two hours a day, during which the other pupils should not be engaged in receiving instruction, or be practised only in gymnastics, or in such lessons or exercises as had already been given

out. Let this flower of the school be now employed in such instruction as is addressed to the understanding (*rationalen*); for, in fact, in those exercises already stated as necessary for the popular school, and successively in those others of address, of reading, &c., they have either made sufficient progress, or are pursuing them with their several classes, step by step, or, if necessary, at home. Can it be doubted that, with these arrangements, these twenty-five, to whose places must gradually succeed every other scholar in the school at all distinguished from the mere dunces, should make a far more striking improvement than can possibly be attained even by the most intelligent in our present popular schools, and that thus carefully instructed, they should exercise an extraordinary influence on all the rest of the scholars with whose superintendence they are entrusted in the hours of Mutual Instruction? Little question can exist that we should soon see awakened in our popular schools a far other description of existence: we should see a progress and improvement, of whose power no one yet has even dreamt. One immediate result of such improvement would be the very great facility with which might be effected the classification of the pupils, — an object of the utmost moment in this grade of instruction; nor this only, — the intellectual impulse would be rendered far more powerful and richer in results than it is at present. The twenty-five would soon feel their consequence; they would feel themselves emancipated; their mental activity would receive a singular accession of energy — an additional service rendered by Mutual Instruction. Another benefit, likely to be conferred by the introduction of this method into our popular schools, I may venture briefly to notice, from my conviction of its deep importance, and the feeling I entertain that it ought of itself to be sufficient to recommend the system to general adoption. With a well-regulated system of Mutual Instruction in operation, we might in future dispense with our expensive establishments for the instruction of the Blind (*Blinden-Institute*), since the Blind (as soon as the necessary apparatus were provided) might easily be taught in the ordinary schools, and one of the Decurios (after adequate instruction and practice for the purpose) might be appointed as their teacher. Nor is it improbable that similar arrangements might be effected, even for the instruction of the Deaf and Dumb, though, in their instance, the execution undoubtedly would be attended with much greater difficulties. Should it, however, be thought advisable in the present age to send the Deaf and Dumb to the common popular schools, and to allow teachers to dedicate a portion of their studies in the Seminaries to preparation for such instruction, and should a fair disposition exist on the part of

the public to try such experiment, it is quite certain that Mutual Instruction — if not directly, indirectly — would greatly facilitate the execution of such a project ; for at least it would furnish the teacher with the power of communicating with the Deaf and Dumb, — a power which, in the present management of our popular schools, without neglecting the other scholars, I have never seen any teacher thoroughly acquire. May these suggestions, in some degree at least, prove of service ! To these several advantages must also be added the great opportunity it presents of raising up, as already shown, from the Decurios, a race of enlightened teachers for our popular schools. Let none then too lightly look down with scorn on this admirable gift of God — Mutual Instruction ; still less cast it away as in nowise suited to Protestant Germany."

"This method has indeed fared most strangely amongst us Germans. Contrary altogether to our national character, which, in former times, was always ready to seize on every novelty, provided it came from France or England, and in latter years, after our country had begun to be awakened to a greater degree of reliance on its own judgment, was not unwilling, after sufficient proof, to adopt the good, and appropriate it with such modifications as were required by our national peculiarities to our own use, in this instance of Mutual Instruction, we have scarcely noticed its existence, received it with doubt and distrust, left it unapplied, or altogether rejected it as an instrument, to us at least, of no possible utility."

"The northern Protestant states of Germany saw in this method a new description of English steam machinery, fitted only for the purpose of stamping (*stampeln*) the lowest class of the people in the shortest given time, by a process purely mechanical, into a race of half men, or, at best, an aid to the ordinary popular school ; but the introduction of which amongst us Germans, with whom the genuine popular school system had been so long domesticated, could be of no sort of advantage. The mass of prejudice and suspicions evinced on this occasion, it would scarcely be thought possible could have existed in Germany. Some there were who maintained that our popular schools had long attained the beau ideal of perfection, and required (God help us !) no improvement ; others, on the contrary, that the method in question possessed nothing new, and that it had been long known and used in Germany by the teachers of our popular schools. This last assertion, indeed, could not very easily be denied. Our teachers, in our more crowded schools, had long since, it is quite true, endeavoured to devise some method by which they might make their instruction equally effective and practicable

with that of Bell and Lancaster, and employ serviceably the grown-up and more advanced scholars in the instruction of the younger and the less advanced. But what does this discovery prove? Why, doubtless, that such a method had been long felt to be of the highest utility and necessity in our popular schools; so that even experience goes to show that it is perfectly adapted to our position. There is thus the greater motive to try the experiment anew; and, selecting what is essential and of universal application, permanently to adopt it, without exception, in all our popular schools. It is essentially necessary in teaching all exercises of mere address, attainable everywhere solely, or in great measure, by mechanical means or constant practice. Let not the reader be startled at the word mechanical. In this instance it is directly applicable to the form of such communication, which, in reference to such exercises, must always be more or less mechanical; but which, in schools where the Mutual Instruction method is adopted, from the number of pupils frequenting them, falls more directly perhaps than elsewhere, under observation. Intellectual studies, as far as such exercises prevail, must be, and continue to be the same, whether the teacher gives lessons in reading and writing himself, or allows the pupil to take them from other scholars under his direction. The only difference is, that the latter course has obviously a much greater power of kindling the energy of the pupil than the former. Hence is it that intellectual instruction need in no instance suffer by the adoption of this method, but rather on the contrary, as already shown, may, through these very means, receive the greatest impulse and extension. That such in reality has been the case, that the intellectual powers have really been developed by the application of this method, we have the most convincing proof furnished us by those states who, on this very ground, are opposed to its introduction. 'It makes the people too cunning! whom shall we trust in future?' Such are their apprehensions. For my own part, I heartily hope that these governments in this particular are in the right. How, indeed, can we suppose that in a matter of this importance they should for a moment be deluded? Yes! the moment Mutual Instruction shall be fully modified, and rendered more and more effective in the manner suggested above, the hair of all statesmen in those countries will doubtless grow grey with anguish and solicitude at the growing power of intelligence! But what little reason have governments to fear—I will not use the suspicious term of enlightenment (*Aufklärung*), but the instruction of the lower orders! They dread the example of France, and with every reason; for it is difficult to imagine a more hopeless condition of the people than what exists in that country. The whole nation

has now for forty years been in the excitement of a continual fever. The feverish phantasies of new projects have taken the place of principles and convictions, giddiness and vacillation have superseded the firm foundations of custom and history; but does this combination of circumstances arise from instruction? Does it proceed from the popular schools, of which up to the present day so few have existed in France? or rather, are not such aberrations the result of the absence of all instruction amongst a lively, volatile (*föhartig*), and easily excited population? It is notorious that France reached the Revolution without any system of popular schools. Why then should we throw the blame upon education, and not rather inquire what would have been the probable result had the great mass been properly instructed in national schools, and 30,000 teachers, distributed over the community, been constantly occupied, directly or indirectly, in forming the moral habits of the people? Such a question, it is true, cannot easily be addressed to history, but there is no reason why it should not be addressed to the common understanding of mankind. How has it happened that the formation of the understanding and the character, both of which should be inseparably kept in view in every system of education designed for the people, should have become an object of such general dislike and apprehension? Does not all experience and all history incontrovertibly teach us, that every kind of atrocity, disturbance, and bloodshed are the usual results of a dark and rude age? Has not civilisation itself everywhere advanced with advancing enlightenment? and is not its extension to every individual the great object of all human society? Is the improvement of the human mind to be the exclusive privilege of certain classes? No! Providence has given to all men equal right to a proper education of the human being; to suppress, or in aught diminish the exercise of which, may well be termed treason against mankind—a crime never to be perpetrated with impunity. Barbarism (*Inhumanität*), forced upon the people, but too fearfully wreaks its vengeance upon its authors: through blood it rushes on to seize its rights. Wise governments should, therefore, meet half-way the demands of their age; and by a well regulated education of the people, make head against that dangerous mis-education which is now carried on by means of half understood reading, meagre conversations, and dry outlines. It is this half education, this partial education (*einseitige*) of the understanding and imagination, this education of display and vanity, which is to be dreaded, and which, in despite of every check interposed to its progress, still finds its way amongst the people. There are a thousand channels through which it penetrates to the multitude. To throw obstacles in its way, tends only

to inspire the masses with a still stronger desire for the forbidden fruit. If they be forbidden to drink of wholesome waters, they will infallibly betake themselves to those which are unwholesome. Hence is it that a rude, an uneducated people, is in all times an instrument in the hands of the dexterous political partisan. And for that reason is it above all other things necessary that an appropriate education, through the means of popular schools, should be provided for the people; which, after attending to the training of the disposition through practical Christianity, should also look to their next great want, their particular personal existence, and to the disciplining the understanding for those particular circumstances and situations in which they must hereafter be engaged. To avoid all misapprehension, it must be distinctly understood that there is here no question of giving them a more refined system of education, approaching to that of the townsman; an education which to the countryman can be of little utility, and tends only to excite scepticism and vanity. I have no intention to teach the people history, geography, politics, or languages: my object is to give them a deeper education than all this; such, in fine, as may promote their happiness in the position to which they are destined. Circumstances render it impracticable to give to all men an equally complete education: we are wise, therefore, in limiting ourselves to such portions as are of primary importance to each particular situation, instead of throwing, by a half education, the whole world into disorder and confusion."—(*Ideen zu einer Revision des gesammten Schulwesens* — Oldenburg, 1836, pp. 95—107.)*

* Lest any one should suppose that such opinions proceed from a political innovator—a Continental radical—a stickler for the pretensions of young Germany, let him take the following account of the author by himself. It is such as might satisfy the most ardent lover of things that be:—"The writer of this work is a man who desires nothing more, who requires nothing more, than peace and quiet; who has always kept aloof from political ambition and contention, who probably could not act a part in any popular assembly, nor would if he could, inasmuch as with the talent the disposition also is wanting; a man whose chief want is sufficient seclusion and solitude, to allow him to devote himself to his beloved studies; who has never yet come forward as a political writer, and is totally unconnected with any political party; who, on the contrary, holds every struggle for a constitution by brute force as one of the greatest calamities which can befall the citizen; and in particular regards the centralisation of the German nation as an object in nowise desirable—a man who is penetrated with an unaffected love for the principles of monarchy (*die Idee Fürst*). What motive can induce him to come forward—as a suppliant, and also as a prophet—but the strongest conviction and attachment to his father-land?"—P. 285. Add to this, he is Rector of the Gymnasium.

B. *Classification of Teachers.* (p. 213.)

The Classen system, and the Fächer system, still divide public opinion in Germany. Greverus, preceded by Schwartz, has attempted in some degree to combine them, not very practicable, except in cases where a large staff of teachers may be met with, as in the extensive monastic colleges on the ancient system. Our modern establishments, where the great object seems to be how to produce the most rapid results with the least possible expenditure of men and money, very nearly preclude such arrangement.

After urging the frequent and cordial communication between parent and teacher, as a matter in every instance of the utmost importance, Greverus continues:—

“ In addition to this, it is essential for the maintenance of a good system of school discipline that in each class there should not be too many teachers, or that at least there should be a head teacher (*Haupt-class-lehrer*), that is to say, a teacher who should singly give as much instruction to that class as all the others put together. Formerly, in the Gymnasias, each teacher had his own class which he exclusively instructed, and to which he was the all in all. In modern times we have begun to divide the instruction of a class amongst many instructors, partly that by such arrangement the several portions of the course might be more thoroughly mastered, partly with the view of lightening the number of class hours on each individual teacher. This last consideration must be allowed its due weight. Even in the lower classes, the teacher ought not to give more than four hours daily, or twenty-four weekly, if he be desirous of discharging his duty with earnestness and attention. In the more difficult departments of knowledge not more than eighteen should be demanded. The other objection has also many arguments in its favour. When a great number of teachers divide the teaching, the pupils are likely to be more thoroughly instructed in each particular department than when they are few, inasmuch as each teacher is more exclusive, and, as may justly be expected, more likely to devote himself with greater earnestness to certain branches, as well as to enter into them more deeply. But, on the other side, it must be remembered that for the lower classes great depth of knowledge is in nowise necessary, since in teaching these classes the teacher is engaged with the elements only, and not with any specific science. Such instruction especially depends upon the art of conveying knowledge in an intelligible and agreeable form, and an equal developement of all the faculties of

the soul. Now experience has taught us that it is not precisely the men of most learning and profoundest research who are best calculated to advance their pupils in these respects, but that, on the contrary, such are the very men who feel, from their too much familiarity with them, little or no pleasure in teaching the elements, and, looking more to results and systems, will not, or cannot be induced to descend to the level of beginners."

"We must not, however, above all things, forget that progress in knowledge in the higher institutions is not the only consideration to be regarded; but that the cultivation of the moral habits must be equally kept in view: for without morality all knowledge is without foundation or value. This object is, however, completely missed, whenever the "Fach system" is carried on separately from the Gymnasium. For is it possible under such a system that the boys and young men can ever ascertain to whom they are to attach themselves? The teachers change too frequently to allow them to habituate themselves to *any single one*, or acquire for him either love or confidence: they consequently fall, from the great diversity of manners and characters they thus meet with, very easily into error, and learn to remark rather the peculiarities and weaknesses in the person of their instructor, than to devote themselves to the objects of his instruction. Besides this, teachers themselves want both leisure and opportunity to enable them completely to measure the entire intellectual capacity of their pupils; and even where this is practicable, they do not so easily feel for them a lively moral interest, but are usually satisfied if they can communicate to them their respective quota of intellectual instruction. How is it possible, it may also be added, for any single one amongst so many to take upon himself the cultivation of the character (*Seelsorge*) without appearing to arrogate to himself a superiority over the others, and a desire to throw them into the background? And even were all willing to exert themselves in proportion to their respective powers to the utmost, is it likely they would all act in unison and consistently, and not, rather from diversity of character, still continue to work in opposition to each other? As many doctors are of little use to the sick-bed, so many educators are but ill calculated to carry on the education of the individual man! It thus appears essential to the good discipline of a school that as few teachers as possible should be employed in any single class; nay, it is to be regretted that the same teacher cannot carry on the whole course of instruction, from the lowest to the highest in the school."

"To conclude, —the best means of all others to establish a good

system of discipline in the Gymnasium, is to connect with the teaching establishment (*Lehranstalt*) a community (*Cönobium*) in which the pupils may live in common with, and under the immediate inspection of, the masters. By such arrangement only can we secure that unity and harmony in youthful education which, with a view of collecting the mental powers into one focus, ingrafting a true love of knowledge, and forming a solid character, is so absolutely requisite: by such means only, working by early habit, can we lay a sure foundation for all good. What such institutions are capable of producing, as far as intellectual acquirements are concerned, may be gathered from the conventual schools (*Klosterschulen*), (confined as they may perhaps have been in their course of instruction,) from which so many eminent scholars have, at various times, proceeded. Whilst, however, we willingly concede such advantages to these establishments, they have still been exposed to very general censure on the ground of morality, and not altogether without reason. Such institutions too often produce and encourage a spirit of austerity, rudeness of manners, and a disposition to depraved sensual indulgence, the result of the secluded and exclusive (*einseitig*) life which young men of a certain age necessarily lead together. This, however, merely proves that these institutions are defectively organised, not that the proposition of combining instruction and education establishments (*Unterrichts und Erziehungsanstalten*) is, by any means, injudicious. At the same time it must be fully admitted that no education is superior to that of the paternal roof, and that such institutions must be considered merely as substitutes—but substitutes, at the same time, altogether indispensable in the present age. I may, in addition, observe that I have personally had ample opportunity of convincing myself of the advantages resulting from the combination above suggested, having been president of a Gymnasium, conducted in a community (*Köno-bial-gymnasium*), and also of a Classical school (*Gelehrten schule*). Not only was the intellectual progress of the young men proceeding to the University much greater in the former establishment, but even in respect to moral habits they stood considerably higher. Nor will this appear singular, if we reflect that the faults of young men, living separately in their parents' houses, are easily concealed and seldom brought to light; whilst, on the contrary, committed in such establishments as that just mentioned, they are easily discovered, generally known, and often greatly exaggerated, by the general reports of the school. And discovery surely is, at all times, better than concealment; for the fault that is discovered may be healed: the fault that is concealed, eats away in secret into

the character, until at last it becomes incurable." — (*Ideen zu einer Revision*, &c. pp. 251—255.) *

C. *Self-Examination.* (p. 247.)

The practice recommended in the text is not new in substance, or even in form. Passing by the various expedients adopted amongst ancient philosophers, and founders of modern religious orders †, all of which tended to the same good end, — self-inquiry and examination, with a view to mental and moral progress, — a few words may be permitted on some recent improvements in these several methods.

The "Common-place Book" of Locke had no reference to moral improvement; it was confined merely to the preserving extracts and notices of reading, the utility of which has been admitted by many distinguished writers, amongst them Sir M. Hale, though denied in still stronger terms by others, such as Milton, Johnson, &c. Franklin's plan is, amongst the first, strictly intended to apply to conduct. He describes in his Autobiography what were the circumstances which first suggested its formation, the objects he had in view, and the means by which he proposed to carry them into effect. Finding that bad habits usually crept in from want of attention, and that his propensities were often too strong for his reason, he adopted a method framed for the purpose of breaking up these habits and controlling these propensities with something like certainty, and forming and strengthening the opposite dispositions and qualities. Observing, that very vague ideas were attached to the names of virtues in general, he specified more minutely those he was desirous of acquiring, and ranged them under the thirteen following heads: — 1. Sobriety. 2. Silence. 3. Order. 4. Resolution. 5. Economy. 6. Application. 7. Sincerity. 8. Justice. 9. Moderation. 10. Cleanliness. 11. Tranquillity. 12. Chastity. 13. Humility. — Resolved to acquire each, he did not attempt the task in gross.

* See also Basedow's opinion of the nature and extent of these inconveniences. He suggests, as a remedy, the establishment of an "Educator," to conduct moral and religious education in every school. — (*Methoden Buch*, k. 1. § 19, 20.)

† "Utantur quotidie omnes conscientie sue examinatione consuetâ." (*Summar. Const. Soc. Jesu*, § 6.)

"Singuli præfinitunt sibi tempus sue conscientie bis quotidie examinationi impendant." (*Regule Communes*, § 1.)

"Nullam debent celare tentationem quam Præfecto rerum spiritualium vel Confessario vel Superiori non aperiant; immo vero totam animum suam illis integrè manifestam esse pergratum habent." (*Summar. Const. &c.* § 41.)

He took each of the thirteen in succession, beginning with *Sobriety*. He accompanied this, conformably, as he says, to the advice of Pythagoras, with a *Daily Evening Examination*; and in order to conduct it with effect, he adopted the following plan: — He assigned in a small book, for each of the virtues just mentioned, a page ruled with red ink, in seven columns, one for each day in the week; these columns were crossed by thirteen horizontal lines, at the beginning of each of which was the initial letter of one of the virtues. On this line, and in the appropriate column, he marked the violations committed during the day against that particular virtue. He paid strict attention for a whole week to each in succession, leaving the others to take their chance. In case he succeeded during an entire week in keeping clear his line marked, for instance, "*Sobriety*," he considered the habit of that virtue to have been sufficiently formed, and extended his attention to the next, with the view of obtaining in the next week another line equally exempt from marks. In this manner he hoped to be enabled to make a course in thirteen weeks, and four courses in the year.

In order to comply fully with the resolution of Order, and that each occupation of the day might have its proper moment, a page of the book above mentioned contained a plan for the employment of the four and twenty hours, as follows: —

*Plan for Employment during the Twenty-four Hours of the
Day and Night.*

Question of the morning — "*What good can I do to-day?*"

- | | | |
|-------|---|---|
| 5. | } | On rising, to wash, and invoke the Supreme Goodness; |
| 6. | | regulate affairs, and form resolutions for the day; continue |
| 7. | | studies; breakfast. |
| 8. | } | Work. |
| 9. | | |
| 10. | | |
| 11. | | |
| Noon. | } | Reading, or examination of accounts, and dinner. |
| 1. | | |
| 2. | } | Work. |
| 3. | | |
| 4. | | |
| 5. | | |
| 6. | } | Put every thing in its place; supper; music and recreation, or conversation; examination of the day. |
| 7. | | |
| 8. | | |
| 9. | | |

- | | | |
|-----------|---|--------|
| 10. | } | Sleep. |
| 11. | | |
| Midnight. | | |
| 1. | | |
| 2. | | |
| 3. | | |
| 4. | | |

Question of the evening — “ *What good have I done to-day?* ”

This plan was continued for some time without any interruption. He was surprised, at first, to find that he had many more defects than he had imagined; but he had soon the satisfaction to see them gradually diminish. After a little time, he made only one course during the year; later, one only in many years; at last none, in consequence of the diversity and multiplicity of his avocations, journeys, &c.; but he always carried his little book with him. The resolution of Order he found the most difficult of all others to observe; for though practicable as long as he was a journeyman printer, the moment he became master, his time was no longer at his disposition. He found also, from early habits of disorder, and too much reliance on an excellent memory, extreme difficulty in keeping in proper arrangement his papers, books, &c.; for a time he almost despaired of ever acquiring punctuality, and very painfully experienced, even in his latter days, the disadvantages resulting from its want. Yet with all this, and though he did not attain the full perfection at which he aimed, his efforts rendered him better, and much happier, than he would have been had he never formed this plan. He states, for the information of posterity, that to it, with the assistance of God, he was mainly indebted for the constant happiness he enjoyed to the 79th year of his life. He attributes to his Sobriety his long and uninterrupted health; to his Industry and Economy the independence which he early attained, and the acquisition not only of wealth but of knowledge, which enabled him to perform the duties of a good citizen, and acquire the consideration which he enjoyed amongst the literary characters of his day; to his Sincerity and Justice the confidence and distinctions with which he had been honoured by his fellow countrymen. In fine, to the union of these several virtues, however imperfectly attained, he was indebted for that equality of temper and good-humour, which rendered his company an object of delight even to the youngest. — He hopes, therefore,

that the process he has recommended will be as eagerly, and he doubts not as successfully, applied by his descendants.

Franklin's "Rule of Conduct" has been imitated and enlarged by recent writers. Amongst the most minute and elaborate may be cited M. A. Jullien, of Paris. He published in 1808, in 1 vol. 4to, an *Essai Général d'Education Physique, Morale, et Intellectuelle*, of which his *Essai sur l'Emploi du Temps* is, perhaps, the most interesting portion. The 3d edition of this work appeared in 1824. It was translated into German in 1811, and into English, and the translation published as an original work, in 1822.* The dissertations on the Employment of Time are obvious, but the machinery by which it is proposed to effect it, in reference to the physical, intellectual, and moral existence of man, forming the second part of the work, is worth notice. Putting aside their complication and minuteness, many of the tables may be used with advantage. The author proposes, in the first instance, strict Evening Examination; of the practicability and powerful efficacy of which he speaks largely. 2. "Le résumé par écrit du compte rendu journalier de sa vie;" or a short journal, not occupying more than 15 or 16 minutes a day. This is to be effected by means of two other small books, "*Livrets portatifs*," which he calls the "*Agenda Général*," and the "*Biomètre*." The journal, or "*Mémorial Analytique*," is destined to receive such facts or articles as require some development, at the same time limited to such only as are really worthy of being preserved. The *Agenda Général*, or "*Livret Pratique de l'Emploi du Temps*," is intended for a summary of the daily life of the writer. It is divided into six great columns. The *Biomètre* is formed to preserve by a single line the precise employment of every hour in the day.

The manner in which these several journals are to be considered is thus minutely given:—

I. *Mémorial Analytique*—

Is composed of five columns. In the 1st stands the Number; in the 2d, the Date and Place; in the 3d, Facts, Observations, and various Details; in the 4th, Title or Heading of Subjects; and in the 5th, References.

II. *Agenda Général*—

Is divided into six sections, 1st, Diary of the occurrences of the preceding day. 2d, Monies received and expended during the day

* He published another work on a cognate subject, at Paris, in 1818 — "*Essai sur l'Ordre, considéré dans l'Administration Publique, et dans les Sciences*," &c. In no country is such order more required than in England.

(“*Mémorial Economique*”). 3d, Addresses of acquaintances, friends, &c. (“*Mémorial des personnes*”). 4th, Heads of letters received and written (“*Mémorial de correspondance, active et passive*”). 5th, List of works read, or to be read (“*Mémorial bibliographique*”). 6th, Projects (“*Projets*”), divided into classes. Each day is marked with a +, —, or 0. Every month is to close with a *résumé* of the whole preceding month; every year with one of the preceding year. “A la fin de l’année on peut tracer un résumé général annuel, comprenant en quelques lignes tous les rapports que je viens d’indiquer; ce résumé n’est, pour ainsi dire, qu’une addition abrégée des articles particuliers des différens mois pour chacune des divisions déterminées. Dans chacune, on procède comme pour la *Vie Economique*; on additionne les *produits* de chaque mois en *perte* et en *gain*, en bien et en mal: leur réunion donne le produit total de l’année.”— p. 271.

It is unnecessary to go into the details by which each of these divisions is proposed to be worked, or the advantages which result from the simplification he has adopted. The Tables given as models for their construction, from p. 272. to p. 298., furnish every information which can be desired. The time required is about eight or nine minutes daily, half an hour monthly, and three or four hours once a year. The advantages to be attained from the practice are, perhaps, summed up in rather too strong a tone: 1. In the Physical branch, a “*Cours d’Hygiène pratique*,” or the art of preserving health, founded on exact observation of our constitution, temperament, &c. &c. 2. In the Moral, an experimental course of man and society. 3. In the Intellectual, progress and developement of our faculties, acquisition of knowledge. 4. Spirit of order and method, from the habit of a daily review of our time and actions. 5. Spirit of economy (*Mémorial économique*). 6. Our social relations well selected (*Mémorial des personnes*). 7. Our correspondence regularly followed up (*Mémorial épistolaire*). 8. Our reading well chosen (*Mémorial bibliothèque*). 9. Our projects, useful or not, in reserve for ourselves or others (*Dépôt mnémonique*).

III. *Biomètre*.

The object of the *Biomètre* is stated to be, “Pour consigner par écrit, en une minute, et sur une seule ligne, les divers emplois de chaque intervalle de vingt-quatre heures (p. 303.). The author thus concisely explains its object and application: — “J’ai tâché de comprendre dans un petit nombre de tableaux, formés de colonnes verticales, tous les élémens de la vie humaine et sociale; indépendamment de la condition, de la profession, ou de la fonction de

chaque individu. Ces colonnes, reproduites dans toutes les pages du livret, sont traversées par des lignes horizontales, correspondantes aux jours de l'année. Chaque tableau présente une série de 15 ou 16 lignes, pour autant de journées, suivant que le mois en a 30 ou 31 : une dernière ligne sert à inscrire, au bas de chaque colonne, le total des heures dépensées, pendant les jours que le tableau comprend. Deux tableaux représentent un mois, et vingt-quatre suffisent pour l'année entière. Un vingt-cinquième et dernier tableau, composé de mêmes colonnes traversées seulement par douze lignes, est destiné à présenter la recapitulation générale des douze mois. Les 365 lignes, laissées en blanc pour les 365 jours de l'année, servent à inscrire successivement, à la fin de chaque jour, le nombre des heures données à chacun des emplois du tems."

"La vie, ainsi considérée sous les rapports les plus généraux et dans leurs applications les plus variées, paraît devoir se diviser en cinq branches principales :—1. *Physique* ; 2. *Morale* ; 3. *Intellectuelle* ; 4. *Sociale* ; 5. *Passive ou Végétative*. Chacune des quatre premières branches comprend eile-même des subdivisions particulières, que je vais indiquer, en donnant l'application détaillée du Biomètre, dont un modèle figuré terminera ce chapitre."

This "Tableau Analytique de la Vie" is composed of 19 columns, each of which is distinguished by a letter of the alphabet, intended to be expressive of the object to which it is destined. "Chaque colonne représente une division de la vie, qu'on a tâché d'exprimer d'une manière abrégée et caractéristique dans l'explication qui va suivre. Chaque ligne représente une journée, qui traverse ces colonnes, et qui laisse dans chacune d'elles plus ou moins d'heures employées pour les divisions de la vie qu'elles expriment. Enfin chacune de ces divisions reproduit un des rapports de l'homme avec la nature, ou avec la société, avec ses besoins, ses devoirs, sa conscience, avec les personnes, les lieux, les choses qui l'environnent, avec ses affaires, ses plaisirs, et avec le grand but qu'il doit constamment se proposer — son perfectionnement moral, et son bonheur" (p. 305.).

It would far exceed the limits of a note, already too extended, to enter into the details of the manner in which the author states that he and his friends had carried this plan into effect. The general outline (p. 325.) appears to be the *Résumé* of these disquisitions, and presents a tolerably intelligible sketch of the whole.

“ *Note Explicative.*

“ De la destination des colonnes du tableau ci-après ; dont chacune est distinguée seulement par une des lettres de l'alphabet.

A. Numeros des jours du mois, ou *Dates*.

B. Température du chaque jour.

“ RAPPORT PHYSIQUE.

C. Vie tranquille, ou sommeil.

D. Vie alimentaire, ou repas.

E. Vie active, ou exercices du corps, promenades, bains.

“ RAPPORT MORAL.

F. Vie intérieure, religieuse, ou méditative et philosophique : Prières, exercices de religion, examen moral, et tenue du Mémorial ; plan de conduite pour la journée.

G. Vie domestique et de famille.

H. Vie économique : Affaires d'ordre, ou d'intérêt.

“ RAPPORT INTELLECTUEL.

I. Vie intellectuelle obligée : Travaux d'obligation.

J. Vie intellectuelle libre : Travaux de choix.

L. Vie littéraire : Lectures.

“ RAPPORT SOCIAL.

LS. Vie épistolaire : Correspondance.

M. Vie errante : Voyages et journées.

N. Vie civile et sociale : Noms, relations et adresses, société, visites, jeux, &c.

O. Vie dissipée : Théâtres, bals, concerts, et fêtes.

P. Vie passive et végétative, abandonnée au *far niente* : Momens vagues, et perte du tems.

Q. Vie numérique ou exprimée en chiffres : Nombre total des heures de chaque *jour*, de chaque *quinzaine*, de chaque *mois*.

R. Vie mnémonique ; Remarques et souvenirs.

S. Vie rationnelle : Signes destinés à indiquer, si l'on a lieu d'être, ou non, satisfait de l'emploi de sa journée ” (p. 325).

Though much of the preceding classification will appear to the majority of readers either superfluous or painfully minute, there can be no doubt that much also may be most usefully applied in the construction of such instruments of self-observation. The suppression or amalgamation of one or more articles or subdivisions, according to the position, temper, or wants of the individual, can in nothing detract from the merit of the principle upon which it is founded. It will be farther observed, that the forms given by Jullien are much more applicable to those who have passed, than to those who are passing, through the earlier stages of their education. This, however, is a matter of application. The same basis may be taken, and, with a little alteration, be rendered applicable to the child as well as to the adult, to the statesman as well as the private man, to male and female, to all ages, sexes, and conditions.

This has, in great degree, been already done for children.

The "Daily Record of Duties," is a happy application of the principles of Phrenology to this most important branch of education. It was first addressed with an explanatory letter to the Editor of the Phrenological Journal, vol. vi. p. 238.* The nature of the plan, and the mode of working it, are detailed in the following passage of the letter:—"My practice is this. Each child above the age of eight years is furnished with a book, having a number of columns on each page. The left hand contains the words, very briefly expressing the different duties to be fulfilled; for instance, under the moral duties, the words *Gentleness, Courage, Activity, Good Temper* occur. The remaining columns are for the days of several weeks, each day being dated at the top of the column. In the column of duties are first entered the points of fulfilment of the organic laws on which bodily and mental health depends. Then follow the moral, arranged as nearly as possible in the phrenological order of the faculties. First, the proper use of the animal feelings or propensities. Second, the due exercise of the higher moral powers, in spontaneous attention and kindness to others, and in pious and conscientious fulfilment of duty. And lastly, the regular exercise and improvement of the intellectual powers, both knowing and reflecting. I have taught the children to note, in each case, as it may happen, one of seven different results. Either the point of duty has been simply obeyed, or not forgotten. This is marked with the initial O. Or, 2d, it has

* Communicated by Mr. Simpson, of Edinburgh, well known by his eloquent and enlightened work on National Education.

been neglected, which is marked N. Or, 3d, it has been positively *well done*, marked W. Or, 4th, *very well done*, marked V.W. Or, 5th, it has been transgressed, marked T. Or, 6th, seriously transgressed, marked S.T. And, 7th, for *cases of omission without blame*, which may happen when circumstances prevent the duty being performed, a horizontal line is the mark adopted. All the marks may be made by the child, except the W. and V.W., or *well done*, *very well done*, which ought to be the parent's function. This will be particularly noted; for some readers, passing it by, have objected to what they have thought the child's recording its own merits."

"Just before going to bed, each child takes his or her book, and on his or her own judgment and conscience, inserts the marks, except W. and V.W., in the column for the bygone day, opposite each duty named. The child does this in *pencil*, and then submits the whole to me. If I confirm the judgment, the pencil marks are entered in ink; if not, they are rubbed out, and the right decision substituted in their place."

The working of this plan is both easy and attended with decided practical benefit. It is not urged rashly, or without due consideration and experience of its operation and effects. "I should have addressed you prematurely," says the writer, "had I done so before ascertaining, by at least a year's experience, how my little plan worked. The children enter heartily into the discipline, which they render nearly self-imposed, and feel a salutary respect for their 'Law Books,' as they call them, in their most unthinking hours of play. It is impossible to imagine a more gentle and heart-improving control; and one which is more fitted to supersede, not only actual punishment, but, in the majority of cases, even reproof. I expect still more marked and yet higher results as the children advance in years, for I would not confine the exercise merely to their childhood." The gradual progress of this experiment, in particular instances, is then detailed in confirmation. Examples illustrative of the mode in which it has been applied to the children of the writer's family are given, and a series of tables for each week in the year, on a very simple construction, and reducible, with very little attention indeed, to practice. The authoress, Mrs. S. (for to a lady fully capable of nicely appreciating the utility and deficiency of any education system, we are indebted for the invention), has tried it in her own family, and, as has already been observed, with the most perfect success. It is of a nature, too, perfectly graduated to all circumstances and classes; and may be adjusted with almost as much facility to public, as to private

education. In the latter case, however, a corresponding degree of vigilance will be required on the part of the teacher; for it is perhaps too much to expect that the pupils themselves, in large, and often very heterogeneous establishments, will possess the conscientiousness which is the first ingredient or qualification for a frank and beneficial use of this self-examining record. In the hands, however, of a paternal and intelligent educator, even with this drawback upon its extension and efficiency, it may be made a very remarkable instrument of every species of improvement. It would be an excellent accompaniment to every public establishment, and, if reduced to an abstract at the end of the year, would be the surest criterion of the pupil's progress, moral, mental, and physical. Such a practice in general operation in all public schools, as well as private, would not only teach the pupil the most important art in life — self-control, but would give him a just measure of his own character and faculties on entering life, and enable his instructor, the sponsor to the public for both, to present society with somewhat more accurate testimonies than the vague "signalements" which are now so often carelessly or criminally palmed upon the public. Some such application of this principle has been in use in the German schools; but it wants the precision and uniformity furnished by the present document. It is to be hoped that, when better known and longer tried, its utility will be more fully recognised, and that it will go far in public, as it has done in private, to supersede all punishment but that of the pupil's own heart.

The chief object of these several instruments is to exact a punctual and well-digested self-examination, and to obtain an accurate measure of progress or deficiency in the character and faculties of the individual. No particular plan seems essential to the securing of these results; they must be regulated altogether by the time, opportunity, disposition, power, situation, &c. of the person or persons by whom they are used or enforced; but in any or every degree they are useful, especially if followed up for a long continuance of time, and, as far as they go, reduced to practice with scrupulous fidelity. Under this head may come, not only such tables as those instanced, but more extended forms for obtaining the same results, such as Journals, Diaries, Common-place Books, Digests, &c. Each of these expedients has its respective advantages. The Journal, if well kept (there is a great deal in that word), is an excellent teacher: it renders observation easy and accurate, makes a man acquainted with himself and others, and presents a very vivid picture of the innumerable changes of many-coloured life, through which, whether physical, moral, or in-

tellectual, every individual, however uniform his existence may appear, must necessarily pass. This self-accounting evening communion not only leaves behind the traces of the past day, but prepares, by an admirable exercise of the whole being, for the next. It rouses the inward man, and sets him in active and intelligent watch upon himself. It shapes into compact and applicable collections the scattered and perishable sensations and judgments of passing life, and "utilises," to apply a quaint but not inexpressive phrase, every instant to the utmost. Were the pages to be thrown into the fire the next day, it is not to be concluded that therefore these benefits would be sacrificed. The more important would remain behind. The record of inquiry might perish, but the habit of inquiring and observing with accuracy and punctuality would not be lost. Nor are children to be supposed altogether incapable of applying to very excellent purpose, proportionate to their position, this practice of journalising. I have seen it maintained for some time in families, with the best results. Of its utility to the public and literary man no question can be entertained. Some of the best portraits we have of mind and character, the most authentic records of the real springs of human action, are attributable to these graphic touches at the instant, and on the spot. It is painting in fresco, with a large and firm pencil. Common-place Books are entirely to be estimated by the manner in which they are kept. Dr. Johnson considered them as waste of time; but Dr. Johnson speaks, as was his wont, too absolutely. He had a comprehensive and accurate memory; he could himself dispense with such aids; but when the original book is often not to be had, the ordinary reader has to run the risk of total, or, what is often worse, of half forgetfulness, without any, or at least distant and contingent, hope of repairing the loss. Time is unquestionably of the first value, to those especially who would be most likely to avail themselves of such expedients; but it may be doubted whether more time may not be consumed in turning over, after a long lapse of years, and often successlessly, the many pages of many volumes, than writing down a short passage, or the substance of it, at the moment when it is first read. The choice, number, and classification, however, of such selections, are the main points: upon these entirely depends the utility or inutility of such helps to the memory and judgment. The articles must be important, striking, and well arranged; and it is then probable they will not be very numerous. The best mode to assure such conditions, is to conduct the pupils' course of reading on a natural, connected, and

well-digested plan. The Common-place Book should be divided in analogy to this course. If the course form two sections, Science and Literature, in like manner there might be two sections for Science and Literature in the book; if Arts, History, &c. &c. be added, there might be more. If the books read in each of these branches followed each other in their proper order, the Common-place Book would, in like manner, exhibit a succession of articles flowing, almost in their natural series, from each other. References would thus be proportionably easier: Locke's analytical table would scarcely be required. An ordinary index, added at the end of the volume, would fully answer the purpose and obviate all confusion from interruption of articles, &c. Whatever objection may be urged against wholesale transcripts, the same can scarcely hold against *Digests*. Bacon's Tables furnish a very elaborate specimen of the application of this instrument, especially when adopted in the prosecution of any special inquiry. It in the first instance applies the analytic, then the exhaustive, and finally the synthetic method. The manner in which the first may be carried on, is shown with great effect by Jullien, in the work just quoted, c. viii. *Seconde Partie. Manière particulière des Lectures spécialement pour les ouvrages de science et d'histoire*; but particularly in that division of it which is entitled *Application de la Méthode des Lectures*, and which he assures us has been actively employed in France, by more than one of her distinguished writers, with the greatest advantage. He reads, generally, the principal passages more than once over, and then selects such as are in accord with the particular objects he has in view. A Digest or Analysis of these passages is next prepared. A volume, or a certain number of pages in a volume, is appropriated to some particular subject, such as *History*, &c. Each page is divided into five parallel columns, each column headed by a title designating the object of the analysis, and over all stands the name of the work from which the extract or analysis is made. The first column on the left contains the number of the article; the second, the dates of the period to which the extract or analysis refers; the third (the largest), the abridgment (*le précis*) of facts and observations collected; the fourth, the title of reference; the fifth, general signs, and numbers of reference to other articles of an analogous nature in the collection. The arrangement for works on Science is equally simple. The third column is divided into two sections, one for observations, and experiments, *made on principles already established*; the other for such as are *to be made or established*; — preserving, in other particulars, the

order of the distribution just mentioned for History. The whole concludes by an Index or Analytic Table, after the manner of Locke. A specimen of the application of this plan to the first three volumes of Bacon, is given, p. 381. (See also Notes, pp. 117. and 118., and the other work of the same author, *Essai sur la Philosophie des Sciences*.) The results of this practice have been found exceedingly beneficial. "Cette manière," says the writer (p. 3.), "de lire et de conserver des extraits de ses lectures, est à la fois simple, commode, instructive, et agréable. On verrait, au bout de quelques années, la substance de plusieurs volumes, ou de beaucoup d'ouvrages différens, sous un rapport déterminé, dans un petit nombre de pages. On se ménage des points-d'appui pour la mémoire et la réflexion ; on acquiert surtout plus de délicatesse de goût, plus de sûreté de jugement, et une plus grande force d'attention" (p. 376.). "Chacun peut ainsi former, pour son propre usage, une histoire générale, abrégée et complète, soit d'une science, soit d'une nation ou d'une époque déterminée, soit d'une branche quelconque, relative à son instruction personnelle, et embrasser dans des tableaux, ou cadres analytiques, les objets principaux qu'il croit utile d'étudier et d'approfondir. Au lieu de laisser échapper les fruits de ses lectures, dont le plupart des hommes conservent à peine une vague et inutile souvenir, on se ménage le moyen d'avoir toujours présent à l'esprit ce qu'on a lu et observé, de mieux élaborer ses lectures par la méditation, de les rendre réellement instructives, en les fortifiant les unes par les autres, et en recueillant avec ordre tout ce qui mérite d'être fixé dans la mémoire, pour le retrouver, et s'en servir au besoin. Si une semblable méthode était pratiquée seulement pendant dix années, par un certain nombre de bons esprits et d'hommes laborieux, elle procurerait des avantages incalculables ; car elle permettrait de former une Bibliothèque choisie et philosophique, qui au lieu de cette multitude de livres dont la seule idée effraie l'imagination, présenterait, dans quelques volumes d'extraits classés méthodiquement, sur des sujets déterminés, la substance des meilleurs ouvrages classiques, dans lesquels les savans et les historiens, anciens et modernes, ont déposé les fruits de l'expérience des siècles." — (p. 388.)*

Whether the last result anticipated be likely to be realised, or how far, if realised, it would be likely to be of advantage, may admit of question ; but the advantage of the habit which such a practice

* Basedow made a similar suggestion. See the concluding chapters of his *Methoden Buch*. Something of the kind, in our condensed editions of Locke and Paley, has also been attempted, though not with much success.

must superinduce, whatever may be this result, is surely undoubted. Here, as in every other department of our complicated existence, to move with utility there must be a well-defined object, and a well-regulated route; principals, and subordinates; analysis before synthesis; observations and facts before conclusions. The habit of grouping round a centre not only gives facility to acquisition, but forms that most retentive of all memories, and most useful for all practical purposes — the methodical. This makes of the mind the “*Bibliothèque choisie*,” above noticed; creates a conscience, intellectual as well as moral; gives a new interest, that of direct applicability, to all reading; and places in the hand of the student his mental capital, for employment in whatever enterprise may offer, instead of locking it up in confused heaps, most difficult to be got at, when most required. Above all, these methods, even the very worst, teach the value of time. “*Tempus, mea possessio est, ager meus*,” was the devise of Cardan: every reader, who knows what it is to keep, a well-arranged Record, Common-place Book, Digest, or Journal, will readily adopt it.

D. Classification of School-Courses and Schools, p. 303.

The Classification of a School Course is a much more important matter in education than is generally imagined. The order in which a subject is studied, determines in great degree the amount of labour required: that which, taken in its proper place, is learned at once with pleasure, out of place, is painfully if ever acquired. Nor are such results confined to the moment of acquisition; the remote consequences are even more decisive. By erroneous arrangement both the memory and judgment have to contend with unnecessary difficulties. The knowledge so obtained, even when obtained, lies in bales and heaps in the recollection, unfit for use. The mind, instead of a cabinet, becomes a lumber room. The intellectual man is deprived of half his powers.

Nor is the moral being less perniciously affected; the want of accuracy, precision, punctuality, order, in the intellect, is fatally productive of a corresponding degree of incertitude and indifference in moral impression and, therefore, in moral action. When the moral sense becomes blunted and inert, what reliance can be placed upon the conduct of the man?

The natural order in the acquisition of knowledge is from the known to the unknown; from the simple to the complex. The application of this order to the arrangement of a School course,

obvious as it may appear to be, is, notwithstanding, involved in much difficulty. What is the simple, what is the complicated, what should be the first known, what should be the last? This depends upon the arrangement of the objects themselves. — But what is, or rather what should be, that arrangement? Here we are at sea. There is no accord amongst authors upon the subject; all efforts hitherto made to adjust the classification and nomenclature of the departments of knowledge, have been attended with limited success. The worst arrangements are still in vogue. We are still condemned to inadequate distribution, totally erroneous denominations, founded on vague or capricious analogies, to an order directly contrary to the developement of the human faculties, — to a system, in fine, disjointed and confused from beginning to end. When such faults appear in the theory, are we to be surprised to meet them reproduced and augmented in the practice?

In these difficulties, we can only select the least defective of these arrangements, or such portions of each as seem on trial most adapted to facilitate the communication, acquisition, and retention of knowledge.

The knowledge of the ancients being limited, their distribution of the objects of knowledge was unequal, and their nomenclature much too comprehensive. The higher we ascend, the more obvious, of course, is this defect. Hence their indistinct ideas of science and art, their divisions of arts into liberal and illiberal, their terms, philosophy, mathematics, physics, metaphysics, ethics, &c. &c. Many of these defects (defects rather than errors) are still retained, and not only retained, but augmented by more striking mistakes. The fact is, no principle is established by which the analysis in question may be properly conducted. Things are not only not distinguished, though essentially distinct, but the names given characterise in a most imperfect manner the objects intended to be described. The terms electricity, galvanism, encyclopædia, each mark a class of these mistakes.*

* It would be difficult to enumerate all these classes: a few may be instanced. 1. Terms too general. "Mathematics" implies whatever may be learned — "des connoissances" — a proper term, perhaps, when all learning was supposed to be shut up in the sciences of form and number. The sciences to which the term is now applied form but a small portion of general science. Under the same head may be ranked not only physics, but physiology. — 2. Terms vague and weak. "Philosophy" is "love of wisdom;" a more paraphrastical compliment, applicable equally to all mental occupation. A poet may surely be as much a "lover of wisdom" in virtue of his poetry, as the mechanic in virtue of his machines.

The classification of the old Scholastics was very rude, and purely mechanical : it was intended to refer solely to the number of the then sciences, and the relation they bore to the ordinary professional purposes of life. The Latin language, and the metaphysics of Aristotle, formed the great staple of the higher departments of their education. They divided the "Curriculum,"

It describes no knowledge ; not one branch in art or science. Its derivative applications are still more objectionable. "Natural Philosophy." What is nature ? Is not the soul nature, as well as earth and air ? Is not "Psychology" natural science quite as much as mechanics, pneumatics, &c. "Experimental Philosophy." Must not all science, for a long time, be experiment before it can really claim the character of science ? In that medium state, it is to be classed among the "-logies ;" but there is just as much confusion in the application of that term as well as of the term "-gnosy" (*γνωσις*, the true or full-formed science), as of that of Philosophy itself.—3. Terms misleading. "Natural History." History is the narrative of actions. Botany is a knowledge of laws, not a narrative of actions.—4. Terms founded on incorrect analogy. "Encyclopædia," &c. Knowledge proceeds from the simple to the compound and complex. The sciences are branches of true knowledge, ranged according as they are attainable. It is progress, advance, expansion. A plain, or a tree, is the appropriate sensible representation. Encyclopædia implies a circle, a turning back upon the point of departure. — 5. Terms obscure, therefore inexpressive. "Chemistry," for instance, upon the origin and meaning of which we have nothing sure. — 6. Terms not descriptive of qualities, but presupposing such qualities to be known. "Electricity," from *ελεκτρον*, amber ; but amber has other qualities besides those intended to be comprehended under the term electricity. The term Electricity or *Αιθεριosity* might as well designate the colour, transparency of amber, &c. as its attracting and repelling quality. The same may be said of Magnetism. The magnet has other qualities besides the power of attracting and repelling, and there are other bodies, such as nickel, which have this quality as well as the magnet. — 7. Terms designating individuals, or classes, not describing the science. Galvanism, Voltaism, Magic, &c. ; common also in the subordinate nomenclature of botany, geology, &c. &c. ; they are altogether unanalytic, and therefore great obstructions to the formation of a truly analytical arrangement.

In moral and mental science the errors are still grosser. What ideas do the terms logic (or, worse, logics), ideology, metaphysics, ethics, convey ? Is logic limited to mere words ? Can the art of reasoning dispense with ideas ? Is mental science confined to the determining operations and results, without looking to that from whence they proceed ? What light is thrown upon a science itself, to be told it is "before," or "after," or "above" another ? But every where we meet with the same absurdities. It is only in the subordinate classifications, such as mineralogy, trigonometry, &c., that we find any attempt at just and characteristic designations. It often would have been better for the purposes of science, that terms, such as chemistry, to which, though dubious at first, a precise meaning might afterwards have been affixed, had been adopted, than those affecting to guide, but calculated only to mislead, such as are now in use.

as it was called (a misnomer, like that of the *Encyclopædia*), into the "*Humanities*" and "*Philosophy*." These were again divided into the "*Trivium*" and "*Quadrivium*," fanciful denominations, resulting from a principle which pretended to comprise all knowledge in the actual circle, and to give its boundless demesnes the narrowness and formality of a Dutch garden. This capricious and false division, notwithstanding the modern enlargements of the old branches, and the numberless additions of new ones, still retains its place in most of the catholic seminaries on the Continent, and is discoverable, like many other errors of the middle ages, throughout the whole course of our academical and university education. The course of the Humanities embraces chiefly the learned languages, and, in most of the colleges abroad, extends to six or seven years. Philosophy includes a meagre outline of the abstract sciences, with antiquated treatises on their applications to practical purposes; little or no reference to the departments which we comprise under the names of Natural History, Chemistry, Mineralogy, but proportionate expen^diture of time and labour on the exploded Metaphysics upon which, more or less, it grafts its Ethics. Consistently, however, with the spirit of the times from which this arrangement dates, Theology occupies much the larger portion of the philosophical course. It once formed together with Jurisprudence the great study, at a time when all study was subservient either to the tribunals, or the church. The wants of the present time require a different distribution; one founded less on passing circumstances, and more on the true nature of the departments of knowledge, and on the universal laws of man and mind.

In opposition to this venerable fabric, Peter Ramus attempted with little success to raise a fabric of his own. His "Tree" of the Sciences, attributed erroneously to Porphyrius, is remarkable both for its object and form. It is a direct continuation of the attack on the Aristotelian Philosophy, commenced by him a few years before in his "*Institutiones Dialecticæ*" and "*Aristotelicæ Animadversiones*;" and in the form adopted is conspicuous that bifurcating or exhaustive method afterwards pursued, though somewhat affectedly, by Bentham. The distribution sets out upon a far more intelligible and accurate principle than could be discovered in any portion of the system he denounced; but it was not likely, with every allowance for the progress of the age, that, when the thunders of Innocent III. were ineffectual, the voice of a single Parisian Professor could prevail. Peter Ramus was deprived, for these literary heresies, of his professorship, at the age of 28; de-

clared, by an edict of the French Parliament under Francis I., " insolent, impudent, and a liar ;" his books prohibited in all future time, and the author himself solemnly forbidden to copy, or even to read them. He fell, with other Protestants, in the massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572; and the old system still continued unshaken.

Various efforts followed the imperfect attempt of Ramus, but none of any note, till the period of Bacon. The merit of the Baconian method is not, however, its classifications or arrangements. His "*Novum Organon*" was indeed a mighty instrument; it broke up all the old despotism of the schools, established a bold spirit of intellectual inquiry, reclaimed man from the eccentric and forced marches in which he had hitherto been wandering, and placed him for the first time in the strait onward path to truth. But he had, with the rest of his contemporaries, embraced a portion only of human knowledge; his ideas and the forms adopted for fixing and communicating them were still in many particulars scholastic. It must also be remembered that the object he had in view was not so much a distribution of the departments of knowledge, as a distribution intended for the classification of facts, which might lead to discovery in any one of these departments. The "*Discovery of Forms*," the "*Tables*" in illustration of these Discoveries, and the "*Doctrine of Instances*," which form the substance of the second Book of the *Organon*, are all intended as instruments for the prosecution of the Inductive Method, but do not aid, except collaterally, in distributing or designating either any attained or attainable science. He can only, therefore, be included amongst such as have treated of the means by which ultimately such classification may be effected. His is rather a treatise of experimental logic for the discovery of truth, than an ordering under certain heads and titles truths already known. This preliminary was however essential to every effort which could hope to attain this latter object. All arrangements not dependent upon an accurate knowledge of the objects to be arranged, it is quite obvious, must be utterly fallacious, or at best hypothetical. It is under this point of view that the "*Novum Organon*" has so largely contributed to succeeding exertions. Without some such work, just distribution would have been very tedious, if not altogether impracticable.

Bacon was followed by numerous disciples, who applied the Inductive Method to the discovery of new truths and facts, each in the science to which their genius was directed; but none appear to have felt the inconveniences of the existing classifications, or to

have made any efforts for their remedy. Their treatises on methods are almost strictly confined to the application of new logical and experimental processes, generally too inferior to their great predecessor to deserve remark. The Treatise "De Methodo" of Descartes, the "Medicina Mentis" of Tschirnhausen, the "Philosophical Algebra" of Dr. Hooke, are all more or less of this character. Even later writers, whose studies, it would seem, should have more directly led them to a due sense of the defects of existing divisions, such as Saunderson, Watts, Harris, Reid, Kaimes, &c., so far from suggesting even incidentally the necessity of a new classification, have almost uniformly thrown fresh difficulties in its way. The first exception deserving any notice to this remark is D'Alembert, who has treated the subject professedly in the "Discours Préliminaire" to the great Encyclopædia. The nature of the work in some degree rendered this indispensable: he felt and showed the necessity of a remedy. He is far, however, from having succeeded in proposing one which can be deemed effectual.

D'Alembert gives in this "Système Figuré des Connaissances Humaines" (avowedly adopted on the principle of Bacon), and the "Explication," &c., which accompanies it, a synoptical view of what he considers the "genealogy" and demarcating limits of each science. The work, notwithstanding its numerous faults, was greatly admired at the time, — a strong evidence how generally the necessity of correcting the existing arrangement and terminology was felt: and though calmer examination, and more extended knowledge, every day detected some new defect, omission, or error in the details, no one for many years after appears to have had the courage to point them out.

The system of D'Alembert is, in many particulars, extremely vicious: it errs in the designation of the subject, in the determination of the first great divisions, in the methods adopted in dividing, in the names given to each of the branches, in the distinctive characteristics of each, and in the frequent repetitions of names, classes, &c. His great merit was to have presented for the first time a tolerably complete outline of the sciences then known, to have proved the necessity and practicability of a reform, to have suggested the mode by which it might be accomplished, and in great degree to have led the way.

Few and feeble efforts were made to follow in the same track, all far below the merits of the "Système Figuré," till Dugald Stewart, in the Preliminary Discourse to the Supplement of the new Encyclo-

pædia Britannica of Edinburgh, in 1815, drew the public attention to the numerous and radical errors in the plan of D'Alembert; insisted with great force, but not less modesty, on the necessity of constructing a new one; but, fearing to strive against two such names as Bacon and D'Alembert, confined himself merely to indicating their errors, and retired from engaging in so bold an attempt as their correction. About the same time, with no less a sense of the defects referred to, but with more determination to reform them, Mr. Bentham, without any knowledge of the labours of Dugald Stewart, was ardently engaged in raising a less objectionable structure. In a remarkable Essay, which forms a portion of his *Chrestomathia*, he put forward his system, not as a supplement, or emendated copy of D'Alembert's, but as a thorough and complete reconstruction. It accordingly has great merits, and great vices, but both strictly his own. In many particulars no man could be better qualified for the task. He was a close and keen searcher after truth, a great lover of order, precise in investigating qualities and determining limits, a microscopic analyst, an inexorable detector of incoherence and contradiction, and deeply sensible of the advantages of a simple and well pursued analogy. With such means, both a good classification and nomenclature might very reasonably be expected. His success, however, in execution was by no means commensurate with his boldness and accuracy in conception. His original basis is scarcely less faulty than D'Alembert's; his divisions are founded on distinctions rather than differences, nominal rather than real; his process for arriving at resemblances, is lengthened, tortuous, and sometimes even fantastic; but, above all, his nomenclature is cumbersome, harsh, and complicated, and often founded on the most forced and sometimes imaginary resemblances: his whole system is consequently little adapted to common use, and never likely to become popular. It has had little or no influence on science or education; the old classification still continues in use, and still produces all its old consequences.

With all this, it cannot be denied that Bentham has taken the first real step. He has fearlessly attacked error; pointed out a method by which accuracy might be attained; and in several departments, particularly in the physical sciences, constructed an essentially just and characteristic classification. The future re-organiser, whoever he may be, will derive much advantage from his labours; and even in the imperfect state in which the subject still lies, the teacher may, without difficulty or danger, avail himself of many of his new distributions.

A more recent effort has been made, but by no means of the extensive character of either of the preceding, by Dr. Arnott. The distinctive features of his classification, detailed in the Preface to the last edition of his *Natural Philosophy*, is the order in which he places the mathematical and physical sciences in reference to each other. He holds that Arithmetic and Geometry, so far from being necessary preliminaries to Natural Philosophy, demand a much more mature mind, and a higher state of intellectual discipline, than is required for the cultivation of the latter science. "This, doubtless, may be true in reference to the mere external perceptions conveyed by such science; but, as furnishing abridged formulæ for the entire conception or expression of its higher branches, the abstract Mathematics become indispensable." Certain portions, too, of the sciences of number and form are absolutely necessary in the very elements of education: no system of practical instruction can possibly go on without them; in almost all they are the essence, and not least in those which purport to be founded on the simplest and easiest development of the human mind. Pestalozzi and De Fellenberg insist especially upon both their principles and applications: and experience has shown that there are few, even amongst the very young, who cannot seize their primary combinations. At the same time, Dr. Arnott's theory is not without great claims to attention. There are cases in which serious injury has resulted to the intellectual powers, by pushing too early the application to the higher branches of mathematical science. Dr. Arnott insists, with just energy, on the impropriety, inconsistency, and indistinctness of our present nomenclature. His proposed alterations are improvements, and may be introduced without any violent innovation, and with practical benefit, into our courses of education. They render the abstruse clear, and the complicated simple; and substitute for those processes which have hitherto contributed so much to deter the general student from the culture even of the elements of the sciences, a much more attractive method, and one, at the same time, quite adequate to purposes of ordinary practical utility.

The works just noticed touch incidentally, rather than professionally, on this important subject; but Ampère's *Essai sur la Philosophie des Sciences, ou Exposition Analytique d'une Classification naturelle de toutes les Connaissances Humaines*, published in 1834, is the first treatise which goes regularly into all its bearings. As the title indicates, it purports to be a classification, founded not on arbitrary or conventional distinctions, but on the nature of things themselves; a work which cost the author three years' incessant

labour, and very numerous modifications, but which is an outline only of a more extensive production under the name of a "*Cours Spécial de Mathésiologie*."

After remarking the failure of his predecessors, arising from the erroneous principles on which most of them set out, he proceeds to show the distinctive characteristics of natural and artificial classifications.

"On a distingué deux sortes des classifications ; les naturelles et les artificielles. Dans ces dernières, quelques caractères, divisés arbitrairement, servent à déterminer la place de chaque objet : on y fait abstraction des autres ; et les objets se trouvent par là même rapprochés ou éloignés de la manière la plus bizarre. Dans les classifications naturelles, au contraire, on emploie concurremment *tous* les caractères essentiels aux objets dont on s'occupe, en discutant l'importance de chacun d'eux ; et les résultats de ce travail ne sont adoptés qu'autant que les objets qui présentent le plus d'analogie se trouvent toujours les plus rapprochés," &c. — (p. 10.)

The conditions for forming such arrangement are then detailed : after stating the two principal means of characterising a science, and fixing the limits which separate it from all others, to be, on one side, the nature itself of the objects of study, and, on the other, the point of view under which they are considered, he proceeds : —

"Il faudra aussi qu'elles soient disposées dans un ordre tel qu'un homme, qui voudrait en parcourir toute la série, les trouve rangées à la suite les unes des autres ; de manière qu'en les suivant dans cet ordre, il n'ait jamais besoin, du moins autant que cela est possible, d'avoir recours pour l'étude d'une science à d'autres connaissances qu'à celles qu'il aurait acquises en étudiant les sciences précédentes. Satisfaire à cette condition, c'est faire à l'égard des sciences ce que M. de Jussieu a fait à l'égard des végétaux, en commençant l'ordre naturel par ceux dont l'organisation est la plus simple, et en l'élevant graduellement à ceux dont l'organisation devient de plus en plus compliquée. Depuis on a jugé préférable de renverser cet ordre, en commençant par ces derniers. L'une et l'autre méthodes peuvent, en commençant par ces derniers, être également suivies lorsqu'il s'agit de la classification naturelle des êtres organisés ; mais on ne peut balancer quand il est question de celle des connaissances humaines," &c.

Proceeding on this principle, he at once begins, contrary to the suggestion of Dr. Arnott, by Mathematics. "I then saw that in any really natural classification of the Sciences, it was by those united generally under the name of the Mathematics that we

ought to begin, inasmuch as those sciences compared to others are composed of only a small number of ideas, all derived from notions of size, extent, motion, force, and because they can be studied without borrowing from any other science."

To the Mathematics he proposes should succeed the sciences which treat of the inorganic qualities of bodies, requiring no aid from any other science than pure mathematics. Those which have for their object the study of living animals next follow, the naturalist and physician having frequently to recur to the mathematical and physical sciences, whilst the mathematician never, and the physical student rarely, is required to borrow his data from the naturalist.

But the sciences which comprise the knowledge of the natural world, and the organised beings which inhabit it, form but a small portion of the truths which come under classification. The study of these latter ought alone to occupy as much as all the others together. Hence the long series of the philosophical, moral, and political sciences.

"L'étude de l'homme ne doit venir qu'après celle du monde et de la nature; car de même que nous nous servons de l'œil sans connaître sa structure et la manière dont s'opère la vision, de même le mathématicien, le naturaliste, peuvent se passer dans leurs travaux de l'étude philosophique des facultés, qu'ils emploient à mesurer l'univers, à observer et à classer les faits relatifs à tous les êtres qu'il renferme." The philosopher, on the contrary, finds in the mathematical and physical sciences materials for the study of the human mind, of which these are the noblest productions.

Literature in all its branches, the Arts in all their applications, follow: he thus reasons on the principles which regulate this arrangement:—

"It is now time to study the means which men adopt to communicate their thoughts, their feelings, their passions, &c. Here, therefore, may be placed the study of the Languages, of Literature, of the liberal Arts, including amongst the latter as a distinct department, but the first of all, the art of instructing men, and guiding them from their youth upwards in the paths of virtue and knowledge. Doubtless the philosopher has need of language to fix his ideas, to determine their relations, and the signs which represent them; but he employs them as the mathematician does his methods of reasoning, neither of them feeling the necessity of examining the nature of the instruments which they employ. But not so in the

present instance ; it is impossible to enter deeply into the study of the means by which man communicates to his fellow man his thoughts, his feelings, and his passions, &c., without having first acquired the knowledge of his intellectual and moral faculties, of the different feelings to which he is subject, the mode in which he acquires and combines ideas," &c. — p. 16.

History and Politics in their various bearings come next.

"To the study of the languages, literature and the liberal arts, should succeed, the study of Human Societies, and whatever may be connected with them, under the denomination either of *facts* relating to their past or actual existence, or of the *instruments* by which they are governed," &c.

The whole is thus summed up : —

"Thus is fully realised the character of which we have just spoken, which each science ought to exhibit in its passage to a neighbouring one. For how is it possible not to perceive the analogy which exists between the mathematics, and the sciences which treat of the inorganic qualities of bodies? — between these sciences and those whose subject is organised existence? — between these last and the study of the human faculties? In a word, from these studies to that of the languages, literature, and the liberal arts, and from these again to the social sciences, is not the transition equally evident?" — p. 17.

The advantages of this "natural" classification are obvious. Most of the sciences have been formed by chance. Those who have endeavoured to unite under one head truths bearing upon each other, and thus to form distinct sciences, have not in general understood how to comprehend or limit themselves to their object ; above all, have not felt the relation which these scattered truths bear to the entire of human knowledge. If a language "*bien faite*," according to Condillac, conduct almost necessarily to discovery, of how much importance is it that the general language of human knowledge should be constructed on first principles?

The mode in which Ampère purports to follow out these principles is detailed in Sect. V. of the Introduction. It would lead too far to pursue his suggestions minutely : a short outline may suffice.

1. Groups of truths resembling at the same time in the nature of the object itself, and the point of view under which they are considered : these he considers to answer to the natural families of vegetables and animals. He gives them the designation of "*Sciences of the Third Order*."

2. After more minute examination, these sciences are divided into "*Sciences of the Second Order.*"

3. These again are combined into a single "*Science of the First Order.*"

4. These single Sciences are then divided into sub-Branches (*sous-Embranchemens*), and Branches (*Embranchemens*).

5. These again into sub-Reigns (*sous-Règues*).

6. And finally into Reigns (*Règues*).

A Synoptical Table, somewhat different in principle and construction from the "Tree" of Ramus, the "*Système Figuré*" of D'Alembert, and the "Tables" of Bentham, illustrates this arrangement. A lengthened explication (*Explication des Tableaux Synoptiques*) is given, p. 245. It is accompanied by Mnemonic verses in Latin, intended to fix the classification concisely and firmly in the memory.—p. 268.

Many of the errors and defects of his predecessors are conspicuous in the system of Ampère; many also have been avoided.

1. Ampère bases his system on a juster principle than D'Alembert, and a more obvious one than Bentham. He grounds it not on the division of the faculties, nor on the "general happiness" principle, but on the natural progress of the mind, in the acquisition of knowledge; he does not consider so much how the departments of knowledge stand in reference "*à priori*" to each other, as in what order they should follow, so as to offer the greatest facilities to the student in acquiring them. If the end of classification and nomenclature be the simplifying and rendering more practicable the attainment of knowledge, it stands to reason, that this end is more likely to be attained by Ampère's system than by any of the others. How far such an arrangement may be a "natural one," as he seems to assert, is another question; but it is quite clear that, whatever may be the metaphysical excellence of any other, if it violate in any great degree this order, it is proportionably worthless for general use, and fails in the chief purpose for which it was constructed.

Ampère does not fall into the confusion arising from an imperfect conception of the meaning of the words "knowledge," "objects of knowledge," "arts," "sciences," &c., so glaringly the case in D'Alembert's plan, but, from which Bentham's is comparatively exempt. Art and Science are frequently contradistinguished; on the ground that Science only is knowledge, and Art application. This is not very exact,—both are knowledge; the Science, of the principles; the Art, knowledge of the mode of applying them. This

will appear more striking by considering a single case. Botany is distinguished from Agriculture on different grounds from those on which it is distinguished from Zoology. From the latter it is divided, as treating of different subjects; from the former, as the Science, of which Agriculture is the Art. There are thus few sciences which have not their corresponding art, and few arts which have not their corresponding science. So far from keeping them totally distinct, much less joining them with others, with which their connection is merely nominal (defects, as already remarked, frequent in D'Alembert), the science and the art of each department should be, as nearly as possible, linked and kept together. Bentham seems to recognise the same principle; but he by no means bears it in mind, when he comes to the application, with the same uniformity as Ampère.

Ampère, having established the order in which his classifications are to follow, follows out the classifications themselves with more accuracy than D'Alembert, but with almost as much complication as Bentham. He proceeds analytically; Bentham synthetically: for a table or a system the latter is clearer; accordingly Ampère has also adopted his Synopsis. No objection can be made to the principle upon which Ampère bases his formations: it is, in fact, that upon which most scientific systems of recent date have been constructed. The execution, is however, liable to exception. The resemblances or relations selected are not always the most obvious or closest; forced combinations are, frequently, the consequence. The character, however, of such resemblances, to be of practical utility, must, in great degree, be determined by the wants and studies of the individual. One man will group chemistry with mineralogy; another with the mechanical arts. The best rule in such cases, so far as education is concerned, will be to arrange them in accord with the purposes of the particular course. This kept in view, no material confusion can arise in the arrangement itself.

The nomenclature of Ampère, though not exempt from the defects of Bentham's, seems to have been framed with more caution, and less departure from terms in use, and is consequently, on the whole, less ambiguous, and more applicable to ordinary purposes. We meet, indeed, with such words as "docimasie," "oxyconomie," "cerdoristique," "phrénégytique," and many others of the same family, but they are not to be put in comparison with the "poisonomatology," the "aploneuroscopic," the "sitosceusoscopic," the "cænonioscopic," &c. with which the pages of his predecessor are so thickly set. They both take the Greek for their basis. Ampère fully recognises this difficulty to have been by far the

greatest he had to contend with in the course of his labours; and, sensible of the imperfect manner in which it had been overcome, goes into an elaborate defence of his principle and the mode in which it had been applied, both in his *Preface* (p. xxxviii.), and in the body of the work itself. Linnæus found comparatively little difficulty in giving names to his classes and orders: he had chosen his distributions "à priori," and had only to combine two Greek words on the same unvarying principle. When a "natural" arrangement is in question, the case alters. The classification is determined before the name, and the name constructed and applied according to the place which the classification holds in the system. After five years' reflection, Ampère adopted the following as the basis for the construction of his terminology:—A single word, necessarily substantive: a substantive followed by a qualifying adjective, restricting its signification to the group which it is intended to designate: the terms taken from the Greek, but adapted as nearly as possible to the genius of the French language: names in use retained whenever practicable: new terms introduced, when none existed before for the particular science, or when the term in use was too comprehensive, or not sufficiently precise. This reserve he sometimes carries too far; Bentham the reverse. These new names are most observable in the minuter subdivisions of the sciences, and cannot, therefore, much affect the system at large.

The preceding arrangements, with the defects with which they are embarrassed, cannot be very easily or usefully applied to the purposes of education. At the same time, they furnish many hints of great value to the teacher, and, above all, prove in a satisfactory manner the unphilosophic character of our present systems, and the absolute necessity of a thorough reform, under the three heads of order, distribution, and nomenclature. Ampère comes nearest to the object which the educationist has in view, and exhibits not only a due sense of what may be considered the practical object of the question, but also gives proof of that lucidity which, in an eminent manner, fitted the French for the first reforms of the nomenclature of Chemistry. It would be well if our literary and scientific men would combine in the same spirit, and, following up his suggestions in a less ample and more popular form, give the country such a system as might without difficulty supersede the vicious and defective one now in use in our scholastic courses, from the Grammar school up to the University.

The speculative character of the majority of the systems just

mentioned seems to have confined them to the closet of the metaphysician. None has yet made its way, in theory or practice, to any one department of education. The courses actually in use will be fully seen in the second portion of the work, amongst the notices of existing systems in various countries in Europe. The courses suggested for adoption in their place are to be found in some of the more recent writers on education. Amongst the most remarkable are those given in Naville, Schwartz, Greverus, &c.

Naville, in his "*Éducation Publique*," goes into great detail on the classification of scholastic courses. The whole of the *3me Partie* (from p. 195. to 346.) of his work is exclusively occupied with this subject. He has accompanied his propositions with synoptical tables.

His first table gives a general view of every description of school, from the Primary up to the University. He classifies them in reference to the different objects which the pupils have in view (*les diverses vocations*), and to the different degrees of instruction fitted to such views. The 1st class of schools are those which embrace *études classiques et études industrielles supérieures*. 2d. Those which embrace *études communes*. 3d. Those which embrace *études industrielles et commerciales*. Each of these departments comprises several degrees of instruction, entered on at specified ages. The 1st, or "Instruction première," continues from 6 to 9. The 2d, "Instruction secondaire," from 9 to 13. The 3d, "Instruction tertiaire," from 13 to 16. The 4th, "Instruction de quatrième degré," from 16 to 19, 20, 21, 22. The 5th, "Instruction de cinquième degré," *ad libitum*. The studies pursued in each class of school, and in each degree of instruction, are then detailed. By running down the column, the various kinds of primary education to be given at the same age, in various schools, are perceived; in running along it horizontally, the progressive course, from the first degree to the last, in any one class of school, is traceable.

The first class of school; "*études classiques, &c.*" does not begin with "primary," but "secondary instruction." This degree, for this class of school, comprehends Latin prose, Greek prose, ancient Geography, and ancient History. The third degree comprehends Latin and Greek (prose and poetry), History (ancient, middle ages, modern), modern Geography, Literature (readings, criticisms, rules), algebraical Arithmetic (general properties of numbers), Algebra (problems of the first and second degree, powers and roots, progressions and logarithms), Geometry (lines, plane surfaces, rectilinear trigonometry), Natural History, Zoology; Botany (organography,

physiology, systems, and nomenclature), Mineralogy, Drawing (details of the human figure, head traced, details of the academical figure, groups of figures, indication of shading, design from the cast, landscape, architecture, practical exercises in drawing, painting, modelling), Music, Declamation, &c. The fourth degree embraces either a general course or special courses, according to the nature of the school. The General course is subdivided into five. — 1. Ancient and modern Languages (philology, general grammar, history of languages). 2. Logic (psychology, moral philosophy, natural law, rhetoric, poetry, comparison of literature, ideology, transcendental philosophy, æsthetics, history of the human mind, of philosophy, literature, &c.). 3. History (history of France, political science, international law, theory of administration, constitution of the state, political economy, general statistics, statistics of France, commercial geography, commercial law). 4. Mathematics (mechanics, the use of the globes (*sphère*), astronomy, physical science (*physique*), chemistry, mineralogy, geology, physical geography, botany, zoology, anatomy and physiology of man). In this degree are also placed the Special Schools. The Polytechnic school following the usual studies. School of fine arts, Academy for the painter, sculptor, and architect, School for the theory of declamation, theory of Ballets, &c. for the principles common to all the fine arts, history of the fine arts, morals in reference to the artist (*morale dans ses rapports avec l'artiste*), Military school, Veterinary school, school for the higher branches of Industry (*de haute industrie*), school of Mining, &c. &c. The fifth degree comprehends the professional studies of the theologian, the lawyer, the physician, the apothecary, the higher studies of the Polytechnic school, whether in relation to the artillery, military engineering (*génie*), naval architecture, or to civil engineering (*ponts et chaussées*), geographical surveying, manufacture of powder, mines, &c. The School of the Fine Arts continue their studies at Rome (*Beaux Arts, Rome*).

The second class of school (*Ecoles communes*), in the first degree, is taught, Reading, Writing, French language (simple phrases), Arithmetic (numeration, four first rules, or questions on integral numbers), elementary Geography, Natural History (detached facts calculated to conduct the child to the knowledge of God), Sacred History (abridgments in which particular facts are developed). The second degree embraces the Latin language (phrases of two, three, or four members), elementary Logic, Arithmetic (fractions, mixed numbers, complex numbers, système métrique, single rule

of three, compound rule of three, extraction of the square root). Natural History (animals and plants, description and manners of the principal species in the country, and the most remarkable in foreign countries). Elementary Notions of Uranography and Physics. Sacred History (in its larger developements). Linear Drawing, elementary Geometry (explanation of the processes employed in linear drawing, knowledge of the principal solids). Music (religious and national songs); Gymnastics. The fourth degree embraces Social Economy, Public Charity (*Bienfaisance*), Education. The third class of school (*Ecoles Industrielles et Commerciales*) begins its course with the second degree of instruction: Modern Languages, Geography, History (ancient and modern); Latin, sufficient to understand the divine service, and to explain the prayers of the liturgy; Calligraphy. The third degree is very comprehensive: it includes Commercial Arithmetic; Algebra (as far as equations of the second degree included); simple theory of Logarithms; Geometry (in reference to the special destination of the pupil); Mechanics (forces, masses, quantity of motion, first principles, weight of bodies, centre of gravity, simple mechanics, laws of motion, fall of heavy bodies, pendulum, centrifugal force, construction of machines, calculation of effects, steam-engine, railroads, hydrostatics in reference to pumps, areometers, hydraulic press, &c.); Mineralogy and Metallurgy, applied to the arts; Physics (density of bodies, principle of caloric, &c.); Chemistry (simple and compound bodies, principal acids). Drawing (machines, ornaments); Description and Use of Natural Products, in reference to commerce and the arts; Elements of Commerce and Commercial Law; Elements of Political Economy. Morals (in reference to commerce and industry). Naval School (*Ecole de Marine*). The period for quitting each of these classes, depends, of course, upon their character and object: those children who are destined to agricultural pursuits, and obliged to aid their parents for their support, will be compelled to quit school after completing the first degree of instruction; their education however to be continued in the Sunday school. The second degree of instruction will be sufficient for those destined to be artisans, manufacturers, shoemakers, butchers, &c.; those intended for masons, stonecutters, carpenters, ironmongers, watchmakers, become apprentices, and may follow simultaneously such portions of the third degree as may be most useful to them. They do not proceed farther. The fourth degree of instruction suffices for officers, veterinary surgeons, civil engineers, directors of mines, builders, heads of manufactories, administrators, persons

destined to the diplomatic line, &c. The fifth is applicable to the higher professions of law, medicine, theology, and the fine arts.

The course to be pursued in each degree is then minutely given in accompanying tables, in each of which the studies and text books for each year, day, and hour are specified. It would take much too large a space to go into these details; the preceding outline is a fair sample of the whole.

Naville, throughout the whole of his plan, insists especially on the De Fellenberg principle of applicability. Whatever instruction is given must bear a direct reference to the future probable position of the pupil, without however restricting him necessarily to any particular course. In order as much as possible to meet these views, and not too harshly to interfere with the stern laws of necessity, he limits in the country intellectual education, both in the first and second degree of instruction, to two or three hours a day, and keeps the school open in the winter only. Not only are the objects peculiar to each class considered, but the necessities of each locality. Natural History, Arithmetic, Elementary Geometry, and Drawing are each taught, not as abstract Sciences or Arts, but as portions of knowledge at once applicable to the immediate and future wants of the pupil: they are exemplified by direct applications to their daily life. The result of this is highly beneficial. It stimulates the scholar, and provides a useful and serviceable stock of information at the same time, for those especially who have not the leisure or opportunity to carry their studies farther. A striking illustration of this has been furnished by the operation of the French Forest Laws, now in many places producing resistance on the side of the people, but a resistance, under such a system of instruction as that just mentioned, likely to be superseded by their growing intelligence and sense of their own interests. This principle of applicability is not confined to studies of obligation: he purposes to fill up the intervals of school hours with lessons on some useful manual exercise.

“ Il serait utile de faire entrer dans l'enseignement des garçons l'apprentissage de quelque travail manuel, afin de préparer à l'homme des champs une ressource pour les loisirs de la saison morte, et de le soustraire ainsi aux dangers de l'oisiveté et de la fréquentation des cabarets. Ces travaux varieraient selon les localités. Dans les contrées de chasse et de pêche on enseignerait, aux enfans à faire des filets; dans d'autres, à faire des lacets, à tresser l'osier et la paille, à sculpter le bois, à manier le carton, &c. &c. Ces enseignemens mettraient les familles en état de se

pourvoir à peu de frais de meubles et d'instrumens commodes : ce qui serait pour elles une source de jouissance, et pour les enfans un encouragement à l'ouvrage." — *De l'Éducation Publique*, p. 331.

This wise adaptation is still more conspicuous in the third degree. These schools, in the rural districts, are intended to be Agricultural Schools, in our acceptation of the word. Farms are proposed to be attached to each, so located as to allow some variety of cultivation : tillage, pasture, forest districts, severally demand different experiments and different teaching. The Director is required to teach Agriculture and Rural Economy; one or two Professors are charged with instruction in Natural History, Rectilinear Geometry, Elements of Physics, Chemistry, Mechanics, and a few of the simpler principles of the Veterinary Art and Jurisprudence. The utility of this special education is obvious, in the salutary influence it must necessarily exercise upon the future class of cultivators.

"De ces établissemens sortiraient des hommes qui porteraient les derniers coups à des préjugés funestes déjà sapés dans leur base par l'éducation judicieuse que la masse des cultivateurs aurait reçue. Les routines seraient abandonnées. Les charlatans, les leveurs de sort, ces artisans de ruine et de malheur, seraient obligés d'exercer pour vivre quelque état plus honnête. Tant que ce sont des citadins qui raisonnent sur l'agriculture et les bestiaux, les fausses mesures qu'ils prennent lorsqu'il s'agit d'exécution, ôtent auprès des paysans tout crédit à leurs discours ; mais lorsque le laboureur verra des hommes du métier, qui joindront la pratique à la théorie, et qui n'auront pas à ses yeux la défaveur que peut faire naître la différence des conditions, lui donner à la fois le précepte et l'exemple, il sera docile à des leçons qui exciteront toute sa confiance."—p.316.

In all this, however, there is no very just idea of the classification, order, or nomenclature of the objects of study. The views of the author are more distinctly developed in the programme of the studies of the fourth degree.

He divides the whole degree into two Courses, Inferior and Superior. Each Course is composed of Five Series.

1. Languages and Criticism. 2. Divided into Rational Philosophy (*Philosophie Rationnelle*) and Liberal Arts. 3. Historical and Commercial Sciences. 4. Mathematical and Natural Sciences.
5. Technology.

In the Inferior Course, he classes in the first series under the Modern Languages, prose authors of a certain difficulty, composition : in the second, under Philosophy, logic, psychology, moral

philosophy, natural law ; under Liberal Arts, rhetoric, poetry, comparison of literature, history of literature : in the third, under History, politics, political economy : in the fourth, under Mathematics, algebra, general theory of equations, geometry, spherical trigonometry, application of algebra to geometry ; and under Natural Science, elements of physics, chemistry, mechanics, astronomy : in the fifth and last series, under Technology, a summary course of arts and trades.

The Superior Course in the first series embraces, under the head of Ancient languages, in Latin, Tacitus, Horace ; in Greek, Thucydides, Demosthenes ; under that of Modern languages, the more difficult authors, poets, &c. criticism, archæology, philology, general grammar, history of languages : in the second, under the head of Rational Philosophy, ideology, transcendental philosophy, history of philosophy ; under the head of the Arts, aesthetics, history of the human mind : in the third series, under the head of History, statistics, social arithmetic ; and as special courses, administration, international law, commercial geography, commercial law : in the fourth series, under Mathematics, pure mathematics in their higher departments ; under the Natural Sciences, zoology, botany (treated specially), chemistry, mineralogy, geology (treated specially and completely), mechanics and astronomy in their higher branches, description and theory of mechanics, physics (specially and completely) : in the fifth series, under Technology, the theory of agriculture (*Agriculture Raisonnée*), history of arts and trades.

This arrangement is not very scientific or artificial, but for practical purposes it answers sufficiently well. There is no obvious reason why the psychological and historical studies might not stand under one head, and the languages and literature under another. As, however, these several branches are pursued simultaneously, and as they mutually illustrate each other, Naville's arrangement comes under the rule prescribed by Ampère — from the known to the unknown, from the simple to the compound. The Fine Arts are judiciously placed in juxtaposition with Psychology, and the mechanical with the mathematical and the natural sciences.

Schwartz does not profess to go into a regular arrangement of courses, but incidentally points out, as he proceeds in the classification of schools, the studies most appropriate to each, the days, hours, &c. &c. Proposing to himself, as Naville does, an ideal perfection, he suggests what is desirable more than what has actually been reduced to practice. He also urges as strongly as Naville the necessity of applicability. The elementary school commences ; the first days are spent in inducing the child to observe, in inspiring

him with courage, in placing him at his case. "He must not enter the school-room as a place of punishment, nor look upon the master as an executioner. His first exercises must be to see, hear, and speak."—*Die Schulen*, p. 46.

The teacher must leave him for a while with the younger pupils, ask him questions on what he sees, how each object is named, what he said to his companions, &c. &c. The school is divided into three classes (*Ordnung*). The exercises for the Lower are thus given:— "Forenoon: exercises of the senses, and of language, reading or reciting aloud, half to three quarters of an hour; counting, repetition, exercises of the memory, exercises of the hand on the cypher table or slate; singing, three quarters of an hour, in all two hours — in summer from 7 to 9; in winter, from 8 to 10. Afternoon: counting and reckoning; bodily exercises one hour, in summer, from 3 to 4." The other classes proportionally. In the boys' school (immediately above the Elementary), he prescribes reading, writing, German language, arithmetic, elements of geometry, drawing, singing, elements of useful knowledge, bodily exercises. Each of these studies is successively developed. Of the elements of useful knowledge he thus speaks:—

"The elements of useful knowledge (*Die gemeinnützigen Kenntnisse*) are those which may be expected from every young man who grows up in an enlightened community, inasmuch as they belong to the very nature of rational existence. Hence we require in our German popular education, that every one should know as much at least of geography, natural history, and history, as may enable him to keep up with existing civilisation. By such means, superstition is to be expelled, the knowledge of the means by which misfortune may be warded off or overcome is to be acquired, the duty of attending to health (*Gesundspflege*) more generally extended, and the relations of man to this earth and to all surrounding nature so far universally understood, that each man may be enabled usefully to employ them in his particular position, and to regulate his conduct in conformity to their laws. The school destined for the people (*Volkschule*) must introduce the pupil to this knowledge. It does not, indeed, profess to teach the special department of science adapted to each special situation, but so much only of the general elements as may enable the scholars to lay the ground for more extended acquisitions, and to acquire a taste for the cultivation of such studies in future," &c. &c.—*Die Schulen*, p. 68. 1834.

The course suggested for Girls' Schools comprises religion, reading, writing, German language, arithmetic, elements of geo-

metry (*Formenlehre*), drawing, useful knowledge, a slight proportion of bodily exercises, and a certain quantity of female work. He is of opinion that the teaching of this course should be divided between a master and mistress, thus taking a middle course between the German practice and ours.

"Girls are by nature quieter and more observant than boys, and more easily directed by the word of the teacher, on the other side they are less disposed to seize and digest the lesson in its principal points, or to dwell on it for any continuance, their thoughts springing off immediately to some inferior or accessory consideration. In reference then to this difference, must the teacher regulate the method of instruction to be adopted in these schools, — a difficult task, we admit, for men, little acquainted as they usually are with the nice movements of the female mind. But are we, then, in consequence of such difficulty, to substitute a female teacher? It is true they are better acquainted with the character of girls; they know much better how to manage their delicate feelings: but, on the other hand, they usually want that energy and solidity which distinguish the male instructor, and they seldom possess the necessary acquirements for the proper discharge of this public duty. The general result of experience teaches us, that, with the exception of home education, girls are much better educated in schools where the higher branches, at least, are taught by men, than in those which are taught exclusively by women. We therefore think it necessary that, of the two persons to whom such instruction is to be entrusted, there should at least be one, and it would be still better if there were two, male teachers; besides which, a female teacher should be also employed for conducting female work. Perhaps she might also be charged with instruction on other subjects; such, for example, as history, geography, and still more easily with drawing and singing; so that one male teacher might suffice, and a third person be thus rendered unnecessary." — *Die Schulen*, p. 5.

The Higher Schools for the People (*Oberschulen*) he divides into higher, and lower.

The course for the Lower is as follows: —

"*Forenoon*. 7 o'clock (in winter, at 8); prayer, religious instruction in common, half an hour.

"7½ to 9: German language, with exercises in reading and recitation, each class separate.

"9 to 10: Mathematics three times a week, each class separate; drawing, ditto; at the close, singing in common.

"*Afternoon*. From 2 o'clock (in winter, 1) to 3: Geography, natural

history (*naturkunde*), knowledge of the arts of industry (*Gewerbkunde*), alternately, for the first two hours; for natural history two, for physics one, for industry one, each week; each class separate.

"3 to 4: French three times, Latin twice, history once, a week; each class separate.

"4 to 5: In summer only, gymnastics in common."

The course of the Higher School is thus arranged:—

"*Forenoon.* From 7 to 8: Prayer, religious instruction in common, half an hour.

"From 7½ to 9: German language and literature, with corresponding exercises, and, for the higher class, accompanied with the general elements of rhetoric and poetry; each class separate.

"From 9 to 10: Mathematics three times a week, each class separate; drawing, and, at the close, singing, three times a week, in common.

"*Afternoon.* From 2 or 1 o'clock, the first hour: Geography, knowledge of nature, knowledge of the arts of industry, as in the Lower School.

"From 3 or 2, the second hour: French four times a week, Latin once, history once.

"The third hour, gymnastics." (P. 98.)

The Town Schools (*Bürger Schulen*) are proposed to be arranged in nearly a similar manner. (P. 99.)

Polytechnic Schools. He proposes a general institute, and special institutions, for each particular profession. Natural philosophy (*Naturwissenschaften*), especially chemistry, the French and English languages, and as many other modern languages as possible, even a little Latin, geography, astronomy, history, arts and manufactures (*Gewerblehre*), and especially mathematics, in their applications, as far as they can be extended, form the principal features of the course. "All these must be gone through as one study, that is, from the beginning, in proper connection with each other; but yet somewhat less scholastically, and with greater licence to the scholar, so that he may have it in his power to choose such branches as are best suited to his own particular purposes and situation."

Classical Schools. (*Gelehrten Schulen*.) After an extended review of what ought to be the objects of the course, and how each subject should be taught, Schwartz gives a concise sketch of the arrangement he would recommend of the several branches and hours of study in such institutions:—

"We designate the classes in the same way as the old Gymnasia, by the names of 'prima,' 'secunda,' 'tertia,' 'quarta;' not, indeed, in a subjective sense, as understood by pupils with

whom *primum* is taken for precedence in point of time, but in an objective one, in which the highest scholar is termed *Primus*, and in accordance with which the *Classis infima* cannot properly be called *prima*. Adopting this distribution, we divide the whole into the *Progymnasium*, the *Mittelgymnasium*, the Higher (*Obere*) *Gymnasium*, or, with the majority of the more considerable classical schools, separate them into their several divisions of great and little fourth class, great and little third, and so on to the second and first. We prefer adopting the easiest and most usual distribution, from the lowest, or eighth, or little sixth class, to the first and *Selecta*."

"We now come to the course of study, beginning with the *Pædagogium*.

"1. *Lowest L. Octava. (Infima, Klein Sexta.)* Four to five hours daily, as in the Middle school; an hour in Latin; so that there shall be thirty hours a week in all, but so distributed that Saturday afternoon shall be free. The hour for Latin should always be in the morning, and amongst the first, so that it should follow immediately after the hour for religious instruction, being a subject which requires the full vigour of the understanding, the memory, and a calmness of apprehension, not yet distracted by the other studies of the day. Latin etymology may be divided into two degrees: in the first, reading, that is, sound and quantity, the chief means of learning by heart: in the second, parts of speech, declensions, conjugations, &c. For this purpose, there should be two classes, each of whom should be equally exercised, and the passage from the lower to the higher should successively take place. In general, the scholar will require to remain in the lower class for one year."

"2. *Septima. (Gross-Sexta.)* Same as in the Middle school. In addition to the six hours a week for Latin, there may, in this class, be four hours for Greek. The number of hours weekly thirty-four, from six to seven a day: Saturday afternoon to be kept free. Latin etymology should be practised until the scholar shall have attained a certain degree of facility, and it should be connected with exercises and observations which may conduct gradually to syntax. Greek etymology should be treated in the same manner as the Latin, but it will not require so many hours of study, inasmuch as the scholar will be better prepared for it by those he has already gone through. For this class also, a year is the regular time required."

"3. *Sexta. (Klein Quinta.)* In Latin the scholar may be left to discover the chief rules of syntax, and to reduce them to practice

by means of simple compositions, and with the aid of which he may also repeat his course of etymology. Greek may either now, for the first time, be taken up, or etymology learned more thoroughly, and brought to a level with the Latin. For the Latin eight hours weekly are now necessary, and as many for the Greek. For the other school exercises there remain three hours a day.* The course continues a year. The following table may stand as a specimen:—

| | | | |
|-------------------|--|-----------|--|
| <i>Forenoon.</i> | | 1st hour. | Prayer, religious instruction, every day. |
| | | 2d. | Latin four times, Greek twice, a week. |
| | | 3d. | German language twice, mathematics twice, French twice. |
| | | 4th. | Singing, drawing, calligraphy (<i>schönschreiben</i>). |
| <i>Afternoon.</i> | | 1st hour. | History three times, geography twice. |
| | | 2d. | Latin four times, natural history once. |
| | | 3d. | Greek twice, natural history once, gymnastics twice. |

Quinta. Latin syntax perfectly; exercises in syntax and prosody; continuation of the learning by heart of words and phrases; Greek syntax begun: for each language twelve hours a week; for other studies as before. The scholar must remain in Quinta, regularly speaking. It will thus require four years to go through the Pædagogium. The boy may enter at eight, so that, generally speaking, at twelve years old he may be fit to go on to the Gymnasium."

The studies in the Gymnasium require a more multiplied division: we may take the following as a specimen:—

"1. *Quarta.* For the ancient languages twelve to fourteen hours a week, for other lessons about sixteen; in all about thirty-six hours.

| | | | |
|-------------------|--|-----------|---|
| <i>Forenoon.</i> | | 1st hour. | Prayer, religious instruction, twice a week; Latin authors (the easier prose writers) four times. |
| | | 2d. | Latin twice, Greek four times. |
| | | 3d. | Latin twice, German language twice, mathematics twice. |
| | | 4th. | History twice or thrice, exercises in writing, drawing, singing, three to four times. |
| <i>Afternoon.</i> | | 1st hour. | Geography three times, natural history twice. |

2d. French, Italian.

3d. Gymnastics twice.

"2. *Tertia.* All the same, with the exception of geography, which

may be reduced to two hours a week, and one hour given instead to the modern languages, so as to allow English to come into the course. In the ancient languages, practice in the exercises of analysis, construing prosody, and the more ready repetition of etymology, are of especial importance in this class. In the higher division the cursory reading of the Latin classics must be begun; the regular study of the language, however, is still to continue the chief object."

3. *Secunda.* He divides the hours of study in the aggregate as follows: for the Latin and Greek languages, twelve to fourteen hours; for the French, Italian, English and German, each two, in all eight hours; for religious instruction, mathematics, history, each two; for physical studies and geography together, two; for drawing and singing, two together; and two for gymnastics.

4. *Time.* The number of hours for Latin and Greek is again twelve; for the modern languages, combined with their respective literatures (including the German), eight hours a week; for religious instruction, mathematics, history, each two; for rhetoric, poetry, logic, general knowledge (*Encyclopædie*), each one; for drawing, singing, gymnastics, from four to six hours a week. (P. 153—158.)

Schwartz does not pursue his course further but develops each portion at some length. Thiersch, to whom he frequently refers in that part of his work which treats of the *Gelehrten Schulen*, has gone into each of these particulars in the most ample manner. His views are contained in several works which he published during the lengthened controversy on the respective merits of Classical and Practical (*real*) education. It would be impossible in the narrow limits of this note to give a detailed view of this highly interesting question, which is more or less connected with every department of education. It may, however, be permitted to point out some portions of his work which more directly bear on the present question. The inquiry into "what ought to be the direction of studies in reference to the sciences themselves" (*2 T. 2 band. 2 abth. s. 5.*) places his opinions on the nature of classification in a tolerably clear point of view. He complains of the confusion and licence admitted in Universities, not only in the distribution but in the order and time in which they are taught; but, though insisting on an obligatory course, he does not enter into any discussion on the classification of the sciences themselves. "What is now understood," says he, "by theoretical philosophy? Is it understood that the student is to attend a course in any science which may be included under that term, — in psychology, logic, metaphysics, even æsthe-

tics, and perhaps anthropology for instance? He usually attends, as opportunity permits, lectures on logic or psychology, metaphysics or æsthetics, or perhaps a still greater number of sciences together; commonly also a course of logic; and having got a testimonium of the performance of this duty, and the certificate that he has gone through a course of theoretical philosophy, he has in his opinion done quite enough," &c. The effect of this, he observes, is every way injurious: the student gets up mere scraps of knowledge, finishes his appointed time at the university, and has neither leisure nor taste for any thing more. The same observation is extended to the mathematics, history, languages, &c. The remedy proposed is a more accurate arrangement of the order of study, carrying each branch to a far higher degree of perfection, and confining pupils to those branches only which are most suited to their condition in after life. (*Ueber Gelehrten Schulen*, 2 band. 2 abtheilung, pp. 158—164.)

In the plan for the organisation of schools (*Schulordnung*), which he drew up by order of the King of Bavaria, in 1828, and the execution of which was afterwards entrusted to a Commission, he is more precise. He divides schools into two branches. The first title thus opens:—

“For the education of youth, the foundation of which is *the knowledge of the old classical languages*, there shall in future be two establishments, separate from each other; the Latin school, and, superior to it, the *Gymnasium*.”

The course for the first is contained in *Titel* III., “On Instruction in the Latin Schools.”

It embraces Latin grammar, and Latin writers; for which there is to be a *Chrestomathia* and *Anthology*, drawn up by competent persons; Greek, Hebrew for the future theologian, German (for each a *Chrestomathia* and an *Anthology*); religious instruction, &c. The rules prescribed for the conduct of each are minute.

Instruction in the Lower Course.

Latin begins with the lesser Latin grammar, the chief rules, &c.; continues in the upper with the larger Latin grammar, with the usual accompaniments of writers, *Chrestomathias*, and *Praxis* books (*Lehrbuch*). Too much time is forbidden to be given to writing; learning by heart select passages is recommended. The Greek course is pursued nearly on the same principles. Translation into Greek is approved of “more as a security that what has been already read has been completely comprehended, than as an exercise in Greek style; an object sufficiently

attained when adequate knowledge in the formation, accentuation, and employment of words, and insight into the rules of syntax, is acquired. (*Tit. II. sect. 23.*)

Prosody and its applications terminate this course. With this view, a few poetical exercises in hexameter and pentameter verse are given.

Hebrew is taught in the same manner.

The regulations proposed for religious instruction are as follows:—

“§ 28. Instruction in *religion* shall be given in the lower course or class from the catechism and a book of scriptural passages (*biblischer Sprüche*) and Christian hymns: in the middle course, it shall be followed up in the same books, accompanied with the readings of selections from the Holy Scriptures (*Auszuges der heiligen Schrift*) adapted to children of tender years. But in the higher course it shall be confirmed by a special text book on religion, and combined with the study of sacred history.”

“§ 29. Besides this, each school-day shall commence with the exercise of prayer, which for Catholic children shall consist in attending mass in the church attached to the school; and for Protestant, in morning prayer and singing in some common locality, or else in their own particular class-room.”

“§ 30. In like manner the children of both confessions shall be required on every Sunday and feast-day to attend Divine Service in their respective churches, with diligence and devotion. In general, and in particular, the Institution is required to see that Christianity be firmly established and kept alive in the minds of the pupils.”

In order to produce uniformity, the same school books are prescribed to be used throughout the kingdom, with the exception of those intended for religious instruction, “which must be especially framed for each separate confession, and be sanctioned with the assent and approval of the spiritual authorities of that church for the members of which they are intended.” The Minister of this Interior is entrusted with seeing this regulation carried into effect. At the same time, “the Rector of the school is permitted, on the application of the teacher, to designate such books as are most calculated to keep in due force the above-mentioned plan, and to attain the object which each particular course may have in view.” (§ 34)

The proportion of time allotted to each study will be seen from the following table:—

“ § 37. The 26 hours each week are divided in the following manner : —

A. *In the entire Lower Course and in the Lower Division of the Middle —*

16 hours, Latin.

4 ——— Religion.

3 ——— Arithmetic.

3 ——— Calligraphy.

B. *In the Higher Division of the Middle Course —*

12 hours, Latin.

6 ——— Greek.

3 ——— Religion.

3 ——— Arithmetic.

2 ——— Geography.

C. *In both Divisions of the Higher Course —*

12 hours, Latin.

6 ——— Greek.

2 ——— Religion.

3 ——— Arithmetic.

3 ——— Geography and History of their native country.

Boys are to enter the Latin schools at 10, and to leave them at 14.

The Second Part (Titel VIII.) embraces regulations for the Gymnasium.

Its object is thus defined : —

“ § 76. The Gymnasium has for its object to advance further, and to render more productive in every branch, the education commenced in the Latin schools ; and thereby to strengthen the intelligence of the pupils, and thoroughly to prepare for the University such as propose dedicating themselves to the study of the sciences.

The course of studies is to be determined by the natural order of the subjects and writers. The historians to precede the orators, the epic poets the lyrical and dramatic, &c. &c. (§ 85.)

The object proposed is not to form philologists, but to penetrate the pupil with the *spirit* as well as the form and externals of the classical writers.

Chrestomathias and Anthologies are not to be adopted in the Gymnasium. Each writer is to be read through, with the exception of objectionable passages. Not more than two Latin and two Greek writers are to be read at the same time.

The course is thus distributed : —

A. *In the Lowest or First Class.*

1. *In Latin.* — Julius Cæsar, Livy, Cicero De Amicitia and De Senectute, the Metamorphoses of Ovid, the Bucolics of Virgil.

2. *In Greek.* — Herodotus, the historical works of Xenophon, the Iliad, the Odyssey.

B. *In the Second Class.*

1. *In Latin.* — Livy, Sallust, Cicero's Epistles, the Fasti of Ovid, the Æneid and Georgics of Virgil.

2. *In Greek.* — Herodotus, Isocrates, the Iliad, the Odyssey, Theocritus.

C. *In the Third Class.*

1. *In Latin.* — Cicero's Orations, his treatises De claris Oratoribus, and De Oratore, the 10th book of Quintilian in conjunction with the Rhetoric, the Agricola and De Moribus Germanorum of Tacitus, the Odes and Epistles of Horace.

2. *In Greek.* — The Olynthiacs and Philippics of Demosthenes, the Oration De Corona, Xenophon's philosophical works, selections from Pindar, easier passages from the Tragic writers.

D. *In the Highest or Fourth Class.*

1. *In Latin.* — Cicero's philosophical works, especially his Academic and Tusculan Questions, his treatise De Finibus, &c. and De Officiis; Annals of Tacitus, Satires of Horace, the Aulularia of Plautus, and Adelphi of Terence.

2. *In Greek.* — Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, Phædon; Euripides, Sophocles, the Persians and Prometheus of Æschylus.

In the native tongue, a short course of selections from the best writers, with sketches of the history of its literature, passages resembling, or contrasted, &c. from the classic writers, &c., are recommended.

Exercises in verse are allowed as a practice in prosody, but they must not be carried too far. Imitations of the classics, or translations into German verse, are also considered useful.

In the Highest or fourth class, the reading of the Philosophical works of the ancients is to be accompanied by a development of the old philosophy down to the philosophical schools of Athens, not, however, to be treated "as a section of a complete history of philosophy, but briefly, and with a view solely to the essentials of the higher problems of philosophic thought in the several schools, by way of preparation for instruction in their theories, and in order

more thoroughly to elucidate the authors the Professor may have to explain." (§ 94.)

In the higher class, Logic and Dialectics (the "*Erotemata Dialectices*" of Melancthon are selected for the purpose), are to be combined with practical exercises.

In Hebrew.—The two lower classes are to read the Historical books, the two higher the Psalms and the Poetical books, of the Old Testament.

"§ 96. Religious instruction is proposed to be so divided in the Gymnasium, that in the two lower classes it shall principally treat of Dogma; in the two higher, it shall have an Exegetical or Historical foundation, and be combined, as its principal object, with the reading of some particular book of the New Testament."

'Each day is also to begin with the exercise of prayer, &c. as in the Latin school.'

Historical instruction is so divided amongst the four classes of the Gymnasium, "that in the lower or first, Ancient History, in conjunction with Ancient Geography, to the time of Augustus, shall be studied; in the second, from Charlemagne, together with mathematical-physical geography; in the third, the History of the Middle Ages, to the Emperor Charles V., with political geography; and in the fourth, Modern or recent history, to the death of Lewis XIV." (§ 97.)

Mathematical instruction begins with a repetition of what already has been learned, and ends with logarithms, and a certain portion of geometry, as far as plane surfaces, &c. &c.

This course, to which must also be added modern languages, drawing, singing, &c., is to occupy twenty-six hours every week, and to be completed in four years. Pupils not to be admitted before they are fourteen, nor until they shall have passed a close examination.

The hours are thus distributed:—

A. *In the First or Lowest Class.*

10. Latin, with weekly exercises in style and prosody.
6. Greek; both these languages in conjunction with studies in German.
2. Hebrew.
2. Religion.
3. Ancient geography and history.
3. Mathematics.

B. *In the Second Class.*

9. Latin, with weekly extemporaneous exercises.
7. Greek; both languages in conjunction with Prosody and studies in German.

- 2. Hebrew.
- 2. Religious instruction.
- 2. History, and Mathematical physical geography.
- 4. Mathematics.

C. *In the Third Class.*

- 8. Latin, with weekly exercises in writing Latin.
- 8. Greek; both languages in conjunction with Rhetoric and studies in German.
- 2. Hebrew.
- 2. Religious instruction.
- 2. History and Political geography.
- 4. Mathematics.

D. *In the Higher or Fourth Class.*

- 6. Latin, with exercises in writing and speaking.
- 6. Greek; both languages in conjunction with German studies and introduction to the History of ancient Philosophy.
- 2. Hebrew.
- 4. Dialectics and Logic.
- 2. Religious instruction, with reading the New Testament in the original.
- 2. History.
- 4. Mathematics.

This course was adopted for a short period; it was found in some particulars to tend rather too strongly to the classical, and the new arrangement embraces a considerably more direct application to the sciences. Systems actually in operation will be treated in another portion of the work. The present observations are confined to suggestions and theory. It may, however, be right to close this outline of Thiersch's plan, by stating his own grounds for preferring it to that by which it has since, in some degree, been superseded:—

“In regulating the course of instruction, we have again reverted to the old basis of the Classical schools (*Gelehrten Schulen*), on the model of which the Gymnasium, besides the study of Latin and Greek literature, in conjunction with German and Hebrew for the future theologian), engrafts religious instruction, mathematics, and history, together, with exercises in prosody, poetry, rhetoric, and logic, so well calculated to elucidate the study of literature; but confines the natural sciences, such as natural history and physics, as well as the more decidedly philosophical sciences, to the Universities, which must, therefore, be visited

by those who intend to cultivate such branches. In opposition to an age of baseless, crowded, and superficial learning of many things (*grundloser Vielwisserei*), in which science, under a chaotic mass of bewildered knowledge, runs great danger of being altogether lost, it seems above all things necessary to concentrate the attention of youth upon a small number of studies, and those deserving their active exertion; to fortify their minds, as well by the reading of the Classics, as by the study and practice of Christianity, and thus to enable them to avoid multiplicity and dissipation on the one hand, as much as poverty and meagreness on the other." (*Ueber Gelehrten Schulen*, 3 band. 1 abth. 1. 10.)

The work of A. Ch. Renouard (" *Considérations sur les Lacunes de L'Education Secondaire*," 1824,) does not offer very many new views on the classification or order of studies. After having stated (c. vi.), that Primary education should "embrace those elements common to all the sciences, and to all the future developments of the human mind;" and included in the course destined for such institutions, reading, writing, arithmetic, drawing, and music; he proceeds to treat of the special objects of his work, — the classification of a course for Secondary Education. His secondary education, however, not only embraces Colleges and Academies, but the higher Elementary schools. He proposes for these, a course comprising, 1. The Mother tongue; 2. Morals (*morale*). This branch is intended to comprehend not only morals in the general acceptance of the word, but also specific religious instruction, and some ideas of legislation.

"The study of religion, or of morality such as God himself has revealed it to us, ought to occupy the first place in public instruction. Where shall we find more salutary or purer lessons than in the meditation of the Gospel, and the divine precepts of Christianity, the whole of which exhibit the closest possible connection with the sentiments imprinted by nature in the depths of every man's conscience."

He continues: —

"Quelques connaissances générales sur la législation du pays et sur l'obéissance qu'on lui doit, sont un complément indispensable d'un cours de morale populaire. Que dans les systèmes d'instruction classique l'enseignement des lois soit réservé pour la fin des études, c'est là une marche naturelle et sage, mais qui ne peut pas convenir à l'instruction dont nous essayons le plan. Les hommes à qui elle est destinée ne fréquentent pas les écoles de droit, et cependant ils ne doivent pas rester étrangers à la constitution de leur pays, et aux lois qui régissent les principaux rapports sociaux.

Il ne faut pas faire des enfans du peuple, ni des publicistes, ni des jurisconsultes ; mais il faut qu'on ne leur parle pas une langue étrangère, lorsqu'on leur dit que tous les citoyens d'un état ont des devoirs à remplir, et des droits à défendre ; qu'ils doivent obéissance aux lois et à la Charte, respect au roi et à la famille régnante ; que la délibération des grands intérêts nationaux est dévolue aux pairs et aux députés du royaume ; que le courage et la moralité se jugent surtout par le choix qu'il fait des députés qu'il est chargé d'élire. Il faut qu'ils comprennent pourquoi on ne les opprime pas lorsqu'on leur demande des impôts, lorsqu'on les soumet au service militaire. Il faut qu'ils sachent pourquoi l'administration veille sur eux tous ; pourquoi les naissances, les mariages, les décès, doivent être inscrits sur des registres publics ; qu'ils connaissent les premières conditions des contrats, les principes généraux de la transmissions des biens ; qu'ils n'ignorent pas suivant quelles règles des tribunaux existent, pour juger les différends, pour punir les crimes. Il faut, s'ils doivent être appelés un jour aux fonctions de jurés, qu'ils ne compromettent pas, par leur ignorance, l'existence, l'honneur, la sécurité de société, ni d'aucun de ses membres. Si l'on objectait que toutes ces notions s'acquerront par l'usage, et qu'un enseignement spécial en est inutile, puisque, tôt ou tard, l'expérience y suppléera, on tomberait dans une erreur capitale. Le but d'éducation est précisément de donner l'expérience anticipée de ce que devra se présenter dans la vie ; et ce serait un grand bien que de prévenir, par quelques idées justes et claires, l'abondance funeste des notions fausses qui, dans l'esprit de la plupart des citoyens dont se composent les classes inférieures, retardent et obscurcissent les connaissances les plus faciles, et les plus usuelles." (Pp. 73—75.)

This is sound doctrine, and not altogether so difficult to be reduced to practice as may be imagined. Next to religion comes history, especially national, accompanied with geography. 4. Elements of mechanical and natural sciences. Under this head are comprehended some general notions of physics, physiology, botany ; suggestions in agriculture ; precepts of the art of health (*Hygiène*) ; explanations of the course of the stars ; motion of the earth ; laws of mechanics, &c. 5. Arithmetic and elements of geometry. To be carried on in the spirit of the Abbé Gaultier's treatise — "*Notions de Géométrie pratique, nécessaires à l'exercice de la plupart des Arts et des Métiers.*" 6. Drawing. The applications of this branch, and then its utility, are thus pointed out : —

"The applications of linear Drawing may be so arranged as to act as auxiliary and illustrative of several other studies. The repre-

sentation of the most improved instruments of agriculture will go far to check the influence of that habit of routine, which is so principal an obstacle to their introduction in many parts of the country, and open the way for further ameliorations, as soon as their utility shall be fully proved: elegant and convenient forms will present workmen with good models for the most ordinary furniture: well-chosen architectural decorations will accustom the eyes to simplicity and grace: a few figures will render much quicker and easier the comprehension of the sphere, and the first notions of geography. Thus the study of Drawing may be made doubly profitable by the utility of its application, and the ease and accuracy it gives to both eye and hand." (P. 82.) 6. Gymnastics. (P. 82.).

The reform he proposes in the higher branch of Secondary Education, reduces itself to a better classification of the existing colleges. After having stated, and with truth, that they did not answer even the purposes for which they were designed; he suggests the re-distribution of different studies amongst different colleges, so that some should be employed in teaching the elements, and others the more advanced branches: —

"This first description of College should conduct the child to that degree in his studies which should answer to those now gone through in our third and fourth classes. Thus, in these Lower Colleges, the pupil might learn the elements of history, geography, arithmetic, one or two languages, and be enabled to give expression to his ideas in simple and correct language, &c. From these Lower Colleges a portion of the pupils might enter the Lycéums, where they might complete their classical studies properly so called, or prepare themselves for the higher branches of instruction. Others, instead of continuing their classical studies, might enter the Military schools, schools of Commerce, schools of the Fine arts, &c., and appear in the world with much better preparatory information than is now usual amongst young men, who, taken away as they generally are in the midst of their studies, and transferred before they can possibly complete them to the counting-house, the public office, the camp, where this half sort of knowledge is very soon altogether effaced from their recollection. The Lycéums would thus be naturally reserved for such students as were desirous to prosecute a little farther their classical studies, to follow the learned professions (*les cours des facultés*), or to prepare themselves for the higher Special schools, the Seminaries (ecclesiastical), for Normal, Polytechnic institutions, schools of Law, &c. &c. (P. 115, 116.)

[His project, though characterised as sufficient — as "*un système d'éducation applicable aux besoins de l'universalité des citoyens*,"

is on the whole, it must be admitted, extremely meagre; and seems little more than another form of the plan suggested during the Republic. The Lycéum portion of the system was tried in Batavia, and not with any remarkable success.

A more recent writer, *J. P. E. Greverus* (*Ideen zu einer Revision des gesammten Schulwesens*, 1836, already quoted), does not fall into this defect. In the reform he proposes, there is sufficient detail.

He takes education up at the elementary schools, in its lowest grade (*Die niedere Volksschulen, Armen-schulen, &c.*). He differs somewhat from general opinion in his views of what ought to form the chief studies of these institutions.

“So far of the characteristics common to all lower schools destined for the people. But as every other school, so also has the popular school its theoretical point of view: the pupil must attend to that also. It thus becomes a matter of important consideration to determine what is to be the nature of this study, and what the end which such schools should have in view. This end is the *humanising* the character (the great object which every school ought to propose), and the preparing the lower classes for the situations they are destined hereafter to fill. Not on reading, writing, or arithmetic, do the people live; these, therefore, should not be their *only*, nor even their principal, exercises. Doubtless each has its use, from the connection which they tend to maintain between them and the other ranks of society, and the means they may furnish to the individual of bettering hereafter his condition; but they are by no means to be considered as the *end* of education. Nor is this all: reading, writing, and arithmetic should be studied, not as they have hitherto been in the elementary schools, but much more thoroughly, on better principles, more to the purpose, and with better results, than has hitherto been the case. Half only of the school hours should be dedicated by the pupil to these exercises; the other half belongs to the important preparation for his future existence — the forming the body, the disposition, and the understanding.”

He passes on to the studies most appropriate to the lower schools.

“It may be asked, what is the description of knowledge useful and necessary to the lower classes? It must be evident, in answering this question, that, besides what is necessary to man *as man*, especial regard must be had to the *locality*, and therefore the same course of instruction should not be given in all schools for the people. For all schools for the people it is equally requisite, inasmuch as it is requisite for man, as man, that each pupil should acquire a knowledge of his own being, in all its main particulars,

and of whatever may be beneficial or injurious to the same ; knowledge, in the next place, of surrounding nature, and its relations to man ; knowledge of heaven and earth, so far as the circumstances of ordinary life may thereby be advanced ; knowledge of civil life, so far as it may concern the lower classes, in reference to his rights, and the laws by which he is governed, including the high police, civil and criminal legislation, the administration, institutions, &c. of his country, — for example, savings and lending banks, &c. &c. ; knowledge of the current coin, weights and measures ; knowledge of the manufactures and handicrafts of his neighbourhood ; finally, instruction in singing, &c. &c. ; but all in strict reference to the future position of the pupil. To this should succeed the knowledge most adapted to the locality (*Localkenntnisse*), whatever may be useful to the pupil in his quality of inhabitant of that particular district. Amongst such, I count those branches connected with the peculiar nature of the district, its instruments and modes of industry, its peculiar manufactures, &c. &c. ; such, for example, as in the mountains the working of mines, and the branches of industry immediately in connection with these operations ; on the sea-coast, navigation, a tincture of hydrography, fisheries, and commerce ; in a flat country, tillage, care of cattle, of bees, &c. &c. In addition to this, in all schools instruction should be given in flower and fruit gardening. The garden of the teacher will furnish an excellent means for such purposes.” — *Ideen*, &c. p. 88—90.

With this view a well-digested series of text books is recommended as essential : —

“ These various branches of useful knowledge must not, however, be entirely left to the discretion of the teacher ; they must be collected in a text book (*Schullesenbuch*), to which the teacher may add his own remarks. This book must be drawn up in such a manner, that even in after life it may be of use, and be read and re-read again and again by the people. It must be executed with more direct and decided reference to the peculiarities of the district, and ought to be in its way a *masterpiece*. Perhaps it might be possible, through the most intelligent teacher of the place, to collect such scattered materials as might be applicable to these purposes ; by which, however, it is not intended there should be any question of special systems, but simply that it should form a well-connected digest, in clear and simple language, of the best authenticated experiments.” — *Id.* p. 91.

These methods are the reverse of what are adopted in the existing Schools for the people. They begin at the wrong end.

"In the existing course of education nothing is more censurable than the practice adopted in the Lower Schools for the people, of beginning with the elementary exercises of reading, writing, and arithmetic. These are matters far too much beyond the comprehension of the rude children of the people, much too abstract and barren — too difficult of explanation, and altogether without meaning to a soul shut up in a body scarcely capable of articulating, or in any way of assisting itself. The man must be first awakened in his body, and rendered active; his body must first be educated; the use and mastership of his limbs must be acquired; the senses and lower faculties of his soul must be rendered pliant; a crowd of things, with all their peculiar forms and names, must be learned and distinguished; in a word, the soul must collect materials, and the veil must be drawn aside which conceals this outer world from the rudely educated child, but not from one whose education has been conducted by means of conversation, and a course adapted to form and fashion its intelligence. Even in the employment of their senses, the children of the people are generally much more helpless than those of the middle classes. How little are they advanced — how little are they capable of separating and discriminating objects, how little accustomed to designate them by their right names," &c. &c. — *Id.* p. 92.

After further insisting, with great energy, on this misapprehension of the true objects of popular education, he continues —

"Away, then, with this pernicious A, B, C, with this abracadabra of a foolish treasure-digger (*Schatzgrüber*). The whole of the first year we would not allow one of these poor little creatures to sit down upon the benches of the school. We would begin our instruction in the open air, and principally with bodily exercises. Without this developement of the body, the soul itself is seldom sufficiently alive. In proportion as it moves the body, so also is its management under the control of the body and the senses: if these be not developed, neither can the soul; it is confined, crippled, and oppressed. But it is objected that the people live in the open air, and have time enough for bodily exercise. Enough, doubtless, for the acquisition of bodily strength; but this gives the body a sort of partial developement, abundance of vigour certainly, but not enough of suppleness or activity; and this is the reason why the children of the people for the most part prefer their damp hovels to the open air, and when in them care little about any thing else, so they can rest and lie down. Hence it is above all things desirable that such a methodical course of bodily

exercises should be pursued in every popular school as may tend to rouse the sluggishness of the pupil, and teach the body to obey the mind."— *Id.* p. 92.

After recommending a general muster every morning, a public cleansing without exception in the neighbouring brook—sometimes bathing, sometimes washing,—in order to get rid of their distaste to water (*Wasser-scheu*), he proceeds to advise, in conjunction with their bodily exercises, an interchange of exercises of the senses—hearing, seeing, tasting, &c., accompanied with short and clear explanations of the qualities of things as they affect each. To these should succeed exercises in recitation, or speaking in a loud distinct tone; exercises of the memory in counting, &c.;—all this in the *open air*, but with frequent change of place, so that, by degrees, the children may become acquainted with every part and particular in or about the house, the garden, the meadow, &c., and be enabled to give a description of each whenever required. At the expiration of a full year, the more advanced may be allowed to enter the school: the others must continue their exercises until they be thoroughly mastered. 'Even in the second year, reading, writing, and ciphering must, as much as may be practicable,—that is, as far as their capacity in learning may permit it,—be kept from them; at the same time they may be employed in copying figures. In the third year the usual school exercises may be gone through, &c.

"Then indeed shall we see wonders. In two years the pupil will make more progress than at present in eight. It will be impossible any longer to recognise the children. That rudeness, awkwardness, and sluggishness, which we now see so common amongst the children of the lower classes, will have completely disappeared. Life, animation, fire, will speak in all their features; and the soul, lately so deeply buried and concealed, will now sit abroad upon the countenance, and, through eyes and lips, seek some outlet to communicate with its equals," &c. — *Id.* p. 94.

In treating of what ought to be the organisation and course of the Higher or Town schools, the schools of Industry (*Gewerb schulen*), he lays down nearly the same proposition—the essential importance of applicability to future purposes; the want of which is, if possible, still more conspicuous in these institutions than either in the Lower school or the Gymnasium. "Each school ought to prepare its scholars specifically for a certain situation, a certain destiny in human society, and give them that knowledge and skill which may be requisite or useful in such situations. Industry is manifold; some of its branches simple, others multiform (many-sided), in object and operation. So also are the wants which the

Town school should be calculated to supply : some are required for the simple, others for the more complex, operations of industry. The Lower Town school will have to attend more particularly to mechanical and practical instruction ; such will be required by the majority of those who frequent them. The Higher, on the contrary, demand a more varied course : the merchant, the manufacturer, the artisan, form the mass of its pupils ; they should work more with the head than the hand, and should combine and direct a great variety of new relations. The Lower town school, besides the usual exercises, in which arithmetic should hold the first rank, should embrace in its course national history and geography ; all descriptions of commercial book-keeping ; the elements of mathematics, physics, chemistry, in their connection with manufactures and trades ; natural history ; technology, comprising modelling, working in relief, &c. The Higher town school should be, in addition, conducted with especial reference to the exigencies of the locality. In more populous states, where the higher class of citizens is numerous, it will be conformable to such views that the Higher Town school should divide its course into various branches ; one referable to commerce, another to manufactures, a third to the useful, a fourth to the ornamental or fine arts, &c. In places where no specific branch of industry is pursued, a due medium between these several studies is to be preserved, but which, however, is not very attainable." In addition to most of the subjects treated in the lower town schools, he recommends ; as a new element, the introduction of the modern languages ; anthropology ; rhetoric ; history of German literature, with examination, criticism, the frequent reading of the German classics and mythology. Amongst the modern languages, French and English are recommended as most important to manufacturers ; in the south Italian ; and in the states engaged in foreign commerce, Spanish. The learning of the other modern languages must depend on individual opportunity. Nor are these languages to be studied merely with reference to their utility, but with a view also to the formation of a fine taste ; the more so as ancient classical literature, in this department at least, is not to be studied in the higher town schools. At the same time, it must not be considered as altogether excluded : even in a commercial point of view, it may be of advantage. " He who acquires a knowledge of Latin lightens the trouble of acquiring Italian and Spanish by one half, and French and English by at least one fourth. Even he who on purely profit and loss principles casts up his account, will find, putting aside every other consideration, that by learning this lan-

guage he will effect no inconsiderable saving of time." . . . "It is not, however, required that he should attain a very profound knowledge of antiquity : he has to deal, not with the past, but with the present. For this purpose, reading the classics through will not be necessary : a good Chrestomathia selected with reference to his particular views will be sufficient. Latin exercises are not required. His time may be applied to much better purposes."

Female schools should be separated from male, on the ground that the sexes from the earliest moment are destined to different duties and functions. Education should keep in view this difference : confounding them is a great evil, "an evil which has hitherto chiefly checked and distorted the education of the people." In the lower elementary schools for females of the poorer classes, the course should embrace, besides the usual instruction, whatever may relate to the duties of servants (*Dienst verhältniss*); and with this view it is recommended that each school of the kind should have attached to it a cooking establishment (*Speise-und-Koch Anstalt*), under the direction of a discreet matron. The instruction should not be carried farther than reading, writing, and arithmetic. In the higher female schools, the course should embrace geography; history; natural history, especially in reference to domestic life; physics; mythology; German literature, &c.; drawing (but neither painting nor embroidery); music, &c. Declamation is objectionable, public examinations and exhibitions especially so : "They only tend to excite vanity, envy, and every other evil passion; the occasions of which cannot be too carefully avoided in every female school. The more, therefore, should every exertion be directed to preserve the young female soul from all violent emotions, and thus gradually allow the development of a serene and equal temperament, which is the crown of the female character, and the best pledge of the fairest and purest happiness which can be enjoyed upon this earth." — *Id.* p. 124.

We now turn to the Gymnasium : —

Greverus comprises the Gymnasium and the University under the name of the "Gelehrten Schulen," or, as he prefers to designate them, the "Ideal Schulen." Their general object he defines to be, "by means of a harmonious cultivation of the philosophical faculties of the mind, to lay a foundation for the acquisition, by the pupil himself, of future knowledge, and the exercise of future mental activity." The Gymnasium, the lower degree of "Ideal school," he divides, like the elementary and town school, into Lower and Higher. To these he adds a class intermediate between the Higher and the University.

The end which the Gymnasium proposes is, "partly to furnish the mind with materials, and partly to exercise its powers upon such materials. Its course has to deal more with the experimental and the 'real;' its chief object is the acquisition of varied information (*Philomathie*), whilst that of the University is directed towards philosophy, and the deepest foundations upon which knowledge reposes. The course of the Gymnasium should therefore principally apply itself to affording instruction in the languages, sciences, and their applications to the arts (*Künste*); each of which branches should follow the other in well arranged gradation from the easy to the difficult, and should be accordingly distributed amongst the two great divisions, the Lower and Higher Gymnasium. These great divisions may, according to circumstances, be broken up into two or more minor divisions or classes." — *Id.* p. 129.

Course of the Lower Gymnasium (*Unter Gymnasium*).

Fourth Class (Quarta) is to have every week 30 hours for intellectual, and 6 for bodily exercises, thus distributed: —

- 6 hours, Latin.
- 3 ——— French.
- 3 ——— Mathematics.
- 3 ——— Geography.
- 3 ——— Natural History.
- 4 ——— Writing and Drawing.
- 2 ——— Religious Instruction.
- 2 ——— Essays.
- 2 ——— German reading.
- 2 ——— Singing.

The *Third Class (Tertia)* has weekly 36 hours for intellectual, and 6 for physical instruction: —

- 6 hours, Latin.
- 6 ——— Greek.
- 3 ——— French.
- 3 ——— Mathematics.
- 3 ——— Physics.
- 3 ——— History.
- 4 ——— Drawing and Writing.
- 2 ——— Singing.
- 2 ——— Essays.
- 2 ——— Religious Instruction.
- 2 ——— Reading.

Course for the Higher Gymnasium (*Ober Gymnasium*).

The *Second Class* (*Secunda*) has 36 hours weekly for intellectual, and 6 for physical instruction, or 7 daily; namely, —

- 6 hours, Latin.
- 6 ——— Greek.
- 3 ——— French, and in the last year English.
- 3 ——— Mathematics.
- 3 ——— Geography.
- 3 ——— Natural History.
- 3 ——— Religious Instruction (Morals and Sacred History).
- 5 ——— Essays and Reading.
- 2 ——— Drawing.
- 2 ——— Singing.
- 3 ——— Hebrew for Students of Theology.

The *First Class* (*Prima*) has 36 hours weekly for intellectual, and 6 hours for physical instruction; namely, —

- 6 hours, Latin.
- 6 ——— Greek.
- 3 ——— French and English alternately.
- 3 ——— Mathematics.
- 3 ——— Physics.
- 3 ——— Archæology.
- 3 ——— History.
- 5 ——— Essays, and German Grammar.
- 2 ——— Drawing.
- 2 ——— Singing.

Besides 3 ——— Hebrew for Theological Students.

The Preliminary Class to the University (*Übergangsklasse zur Universität*) has weekly 30 hours of intellectual instruction; namely, —

- 3 hours, Cursory reading of Latin writers, dwelling only on the difficult passages.
- 3 ——— Cursory reading of Greek do.
- 3 ——— Italian.
- 3 ——— French and English alternately, each half-year.
- 6 ——— Essays, Exercises in Elocution, Rhetoric, Poetry.
- 3 ——— The higher Mathematics.
- 5 ——— History of German Literature, in conjunction with German Classics.
- 4 ——— Preparation for the University; introduction to the course and methods of University instruction.

Each of these classes is to occupy two years; the pupil to enter the Lower Gymnasium at 10, and to be ready for the University at 19 years of age.

The books proposed to be read in each class are as follows: one Latin writer in each half-year, or in each class four:—

In *Quarta*.—Cornelius Nepos, Justin, Cæsar's Commentaries, and a Chrestomathia.

In *Tertia*.—In Latin: Sallust, Cicero, Phædrus, Terence.

In Greek: Homer, Xenophon.

In *Secunda*.—In Latin: Cicero, Livy, Virgil, Ovid.

In Greek: Homer, Xenophon, Theocritus, and Herodotus.

In *Prima*.—In Latin: Tacitus, Cicero, Horace, and the Chrestomathia of Orellius.

In Greek: Plato, Demosthenes, Sophocles, Euripides.

In the Preparatory Class to the University,—Plautus, Propertius, Tacitus, Æschylus, Aristophanes, Pindar, Plato, Thucydides, by themselves.

These authors are to be accompanied with a regular course of grammar, from the mechanical grammar of the language up to a general grammar, with instruction in prosody, &c., exercises, &c. He is justly adverse to compositions derived from the pupil's own resources. He holds that all early essays must, as near as possible, be imitations (p. 193.) until he has attained a full idea of "correct forms" of speech. "Nor need we fear," he adds, "that by this method the pupil will contract a servile habit of imitation. That could only occur in case he confined himself to one writer, or to one style; but not in case he changed his models. And what would there be to censure, on examining his style, if we should discover that it was formed after that of Göthe, Engel, Garve, Herder, Tschirner, Schmalz, &c.; should we not regard this resemblance rather as a merit than as a defect? Nor, even though the ideas of these writers were made use of as his own by the pupil, is such circumstance to be looked on as a fault, inasmuch as his creative talent will apply them hereafter to the best advantage; one idea connects itself naturally with another, and becomes essentially modified by the individuality of those through which it passes. And it is only in this manner that our ideas may be considered our own property; for of those which are called new, few or none there are which have not been preceded and suggested by others.

If there is little to be apprehended on this side ; so on the other, there is much to gain. The pupil, in the first instance, attains a correct and elegant phraseology, which, under present circumstances, is with difficulty and at a very late period acquired ; nay, there are some who through their whole life cannot learn how to construct their sentences with correctness, which, as the element of a good style in every language, is absolutely indispensable. They are thus enabled to express their thoughts with ease, — they acquire a certain *savoir faire*, &c. But in order that these models may become living in their minds, they must be thoroughly enjoyed, digested, and assimilated, so that they may actually pass *in succum et sanguinem*," &c. — *Id.* p. 196.

How this may be effected, and every other branch be taught with similar good results, various suggestions are offered in the course of the work, but which it would far exceed the limits of this note to review in detail. A few extracts will show upon what principles it is proposed to work.

Languages. — "The languages, at least the modern, are to be regarded in the truest sense as practical, or *real studies* for schools, inasmuch as they serve, in many ways, for all the purposes of life. Even the study of the ancient languages has much also of the 'real,' embracing, as they do, a large portion of the historical knowledge which should be communicated in schools, and throwing so much light upon the whole of the past. Men can only learn what relates to the *past* and what relates to the *present* ; who is there will pronounce which of these two departments is sufficient ? — the best rule is a certain portion of both. The knowledge of the present is more necessary, gives greater quickness, is more profitable ; on the other side, the knowledge of the past leads the student to wisdom, to a higher tone of thinking, to a nobler character in life. The latter is loftier and nearer to godlike knowledge, but the more therefore is it necessary it should go hand in hand with the former. No one can thoroughly seize the past who is not familiar with the present, and has it in his power to compare both together. In this point of view our ancestors were quite right in attributing such high importance to the study of the ancient languages ; they are the key to the past, and constitute the highest degree of human knowledge." — *Id.* p. 138.

He finds, however, much to censure in the ancient writers, and still more in the mode of studying them. He lays great stress on combining with the study of the idiom the study also of the mind of the writer, (by far the most important branch) ; a study not,

however, to be prosecuted through speaking and writing only, but through frequent perusal and reflection, accurate research into the history of the time, &c. "If a language is to be studied, in writing and speaking only, let the Mother-tongue be chosen."—*Id.* p. 147.

Sciences. — The method of teaching the sciences in actual use, by dictation and lecturing, is to be censured. "A far better method of teaching is from the head and heart (*zu Kopf, und Herzen*). It has this advantage, that the lecturer is not painfully confined to his papers and text-book (*Hand buch*), though at the same time such aids are indispensable even to the most experienced, if for no other purpose than keeping them within bounds, so easy is it, without such checks, to wander wide from a subject; on the contrary, the lecturer is at his ease, and addresses his pupils, looking them in the face, without requiring, so long as the lecture lasts, they should commit any portion of it to writing. In the last half hour, or, where circumstances present it, at the close of the lecture, the lecturer repeats, as far as may be required, the substance of his discourse, and either questions upon some particular topic, or develops more fully such passages as may demand it. At present the pupils are required to go over cursorily the points selected by the teacher: better nothing was required, so long as writing supplies the place of observation. At the beginning of the next lecture, the preceding should be gone through quickly, but sufficiently, in question and answer. At the close of the month the pupils should repeat, as far as possible, in a connected form, the whole of what they had learned during that interval: a similar review should be gone through at the end of every half year; — *Repetitio est Mater studii.*"—*Id.* p. 151.

Geography should be, in great degree, taught after having mastered the first principles, by means of books of Travels. "The choice of the author must, however, be good; he must be lively and spirited. During the description of the journey each pupil should have his map before him: at different intervals there should be repetitions of what has been just read, or instead thereof a free account of the more important passages may be given in writing, &c.

"Life, activity, spirit, these are the very essence of all teaching; under this point of view, should be considered as indispensable to teacher and pupil the study of *Drawing*. Every lesson should be accompanied with as many illustrations as possible; the senses should be constantly appealed to."

"It is impossible to calculate the great advantages of thus render-

ing every thing obvious to the senses (*Versinnleitung*): it gives life to dead words; it imprints the subject indelibly on the memory through means of the imagination; it prevents misapprehension; it assures, in a thousand ways, correct understanding of whatever is learnt, and thus leads directly to truth. Without the talent of Drawing, the efficiency of a teacher must be very partial, or rather but one half of what it otherwise would be; no teacher ought to be in future suffered, who does not possess quite as much dexterity of hand as of elocution, and is not quite as competent to teach with lines as with words. The knowledge of Drawing is of inestimable value throughout life; it should therefore be taught methodically and with diligence in school, but more particularly in Gymnasias, especially in reference to the education of future teachers."—*Id.* p. 163.

There is no reference in these pages to the combination of literature, science, and art, or the æsthetical developments, especially in the higher branches, to which such combination necessarily leads. This, however, is one of the most important portions of Gymnasium education, and still capable of highly interesting improvements. By means of such study is most likely to be attained that high tone of thought, and refined appreciation of the "noble and the beautiful," which have not only the most direct influence upon the intellectual, but also upon the moral portion of our being. It is from this spirit that in after-life our studies and occupations take their most attractive character, and that life itself is rendered in the midst of its inquietudes comparatively calm and peaceable. In the language of Schiller,

"Sanft und eben rinnt des Lebens Fluss
Durch der Schönheit stille Schattenlande."

"Softly and gently life's smooth current flows,
Through the still shadow-land of Beauty gliding."

No scheme of school classification can be perfect of which it does not form a part. Few or any of our English schemes have yet embraced it.

It will be at once perceived from the foregoing pages that this important object, not only in this branch but in almost every other, is still to be attained. The difficulty lies deeper than it at first appears. It is not only produced by the confusion of our educational views, and the little reference made to the specific position of the pupil, but in great degree also by the confusion which exists in the classification of the objects of human knowledge themselves.

A reform in this particular is every day more and more called for. It is a work worthy of the loftiest ambition, requiring the highest powers, the most extensive experience, true philosophical habits, and unwearied perseverance. Is it too much to expect from the present age so rare a combination? or may we still indulge the hope, that what France has done for Chemistry other nations may yet achieve for every other science without exception?

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